Soutenabilité et commerce international by Dupuy, Louis
Sustainability and International Trade
Louis Dupuy
To cite this version:
Louis Dupuy. Sustainability and International Trade. Economies and finances. Universite´ de
Bordeaux, 2014. English. <NNT : 2014BORD0087>. <tel-01232555>
HAL Id: tel-01232555
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01232555
Submitted on 23 Nov 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
THÈSE PRÉSENTÉE
POUR OBTENIR LE GRADE DE
DOCTEUR DE
L’UNIVERSITÉ DE BORDEAUX
ÉCOLE DOCTORALE de SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES, GESTION et
DÉMOGRAPHIE (E.D. 42)
SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES
Par Louis DUPUY
Soutenabilité et Commerce International
Sustainability and International Trade
Sous la direction de Jean-Marie Cardebat, Professeur des universités
Soutenue le 16/06/2014
Membres du jury :
Mme. CALMETTE, Marie-Françoise, Professeur des Universités, Université de Toulouse I, Présidente
M. AYONG LE KAMA, Alain, Professeur des Universités, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre, Rapporteur
M. HANLEY, Nicholas, Professor of Economics, University of Stirling, Rapporteur
M. ATKINSON, Giles, Professor of Environmental Policy, London School of Economics, Examinateur
M. RÉGIBEAU, Pierre, Visiting Research Fellow, Imperial College Business School, Examinateur

iRemerciements/Acknowledgements
C’est un lieu commun de dire qu’il est di cile de s’y retrouver après 5 années de travail,
quand vient l’heure d’exprimer ce qui n’a pas forcément été dit avant. A la di culté habituelle
des remerciements s’ajoute ici une di culté linguistique, qui place le défenseur de la langue
française dans une situation pour le moins ironique. La solution la plus simple, sans faire
d’entorse au protocole, a été de respecter la stricte séparation des langues.
English speakers are therefore directed straight to page iii, les francophones peuvent quant
à eux commencer au paragraphe suivant.
Je commencerais naturellement par remercier le Professeur Jean-Marie Cardebat pour son
encadrement et son soutien durant ces 5 années. J’ai beaucoup apprécié la pleine liberté d’action
qu’il m’a laissé, assumant une orientation de thèse qui pouvait paraître hasardeuse. Il a ensuite
pris le temps nécessaire pour se plonger dans un sujet qui ne lui était qu’en partie familier, et ce
document ne serait pas ce qu’il est sans ses nombreuses remarques et suggestions. Je voudrais
également le remercier plus personnellement pour la confiance qu’il continue à me prodiguer et
j’espère que nous continuerons notre fructueuse (et souvent drôle) collaboration.
Je voudrais ensuite remercier le Professeur Marie-Françoise Calmette d’avoir pris la prési-
dence de mon jury de thèse. Je voudrais également remercier les Professeurs Alain-Ayong Le
Kama et Nicholas Hanley pour avoir accepté la charge de rapporteurs. Je remercie également le
Professeur Giles Atkinson et M. Pierre Régibeau d’avoir accepté de venir compléter mon jury de
soutenance. J’ai beaucoup apprécié les remarques orales et écrites formulées par l’ensemble du
jury, qui m’ont déjà permis de mieux cerner les forces et faiblesses de mon travail. Les membres
du jury m’ont remercié de leur avoir soumis un travail approfondi et de qualité. Je voudrais à
mon tour les remercier sincèrement de l’avoir lu en détail et de façon critique, faisant ainsi cas
d’un travail de longue haleine qui, je l’espère, ne sera pas complètement inutile.
Je voudrais ensuite remercier les membres du LAREFI, à commencer par le Professeur An-
toine Bouët, directeur du LAREFI, de m’avoir accueilli durant ces 5 années. Le souci constant
du Pr. Bouët d’encourager les doctorants (et également les jeunes docteurs !) dans leurs re-
cherches, y compris contre une administration souvent décourageante, marquera mon passage à
Bordeaux. Je voudrais remercier particulièrement Ion Lapteacru et Cristina Badarau pour leurs
conseils avisés sur les parties les plus techniques de ma thèse. Les chapitre 3 et 4 n’existeraient
probablement pas sans leurs suggestions et corrections. J’espère avoir pris un peu de la rigueur
avec laquelle ils m’ont aidé. Remerciements également à Pierre-Henri Faure pour m’avoir écouté
me plaindre (souvent) et avoir su dédramatiser de nombreuses situations par une référence bien
ii
placée à ses chers sommets Alpins.
Je voudrais également remercier Michel Cazals, le Pr. Pascal Kau mann et le Pr. Michel
Dupuy pour m’avoir donné l’occasion de découvrir le métier d’enseignant et pour m’avoir donné
toute latitude pour le faire le mieux possible. Je remercie particulièrement Michel Cazals pour
nos nombreux échanges sur le métier et pour une vision partagé sur les étudiants et sur notre
responsabilité vis-à-vis d’eux et le Pr. Pascal Kau mann pour l’amitié de ses remarques sur
l’existence en général. J’ai enfin une pensée particulière pour le Pr. Sophie Brana, qui a suivi
mon parcours depuis la troisième année de licence et m’a toujours encouragé, depuis lors, dans
les moments plus faciles (ex. lors des séminaire à Barèges) comme dans les moments de doute.
Vient maintenant le tour de mes camarades doctorants ! Soutiens des moments di ciles,
à la fois ressources humaines et matérielles, ils sont le sel sans lequel l’aventure serait bien
trop solitaire. Un grand merci donc à Alain, Alexandre, Amel, Ibrahima, Irena, Marinette,
Max, Melissa, Nathaniel, Thomas, Viola et Yi, simplement pour avoir été là. Je ne suis pas
nécessairement un grand expansif, mais je souhaite ainsi qu’ils sachent m’avoir aidé à plus d’un
titre, et souvent sans le réaliser. Une "spéciale dédicace" à l’équipe du bureau R 172, pour les
discussions très sérieuses (la politique macroéconomique de la zone euro), sérieuses (le paiement
des corrections de copies) et beaucoup moins sérieuses (le démantèlement de la filière albanaise).
Les années passeront, mais le souvenir de la deuxième famille des années thèse restera. Dans
un contexte souvent morose pour la profession, c’est déjà ça. Une pensée aussi pour un lointain
parisien au parcours parallèle au mien.
Après la deuxième famille, vient le temps de rendre hommage à la première. Patience.
Un mot qui a probablement été souvent prononcé derrière moi, quand j’étais perdu dans un
raisonnement, contrarié par un obstacle, voir purement et simplement absent. Qu’il me soit donc
permis de remercier mes proches pour leur patience avant tout ! Ces cinq années de transition,
des études vers la "vraie vie", n’ont pas toujours été faciles, mais nous avons maintenant un
beau parcours devant nous.
Et bien sûr, merci à celle qui me fait l’honneur de partager mon existence depuis maintenant
plus de 7 ans, me supportant au propre comme au figuré. Merci de tes attentions et de ton
soutien de tous les jours.
iii
Now that this PhD thesis is drawing to a close, it strikes me as obvious that it would not
have happened without the interventions and help of so many people, who all contributed to
the final result. It is fair to say that my three stays in the United Kingdom and the people I
was lucky to meet there had a defining influence on the final result.
I would start by thanking Pr. Matthew Cole from the University of Birmingham for his
supervision of my master’s dissertation. It is by working under his supervision that I realised
how fascinating (and addictive) research is. I would like to thank my temporary supervisors
in the University of Nottingham who welcomed me for a total of 9 months there. Pr. Bouwe
Dijkstra first, who believed in my potential when I had not much to show for. His decision
allowed me to discover a whole new scale of investigation in research. If there is any ambition
in my PhD, it is mostly thanks to him.
I am in so many ways in debt towards Pr. Daniel Bernhofen who, as head of the GEP,
welcomed me a second time in Nottingham to finish the writing up of my doctoral work. His
relentless questioning, his rigour and his great impressive knowledge of international trade issues
all had a defining influence on my approach to the international trade side of this work. I most
certainly hope that our intellectual collaboration, and friendship, will endure.
Last but not the least, I thank Prs. Giles Atkinson and Nick Hanley for their invaluable
help on the sustainability side of my work. It strikes me as an extraordinary act of faith that
three years ago they both accepted to meet me and took my very early work seriously. For
a PhD student in France, it was an impressive moral and intellectual boost without which, I
am not sure I would have persevered. Let me thank them again for this, and for giving me
opportunities since then to work with them.
Finally I would like to thank the great community of the Nottingham University PhD
students, especially the honourable people of the famous B51 o ce. Let me thank all whom I
met: Anna, Christian, Christoph, Daniel, Emilija, Felix, Francesco, Jeroen, Jonathan, Milan,
Pascale, Samantha, Tim, Tobias and Steven, and especially those whose friendship is standing
brilliantly the test of time. Let Natasha, Hiroshi, Zouheir be particularly thanked, and I take
this opportunity to wish for the best for their future careers.

“Unless we succumb to the forces of chaos and folly, the transition to a planetary civilization
is inevitable, the end product of the enormous, inexorable forces of history and technology
beyond anyone’s control.”
Dr. Michio Kaku, theoretical physicist.

Mots Clefs – De´veloppement Soutenable, Soutenabilite´, Changement Structurel, Com-
merce International, Croissance Ne´oclassique, Economie des Ressources Naturelles, Ins-
titutions.
Classification-JEL – B13,F11,F17,F18,Q01,Q32,Q33,Q37,Q51,Q56,Q58
2

Introduction
L’e´mergence du paradigme de la soutenabilite´ a` partir des anne´es 1970 est um chan-
gement majeur pour l’analyse e´conomique actuelle. La de´finition d’un de´veloppement
durable implique de prendre en compte a` la fois les moyens et des fins du de´veloppement
humain. La soutenabilite´ est l’e´tude des moyens du de´veloppement, qui viennent ensuite
servir des fins socialement de´finies. Les pre´occupations lie´es a` la soutenabilite´ font par-
tie de la pense´e e´conomique depuis le 19e`me sie`cle, mais deviennent avec la monte´e des
questions environnementales un e´le´ment clef de la the´orie e´conomique. L’e´tude de la
soutenabilite´ demande la prise en compte de questions normatives, lie´es aux besoins des
ge´ne´rations futures, notamment les questions de justice et d’e´quite´ d’acce`s aux droits et
au ressources de la socie´te´. L’analyse e´conomique standard doit donc eˆtre e´tendue.
L’e´tude du commerce international part de l’observation que le monde n’est ni un
ensemble d’ıˆles sans liens entre elles, ni un espace parfaitement inte´gre´ et unifie´. Ce
fait a d’importantes conse´quences sur la the´orie de la soutenabilite´, qui est habituelle-
ment de´finie en e´conomie ferme´e. Le commerce international a connu de nombreuses
mutation dans son histoire re´cente, devenant d’inter-industriel intra-industriel puis infra-
firme. La gestion sociale des facteurs reste cependant de la responsabilite´ des E´tats, une
source potentielle de conflits entre optimalite´ domestique et globale. La gestion domes-
tique peut ne pas eˆtre syste´matiquement optimale, notamment si les E´tats ne parviennent
pas a` e´pargner et re´investir une part suffisante de la rente issue des ressources naturelles
(Hartwick 1977). Le proble`me est plus aigu encore dans un contexte d’e´conomie ou-
verte : il n’existe alors plus d’institution e´tatique centrale pour superviser la gestion des
ressources non-renouvelables.
Il semble alors ne´cessaire de recenser et d’expliciter les me´canismes qui relient les
e´volutions du commerce international a` la soutenabilite´. Cette the`se a pour but de recenser
et d’expliciter les me´canismes par lesquels le commerce international peut influencer du-
rablement la soutenabilite´. Nous sugge´rerons des amendements autant the´oriques qu’em-
piriques aux indicateurs et aux the´ories de la soutenabilite´ sur la base des me´canismes de
commerce pre´sente´s.
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Les composantes conceptuelles de la soutenabilite´
La soutenabilite´ est issue de la combinaison d’une the´orie de la valeur et d’une the´orie
des moyens, la the´orie du capital. La the´orie du capital est d’abord formule´e par Fisher
(1906), comme la synthe`se de nombreuses contributions et courants de pense´e durant la
seconde moitie´ du 19e`me sie`cle. La the´orie du capital formalise les interactions entre les
humains et leur environnement. Chaque e´le´ment constitutif de l’environnement constitue
un stock, qui est une part de la richesse. Chaque instrument de richesse constituant ce
stock est forme´, alimente´ ou maintenu par un apport de matie`re ou d’e´nergie (outgo) et
ge´ne`re un flux de services (income) parfois qualifie´ de revenu ou de be´ne´fices. Ces instru-
ments de richesse prennent valeur dans le cadre des me´canismes de marche´, formalise´ par
une the´orie, actuellement utilitariste, de la valeur. Cette valeur provient de la rencontre des
pre´fe´rences des agents, de leurs utilite´s et besoins individuels. Une allocation de valeur
par le marche´ dans le cadre de la the´orie utilitaire ge´ne`re une distribution optimale des
ressources, au sens de Pareto : la plus grande satisfaction possible du plus grand nombre,
compte tenu des droits de proprie´te´s constate´s.
Les E´conomistes e´cologistes les premiers ont propose´ une alternative a` la the´orie uti-
litariste, sur la base d’objections concernant les possibilite´s de substitution (parfaite, im-
parfaite, impossible) entre diffe´rents instruments de richesse. Certains, suivant les conclu-
sions de Georgescu-Roegen (1971), proposent un proce´de´ d’allocation des ressources al-
ternatif, base´ sur la de´gradation thermodynamique de l’environnement. Nous sugge´rons
que malgre´ l’opposition souvent postule´ dans la litte´rature entre e´conomie environnemen-
tal et e´conomie e´cologique, les deux courants pourraient se retrouver dans une the´orie du
capital convenablement de´finie. L’industrie e´cologique est un premier exemple au cre´dit
de cette assertion. Il est ne´anmoins certain qu’une the´orie de la valeur alternative est re-
quise pour refle´ter les pre´occupations concernant l’e´quite´, la justice (Rawls 1971) et le
niveau de substituabilite´ re´el entre plusieurs instruments.
La soutenabilite´ a` l’e`re de la mondialisation
Le commerce international est base´ sur la notion d’avantage comparatif (Ricardo
1817). Un avantage comparatif conduit le pays conside´re´ a` se spe´cialiser dans le bien ou le
facteur procurant un avantage a` l’e´change vis-a`-vis d’un partenaire. L’avantage comparatif
est conside´re´ comme donne´ dans les the´ories traditionnelles du commerce international.
Des contributions plus re´centes ont inte´gre´ l’impact de la distribution dans le temps et dans
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l’espace des sources d’avantage comparatif, soulignant les me´canismes de formation en-
doge`ne de ces meˆmes avantages. Ces travaux font ressortir la ne´cessite´ de de´velopper une
”diversification des spe´cialisations”, de ne pas concentrer a` l’exce`s ses avantages compa-
ratifs dans un nombre trop restreint de secteurs, facteurs ou biens. Cette diversification est
obtenue par une politique avise´e de re´investissement et de maintenance des instruments
de richesse. Il s’agit ici de ge´rer la part de ressources non-renouvelables et renouvelables,
du capital e´conomique, social et environnemental. La politique de re´investissement des
revenus du capital et de maintenance est donc de´terminante pour la formation des avan-
tages comparatifs, alors que les avantages comparatifs cre´e´s des incitations fortes a` la
spe´cialisation qui peuvent contredire les impe´ratifs de la soutenabilite´.
Cette potentielle contradiction intemporelle est plus pre´gnante encore du fait des dernie`res
e´volutions du commerce international, qui prend de plus en plus la forme d’une ”chaine
d’approvisionnement internationale”. Chaque pays se retrouve ainsi de´positaire d’une part
du processus de production d’un bien, au lieu d’accueillir l’ensemble du processus et de
faire commerce de biens de consommation ou d’e´quipement acheve´s. les pays riches en
ressources naturelles sont ainsi incite´s a` prendre part au commerce international principa-
lement en tant que fournisseurs de ressources naturelles, ce qui peut contraindre ou limiter
leur de´veloppement par le changement structurel.
L’e´tude du paradoxe de la spe´cialisation est e´galement d’importance pour la the´orie
du commerce international dans la mesure ou` le commerce des ressources naturelles
repre´sente une part en augmentation du commerce mondial, alors que les pays riches
en ressources naturelles repre´sentent de´ja` une part importante de la population mondiale.
Le commerce international cre´e majoritairement de l’interde´pendance entre les pays et
non des relations de de´pendance pures. Une the´orie de la soutenabilite´ en e´conomie ou-
verte, qui serait juste et e´quitable, demande donc le re´tablissement de la compatibilite´
entre la formation de spe´cialisations productives en lien avec le commerce international
et le changement structurel requis pour un de´veloppement durable. Si cet e´quilibre ne peut
eˆtre trouve´, le commerce international ne peut pre´tendre be´ne´ficier a` tous les acteurs de la
chaine d’approvisionnement mondiale.
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1 Le de´veloppement soutenable en e´conomie : l’e´mergence
de la soutenabilite´
Le paradigme de la soutenabilite´ faible, base´ sur la vision ne´oclassique, est le principal
paradigme de la the´orie de la soutenabilite´. Ce paradigme est base´ sur la combinaison de
la the´orie du capital et de la the´orie utilitariste de la valeur. Nous nous nous basons cette
tradition et sa traduction dans l’Epargne Nette Ajuste´e (ENA) pour proposer un mode`le
global de soutenabilite´, mettant en avant les cinq dimensions de la soutenabilite´.
Le mode`le se soutenabilite´ faible est issue des contributions de Dasgupta and Heal
(1974), Solow (1974) et Stiglitz (1974) qui forment le mode`le DHSS, la base jusqu’a` ce
jour des e´tudes en soutenabilite´ faible. Le mode`le est rapidement comple´te´ par la re`gle
de Hartwick (Hartwick 1977, Asheim et al. 2003) qui prescrit le re´investissement de la
rente issue des ressources naturelles en capital produit, afin de maintenir le niveau de la
richesse globale et assurer la soutenabilite´. Reste a` estimer cette rente et plus ge´ne´ralement
l’e´volution des diffe´rents instruments de richesse disponibles dans l’e´conomie conside´re´e.
Le premier indicateur de soutenabilite´ est l’Epargne Nette Ajuste´e (ENA) propose´e
par Pearce and Atkinson (1993) suivant le mode`le de Solow (1974). L’ENA est d’abord un
projet empirique, avant de trouver une justification the´orique dans les travaux d’Hamilton
and Clemens (1999). Des doutes persistent quant a` la capacite´ de l’ENA de pre´dire la sou-
tenabilite´ future (Ferreira and Vincent 2005). L’ENA est cependant l’indicateur d’e´quite´
interge´ne´rationnelle le plus robuste actuellement disponible. L’ENA est l’he´ritie`re directe
des deux principales traditions du paradigmes de la soutenabilite´ faible, supplantant le
produit net national vert (Dasgupta 2009). L’indicateur est calcule´ par la Banque Mon-
diale (The World Bank 2011), qui le propose dans une base se´pare´e (Wealth Accounting
Database) et comme Indicateur de De´veloppement dans le Monde (IDM).
Les institutions ont un roˆle instrumental pour la soutenabilite´, notamment dans les
pays riches en ressources naturelles (Van Der Ploeg 2011). Nous offrons une lecture du
cadre d’analyse propose´ par Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) pour analyser l’impact des
institutions extractives et inclusives sur la soutenabilite´. L’e´volutions des institutions se
fait par incre´ments successifs, qui peuvent favoriser la concentration graduelle de la ri-
chesse dans un partie de la population. Ce phe´nome`ne rend l’accaparement de la rente
par une e´lite plus probable et le re´investissement optimal de cette rente moins probable.
Cette tendance potentielle est rendue plus proble´matique par des droits de proprie´te´s mal
de´finis (Ostrom 1990), particulie`rement pour les biens publics et les espaces communs.
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Une grande varie´te´ d’e´volutions institutionnelles sont possibles, auxquelles s’ajoutent les
”croisements critiques”, qui repre´sentent de grandes distorsions dans l’e´volution institu-
tionnelle (ge´ne´ralement des re´volutions). Les analyses base´es sur la notion d’e´quilibre de
long terme ne semble donc pas les plus adapte´es pour l’analyse de la soutenabilite´ si des
controˆles efficaces concernant les e´volutions institutionnelles sont impossibles.
Nous nous inte´ressons ensuite aux conse´quences potentielles de ces e´quilibres mul-
tiples et de l’incertitude pour la soutenabilite´, suivant en cela le chemin trace´ par Hicks
(1946). Nous concluons a` la validite´ des objections formule´es par Georgescu-Roegen
(1971) sur l’importance de la locomotion qui devraient eˆtre prises en compte dans les
e´tudes de soutenabilite´. Les analyses contrefactuelles (Hamilton et al. 2006), base´es sur
des indicateurs en valeur courante et en valeur pre´sente autour de l’ENA et de la richesse
globale semblent les plus adapte´es pour capturer la multiplicite´ des sce´narios envisa-
geables.
Nous concluons cette pre´sentation par la pre´sentation de notre cadre inte´gre´ pour la
soutenabilite´. La soutenabilite´ repose sur cinq dimensions qui doivent eˆtre conside´re´es de
fac¸on conjointe et e´quitable :
— Le maintien d’un niveau de consommation constant en valeur sur l’horizon conside´re´.
— Le maintien d’un niveau de richesse global en valeur sur l’horizon conside´re´.
— Le controˆle du niveau effectif de substituabilite´ re´el
— Le maintien d’une e´quite´ interge´ne´rationnelle
— Le maintien d’une e´quite´ intrage´ne´rationnelle.
Les institutions organise´es sur le principe de la subsidiarite´ sont les plus adapte´es pour (et
potentiellement les seules capables de) fournir le cadre ne´cessaire a` la re´alisation de ces
cinq dimensions.
2 Commerce International et soutenabilite´ : exploration
des liens
Nous avons propose´ un cadre d’analyse cohe´rent regroupant les diffe´rentes dimen-
sions de la soutenabilite´ en e´conomie ferme´e. Nous allons maintenant transcrire ce sche´ma
dans un cadre d’e´conomie ouverte. La litte´rature est d’ors et de´ja` riche de contributions
pre´sentant les liens entre la soutenabilite´ et le commerce international partant d’autres
champs d’analyse. Nous tentons une synthe`se sur la base des dimensions de notre cadre
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de de´finition inte´gre´.
Le corpus le plus important a` ce jour est le corpus regroupant les contributions sur
les liens entre commerce international et impacts environnementaux (pollution ae´rienne,
des sols et de l’eau). Base´ sur le mode`le de Copeland and Taylor (1994), cette litte´rature
de´crit l’e´volution d’un syste`me e´conomique face aux dommages environnementaux, selon
les effets d’e´chelle, de technique et de composition. Le mode`le apporte un important
e´clairage sur les de´bats concernant la courbe de Kuznets environnementale et l’hypothe`se
des havres de pollution.
Vient ensuite, en termes de contribution, la litte´rature analysant l’e´conomie des res-
sources naturelles dans un cadre d’e´conomie ouverte. Cette litte´rature regroupe les re`gles
de soutenabilite´ en e´conomie ouverte (Asheim 1986) et les e´tudes sur l’impact de la volati-
lite´ des prix mondiaux (Hartwick 1995, Vincent et al. 1997) sur les sentiers d’exploitation
des ressources naturelles. Cette litte´rature trouve un de´bouche´ empirique dans les e´tudes
sur le contenu en ressources naturelles des flux commerciaux (Proops et al. 1999), qui
donne aujourd’hui lieu a` des calculs de ”soutenabilite´ virtuelle” (Atkinson et al. 2012) a`
comparer aux taux d’ENA domestiques.
Notre proposition de synthe`se commence par une revue des contributions, moins nom-
breuses, concernant le roˆle des instruments de politique commerciale dans un contexte de
soutenabilite´ (Flaaten and Schulz 2010). Nous pre´sentons ensuite l’impact de l’ouverture
e´conomique sur les cinq dimensions de la soutenabilite´. Les textes du corpus traitant de
la soutenabilite´ en e´conomie ouverte sont base´s sur l’hypothe`se implicite que le monde
se dirige vers l’unification de l’espace en un marche´ commun : l’alternative serait l’en-
fermement dans le cadre national. Ce mouvements serait inexorable du fait des gains
d’efficience et de bien-eˆtre attendus.
La re´alite´, qui justifie les e´tudes du commerce international est un entre-deux im-
parfait. Pour faire face a` cette situation, de nouveaux me´canismes institutionnels sont
requis, pour e´viter les phe´nome`nes de polarisation des ressources dans certaines re´gions
ou groupes de population de par la monde. Ces me´canismes incluent notamment des po-
litiques de redistribution/re´investissement : ils doivent contrer la tendance du commerce
international a` redistribuer la richesse a` l’encontre des impe´ratifs de soutenabilite´. Cette
ne´cessite´ est rendue plus pressante encore par la place prise par l’incertitude sur les temps
futurs ou concernant le niveau re´el de substituabilite´ entre les diffe´rentes instruments de ri-
chesse. Face a` ces limites inde´passables des me´canismes de marche´, l’usage d’instruments
de politique commerciale nous semble justifie´, dans le respect du principe de pre´caution.
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3 Un mode`le dynamique pour la soutenabilite´ en e´conomie
ouverte
Nous pre´sentons un mode`le global d’e´valuation du changement structurel dans un
contexte d’e´conomie ouverte. Ce mode`le nous permet d’explorer diffe´rents sentiers de
de´veloppement, base´s sur diverses re`gles de soutenabilite´ et de re´investissement.
La litte´rature sur la soutenabilite´ s’est tourne´e vers les mode`les dynamiques (Che-
viakov and Hartwick 2009) pour e´tudier les dynamiques d’accumulation des diffe´rents
instruments de richesse. Parmi les variables de´terminantes pour cette classe de mode`les,
le niveau des taux d’escompte pour la formation des dynamiques doit eˆtre correctement
e´value´ (Bogmans and Withagen 2010). Nous nous basons pour la re´alisation de notre
mode`le sur diffe´rentes contributions de la litte´rature ne´oclassique sur la croissance, de
la litte´rature sur la soutenabilite´ et de la litte´rature sur les mode`les Heckscher-Ohlin de
commerce international.
Nous partons du mode`le propose´ par Cun˜at and Maffezzoli (2004) pour construire un
mode`le associant une composante dynamique (qui re´gie l’accumulation des instruments
de richesse) et une composante statique (qui de´termine les prix des facteurs). Nous pro-
posons quatre instruments de richesse synthe´tiques (le travail, le capital produit, le capital
e´puisable renouvelable et le capital e´puisable non-renouvelable). Nous e´valuons les dy-
namiques d’accumulation sous l’hypothe`se d’e´galisation des prix de facteurs mondiaux,
et lorsque cette hypothe`se est viole´e : les prix de facteurs sont alors de´termine´s pays par
pays.
Le mode`le produit des sentiers d’expansion pour chaque instrument de richesse, selon
une re´solution se´quentielle. On conside`re une distribution exoge`ne des instruments de ri-
chesse a` la premie`re pe´riode. Les prix des facteurs et des biens sont d’abord de´termine´s
dans la composante statique. Ils sont ensuite utilise´s pour de´terminer le niveau de chaque
instrument de richesse a` la pe´riode suivante et ainsi de suite. Lors de la re´solution, un ins-
trument de richesse est accumule´ de fac¸on endoge`ne dans chaque pays, les autres suivent
un profil d’accumulation contraint (exoge`ne). Cette me´thode nous permet d’e´valuer la
convergence potentielle des niveaux de consommation et de richesse lorsque l’asyme´trie
dans la distribution des instruments (qui est la base de la spe´cialisation internationale dans
un mode`le Heckscher-Ohlin) se re´duit par les politiques de re´investissements. Nous com-
parons notamment le cas ou` les deux pays repre´sentatifs accumulent de fac¸on endoge`ne
le meˆme instrument au cas ou` ils accumulent deux instruments diffe´rents.
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Il ressort de notre analyse que de multiples sentiers de de´veloppement sont pos-
sibles selon la re`gle de soutenabilite´ suivie. Notre sce´nario de base est construit en par-
tant d’une re´duction syme´trique de l’asyme´trie de la distribution des instruments de ri-
chesse exoge`nes dans les deux pays. Nous e´tudions e´galement des situations de variation
asyme´trique de cette distribution, que ce soit dans le sens d’une accumulation ou d’une
de´cumulation plus rapide d’un facteur exoge`ne dans un des deux pays.
Nous concluons tout d’abord qu’une forte asyme´trie de la distribution des instruments
de richesse est pre´judiciable aux deux pays, que ce soit en autarcie ou en libre-e´change.
Ce constat repose sur la technologie de production, qui suppose que l’ensemble des in-
trants sont requis dans le processus de production global. Dans ce cadre, s’ouvrir au libre-
e´change re´duit le niveau de consommation dans les deux pays lorsque l’asyme´trie de la
distribution de la richesse est e´leve´e.
Ce re´sultat de´coule de la ne´cessite´ de se spe´cialiser dans la production de certains
biens interme´diaires pour former un avantage comparatif. Les pays produisent donc un
segment de la gamme de biens interme´diaires et importent les autres. La baisse de la
consommation globale vient des couˆts engendre´s par la complexification de la structure
de production. Nous comparons ensuite les e´quilibres de long terme entre forte et faible
asyme´trie dans la distribution des instruments de richesse et concluons que les deux pays
perdent moins a` s’ouvrir a` l’e´change lorsqu’ils accumulent le meˆme facteur de production.
Nous pre´sentons la possibilite´ que des pays riches en ressources naturelles qui se
concentrent sur la sauvegarde de leur capital naturel puissent passer par un changement
structurel et se trouver relativement et absolument mieux en autarcie qu’en libre e´change.
Ce re´sultat sugge`re que dans un cadre dynamique, les pays qui se spe´cialisent dans les
instruments accumule´s au cours du changement structurel ont un avantage par rapport a`
ceux qui de´pendent d’un instrument dont le stock doit eˆtre re´duit dans le cadre du chan-
gement structurel. Dans ce cadre dynamique, les conse´quences en termes de soutena-
bilite´ de spe´cialisations diffe´rentes ne sont pas les meˆmes. Nous constatons e´galement
une re´duction du volume des e´changes avec la re´duction de l’asyme´trie de la distribution
des dotations factorielles, un re´sultat conforme aux pre´dictions standards des mode`les
Heckscher-Ohlin.
Le fait que les pays se retrouvent face a` des niveaux de consommation et de richesse
plus faibles en libre-e´change ne signifient pas que les sentiers d’expansions en libre-
e´change sont en tout point infe´rieurs. Les prix de facteur e´voluent pour refle´ter la rarete´
globale (et non plus seulement domestique) ce qui produit des gains a` l’e´change pour les
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producteurs. Ces changements dans le syste`me de prix conduisent a` un usage plus intensif
de certains facteurs par rapport a` la situation d’autarcie. Ce constat nous me`ne a` demander
le re´investissement de ces gains dans le financement du changement structurel, suivant la
logique de re´investissement des rentes et la re`gle de Hartwick. Ceci ne signifie cependant
pas que l’ensemble des gains de l’e´change doivent eˆtre e´pargne´s puis re´investis. Les gains
venant d’un progre`s technique Hicks-neutre (qui ame´liore la productivite´ toutes choses
e´gales par ailleurs) ne sont pas concerne´s.
4 Soutenabilite´, institutions et interde´pendance dans les
processus de de´veloppement
Nous avons conclu le chapitre pre´ce´dent en soulignant la ne´cessite´ d’e´pargner et de
re´investir certains des gains a` l’e´change international. Le volume des e´changes prove-
nant de l’asyme´trie dans la distribution des facteurs diminue a` mesure que cette meˆme
asyme´trie se re´duit. Cette diminution du commerce inter-industriel base´ sur les facteurs
s’est en fait accompagne´e empiriquement de l’e´mergence d’un commerce intra-industrie,
entre pays ayant une distribution des facteurs similaire. Nous explorons les conse´quences
de ce fait du point de vue de la soutenabilite´.
Le mode`le d’Ethier (1982) nous permet d’e´valuer l’incidence des rendements d’e´chelle
croissants sur les conclusions pre´sente´es au chapitre pre´ce´dent. Nous concluons que meˆme
si les rendements croissants ne changent pas l’allocation des facteurs dans une perspec-
tive statique, ils ont un effet important sur les sentiers des prix de facteur en dynamique.
Conside´re´e pe´riode par pe´riode, l’allocation des facteurs ne change pas avec les rende-
ments d’e´chelle, mais les variations de prix entre les pe´riodes cre´e´ent en dynamique un
re´sultat diffe´rent.
En conse´quence, les gains a` l’e´change issus des rendements d’e´chelle croissants doivent
eux aussi eˆtre e´pargne´s et re´investis. Il est e´galement possible qu’un pays progresse plus
rapidement que ses partenaires dans la voie du changement structurel. Les partenaires
seraient alors potentiellement maintenus dans une spe´cialisation condamne´e a` l’obsoles-
cence a` long terme. Les partenaires commerciaux ont alors moins de ressources pour
entreprendre le changement structurel sur le long terme, a` rebours de leurs inte´reˆts de
court terme de surcroit.
Nous pre´sentons ensuite brie`vement la litte´rature sur la male´diction des ressources
11
et le syndrome hollandais (avec notamment l’importante contribution de Van Der Ploeg
(2011)), dans la mesure ou` cette litte´rature illustre parfaitement l’interaction du com-
merce international et des institutions. L’explication privile´gie´e par la litte´rature pour la
male´diction des ressources est institutionnelle. Nous de´fendons la the`se que les facteurs
institutionnels et les incitations du commerce international jouent de concert et sont im-
possibles a` distinguer sur le plan logique. La male´diction des ressources ne peut ainsi se
comprendre que du fait de l’interde´pendance internationale ge´ne´re´e par le commerce.
Pour appuyer cette the`se, nous proposons un test e´conome´trique base´ sur le com-
merce ”intra-industriel” des biens intensifs en ressources naturelles. Nous montrons que
le commerce inter-industriel domine pour ces biens dans les pays riches en ressources na-
turelles. Ce re´sultat nous emme`ne a` conclure que les pays riches en ressources naturelles
re´duisent l’asyme´trie de leur distribution d’instrument de richesse par une diminution ab-
solue du stock de capital naturel et non par une diminution relative lie´e a` la hausse des
autres stocks. Nous sugge´rons donc d’utiliser la structure des e´changes internationaux,
notamment la diffe´rence entre commerce inter et intra-industrie dans les biens intensifs
en ressources naturelles, comme un indicateur d’insoutenabilite´ du de´veloppement.
Nous proposons finalement d’utiliser une expe´rience naturelle pour distinguer l’im-
portance respective de l’abondance en ressources naturelles et des e´volutions institution-
nelles pour expliquer la trajectoire en terme de soutenabilite´ d’un pays donne´. Selon nous,
la chute de l’Union Sovie´tique cre´e une rupture critique commune a` l’ensemble des an-
ciennes re´publiques socialistes, ce qui permet une analyse des e´volutions a` partir d’une
base commune dix ans apre`s 1.
Les diffe´rences de taille des stocks de capital naturel entre les ex-re´publiques sont
e´galement observables. Nous choisissons comme cadre d’analyse la Fe´de´ration de Russie
et montrons comment sa performance en terme de soutenabilite´ (estime´e graˆce a` l’ENA)
se rapproche de pays proches sur le plan institutionnel mais pauvres en ressources natu-
relles et non de pays riches en ressources naturelles mais sans liens institutionnels. Nous
pre´sentons finalement des sce´narios d’investissement contrefactuels pour la Fe´de´ration de
Russie en suivant la me´thode utilise´e par Hamilton et al. (2006) et la Banque Mondiale
(The World Bank 2011). Nous concluons que la comparaison des trajectoires d’investis-
sement contrefactuelles devrait faire partie inte´grante de toute e´tude de soutenabilite´, afin
d’appre´hender pleinement les conse´quences cumulative des de´crochages par rapport aux
strate´gies de re´investissement optimal. Nos re´sultats sugge`rent que la male´diction des res-
1. Ce de´lai est retenu pour des raisons de disponibilite´ des donne´es et pour e´viter les chocs de court
terme lie´s a la dislocation de l’Union Sovie´tique
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sources devrait eˆtre traite´e a` l’e´chelle re´gionale, pour tenir compte des interactions entre
le pays victime et les partenaires commerciaux ayant une proximite´ institutionnelle.
Conclusion
Nous avons propose´ au cours de l’exposition de notre the`se une exploration des nom-
breux liens entre le commerce international et la soutenabilite´. D’un point de vue the´orique,
la soutenabilite´ est base´e sur l’application de la the´orie utilitariste de la valeur a` la the´orie
du capital. La the´orie du capital permet de conceptualiser la relation entre l’homme et
son environnement. Nous montrons comment la soutenabilite´ est en fait la gestion sense´e
est e´quitable des moyens du de´veloppement. Il s’agit plus pre´cise´ment de maintenir un
niveau de consommation et de richesse en valeur, d’encourager et de renforcer l’e´quite´
intrage´ne´rationnelle et interge´ne´rationnelle et de controˆler le niveau de substituabilite´
physique entre les instruments de richesse.
Nous choisissons l’Epargne Nette Ajuste´e (ENA) comme indicateur de soutenabilite´
de re´fe´rence pour e´valuer la fac¸on dont des e´conomies ouvertes au commerce interna-
tional voient leurs sentiers de de´veloppement eˆtre modifie´s. Nous montrons que l’ouver-
ture commerciale devrait donner lieu a` plus d’e´pargne et d’investissements et que les
gains a` l’e´change provenant de modifications du syste`me de prix relatif domestique ne
devraient pas eˆtre consomme´s. Nous pre´sentons finalement des impacts plus larges des
flux commerciaux sur les sentiers de de´veloppement, soulignant l’importance de prendre
en compte les rendements d’e´chelle. Nous e´tudions e´galement l’imbrication des effets du
commerce international et des e´volutions institutionnelles a` la racine de la male´diction
des ressources et d’une gestion sous optimale des ressources naturelles dans les pays ou`
elles sont abondantes.
Pour mieux comprendre l’importance des institutions, nous proposons d’utiliser la dis-
location de l’Union Sovie´tique comme expe´rience naturelle. Nous montrons que l’e´volution
de l’ENA en Fe´de´ration de Russie suit de plus pre`s celle de ses voisins institutionnelle-
ment proches (et ce quelque soit leur dotation en ressources naturelles) que celle des pays
de part le monde ayant un niveau de dotation en ressources naturelles similaire. Nous
pre´sentons enfin une e´tude contrefactuelle des sentiers de de´veloppement en Russie, pro-
posant d’utiliser cette me´thode de fac¸on syste´matique pour e´valuer la soutenabilite´ des
pays dans un contexte d’incertitude et d’impre´cision des donne´es nationales concernant
la richesse globale et la de´pre´ciation re´elle des actifs, naturels ou autre.
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Ces diffe´rents e´le´ments sont a` conside´rer au mieux comme les premie`res pierre d’un
mode`le de soutenabilite´ e´largi. Nous rejoignons Arrow et al. (2010) concernant le be-
soin de proposer une the´orie pour relier les e´volutions institutionnelles et les mode`les
de soutenabilite´ existants. Un tel mode`le permettrai de calculer pre´cise´ment la contribu-
tion du commerce international a` la soutenabilite´, permettant une identification des flux
commerciaux allant a` l’encontre de la pre´servation de la richesse globale. Utilise´e avec
des indicateurs en valeur pre´sente pour e´valuer les fins du de´veloppement, l’ENA pour-
rait alors le´gitimement eˆtre conside´re´e comme l’indicateur repre´sentant l’e´volution de la
soutenabilite´ des moyens du de´veloppement.
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General Introduction
It is now widely acknowledged that the last 40 years of human history saw a dramatic changein the relationship between mankind and the planet. Some have considered this change to
be a new geological age, called the anthropocene 1. The anthropocene is characterised by the
emerging capability of mankind to modify the environment and the living conditions on earth,
as opposed to previous eras where environmental shocks such as ice ages where imposed on
mankind, who adapted usually by migrating.
The answer to this new state of the planet took the form of a push for sustainable devel-
opment, as a way to mitigate the consequences of potentially harmful human action on vital
components for the survival of all in the environment. The landmark definition for sustain-
able development was proposed by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) which produced in December 1987 a resonating report, Our Common
Future. The publication, sometimes refereed to as the Brundtland report after the chair of the
commission, defined sustainable development as “The development that meets the needs of the
current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy theirs”
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
Sustainable development was to be a new coordinated e ort to achieve a development that
would be equitable and lasting for both developed and developing countries. Thirteen years
later, the Millennium Summit propelled the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as an
expression of this imperative. The MDG are quantifiable targets for countries, the expression
of sustainable development in observable dimensions. The World Commission on Environment
and Development (1987) definition is very broad and consensual, but by no means operational.
The key concept is obviously development, already ambiguous before even considering whether
it is sustainable or not. As a full-scale report would be necessary to review the definitions of
development, we will focus in this introduction on the most common conceptions.
To economists, development is the process by which emerging economies catch-up with
advanced economies. Development is a multi dimensional concept, encompassing several aspects
of life. Development is to be understood as the nexus maximising the individual’s possibilities
of development inside a social fabric, situation, context that itself is made e cient in terms
of resources and guaranteeing a harmonious cohabitation of the individuals. Development is
1. The anthropocene then starts at the end of the eighteenth century, with the industrial revolution in
the United Kingdom. It is worth noting that the term anthropocene is gaining momentum in the scientific
community, but is not yet recognised as a proper geological age.
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therefore to be understood as the ultimate goal of the human species. As a species, humans
are by definition biologically homogeneous, but they exist in an impressive diversity of social
organisations and individual behaviours.
This implies that development can di er in nature and objectives across geographic situa-
tions and social groups. Di erent social structures can promote di erent forms of development,
depending on the interactions between individuals and society, or groups within the wider so-
ciety. To use a Marxist analytical tool, the superstructures of di erent social groups can di er
and the resulting perceptions of development and development processes themselves are likely
to di er. Common goals do not (and probably should not) guarantee an uniformity of social
forms and implementation procedures.
Two broad categories of development have been highlighted in the course of western history
(Rampnoux 2010). The first tradition dates back to ancient Greece. Greek philosophers be-
lieved the world was slowly decaying from its peak: the best possible option was to temporarily
stall decline. Ancient Romans on the other hand believed in expansion and progress. Those two
opposite traditions still coexist today, although the dialogue is biased by the de facto victory
of the idea of progress after the rise of Humanism and the Enlightenment.
Today, societies envision development as either an eternal expansion based on technical
progress, economic growth and growing population or a form of symbiosis with the environment
which precludes extensive growth. In this second scenario, human beings reach rapidly a state
of symbiosis with the environment and an ever reproducing steady state society unfolds 2.
In both cases, but more acutely in the first one, the question of the sustainability of devel-
opment arises quickly. Sustainability here is in very general terms, an unaltered and controlled
evolution of the dimensions by which development is assessed. If development is understood in
the Greek sense, then sustainability is merely preventing degradation (homoeostasis). In the
Roman sense, sustainability becomes creating the conditions for the driving forces of progress
and expansion to sustain that expansion.
Development can therefore be translated as the question of sustaining the means to an end,
leaving us with the need to define the reality behind those terms. This has been the mainstream
understanding amongst economists at the very least. The ends of development are described
using a theory of social and individual needs and wants. The means are described by a theory
of the relationship between human capabilities and the material and immaterial environment.
Putting it another way, the question of the ends is the question of why would humans interact
2. This distinction does not take into account societies striving for the return of an old order from the past,
an idealised level of past development. The Greeks already knew that reaction was unworkable.
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with their environment. The question of the means is the question of how to apprehend those
interactions.
It seems intuitive that a growing amount of means will allow for bigger ends or make current
ends easier to achieve. But a simple reference to the classical laws of matter (Georgescu-Roegen
1971) makes the point that extensive growth of means cannot last for ever. In a similar vein,
the possibility of the needs and wants of society growing beyond its ability to satisfy them
has been debated since at least Malthus (1817). As explained by Wrigley (2010), classical
economists, especially David Ricardo, had total faith in the law of diminishing returns and
predicted any growth in means would ultimately stall, as the environment could not handle
infinite growth. Wrigley (2010) shows that an extensive growth process existed in Europe from
the 1500’s onwards. This process was however barely perceivable as it was limited by the energy
available to “fuel” the transformation of matter, i.e. the production processes developing in
those emerging economies. Hence, energy is often described as the most basic mean of social
groups.
At this stage a first interesting parallel can be drawn. Development as advertised in the
MDG is the Roman form of development and the object of development economics. Sustain-
able development is the recognition of the physical fact that development, although de facto
happening in a diversity of ways, face limits in terms of means. Therefore, if ends are to be
reached, some rules concerning the means are to be set to reflect on the realities of the social
and physical environment. Similarly, the study of the means originally targeted the condition
of the “Roman”, i.e. continuous, expansion of the means. This is the study of economic growth.
As studies of economic growth gained momentum (Solow 1956), a very “Greek” realisation
that there could be limits to economic growth gained traction. The seminal work here is obvi-
ously the first Meadows et al. (1972) report on The Limits to Growth. Although the predictions
of the report were proven wrong (see chapter 1, section I.2), the general message is still valid.
This first report lead to the emergence of sustainability as an object of scientific investigation.
Sustainable Development is the characterisation of the Roman progress of mankind in all its
dimensions once all the potential constraints to expansion have been taken into account. Sim-
ilarly, sustainability is the study of the means, expansion, depletion and allocation, that are
instrumental to sustainable development. Following this distinction and definition of terms,
this thesis is not concerned with sustainable development, but with sustainability.
We stressed the possibility of di erent groups having di erent conceptions of development,
creating di erent superstructures as a result. Even if common ground is found about the best
way to describe global needs and wants as in the MDG, the conceptual goals are still a matter
of debate. The picking of these goals and the resulting social management is presented in
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chapter 1, section II.1. Social scientists describe the sets of rules, conventions and habits as
institutions, less associated with the Marxist theory than superstructure. We will from now on
use that term to describe those elements independently of the theories describing the needs,
wants and means. Note that institutions (as many dimensions of development in this thesis),
have both an instrumental value and an intrinsic value. The intrinsic value comes from the
ends, the social goals the institutions fulfil (tribunals exist to materialise the ideal of justice)
and the instrumental value comes from the contribution to allocation and conflict resolution
issues (tribunals are a legal conflict resolution mechanism critical to the existence of property
rights).
Sustainable development in its common meaning has an ambiguous status. The definition
in the Brundtland report stresses the complexity of defining development by not defining it.
It adds the constraint of sustainability to what can either be understood as a process, a path,
the co-evolution of a set of variables, indicators and phenomena or a state, a social condition.
Finding a way out of this ambiguity is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is worth re-
moving it from the start. We consider, quite similarly to Dasgupta (2001), that development
is associated with the global process or path characterising the evolution of a society. This
path is characterised and determined by elements and decisions reaching beyond the object of
economics.
We consider the economics of sustainable development to study a subset of variables and
dimensions related to the means put in motion to achieve the broader social goals of develop-
ment, as set by individuals and society as a whole. It is to mark this distinction that we will
use the expression sustainable development when referring to those broader goals and aspira-
tions and sustainability when referring to a sustainable management of the means. Beyond the
fundamental goal of clarity of expression, the distinction matters for two reasons.
First, it provides a first way to define the object of sustainability economics and a refutation
of the idea that all decisions are in essence economic decisions. Economic analysis should, in our
view, always be ambitious in scale but modest in scope. Economic issues are always delimited
by social choices, materialised by law, customs and culture. Second, the distinction is useful to
have when considering variables of interest in empirical studies. It helps to di erentiate between
variables related to the instruments, the means, and those related to the goals, the finality set
by society for development. All in all, sustainability appears as a subtopic of sustainable
development.
It is no accident that the first book which endeavoured to propose both a theory of social and
individual needs and wants and a theory of the relationship between human capabilities and the
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material and immaterial environment is considered the first and founding step of economics 3.
Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776 proposed
operational definitions for the concepts of value and wealth, describing how a given social
organisation (around the “invisible hand”) provided the prerequisites for the development of
nations.
Smith (1776) defined wealth as “the annual produce of the land and labour of the society”
and proposed a theory of value to define this produce based on labour. This was the first step
of a debate, still not closed, about the true nature of wealth and value. From Adam Smith
onwards, economics as a social science has always been an endeavour to combine a social theory
of value with instruments to allocate resources in line with this theory. We review in chapter
1 the combination of capital theory and the neoclassical theory of value as the basis for weak
sustainability analysis.
I The building blocks of sustainability
Economic theory coined several concepts to build a theory of means and ends. As those
concepts are still at the very core of sustainability, it seems useful to understand their origin
and the phenomena they refer to. In the first part of this section we present the key concepts
of wealth and income as integrated into capital theory, based on the early works of Fisher
(1906). We then review utilitarianism, the theory of value at the core of neoclassical economics.
We conclude by presenting the ecological economics critique, which provided sustainability
with a raison d’être by emphasizing the potentially limited substitutability between di erent
instruments of wealth.
I.1 Wealth, capital theory and income
First, chronologically and logically comes the theory of the means in economics. We use the
umbrella term “capital theory” although legitimate objections could be made against this use.
A first objection is that some of the cited authors did not think of their contribution in terms
of capital theory. A second objection is that the term capital is associated with an economic
system, capitalism, that is usually defined as an economic organisation, more encompassing
than a “simple” theory of means 4. A third objection is that capital theory as it is understood
3. As suggested by Dasgupta (2001, p.30).
4. In a presentation on the 4th of June 2013 on the future of capitalism at the London School of Economics,
Pr. John Kay suggested that the term capitalism had lost any use as a concept, as the reality of the 21st century
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today is concerned with more and less of “capital” at the same time, than we are considering
here (see for example Bliss et al. (2005)).
To objection number two, which seems to us to be the most legitimate, we answer that
sustainability is precisely about providing a framework that can interact with di erent economic
systems (di erent in terms of institutions and/or superstructure). To all three objections, we
answer that it is only by limiting the use of the word capital (or by using another word for it)
to the quintessential properties of it, that much confusion can be avoided and the concept be
put to good use. The aim of this section is precisely to show how a single conception of capital
and wealth appears to be a sound foundation for sustainability.
As hinted in the previous paragraph, capital theory is plagued with endless controversies.
The definition of wealth proposed above by Smith (1776) “the annual produce of the land and
labour of the society”, suggest that wealth and capital are both related to production and the
ability to generate value. Prior to Smith, the Physiocrats thought di erently. Richard Cantillion
(1755) and Francois Quesnay (1758) defended the idea that land was the only source of value
and the ultimate constraint on economic and societal activity. Only the surplus generated from
land could allow the “unproductive classes” to prosper and provide manufactures.
In essence, the Physiocrats were defending the idea that value can only emerge from land
as manufacturing is merely about passing value extracted from land to the consumers. Capital,
associated with the manufactures, was therefore non productive. The debate continues after
Smith 5. Briefly into the twentieth century, an important contribution is brought by Fisher
(1906) in The Nature of Capital and Income. His goal is to define value, income and wealth in
a theory that is internally consistent.
His concepts have been the implicit or explicit (depending on the author) foundation of
the neoclassical theory of value, exposed below. Fisher starts by emphasising the link between
wealth and property rights. Ownership is the cornerstone of any capital theory because own-
ership creates the right to use according to one’s will. “A property right is the right to the
chance of obtaining some or all of the future services of one or more articles of wealth”(Fisher
1906, p.22).
According to Fisher, wealth needs only fulfilling two conditions: it must be material and it
must be owned. Wealth is instrumental in providing services to the human mind, and this is
the only reason for wealth accumulation. The objects composing wealth are called instruments
of wealth. Instruments of wealth yield services which are “the desirable changes e ected (or
was the dissociation of ownership and control of the means of production.
5. A presentation of this debate in the nineteenth century can be found in Fisher (1906, p. 53-57 ).
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the undesirable changes prevented) by means of that instrument” (Fisher 1906, p.19). Wealth
being defined extensively as Fisher did, property rights are the rights to the uses of wealth
for its services. The desirability of those services are entirely subjective and depend on the
user, but the desirable service is objective and in principle observable and measurable. Each
of those instruments are items of capital. There can be several forms of capital or instruments
of wealth: Fisher distinguishes between land, commodities and human-beings (Figure 1). It is
worth stressing that, as made clear by the classification, what would be considered consumption
goods in modern terms are part of wealth for Fisher as they are material and can be owned.
They are an instrument of wealth and therefore they are capital. The time during which an
instrument can provide services to the human mind makes no di erence of nature: all goods
are to be classified as capital. As for services, they are considered to be income provided by
another instrument of wealth, which is the human body. What contemporary writers identify
as a service is therefore not di erent from the services provided by capital.
Instead of calling services only services provided by the capital item which is the human
body, services are the services provided by any form of capital. Satiety provided by an apple
to the human body is a service provided by an item of capital to another. It should by now
be clear that wealth and capital are synonymous in Fisher’s analysis. The materiality between
both concepts is indeed not di erent in nature, but Fisher tends to save the use of the term
capital as an adjective for some instruments of wealth. For example, the instrument of wealth
named money is money capital.
“Wealth is wealth only because of its services. And services are services only because of
their desirability in the mind of man, and of the satisfactions which man expects them to
render”(Fisher 1906, p.41). Capital is a fund, or stock of wealth at any given period of time.
It yields a service of wealth, which is a flow. When capital yields a flow of services, the flow
is called “income”. When capital is abounded by disservices rendered to it, the flow is called
“outgo”. An essential property of capital in Fisher’s theory is its fungibility. The same fund of
capital can take any physical form (or immaterial in the case of money) as income and outgo
from one flow to the other seamlessly.
It is equivalent to hold capital in the form of two houses and turn it by income flows from
those two house into money, then triggering income from money into shares from a listed
company. Capital exhibits perfect substitutability between funds of capital. We cannot stress
enough that any use of Fisher’s theory without explicit alteration of the concept of capital has
therefore build-in the assumption of perfect substitutability.
Property (direct or via titles such as shares) to wealth gives right to part of the services
generated by this wealth. As those services may not be of direct use to the owner (i.e. he
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Figure 1: A Classification of Wealth Instruments
Source: Fisher (1906)
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may not have desirability for those) some forms of capital were invented so as to make di erent
services fungible in an integrated system of exchanges. Prominent amongst those means is
obviously money, which in modern terms solves the problem of the double coincidence of wants.
In this narrow definition, money is an intermediate instrument in exchanges which has the
particularity of being accepted against other services in any transactions in a given area.
For example when a fund of money is debited as the agent adds a monetary flow to it, it
is called outgo or disservices as those are services provided by the agent to his fund of money.
When the agent uses this capital and money is credited, it is a service provided by this capital
in money form to him. As it comes to him it raises his income at that time (flow of service from
his money-capital to him) and with that extra income he can in turn get outgo from another
form of capital (in an exchange of flows) which may provide a direct service. “if the outgo is in
monetary form it is called expense; if it is in the form of human exertion it is called labor. It
includes all of what economists have called cost, i.e. labor, trouble, expense, and sacrifices of
all kinds” (Fisher 1906, p.119-120).
Wealth can be measured in physical units, weights units or space units, depending on what
is most accurate. Those units must not be confused with qualitative dimensions which are not
used to characterise an instrument, but to characterise the di erence between two instruments.
Fertile and non fertile lands are two di erent instruments and not one instrument with di erent
characteristics. If one objects to this on the basis that some services have a single provider
(Fisher uses the example of a Sarah Bernhardt performance), the logical conclusion is that this
service is obviously unique as it can be provided by only one instrument. Instruments of wealth
can then be measured in monetary units.
Fisher introduces a link to relate monetary value to transfers. “An article of wealth is said
to be transferred when it changes owners”. So the notion of transfer is linked to the notion of
ownership. Reciprocal transfers, which are the majority of transfers, are called exchanges. The
price of the exchange is obtained by dividing the two physical quantities of wealth involved
in the exchange to obtain a relative price. The price is in physical units or monetary units
depending on the units used to measure the quantities of wealth. The product of quantities
and price involved in the exchange is called the value of the amount exchanged.
Fisher does without a mechanism to set the quantities and therefore the prices involved
in the exchange. He only considers that when entering a transaction, the seller has one price
in mind (the ask price) and the buyer has a price at which he would like to buy (the bid
price). The price at which the transaction takes place should be the half-way price. It is
observable in recorded transactions. When such a price does not exist the observer should ask
potential exchangers about their bid and ask prices (which is in fact willingness to pay (WTP)
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Figure 2: Income and Outgo in Fisher’s theory of capital
Source: Author from Fisher (1906)
and willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) and therefore contingent valuation) or try to
make an appraisal by any means available. This is a first suggestion that when prices are not
available and an estimate of wealth is needed, contingent valuation based on estimates of the
WTP and the WTAC is legitimate. 6
Fisher builds on this basis his theory of the rate of interest which he calls a value return,
as it is the ratio of two quantities expressed in monetary terms (Fisher 1906, p.184). It is
worth noting that the question of the value of income between the occurrence of income flows is
treated at length by Fisher in the chapter 14 about interest. Fisher makes a di erence between
income and earnings to explain why and how capital value fluctuates when income flows are
anticipated, which is the common case when capital is yielding annuity payments. The Fisher
theory of capital and income is an internally consistent theory to link wealth and income. The
main elements are summarised in figure 2.
6. Elaboration on WTP and WTAC can be found in Hanley et al. (2001) and in chapter 1 section I.2.
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As noted above there is no mechanism to determine prices in Fisher’s theory. Value is just
price times quantities, but quantities are assumed to be available to the individual to start
with, as in an Edgeworth Box. Growth in the modern sense happens in the economy only
as capital is able to yield higher anticipated income flows, without the reason for this being
explicitly specified by Fisher.
After Fisher, the next author to propose a critical contribution to the concept of capital is
John R. Hicks. In Value and Capital, Hicks (1946) makes a critical assessment of the concept
of income. Discussing income, savings and depreciation he justifies his decision to abstain from
using those in his attempt to characterise economics by stating he does “not believe that they
are suitable tools for any analysis which aim at logical precision” Hicks (1946, p.171). He
justifies his aversion, stressing income can indeed be clearly defined in static analysis or at the
steady state. Income is then equal to one person’s receipts. “If a person expects no change in
economic conditions, and expects to receive a constant flow of receipts, the same amount as he
receives this week, it is reasonable to say that that amount is his income” (Hicks 1946, p.172).
Uncertainty or irregularity in the payment of receipts creates the need to di erentiate be-
tween what is income and what is to be dedicated to maintaining capital constant. Why the
focus on maintaining capital constant? According to Hicks, the purpose of income calculation
is to “give people an indication of the amount which they can consume without impoverishing
themselves” (Hicks 1946, p.172). Income defined as such is the upper-bound of “legitimate”
spending. He also argues that if one is paid every month, this doesn’t mean that the income of
the three weeks before the week of payment is zero 7. In Value and Capital income is meant to
be an operational concept, an indicator of what would be in the common sense a sustainable
way of life. A person consuming more than its income can expect to be worse-o  in the week
after the current week, and the other way around for a person consuming less than income.
But what would be the definition of income if it is to serve this practical purpose? Hicks
o ers three approximations, called income number 1, 2 and 3:
1. Income 1 is the “capitalized money value of the individual’s prospective receipts”Hicks
(1946, p.172). In contemporary terms, income can be calculated as the net present value
derived from net interests on capital i.e. once investment to keep capital constant is
subtracted from income. Income is then “the maximum amount which can be spent during
a period if there is an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective
receipts” (Hicks 1946, p.173).
7. Although Fisher’s di erence between realized income and earned income dispenses with this problem
(Fisher 1906, p.255)
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2. Income 2 is the “maximum amount the individual can spend this week, and still expect
to be able to spend the same amount in each ensuing week”(Hicks 1946, p.174). This
definition di ers from the first only if the rate of interest is not constant.
3. Income 3 is the “maximum amount the individual can spend this week, and still expect
to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in each ensuing week” (Hicks 1946,
p.174). Definition 3 matters only if prices are expected to change.
Hicks concludes that using income is a general problem because “Strictly speaking, savings
is not the di erence between income and expenditure, it is the di erence between income
and consumption” (Hicks 1946, p.174). If one defines income as the maximum amount one
can consume without impoverishing oneself, then there is a di erence between what one can
consume and what one can spend. That di erence is the amount required to maintain capital
constant, hence making sure the same amount of income will be available the next period.
Expenditure therefore exceeds consumption in most periods and reciprocally savings are in fact
divided between pure savings and investment to maintain produced capital.
Hicks considers that when receiving income, the agent must immediately spend (as invest-
ment) a share of it to compensate for the depreciation of capital, but this first expense should
not be counted as income if income is to be the maximum amount one can spend without
impoverishing oneself. A di erence should therefore be introduced between for example gross
income and net income, the di erence between the two being investment to maintain capital
constant. Only net income is the income satisfying the non-impoverishment condition. Instead,
Hicks concludes from this apparent confusion that “we shall be well advised to eschew income
and saving in economic dynamics. They are bad tools, which break in our hands” (Hicks 1946,
p.177). It is somewhat puzzling to see Hicks fail to propose at least a simple trick (such as the
gross/net income di erence) to solve the problems he raises. A potential explanation for this
is o ered below.
How to articulate consumption investment and savings? A first solution is to consider
income to be, as in Fisher (1906) the sum of services from capital at time t. Then it is
possible to call “replacement investment” the first investment necessary to maintain capital
(excluding money) constant. “Investment” becomes the outgo to capital (still excluding money)
in excess of this “replacement investment”. “Savings” is then the outgo to money-capital and
consumption, the residual from all those subtractions. In this solution, income does not satisfy
Hicks’ definition and a di erence Fisher would consider artificial is introduced between money-
capital and non money-capital.
This solution also assumes that although receiving the entirety of its potential income and
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being free to allocate it as he pleases, the agent always takes the decision to maintain capital
constant before arbitraging between investment, consumption and saving. Against this solution
it can therefore be argued that it assumes a form of “sustainability” to start with.
A second solution would be to follow Hicks’ definition of income to the letter and consider
that the services that should be mobilised to maintain the beginning of the period level of capital
are excluded of income as those cannot be consumed without impoverishing oneself. One has to
picture either an accounting trick such as amortisation or an actual automatic “before-income”
outgo to such a fund, physical or monetary. Only after this compulsory subtraction can the
agent choose between savings and consumption.
The di erence between solution 1 and solution 2 lies principally in the definition of income.
It could therefore be argued that by accepting the gross/net income solution the problem is
solved and the agent simply focuses on net income. But this answer only solves the beginning
of period problem of what is income, it does not solve the problem of the articulation of
investment and savings. We argue this di erence is the reason why Hicks found the concept of
income and saving to bring more trouble than light to the debate. In solution 1, we solved the
problem of what is investment and what are savings by bringing an artificial di erence between
money-capital and physical capital.
This di erence may have been accepted by the reader used to consider money as a peculiar
form of wealth and automatically thinking that savings have a link to the future and therefore
are essentially di erent. This interpretation does not add up in Fisher’s view of money as
another form of perfectly fungible capital. If it is, then it should be equivalent to own capital
as physical capital or money capital and there is no point in making a di erence between
investment in money and investment in physical capital.
The solution to this puzzle lies in the di erence between beginning of the period capital
and end of the period capital, regardless of the instrument involved and of the importance of
uncertainty. In Fisher, the presentation of capital theory is made assuming that future flows
of income generated by an instrument of wealth are known with certainty. Fisher does not
recognise the di erence between risk and uncertainty and assumes the future is only about risk.
Hicks on the contrary sees the problems with neoclassical habits of thinking as his intention is
to create a synthesis between the Keynesian view and the neoclassical mainstream. If there is
uncertainty, then a form of wealth that could provide a hedge against it will become the default
form of wealth owned by agents when considering how to allocate their income.
Money-capital is the ultimate form of liquidity 8 in its area of circulation, and is favoured by
8. Clower famously said money was liquidity par excellence.
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agents for this. Because of uncertainty, money-capital is at the same time an instrument better
suited than any other as a medium of exchange although not essentially di erent from other
instruments of wealth, and essentially di erent from other instruments as the ultimate form of
liquidity and hedge against uncertainty. This is the essential problem of money in the wake of
uncertainty. It cannot be solved. Because money is liquidity, it is the best suited medium of
exchange and vice-versa. It is therefore logically impossible to conceive two instruments which
could be as good as money to perform both tasks without being only one instrument.
Because of uncertainty, a more than rational share of capital is owned by agents as money
capital and it is this share, linked to precaution and the desire for liquidity, that should be
called savings. As Keynes (1936) showed, neoclassical economists are right to argue that over a
given period of time investment and savings are identical in mathematical terms (I © S). There
is no need to make a conceptual di erence between the two as today’s savings are tomorrow’s
investments, savings are merely delayed investment (temporary disservice to money capital 9)
and both are embodied in projects yielding income.
If there is uncertainty, then end-of-the-period savings will be determined by beginning-
of-the-period investment even if both end up being equal (I = S). Uncertainty creates the
famous Keynesian “leak”, which in Fisherian terms would be money-capital proving only the
service of hedging against future uncertainty. However, this fund of money-capital does not
guarantee a continuous flow of service as by definition under uncertainty the agent cannot
know how big the fund needs to be to provide this same service of liquidity in the next period.
Reduced uncertainty therefore reduces the leak and puts more wealth to productive use, raising
investment and savings. 10
Uncertainty and the concept of liquidity provides a serious challenge to the treatment of risk
presented by Fisher. It leads Hicks to discard the concepts of saving and income altogether on
a theoretical basis. 11 The concept of capital was limited afterwards to the narrower produced
capital, characterised as one of the many potential factor of production. Controversies about
capital were not over though, being reignited over another important feature of capital theory,
the current and inter-temporal fungibility of capital items. This debate would be known as the
Cambridge/Cambridge controversy.
The Cambridge-Cambridge controversy is a theoretical argument between mostly Keyne-
9. The careful reader would note that savings refer to both the disservice to money capital and money capital
predestined for future investment. This is again not a problem when I ©S, but otherwise outgo to money capital
should be termed di erently.
10. An ironically quite Keynesian argument to shore up “confidence” in times of crisis.
11. Although we will see in the chapter 1 that the appeal of Hicks’ type 1 income as an operational tool will
endure and the concept be used in the subsequent literature.
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sian economists in Cambridge, UK and mostly neoclassical economists in Cambridge, MA. A
summary is presented by Cohen and Harcourt (2003). It involved the most famous names in
economics at the time, such as Piero Sra a, Joan Robinson, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow.
The first part of the controversy had to do with productive combinations and the idea that
not all combinations of factors are equivalent. What is of interest in the controversy to our
topic is the second part, exemplified by the observation from Joan Robinson reported in Cohen
and Harcourt (2003) that there is a di erence between di erence and change. The process of
accumulation cannot be described by merely comparing two steady states, by using an exercise
of comparative statics.
The idea that a system would converge to equilibrium was quite alien to the Cambridge,
UK side of the controversy. Hicks (1946, chapters IX and X) made a similar point. According
to Cohen and Harcourt (2003) the controversy ended by the de facto victory of Cambridge, MA
as empirical evidence at the time was broadly supportive of the neoclassical functions, although
the theoretical points made by the Cambridge, UK side could not be overthrown. Evaluating
the consequences of the controversy are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important
to mention as it gives elements of context. As the nature of capital was still debated and the
Keynesian and neoclassical conceptions of capital were about to diverge, capital theory was
about to be put to new use.
The Meadows report from the Club of Rome(Meadows et al. 1972) was the first of a series
of e orts to assess the impact of the new concerns for the environment on the economies
of the world. Before the report, the debate about nature in economics was framed by the
division between preservationists and conservationists. Conservationists wanted to preserve
the environment for the sake of its services, a direct use through the extraction of resources
and amenities (as for example in national parks). Preservationists wanted to preserve “primal”
nature without relation to human needs and wants. The notion of “the environment” is quite
complex and no single common definition exists in economics, let alone between disciplines.
The term is old, but came to be characterised mostly by the objects of study and the finality of
the study. Theys (1993) distinguishes between three conceptions of the environment: objective
and bio-centric, subjective and anthropocentric and technocentric.
In economics, the second definition is favoured as the environment is usually defined with
reference to human needs and activities. The environment becomes the purveyor of natural
resources (renewable and non-renewable exhaustible resources) organised in ecosystems which
provide useful services. Those services are threatened by the scope of human activities which
may undermine the functioning of ecosystems, either via direct physical appropriation of ter-
ritories, or via pollution. The Meadows report intended to raise awareness on the limits of
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natural resources reserves, some of them critical to human industries. Reserves were evaluated
in physical terms and ignored the economic mechanism organising exhaustible resources man-
agement. Since at least Hotelling (1931) exhaustible resources have been analysed as a form of
capital. Resources could be optimally managed and integrated in the production process, just
like labour and produced-capital. In their seminal book in 1974 Herfindhal and Kneese define
capital as “anything which yields a flow of productive services over time and which is subject
to control in production processes” (Herfindhal and Kneese 1974, p. 68).
This definition, although restoring the “flow of services” flavour of the Fisherian definition,
falls short of embracing consumer goods and makes no mention of it. It also puts an emphasis
on productive services, de facto excluding ecosystem services that are not (yet) perceived as
productive. But this definition paved the way for the extension of capital theory to address
environmental concerns. The direct purpose of this enlarged definition is to take into account
the growing role of the environment in the economy. Using capital theory is a way to “set a
price” on the environment, either its direct contribution through natural resources, or through
the services it provides via ecosystems. Natural resources were not considered to be valuable
as they were not scarce (see the role of scarcity in neoclassical economics in chapter 1). Envi-
ronmental economics specialises in dealing with pollution as a by-product of the relationship
between humans and their environment. Resource economics studies the e cient management
of exhaustible resources.
The challenge for economics is to provide a way to reveal the “real value” of resources
that are either undervalued or not valued at all and therefore subject to overuse or pollution.
Herfindhal and Kneese (1974), Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Solow (1986) (see chapter 1
section I) completed the treatment of capital theory in a resources and the environment context.
Finally, empirical applications were conducted on the basis of capital theory (Repetto et al.
1989, Pearce and Atkinson 1993), when following the Brundtland report (World Commission
on Environment and Development 1987) sustainability emerged as a field of enquiry.
The notion of natural capital was coined to describe the instruments of wealth in the en-
vironment, namely exhaustible resources and the ecosystems containing (and providing shelter
to) them (see figure 3). The list bears resemblance to the instruments of wealth in figure 1.
The critical contribution from natural capital lies in the introduction of elements that are not
valued, but are critical to the proper functioning of natural resources, such as pollination.
It is interesting to note that when capital theory was described by Fisher, capital had
a broader and more accurate definition. Reading the contemporary definition of capital in
empirical estimates such as those of the World Bank (2006, 2011), it is obvious that after the
controversies of the 20th century about capital, sustainability is coming back to a vision of
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Figure 3: The Environment and its components
Source: Author
capital much akin to Fisher’s. 12 But the loop is not completely closed, mostly because, as
presented in chapter 1 section I, the contemporary value theory associated with capital theory
in sustainability draws from Hicks (1946) and Hicks already started to diverge from Fisher.
We would argue that based on Fisher’s theory of capital an internally consistent theory
of capital is still possible. It is not only possible but it is probably a way out of the current
controversies regarding sustainability. In this theory income is still the sum of the services
provided by an agent’s instruments of wealth. Consumption is the share of those services
that is converted over the period as disservices to the human body (through a temporary
transformation into money-capital). Investment is the beginning-of-the-period disservices to
instruments of wealth.
A di erence that is conceptually meaningless but operationally useful can be drawn between
“replacement investment” to compensate the wear and tear of the instruments and investment
into new (in the sense of not previously owned by any agent) instruments. If that distinction
is drawn, then total investment should be (and will be, see chapter 1 section I) named com-
prehensive or inclusive investment. As for savings, we would favour its use to be limited to the
share of money-capital that is owned for the service of liquidity for the sake of clarity. The rest
12. Inclusive income in Pemberton and Ulph (2001) is remarkably close to the Fisherian perspective.
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Figure 4: The production process in capital theory
Source: Author
is indeed investment in one instrument or the other.
Neoclassical theory sticks to the idea that all of money-capital is destined to a di erent
use than other forms of capital. So entrenched is this idea that in the remaining of this work
“savings” will be used to refer to money-capital owned by agents to provide disservices in future
periods to other instruments. And in that sense, the share of money-capital that is not owned
to address liquidity issues is equal to comprehensive investment. In figure 4 we show how the
production process can be understood as a chain of instruments of wealth organised around
outgo from the human mind (via his body, called labour) to bring back income to human
beings. 13
This is the final complexity attached to capital theory. Capital theory clearly illustrates
how the concept of value is meaningless out of any references to humans. Capital theory can
only help in setting rules for human/environment interactions under a set of values defined
by human beings. We presented capital theory and the critical concepts of wealth, capital,
income and investment. Capital theory provides a theory of the relation between human wants
and needs and the means available to satisfy those. It is now time to turn to the theory of
means allocation and valuation used to form the basis for the theory of sustainability, namely
utilitarianism.
13. Income and outgo are used here from the pool of instruments of wealth perspective.
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I.2 Value and sustainability
In The Nature of Capital and Income Fisher considers value to be simply price times quan-
tity, both being expressed either in monetary or physical units. Fisher describes an economy
were wealth is given and needs and wants are exogenous. From an operational perspective
capital theory works well in describing how human needs and wants can interact with the inert
and living matter. Still, his theory lacks an allocation mechanism to explain how exchanges
are organised and decisions regarding the satisfaction of needs and wants are taken. 14 As it is
well-known, the neoclassical theory of utility provides such an allocation mechanism.
The question of the source of value is probably the oldest in economics after the question
of the nature of wealth. Intuitively value should be associated with the needs and wants of
human beings and therefore be the raison d’être of economic activity. But as presented by
Fisher, humans are on both sides (“loose ends”) of the economic system (see figure 4). Agents
are the final recipients of services, but also the providers of the sole disservice not instantly
matched by a service: labour. Fisher agrees with Jean Bodin (1576) saying “Il n’est de richesse
que d’hommes”. Value and wealth both being sourced in human beings, value can either emerge
from needs and wants or labour. We saw earlier that the Physiocrats saw in land the sole source
of value. Land as a source of value was deemed unacceptable as it did not recognise the value
generated by the expanding manufacturing sector.
Later, Smith (1776) expanded the sources of the “Wealth of Nations” to include manufac-
turing. The source of value moved from land to labour. Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1817)
assumed that value was generated as labour was added to the production process. Labour was
at first perceived as a good standard for value, especially as Smith claimed it could solve the
famous diamond-water paradox. Economists have also made an early di erence between value
in use and value in exchange. Value in use is the subjective value of an instrument for the agent
using it. The value in exchange is the amount of instruments an agent can obtain against the
element he is o ering. For Smith, labour solved this problem as the price a man was ready to
pay for an element is “the toil and trouble of acquiring it” (Smith 1776). The labour theory
of value failed however to explain the fact that some elements requiring less e ort to collect or
assemble could prove more valuable than elements requiring more.
Finding how value is determined supposed from the start a theory for the motivation of
individuals, for the relationships between individuals, and potentially for the relationships
between an individual and a group, and a group and a larger group. The subjective theory of
14. Fisher refers to the works of Jevons (1871) and Walras (1874) and states that individuals will satisfy needs
and wants from the more pressing to the less pressing. But he does not propose a link between those elements
(he presents as obvious) and his theory of capital.
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value states that the value of things is in direct relation with agents’ wants and needs. Economic
agents are defined as members of a society, characterised by rational thinking and an ability
to rank goods and services according to their preferences. An economic agent can either be
able to attribute a value to the satisfaction derived from the acquisition and consumption of
one good (cardinal preferences) or be able to rank the acquisition of those goods on a scale
(ordinal preferences). An element that is neither wanted nor needed by agents (or ranks low
on the scale of needs and wants) will have low value.
This opposite is true for an element that ranks high on the scale. From the recognition
of the subjectivity of value comes the theory of utility and the concept of marginal utility.
Utilitarianism, sometimes called “Benthamite utilitarianism” in reference to Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832) to di erentiate it from close but di erent philosophical traditions, is the basis of the
theory of utility. 15 Utilitarianism views man as rationally reacting to pleasures and pains. 16
Bentham (1789) famously equated usefulness with the production of pleasure and avoidance
of pain. In this view, the di erence between needs and wants is rather artificial: both are
evaluated depending on the pleasure generated by satisfaction and pain generated by the non
satisfaction of both.
If an agent has the possibility to choose between several elements to acquire, he will acquire
first the one that satisfies the most pressing need or want. If that need or want is satisfied he will
move on to the next one. If not, the agent will acquire again the element satisfying the same, as
of yet unsatisfied, need or want. The concept of marginal utility was proposed simultaneously
by Jevons (1871), Menger (1871) and Walras (1874) to describe the small increment to utility
brought by the consumption of an extra good or service generating pleasure. Marginal utility
is decreasing as more units of the same goods are consumed, therefore total utility is growing
at a decreasing rate as consumption increases.
The theory of marginal utility therefore assumes both the ability to rank elements according
to preferences and the ability to attribute a quantity to the satisfaction of a given need or want.
If the agent can only rank, it is impossible to decide when to stop acquiring and using a given
good. If he can only estimate the required quantity of an element to satisfy one need, he
cannot compare two di erent elements that may satisfy two di erent needs. This problem
was raised by Hicks (1946, see Chapter I) who advocated against using marginal utility as it
seems dubious that agents can attribute a number to a given level of utility. Only the ratio of
marginal utility (the rate of marginal substitution) which represents ordinal utility should be
used. But regardless of this problem, marginal utility is still used today. The use of the word
15. Dasgupta (2001) calls this form “classical utilitarianism”.
16. Bentham proposed a list of pleasures and pains and tried to produce hedonistic indicators of social welfare
based on those.
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utility to describe the pleasure generated by the consumption of goods and services was also
criticised, as early as the works of Vilfredo Pareto, who suggested to use Ophelims instead. The
words felicity and desirability have also been proposed. But no other concept proved compelling
enough to overthrow utility.
Whether ordinal or cardinal utility, increased consumption raises utility but greater quan-
tities are required to raise utility by the same amount because of decreasing marginal utility.
Conversely, something that is supplied in little quantities will have a higher marginal value.
With this brilliant intuition, utility theory put at the centre the concept of scarcity: subjective
value is associated with items that are relatively scarce as their marginal utility will be higher.
We can not stress enough that the theory of utility is based on relative scarcity: the agent has
to choose between elements that are more and less desirable and more or less scarce.
The analysis of utility is, as is well known, usually conducted with “well-behaved” func-
tions. 17 Utility is asymptotically convergent, and therefore ill-equipped to describe situations
of absolute scarcity (when the supply of consumption goods is absolutely scarce, as in famines)
or absolute abundance (when the supply of consumption goods is disproportionate compared
to the needs and wants as with the cornucopia).
The theory of utility and the concept of scarcity are the foundation of the neoclassical
theory of value. First popularised by Marshall (1920) the theory of utility is the basis of the
constrained optimisation and general equilibrium analysis which are the workhorse tools of
neoclassical economics. Based on the theory of utility Lionel Robbins famously characterised
economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and
scarce means which have alternative uses.” (Robbins 1932). In reaction to the Keynesian
revolution, which describes the economic system without reference to a theory of value, Arrow
and Debreu (1954) introduced a formulation of the general equilibrium model still in use today.
There is obviously interdependence in the development of the concepts used in economics.
As we saw earlier with capital theory, it is possible to develop a theory of means without actually
defining any allocation mechanism. Conversely, it is possible to imagine a theory incorporating
general equilibrium analysis but not capital theory. In the neoclassical theory, the allocation
mechanism is based on the theory of utility as described by the utility function. The general
equilibrium analysis is based on markets.
Together, those theories would grant an optimal allocation of all the resources available, as
expressed in the equilibrium conditions (or market clearing conditions). A general equilibrium
17. Satisfying the Inada conditions: the function is continuously di erentiable, strictly increasing, concave,
f(0) = 0, lim
xi≠æ0
ˆf(x)
ˆxi
=+Œ and lim
xi≠æŒ
ˆf(x)
ˆxi
= 0.
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is a situation where all markets are in equilibrium: all the exchanges that could improve the
utility of one agent without decreasing another’s (Pareto-optimality) have taken place. In this
state of the economy, “the greater good for the greatest number” to borrow the famous sentence
of Joseph Priestley; is granted under the constraint of the original allocation of resources. The
famous second theorem of welfare economics shows that any Pareto-optimal outcome can be
reached granted that the correct original distribution of resource can be arranged via lump-sump
transfers.
Those are the building blocks of mainstream economic analysis. The Meadows et al. (1972)
report then brought forward the need to consider potential limits to growth, which would in
fact result in upper-limits to achievable individual utility. Proponents of this approach draw
from environmental and ecological studies to propose an alternative economic model.
I.3 Ecological economics and strong sustainability
Marshall (1920) cited by Victor (1991) reminds us that “land is a permanent and fixed stock
while appliances made by man... are a flow capable of being increased or diminished...Now if
the nation as a whole finds its stock of planing machines or ploughs inappropriately large or
inappropriately small, it can redistribute its resources. It can obtain more of that in which it is
deficient, while gradually lessening its stock of such things as are superabundant: but it cannot
do that in regard to land: it can cultivate its land more intensively but it cannot get any more”.
Although Marshall seems to be confusing the flow of services generated by appliances with the
stock of it (and therefore ignoring any sunk cost for example) he makes a point about the di er-
ence in nature, beyond the debate of physical substitutability. Although land (part of natural
capital) can potentially be cultivated more extensively (suggesting imperfect substitution with
man-made capital) the total surface available is limited (ruling out imperialistic behaviour and
international trade for now).
When Nicholas Goergescu-Rogen published The Entropy Law and the Economic Process in
1971 his intention was to show how the evolution of thinking in physics, statistics, mathematics
and biology had consequences for economics as well. More than half of his book is devoted to
the presentation of concepts from those disciplines and only the remaining part to economics.
Georgescu-Roegen (1971)’s main argument is made using the concept of entropy. Instead of
focusing on time, economists should see the evolution of economics as the transition from a state
mostly characterised by low-entropy materials to a state of high-entropy materials. Economics
he argues, still uses laws akin to the principle of Newtonian classical mechanics, but the law
of thermodynamics (and especially the entropy law) shows that economic systems cannot be
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described by comparative statics. There is no “coming back” to a previous state of the system
as entropy (understood as energy dispersal) prevents this.
Economic processes should be described as a set of physical flows using low entropy ma-
terials (such as fossil fuels) and generating high entropy materials (such as waste). The
point about comparative statics clearly echoes the point made by Joan Robinson in the Cam-
bridge/Cambridge controversy: change and di erence are two di erent things. But it has an
even more direct implication. If any step of a given production process is in essence an evolution
from low entropy to high entropy, then there is no equivalence between a state of the world 1
with 10 units of iron and 5 units of machines and a state 2 with 10 units of machines and 5
units of iron. Although the value (expressed in any given unit) is constant, the overall entropy
in the system increased while moving from state 1 to state 2. From a physical perspective, the
two states are by no means equivalent. A detailed analysis of the consequences of the second
law of thermodynamics is available in Ayres (1998).
Although the book is contemporary to the debates surrounding the Meadows et al. (1972)
report, it was largely ignored until the end of the 1980’s. The direct implication of Georgescu-
Roegen’s principle of entropy is that fungibility in capital as proposed for example by the
Hartwick rule (see chapter 1 section I) is an illusion. There is no substitution possible between
one instrument of wealth and another, there are only transformations and increasing entropy.
Georgescu-Roegen (1971)’s ideas were completed by his student and friend Herman Daly, who
tried to introduce the concept of carrying capacity into mainstream economics.
Daly and Cobb (1989) and Daly (1996) questioned the ability of a geographic area, charac-
terised by ecosystem services provided and resources available, to support more than a given
number of human-beings and a given degree of activity (or way of life). Ecosystem services
are the flow of services provided by a community of living organisms and their environment.
Some of those services, such as air recycling and water filtration are critical to human life and
are to be delivered by man-made alternatives to the adequate scale.Ecosystems are more than
the sum of their individual components, and although the services of individual components
can be comprehended by markets as those components are material and can be owned (and
are therefore capital), the services of the whole ecosystem are typically a positive externality,
a total contribution greater than the sum of the parts.
Under such critical externalities the set of real world markets is neither e cient nor optimal.
Those concerns about externalities were handled by pushing for a general extension of the scope
of market activity, notably by the development of cap and trade systems, locally and globally.
If the failure of market mechanism was related to transactions costs and externalities, then a
push to reduce transaction costs and an “internalisation of externalities” should be able to solve
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the problem. This is the beginning of contingent valuation using Willingness To Pay (WTP)
and Willingness To Accept Compensation (Hanley et al. 2001). In the famous 1997 article in
Nature, Costanza et al. (1997) estimate the value of ecosystem services to lie within a range of
sixteen to fifty-four trillion of dollars per year.
Several options for the proper management of ecosystems have been proposed, from com-
plete conservation to multiple use management (Swallow 1996). More generally, proponents
of ecological economics tried to introduce concepts from physics and biology into economics
and political science. 18 Following Georgescu-Roegen (1971)’s contribution, they point at rapid
methodological advances in natural sciences that never were translated in social sciences.
Following the works of Daly, a second journal that would give its name to the field was
launched, Ecological Economics. The main concern of ecological economics as a discipline is
“strong sustainability” as opposed to “weak sustainability”. Proponents of strong sustainability
defend the principle of non (or at least very limited) substitutability between di erent instru-
ments of wealth. There is therefore a possibility of absolute scarcity, if a critical form of capital
come close to depletion.
When assessing sustainability, how to translate the constraints of absolute scarcity? In
other words, how to manage resources that are or will become strategic assets? Is the national
or global level relevant? Is the general carrying capacity of the environment to be considered at
the same level as strategic assets? What are the drivers of carrying capacity and which policies
should be implemented to encourage people to develop it and reduce incentives to decrease it?
More generally, can non market mechanisms work well next to market mechanisms? Ecological
economics registers as an heir of a long tradition of holistic approaches in economics, from the
Physiocrats to Institutionalism.
Ecological economics wrestles with the problem of matching biological, physical constraints
regarding natural reproduction and evolution on the one hand and maintenance of a resource
with respect to human needs and wants on the other hand. Ecological economics is quite
successful at proposing analytical tools for defined (i.e. limited) problems, the most high-profile
one being the ecological footprint (Wackernagel and Rees 1996, Wackernagel et al. 2002). But
it failed as of today to identify a mechanism akin to neoclassical economics’ markets. A more
detailed presentation of the debate between weak and strong sustainability can be found in
Neumayer (2010). The question of the actual level of substitutability, although the main bone
of contention here, has not been resolved yet.
18. In a di erent context Hobsbawm (1994) saw some application in social sciences for Bohr’s principle of
complementarity.
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It should however be noted that studies addressing the issue found a high degree of substi-
tutability (Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato 2007) between natural and produced capital. 19 It
is an empirical question that is di cult to tackle. The World Bank (2006) used its wealth esti-
mates (see chapter 1 section I.2) to test the current level of substitutability between exhaustible
resources and produced capital. The report shows a fairly high number, around 80% of actual
substitution. Proponents of strong sustainability would eagerly respond that should it be true,
it only shows substitutability in the present and eventually the past and is no guarantee of
future substitutability.
Substitutability is in essence a dynamic notion. Evolutions in technology, demography,
tastes can make some forms of capital strategic at some point (or in some places), but not
for any time or places. A commonsensical approach would be to shield strategic assets from
depletion by the implementation of “safe minimum standards”(Pezzey and Toman 2002). The
preservation of option values, such as biodiversity should also be undertaken. Biodiversity
is an indicator of the health of ecosystems and a potential tank of benefits for mankind as
scientific progress discovers the potential for complementarity or symbiosis with the rest of the
biosphere. Industrial ecology (see the famous example of Kalundborg) is the perfect example
of environment-inspired human organisation.
The weak sustainability paradigm following Hartwick (1977) argued for a central object
for sustainability, savings (see chapter 1 section I). Strong sustainability still favours multiple
targets and keeps debating about the meaning of sustainability (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010,
van den Bergh 2010). Victor (1991) distinguishes between four types of maintenance for capital:
physical quantity, total value, unit value of the services and value of the resource flow. Costanza
and Patten (1995) argue for di erent time scales and scope of sustainability depending on the
service considered. The debate is still open and is very much alive.
A final note should be made that most of the literature is concerned with the supply side
when it comes to sustainability: how to provide for the wants and needs? The answer to this
question is largely related to the evolution of the wants and need, the pattern of consumption.
For a given trend in technical progress, it is obviously always easier to accommodate a lower level
of consumption. The social dimension of consumption and the possibility of over-consumption
are explored by Jackson (2007). The consumption side potentially plays an empirical role as
well in the calculation of factor contributions.
This final note on consumption ends our presentation of the basic concepts of sustainability:
capital theory, the theory of value and weak versus strong sustainability. Those questions have
19. And also that many ecological economists would object to the very notion of “natural capital”.
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been addressed in an already very large body of literature. However, most sustainability studies
are performed in the national context, or even at the ecosystem level. It is at the same time
quite clear that the sustainability challenge, although more or less acute in di erent areas of the
globe, is in essence a global challenge. Nothing illustrates this point better than global warming
and ocean acidification. It seems therefore legitimate to put the sustainability question in the
context of international exchanges, cooperation and competition. It could indeed be argued
that the broad environmental question and the current phase of globalisation are the two salient
global changes of our time.
II Sustainability in an era of globalisation
International trade analysis covers many di erent elements: goods and services, capital
exchanges, financial flows, preferences and spillovers. The field is usually divided between
the study of open economy macroeconomics, focusing on exchange rates, financial flows and
macroeconomic imbalances, and the field of plain international analysis, focusing on merchan-
dise, capital goods and service trade. Another way to see those functions is to discriminate
between international trade and open economy studies. International trade is then the study
of trade relations, observable or predictable trade flows (i.e goods, services, capital goods, fi-
nancial flows) and the domestic economic pattern that might be responsible for those flows.
Open economy macroeconomics and tradestudies the transition form an autarky setting to an
economy that starts to have relations with other economies.
The first approach usually generates prescriptions for the organisation and the management
of international trade and presents the interaction between trade flows and domestic factors.
It also studies the structure of trade and trade relations in a dynamic context. The second
approach takes trade flows and dynamics as they are and merely reflects the consequences of
the state of international trade on domestic economies. To put it in another way, one can
either take international trade as given and adapt to it, or one can study the evolution of
international trade as the result of evolution in domestic economies. 20 In economic literature
studies of international trade and sustainability have long been viewed as separate exercises.
International trade was concerned with the e cient allocation of goods and capital, con-
tributing to sustainability via productivity improvements and increased welfare for a given level
of production. Proponents of strong sustainability first criticised this assertion, arguing that
international trade is not a “neutral” mechanism to improve global e ciency. Daly (1996) ar-
20. The distinction obviously holds in partial equilibrium analysis. In comparative statics general equilibrium,
both trade flows and countries are altered.
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Figure 5: The volume of world trade since the end of the cold war
Source: CPB World Trade Monitor, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2014
gues the conclusions of neoclassical theory are flawed as capital is now mobile internationally,
when the logic of the comparative advantage is based on international factor immobility.
There certainly is an important increase in the volume of merchandise trade since the second
world war, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union (see figure 5). This is usually compared
to the first globalisation from the 1875-1914 period, an age the historian Eric Hobsbawm
characteristically calls The Age of Empire.
Phases of globalisation are more than “simple” phases of trade expansion. They are char-
acterised by global dispersion of innovation, a new international division of labour, increased
labour mobility as well as an increase in trade flows. The analysis of international trade has
followed those evolutions in the nature of trade and several models have been proposed to ex-
plain the existence and the development of trade, trying to predict the consequences of further
trade expansion. More recently, the “new trade theory” proposed a new modelling strategy to
explain patterns of trade in a global context.
II.1 International trade expansion: the logic of comparative advan-
tage
After the mercantilist phase, the emerging classical school developed the notion of com-
parative advantage. Smith (1776), then Ricardo (1817) presented respectively the idea of the
absolute and the relative comparative advantage. A comparative advantage is an advantage
given in a country, that forms the basis of trade. The country should specialise into the pro-
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duction of goods in which it has a comparative advantage and enter trade to acquire the other
goods, to obtain the greatest benefits for exchanging nations. Note that the division of labour
and the resulting specialisation within and between countries form the rationale for trade.
In Smith (1776), the advantage is absolute. Countries specialise in goods in which they are
absolutely more productive than other countries.
The great innovation of Ricardo (1817) is to show that even if one country has an absolute
advantage in every goods, trade is still interesting if the country with all the absolute advantage
entrusts the production of the goods in which the other country is the least disadvantage
to this very country. Country A possesses a comparative advantage in producing good X
when its opportunity cost of producing X is lower than its trading partners’. The notion of
comparative advantage establishes that for a given set of countries, specialisation and trade
generates welfare gains that exceed autarkic possibilities (Leamer 1984). Theory predicts that
small open economies specializing according to their comparative advantage exhibit an increase
in overall e ciency, face lower real prices for consumption goods, and experience net welfare
gains (Deardor  1980, 1982, 1994a).
Over time, several sources of comparative advantage were uncovered, but the main ones are:
– Productivity di erences due to di erences in knowledge and technology (Dollar 1993,
Dornbusch et al. 1977, Eaton and Kortum 2002, Trefler 1995).
– Di erences in factor endowments resulting in di erent specialisations (Deardor  1982,
Leamer 1993, 1995, Ohlin 1933).
– Di erences in the number of varieties produced and in the size of the internal market
(Chaney 2008, Krugman 1980, Melitz 2003).
– Di erences in the property rights regimes, in legislation and overall institutional quality
(notably enforcement of laws and standards) (Chichilnisky 1993, 1994).
– International increasing returns to scale resulting in trade in intermediate products (Ethier
1982).
Studies of international trade based on increasing returns to scale distinguish between in-
ternal scale economies, sourced in fixed costs, and external scale economies, emerging from
agglomeration forces and resulting spillovers. Due to its simplicity, parsimony, and apparent
explanatory power, the logic of comparative advantage drives much of the literature on interna-
tional trade. The first model based on the work of Ricardo is the Ricardian model: international
trade is explained by productivity di erences. Some countries are able to produce more of a
given good than others with the same amount of capital.
Starting with the works of Ohlin (1933), a second source of comparative advantage was
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explored after the first world war and the end of the first globalisation period (The “Age
of Empire” following Hobsbawm (1994)). The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model explains the de-
velopment of international trade by the asymmetric distribution of factor endowments across
countries. In its basic 2-2-2 form, the H-O model consists of 2 countries, each endowed with
2 factors (inputs), which can be used to produce 2 tradable goods. Also known as factor pro-
portion models, HO models emphasize di erences in factor endowments as key determinants of
trade relationships.
They entail several simplifying assumptions: technology is constant across countries, pro-
duction functions exhibit constant returns to scale, factors are mobile within countries (and
domestic industries) but immobile between countries, all agents are price takers, and factor
endowments may di er across countries. Notably, many of these assumptions eliminate al-
ternative sources of comparative advantage. The original HO model gave rise to four major
theorems:
Factor Price Equalization is both an assumption and a long run prediction, stating
that ceteris paribus, international trade causes factor prices to equalize in the long run
(Baldwin 2008, Leamer 1995, Ohlin 1933).
Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem under which countries endowed with greater environmental
resources will specialize in and export environmentally intensive goods, ceteris paribus
(Copeland and Taylor 2003, Deardor  1980, 1982, Neary and Schweinberger 1986).
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem . In the HO world, a rise (resp. fall) in the real price of
good X yields higher (resp. lower) returns to the factor in which X’s production is most
intensive (Feenstra 2004, Jones and Scheinkman 1977, Stolper and Samuelson 1941).
Rybczynski Theorem . An increase in the supply of the factor in which good X is
intensive will lead to a more than proportionate increase in the output of good X, assuming
goods prices are unchanged (Rybczynski 1955).
As clearly stated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, HO-type trade creates potential com-
petition between factors, for the benefits of countries. Factors benefit from increases in the
price of the goods when production requires them intensively and vice-versa. Vanek (1968)
extended the original 2-2-2 model to n-dimensions. The four theorems carry unscathed from
this operation, apart from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which is reduced to a telling “friends
and ennemies” version.
In this n-dimension version of the theorem, every factor has a good which is a natural
enemy and a natural friend 21. It is however not possible to pin down those goods because of
21. A good is a natural enemy of a factor when an increase in the price of this good lowers the income of this
factor. Conversely, a good is a natural friend of a factor when an increase in the price of this good increases
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the dimensionality problem. Deardor  (1982) proposes a general demonstration of the validity
of the comparative advantage 22.
The first empirical test of the HO model was conducted by Leontief (1953) in what is
remembered as the “Leontief paradox”. Quite strikingly, Leontief shows that the United States
export labour intensive goods, when capital intensity was expected. The puzzle was later
explained by di erentiating between qualified and unqualified labour. The United States were
in fact relatively well endowed in qualified labour. Another potential explanation lies in the
necessity, shortly after the second world war, for the United States to produce goods that were
not yet produced by any potential trade partner. This finding is in line with the statistics
on comprehensive wealth showing that the great majority of developed countries are relatively
well-endowed in human capital (see figure 6).
Since then, several empirical tests have been conducted on the Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin
models of trade. Those tests confirmed that the predictive power of the HO and Ricardian model
were relatively low, slightly better than a toss of coin (Leamer 1984) . Trefler (1993) observed
that the volume of international trade was only a fraction of what could be expected from
trade theory. To explain this “missing trade”, he proposed an Heckscher-Ohlin model where
technology matrices would di er across countries, e ectively combining a test of Ricardian and
HO trade. This transformation greatly improved the predictive power of the model, compared
to the test realised by applying the United States technology matrix to all the trading partners.
Later tests under increasing returns to scale (Antweiler and Trefler 2002) and accounting for
factor price equalisation violations (Debaere and Demiroglu 2003) also improved the predictive
power of the canonical models.
The first analytical juncture between the trade literature and the emerging sustainability
literature occurred in the first five years of the 1990’s. Following the first Rio Earth summit,
potential damages to the environment from economic development came on top of the agenda
in several fields. As far as international trade is concerned, it is the negotiations surrounding
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that brought into light the potential
spillovers between the two fields. Concerns were raised that the NAFTA would probably bring
economic gains in line with the logic of comparative advantages, but at the cost of environmental
quality. Competition from Mexican producers would lead to a downward pressure on American
environmental standards. In their seminal working paper (Grossman and Krueger 1991) and
article, Grossman and Krueger (1995) suggested that free trade was overall the best option
because of the likely existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).
the income of this factor.
22. For a general review of the HO models and the n-dimension extensions see Baldwin (2008).
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Figure 6: Intangible Capital in OECD countries
Source: Ferreira and Hamilton (2010)
The Kuznets curve is an inverted U-Shaped relationship between GDP per capita and
inequality. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) postulates that as GDP per capita
increases, pollution first increases until a given threshold and then decreases as better-o  citizens
demand higher environmental norms and quality. As international trade generates income gains,
free trade agreements should have a positive impact on environmental quality. Following an
early proposition of Grossman and Krueger (1991), Copeland and Taylor (1994) decompose the
impact of trade on the environment into three e ects: scale, technique and composition. Later
tests of their theory (Antweiler et al. 2001, Copeland and Taylor 2003) show that the overall
impact of trade on the environment is positive, at least for the selection of air pollutants used
as proxies for environmental quality.
This favourable story of trade is tempered by the fact that gains from trade are rarely
distributed evenly: some win while others lose (Dixit and Norman 1980). Also, if property
rights are ill-enforced or ill-defined (Chichilnisky 1994) specialisation can be detrimental to
the environment, often through over-exploitation of the commons (domestic and global), as is
often the case in fisheries (Ferreira 2007, Ostrom 1990, World Bank and FAO 2009). However,
as long as gains exceed losses, (potential Pareto) compensation is theoretically possible, and
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trade can be considered a net benefit. 23 “Trade optimists” argue that greater production
e ciency, technical progress, and tighter regulation driven by higher living standards benefit
the environment (Neumayer 2001). “Trade pessimists” argue that theoretical assumptions break
down in practice 24, and voice concerns that international trade fuels a potential “race to the
bottom” in global environmental standards (Martinez-Alier 1995, Muradian and Martinez-Alier
2001).
Sides in the argument in the debate on the relationship between trade and the environment
(optimists and pessimists) are usually a match to sides in the debate on strong versus weak
sustainability. The optimistic message of the Copeland and Taylor model rests on restrictive
assumptions regarding what actually is “the environment”. “Environmental resources” refer
not only to stocks of exhaustible resources, fisheries, and forests, but also to air, water, and
assimilative capacity. In particular, “assimilative capacity” may act as a euphemism for reg-
ulatory stringency: countries with strict pollution controls are in e ect endowed with fewer
environmental resources in that sense.
This confusion of physical endowments, assimilative capacity and pollution damage makes
sense from the conceptual perspective of capital theory applied in environmental economics. It
is obviously not viewed in a favourable light by proponents of strong sustainability. Nonethe-
less, as in the Cambridge/Cambridge controversy, the arguably rough analytical framework
provided by international trade theory and environmental economics yielded useful insights.
A good example of this is the pollution haven hypothesis. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
stresses competition in a globalised world is as much between factors as it is between firms
and countries. Leamer (1995) uses this theorem to explain the downward pressures on wages
in developed countries in the 1990’s. Similarly, a country could increase its factor endowment
of environmental resources simply by reducing pollution regulation, triggering a “race to the
bottom”.
This is the underlying mechanism behind the creation of pollution havens, clusters of pollut-
ing (usually heavy) industries located in developing countries. Pollution havens are opposed on
ethical grounds: developing countries should not have to sacrifice their environment to attract
industries, and developed countries should not have to sacrifice their higher standards on the
altar of international competition. Whatever one’s opinion, the logic of pollution havens is ef-
fortlessly explained by both the HO model and the New Economic Geography. Pollution havens
were even supported on quasi-libertarian grounds by economists such as Lawrence Summers 25.
23. Notably through the implementation of local management schemes, as is the case for fisheries in Island.
24. Daly and Cobb (1989) and Daly (1996) show how violating the assumption of factor immobility distorts
the gains from trade.
25. In the famous “Summers memo” from 1991.
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The logic of comparative advantage has been the main force behind trade expansion during
the industrial revolution. It is still presented as the main mechanism behind successes in
development strategies (Yi-fu Lin 2012). However, the canonical models failed to explain the
rapidly emerging movement in inter-industry trade from the 1960’s onwards. The very structure
of trade seemed to change as the source of comparative advantages in a world characterised
by stronger competition seemed to be increasingly challenged by the emergence of industrial
nations in the formerly under-developed world. Intra-industry trade was the first symptom
announcing a new phase of globalisation, based on the importance of agglomeration, market
size and competition between factors. We will now present the changing nature of international
trade in the current phase of globalisation.
II.2 International trade in the context of globalisation
The logic of comparative advantage in HO or Ricardian models is based on the international
division of labour between sectors, either according to technology di erences, or discrepancies
in factor endowments. In a world of free trade, an exogenous increase in the number of goods
should lead to an increase in the volume of trade. Such phases of trade expansion occurred
frequently in history, as for example with the new products brought by the discovery of the
Americas, the extension of the Venetian trade or the development of the silk route. Inter-
industry trade booms made sense as they increased the number of goods and services available
to consumers, usually by bringing them from afar.
Phases of globalisation change this logic as they are mostly marked by increased intra-
industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd 1971). Globalisation describes a trend of increased intercon-
nection and exchanges of all kind between countries and actors of international relations. It
translates into the emergence of a common working language, common norms and standards
used throughout the world, the spread of communities of interests and cultural communities
transcending national barriers. Globalisation is therefore not only an economic phenomenon,
it has political and cultural consequences.
Economic historians usually describe two phases of globalisation. A first phase starts with
the end of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 bringing relative peace to continental Europe and
the beginning of the first world war in 1914. A second phase starts around 1973 with the o cial
end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, accelerates with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the incremental insertion of former communist countries in the global economic
system 26, and goes on until today. On its economic side, globalisation is best described as the
26. As exemplified by the accession of China in 2001 and Russia in 2012 to full membership of the WTO.
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emergence of two new realities:
– Multi-National Firms (MNF) which produce in di erent countries, calling into question
the old model of the national firm with a national base.
– The expansion of trade in intermediaries, linked to the international division of production
processes (IDPP).
A comprehensive presentation of those two developments can be found in Berger (2006).
The IDPP is the deepest transformation, as it profoundly altered both the nature and the
scope of the organisation of production factors in production processes. It alters organisation,
in the sense that the combination of factors is now dependent on an international benchmark of
potential combinations, realised depending on circumstances such as prices, legislations, point
in time advantages such as subsidies, etc. It also alters the magnitude, as a wave of globalisation
is systematically associated with the integration of new countries in global exchanges.
As new countries entered globalisation, new opportunity of IDPP emerge. The signature of
the current globalisation is the emergence from 1990 onwards of new information and commu-
nication technologies which helped to level the playing field of the global factor competition.
As presented in Friedman (2005) this “flat” playing field allows the e cient coordination of pre-
viously out of reach factors into global supply chains, managed by “core” MNF. In the current
phase of globalisation, the key economic object is the global supply chain. The global supply
chain is the logistical reality behind trade, the organizational pattern of flows in intermediate
goods and business services managed by a reduced group of MNF responsible for transportation
and assembly of most of today’s production.
International trade theory first perceived globalisation with the development of intra-industry
trade. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) proposed an indicator, the Grubel-Lloyd index to assess this
phenomenon (see chapter 4). Intra-industry trade takes root in economies of scale and learning-
by-doing in human capital, which in turn generates monopolistic competition. Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) proposed a seminal model for monopolistic competition, which was then used by Krug-
man (1980, 1981) to propose an explanation for intra-industry trade based on the taste for va-
riety. Lancaster (1980) stressed consumers’ preference for di erentiated goods. The Krugman
model highlight the role of scale economies as the basis for agglomeration incentives creating a
“home market e ect” in international trade.
A simultaneous contribution from Ethier (1982) studies the importance of international
economies of scale based on the international division of labour. Ethier (1982) makes a com-
pelling theoretical presentation of the rationale for trade in intermediate goods as a way to
exploit economies of scale external to the firm at the international scale. Other contributions
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from Krugman (1991) onwards explored the impact of geography and the likely formation of
“core/periphery” patterns as a result of international trade. There are therefore compelling
theoretical arguments to explain the di erent aspects of globalisation. International trade the-
ory recognises that firms are the main drivers of trade patterns, as shown by the important
number of studies based on the Melitz (2003) model explaining firm’s export decisions.
Evolutions in the scope and organisation of firms lead countries to question the national
bounds of firms, the interests of which no longer coincide with those of their countries of origin.
Similarly, the new wave of globalisation triggered a slow industrial re-composition along the
new lines of comparative advantage between the old and new players of globalisation. It is
increasingly obvious that MNF choose locations depending on broader dynamic comparative
advantages, which now encompass concerns regarding taxation, institutional quality, labour
regulation, etc. Some factors in industrialised countries are facing a sharp fall in demand
as industries move to more competitive locations, creating structural unemployment in large
segments of the labour force.
Globalisation means that countries (and regions within countries) will have to develop strate-
gies to make the most of their international comparative advantages while at the same time
providing employment opportunities for the other domestic factors not needed by the IDPP.
This is an especially daunting challenge for countries whose comparative advantage mostly rest
on natural capital. Finding a balance between sustainable use of natural capital, employment
opportunities for the local population and international competitiveness is without grandilo-
quence the challenge of the first half of the century for many countries.
This is especially hard since current comparative advantage may have to be abandoned as
countries undertake structural change. Although development can theoretically be pursued
solely based on comparative advantage, economic dynamics usually involve a shift from basic,
natural capital (or pollution) and labour intensive productions to more produced capital and
innovative production. In this process, the average income of the population increases creating
both the labour force and the demand for those products.
The equation of structural change is made more complex in a phase of globalisation as
countries and regions cannot focus on the production of goods but merely on the production
of segments of the global supply chain. Competition to attract the segment of the IDPP
matching the characteristics of the country is fierce, since countries must now negotiate with
the “footloose” MNF responsible for localisation decisions. To civilise this competition, the
World Trade Organisation supervises multilateral agreements, sets global norms to prevent
blatant cases of social or environmental dumping or unfair competition.
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Another answer gaining momentum is based on the realisation that agglomeration forces
and centre/periphery patterns are better managed in larger blocs. Following the European
Union, regional trade blocs and agreements are currently negotiated, to open regions to trade
while gaining power in international negotiations. Nonetheless, the world economy is still an
imperfectly integrated economy, somewhere between a collection of islands in autarky and a
completely open and integrated ensemble. We just saw this has consequences for countries
and regions competing for the best possible insertion in the global supply chain. Intuitively,
the least homogeneous a country is in terms of factor endowments, the more geographically
concentrated production is within its borders, the greater the challenges from globalisation.
This is unfortunately this setting that best describes the conditions for natural capital use in
this globalised context.
II.3 International trade and sustainability: more than resource
trade in globalisation
We presented supra the building blocks of sustainability. The rationale for this thesis is
rooted in the growing concerns regarding particular instruments of wealth: renewable and non-
renewable exhaustible resources. The broader environmental question is one of the critique
addressed to capital theory that gave birth to the DHSS model and the neoclassical theory
of environmental economics (see section I). Exhaustible resources constitute, as any factor of
production, a potential source of comparative advantage. Energy resources (e.g. oil, gas, coal,
uranium, etc.), enter in the production of virtually any good or service, and constitute the
main factor in extractive (iron, zinc, copper) and in transformation industries (steel). As such,
both the values and magnitudes of exhaustible resources embodied in international trade are
significant:
– Natural resource rents account for more than 20% of GDP in 28 countries including
Russia, Saudi Arabia Iran and Venezuela.
– From 1998 to 2008, international trade in natural resources grew over 600%, from US$
613 billion to US$ 3.7 trillion (World Trade Organisation 2010).
– In 2008 natural resources accounted for 24% of global merchandise exports (World Trade
Organisation 2010).
– The 2008 value of natural resources in international trade exceeded the GDP of all but 4
countries, and was equivalent to the combined GDP of the poorest 131 economies (IMF
2008).
– At the regional level, natural resources occupied 74% of total merchandise exports in the
Middle East, 73% in Africa, 70% in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and nearly
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half (47%) in South and Central America (World Trade Organisation 2010).
– For 21 countries, natural resources represent export shares in excess of 80%, and in 9
countries they contribute more than 50% of GDP (Ruta and Venables 2012).
Exhaustible resources are therefore an important component of international trade. They
are also a critical object of study (although not the only one) for sustainability. Developed and
developing countries have di erent attitudes towards natural capital. In developed countries,
natural capital is a small share of comprehensive wealth and does not constitute a compara-
tive advantage or a potential force of agglomeration. There are interesting exceptions to this
rule, such as Canada and Australia. Even in those countries, natural capital accounts for less
than 15% of comprehensive wealth. In developing countries, natural capital intensity is vastly
heterogeneous. Some developing countries are moderately to very intensive in natural capital
while others are virtually without any natural capital.
Both categories of developing countries are to undertake a form of structural change, facing
the hurdles mentioned above. After the initially indiscriminate post-war development strate-
gies 27, growing evidence of trade-related issues with development and structural change in the
context of resource abundance were presented in the literature on the “Dutch Disease” (Corden
and Neary 1982, Corden 1984). Those contributions suggested a terms-of-trade e ect under
which resource abundant countries could see the resources intensive sector of the economy ex-
pand and generate inflation in the economy, which would in turn destroy the competitiveness
of the manufacturing sector.
As a result, instead of undertaking structural change, resources abundant countries may
revert to or stay in a state of pre-industrial specialisation in labour and natural capital intensive
manufactures. After this early trade-focused rationale for the lack of structural change, Sachs
and Warner (1995) proposed empirical evidence of a “Resource Curse”. The resource “curse”
symbolises a statistical negative relationship between the growth rate of GDP and natural
resource abundance proxied by a relatively high ratio of resource intensive exports to GDP. The
favoured explanation for the curse in the recent year seems to rest on institutional characteristics
(Van Der Ploeg 2011). A useful guide to the impact of institutions on sustainability is provided
by ? who o er to discriminate between extractive and inclusive institutions. The former tend
to encourage unsustainable management of natural resources and rent capture by an elite. The
later are identified by the authors as the requirement for a balanced and lasting development.
All in all, exhaustible resources have an impact on three levels:
– They are used as inputs in several sectors and are therefore needed to develop some
27. See Yi-fu Lin (2012) for a presentation of the failure of import substitution strategies and the Washington
consensus, and the potential reasons behind those setbacks.
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industries.
– They are, as a result, a significant part of physical trade.
– In countries and regions where natural resources constitute the most valuable factor of
production, their management determines sustainability and development strategies.
In the permanent state of competition of a globalised economy, countries have an obvious
interest in natural resources. Resource-rich economies need to exploit them sustainably to
finance structural change and risk a stalling development if they fail to do so. The global
supply chain does not require those countries to undertake structural change as long as it does
not hinder their ability to supply those natural resources. The impulse has to come from within,
bearing in mind that trade forces may actually go against structural change and diversification
as they encourage specialisation in line with the current comparative advantages. Resource-
poor countries need to secure a steady supply of resources to keep the production of their part
of the global supply chain going.
The troublesome reality of globalisation is therefore the de facto interdependence between
countries, paired with ever increasing competition. A development strategy in the context
of globalisation must accommodate the static nature of specialisation to form comparative
advantages with the fundamentally dynamic nature of development. To provide useful guidance
for both resource-rich and resource-poor, developed and developing countries, it is therefore
necessary to produce a model of international interdependence in the context of structural
change.
In this context, we will, for the rest of this thesis, strive to propose a comprehensive frame-
work to understand the interaction of international trade dynamics with the requirements and
objectives of sustainability. To this end, we will first provide as survey of both the theoretical
and the empirical literature on sustainability in chapter 1. The Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz
(DHSS) model is the natural starting point for this, as it combines capital theory with the
neoclassical theory of value. It fulfils the requirements for a theory of sustainability.
We will next present the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) and Comprehensive Wealth indicators
of sustainability and review how they can be linked to the theoretical models of sustainability.
We will then present the critical role of institutions in shaping sustainability and explore the
conceptual tools we need to mobilise to develop a comprehensive model of sustainability. We
discuss the notion of steady-state since it is used in both environmental and ecological economics
with di erent understandings and a di erent purpose. We conclude this first chapter with a
non-formalised presentation of a closed economy framework derived from the literature.
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We argue that sustainability is in essence the need to consider five dimensions of themeans to
development: maintaining comprehensive wealth, allowing for constant value consumption over
time, guaranteeing intra and intergenerational equity and controlling for real substitutability
between instruments of wealth. We also argue that the best way, even in a closed economy, to
take those five dimensions into account simultaneously is to develop institutions, allocation and
conflict resolution mechanism according to the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle
is especially important when legal rights are weakly enforced, since it reduces the possibility of
power or resource grabbing.
In chapter 2 we review the three fields of the literature that need to be matched to propose
an open economy sustainability theory 28: the trade and the environment literature, the open
economy resource economics literature and the empirical sustainability literature. We show
through the analysis of the literature that the complexity of open economy sustainability comes
from the rationale for international trade. Sustainability rules and principles are not fitted
for the grey area, especially in terms of rights and responsibility, between complete country
autonomy and perfect global integration.
This makes the implementation of additional sustainability measures necessary since trade
flows do not reflect actual contributions to (un)sustainability. The concept of “virtual sus-
tainability” proposed in Atkinson et al. (2012) presents empirically the consequences of unsus-
tainable management via international trade. We stress that the literature tends to approach
sustainability issues either as a static international trade problem of resource content (based on
classical static trade models) or as a dynamic resource management issue (based on dynamic
resource models). We argue that the dynamic interactions between international resource prices
and domestic incentives to specialise or diversify in the context of structural change make the
case for dynamic models of trade and sustainability. Such models would allow us to study the
determination of world prices by domestic capital management decisions and vice versa.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the presentation of the first attempt to build such a model. We
combine sustainability rules with the neoclassical growth model from Cuñat and Ma ezzoli
(2004) to compare how countries characterised by asymmetric endowments undertake structural
change in autarky and free trade. We propose several scenarios to account for potential biases
in structural change (e.g. faster accumulation of a given factor). We also compare the case
where the two trading partners accumulate the same instrument of wealth against the case
where they focus on di erent instruments.
28. An anonymous referee, in a report on an earlier version of chapter 2 noted that the literature on trade
and sustainability does not exist as such.
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We first find that, when all factors are needed in the production process, countries are
better-o  under autarky than free trade. This feature comes from the fact that exploiting a
country’s potential comparative advantage requires the reallocation of resources (the creation
of intermediary goods in our model) following the asymmetric distribution of endowments
in the country. As a consequence, productivity is reduced by the extra allocation decisions.
We also observe that countries are worse-o  when asymmetry in endowments is high, so that
consumption and total wealth are actually lower. What we actually observe is the rationale to
undertake structural change.
As countries reduce asymmetry by investing in produced capital using labour and natural
capital, they increase comprehensive wealth and steady-state consumption. A third interesting
finding comes when the two countries are accumulating a di erent factor. Natural capital
abundant countries are relatively better-o  compared to produced capital abundant countries
in autarky. This last finding suggests that autarky might be a better course for countries that
are abundant in natural capital and would only accentuate this specialisation when opening up
to free trade. We conclude with the observation that although both countries lose in free trade
compared to autarky, trade liberalisation comes with gains from trade in the production sector
in the course of structural change. Originally scarce factors see their price fall faster while
originally abundant factors see their price increase more slowly. Those amendments to the
price path modify incentives to invest in one instrument of wealth with respect to the others.
As a consequence, we call for those gains from trade resulting from factor reallocation to be
added to Adjusted Net Savings (ANS), saved for reinvestment and not consumed.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a framework for the analysis of sustainability in the presence
of international trade. We stress the role of increasing returns to scale and institutions in
shaping trade and development patterns in the current phase of globalisation. In chapter 4 we
use the Ethier (1982) model on the international division of labour to investigate the impact
of increasing returns to scale on the requirement to save some of the gains from trade for
sustainability. We conclude that based on the impact of increasing returns to scale on factor
prices, the international division of the productive processes actually commends more savings
as it creates an externality on the factor prices path.
This result suggests that natural resources abundant countries are critical to global sustain-
ability, as the way they make natural resources available to the global supply chain will have an
important cumulative impact on natural resources prices. We propose a reinvestigation of the
resource curse, arguing that the Dutch disease and the extractive institutions that are the basis
for the resource curse are actually two sides of the same coins. Extractive institutions create
conditions for an increase in the size of the natural resource sector to extract more rents and
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increase the size of the comparative advantage, while a trade-induced increase in the size of the
natural resource intensive sector will create more appetite for rents and reinforce institutional
extractiveness.
We propose to use the pattern of trade in natural resources intensive goods (in terms of
one way, interindustry trade versus two ways, intraindustry trade) to define two possible paths
for resource abundant countries. Structural change can either take the form of unsustainable
depletion of natural resources before the build up of a produced-capital intensive productive
base, or the composition of this productive base by sustainable reinvestment of natural resources
rents. We argue that countries engaged in one way trade in natural resources intensive goods
are likely to follow the first unsustainable path, so that the trade pattern in those goods can
be used as a proxy indicator of un-sustainability.
In the final section of chapter 4 we turn to the impact of institutions on resource abun-
dance and try to provide a better understanding of the dynamics behind the formation of the
“institutional drift” as in ?. We propose to use the dislocation of the Soviet Union as a nat-
ural experiment in institutional sameness with observable heterogeneity in natural resources
abundance. Using correlation in ranks, we make the hypothesis that although the Russian
Federation can be considered to be part of natural resources abundant countries because of the
share of natural resources rent in GDP, its reinvestment behaviour as estimated by Adjusted
Net Savings (ANS) is actually closer to its relatively resources poor neighbours.
This observation suggests sustainability policy should be undertaken at a regional scale,
as defined by co-evolution in ANS, since a country by country approach may fail because of
regional interdependence in reinvestment policy. We conclude the section by stressing how
counterfactual evaluations based on sustainability rules are critical to sustainability assess-
ment. The cumulative nature of institutional and reinvestment paths makes the case for the
creation of benchmark paths to situate a country’s current level of comprehensive wealth in the
great number of possible paths. This is even more important when considering the inherent
uncertainty in investment decisions.
We conclude from those results that international trade, in a world characterised by a process
of globalisation and imperfect openness, has a profound impact on sustainability. We propose
more comprehensive national sustainability assessments, coupled with regional assessments to
control for interdependence. The empirical findings based on “virtual sustainability” and the
results of our simulations concur to suggest that some gains from trade should go hand in hand
with extra savings. The definition of regional sustainability blocks could legitimise the use of
trade management instrument as a way to make those extra savings available to society as a
whole.

Chapter 1
Sustainable development in economics:
the emergence of sustainability
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Introduction
In this first chapter, we review the development of the theory of sustainability. Based on the“building blocks” from the general introduction, sustainability can be defined as the analysis
of the means for a sustainable development. Sustainability is based on capital theory, which
provides conceptual tools to define values associated with the environment of human beings.
Those values turn physical and immaterial components into instruments of wealth, which can
be combined to satisfy needs and wants.
Those needs and wants are the sources of value as defined by the utilitarian theory of
value. Utilitarianism forms the basis for the e cient allocation of resources in a geographical
space. This allocation is understood as optimal under the Utilitarian ethic. The combination
of capital theory with the Utilitarian theory of value is the basis for the weak sustainability
paradigm. The weak sustainability paradigm emerged from the early DHSS model (Dasgupta
and Heal 1974, Solow 1974, Stiglitz 1974) and the definition of the Hartwick rule for sustainable
reinvestment (Hartwick 1977, Asheim et al. 2003).
Those theoretical contributions required empirical confirmation. A first assessment of the
state of comprehensive wealth was made by Repetto et al. (1989). Soon, the “London school”
of sustainability proposed the Genuine Savings (GS) or Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) as an
indicator of sustainability (Pearce and Atkinson 1993, Hamilton 1994). After a period of relative
rivalry between ANS and the Green Net National Product (GNNP), ANS are adopted as the
best theoretically grounded indicator of sustainability (Dasgupta 2009). Still, the indicator fails
to convince proponents of strong sustainability, who still believe that money-value sustainability
is over-estimated because of market imperfection and physical limits.
To propose a definition of sustainable development and sustainability it is critical to take into
account the contribution of institutions. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) institutions
can be defined as extractive when they favour the interest of a minority, and inclusive when
they o er opportunity and voice to every agent. The presence of inclusive institutions is critical
to sustainability: exclusive institutions prevent intragenerational equity. Exclusive institutions
also limit intergenerational equity as they foster market ine ciencies and favour short-termism
through prevalent rent-seeking behaviours. We discuss the central role of equilibrium analysis
for sustainability, and stress how equilibrium analysis should only be undertaken if indicators
of disequilibrium are also available.
We end the chapter with a proposition for an integrated sustainability framework. Sus-
tainability is characterised by the realisation of five dimensions: maintaining comprehensive
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wealth over time, maintaining constant consumption over time, controlling for money-value
substitutability to be consistent with physical substitutability, guaranteeing intergenerational
equity and fostering intragenerational equity. Working along those five dimensions will guaran-
tee sustainability while helping to select consistent transition paths under uncertainty. Under
this framework, time consistency at the most aggregated level is guaranteed using current value
indicators while present value indicators are used to make adjustments to the development path
as society moves in time and uncertainty is reduced. On this conceptual basis, we can propose
a characterisation of the action of trade variables and mechanisms on sustainability.
In section I we present the construction of the weak sustainability paradigm, with the
formation of the DHSS model (subsection I.1) and the elaboration of Adjusted Net Savings
(subsection I.2). We then present the role of institutions in subsection II.1, discuss the con-
cept of steady-state (subsection II.2) before presenting a framework for sustainability analysis
(subsection II.3).
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I The development of the weak sustainability paradigm
The neoclassical theory of value builds on capital theory. As in Fisher (1906), perfect
substitutability between instruments of wealth through exchanges is therefore build-in. The
neoclassical paradigm central claim is that market mechanism allows for an optimal allocation
of resources (in the Pareto sense) under the constraints of all rival resources available. This
claim was proven to be true under pure and perfect competition (Arrow and Debreu 1954).
But this rigorous intellectual construct failed to address some documented stylised facts.
A first criticism on the ability of markets to provide a social optimum was formulated by
Keynes (1936) who stressed the possibility of a permanent situation of under-employment.
Keynes believed however that the right set of policy measures could bring down unemployment
and reduce spare capacity. Keynes’ critique could be deemed conjunctural 1 but another issue
related to e ciency in use of instruments of wealth would soon emerge. Coase, in his totemic
contribution The problem of Social Cost (Coase 1960) introduces the concept of externality.
The notion of externality highlights the fact that some actions bear no cost (or generate no
advantage) to the agent undertaking the action but do so for the agent at the receiving end.
A perfect illustration is air or water pollution. As there is no price paid or benefit received,
the externality can endure. Coase thought of the problem of externalities from a business
perspective, but stressed more generally that markets could not be e cient because of property
rights problems and information issues. 2 Both Keynes and Coase question the e ciency of
market mechanisms under circumstances than can be regarded as exceptional. But externalities
can be found everywhere, and especially in the emerging analysis of environmental issues.
Coase’s critic and the solution presented in the Coase theorem framed the way environmental
issues would be dealt with in economics.
The environmental critique of the neoclassical paradigm stems from the notion of externali-
ties with the seminal work of Ayres and Kneese (1969). Those authors stressed the importance
of material flows to assess production processes, and discussed how to “internalise” externalities.
The Club of Rome report (Meadows et al. 1972) then cast doubt on the lasting of the current
stocks of materials. The final critique came from Paul Erlich’s book, The Population Time
Bomb. The last two brought back into the agenda the question of absolute scarcity. Erlich’s
work was a direct reference to the early observation of Malthus (1817) regarding diminishing
return and population growth. The Club of Rome put more emphasis on the material intensity
of production processes in societies entering mass consumption, following the conclusions in
1. And would be treated as such by the monetarists and M. Friedman.
2. G. Akerlof elaborates on this point with the theory of adverse selection in the context of asymmetric
information.
48 Chapter 1. The Emergence of Sustainability
Ayres and Kneese (1969). Recognition of the possibility of absolute scarcity would come as
a threat to the relevance of allocation mechanisms (and the role of prices as a signal) based
on relative scarcity. Those concerns were not new. Problems regarding pollution and environ-
mental damage were acknowledged for some time. Hotelling (1931) proposed a rule of optimal
depletion in the context of complete markets to answer the questions raised by the conserva-
tionist movement in the United States. But the rule holds in the context of e cient markets.
Still, those early works aimed at amending the marginalist framework, when in the early 70’s
attention was directed to finding an alternative to it. This e ort would later be articulated by
ecological economists.
The final critique came from philosophers concerned with the social dimension of the “in-
visible hand” and market mechanisms. As numerous commentators and careful readers have
since stressed, Smith understood the invisible hand as part of a social context, described in
his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759). But subsequent theoreticians in the neoclassi-
cal approach tend to overlook this social context. 3 Setting aside the reminiscences from the
Marxist superstructure, this argument was most eminently defended by John Rawls. A The-
ory of Justice (1971) 4 triggered a controversy regarding the plausibility of the representation
of society in neoclassical economics 5 Rawls belongs to the philosophical school of the social
contract (Rousseau 1762). After the emergence of the welfare state, Rawls proposed a model
for a “fair” society centred on the social contract. Rawls (1971) explains that equity is the core
of any social contract, and as such of any equitable and sustainable society. He develops the
concept of justice as fairness, trying to propose an alternative to utilitarianism by reconciling
equality and liberty.
Rawls proposed the concept of the “original position”. One should decide on his conception
of justice behind a “veil of ignorance”, that is without knowing in advance his position in society.
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.
We shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”
(Rawls 1971). If the social conception of justice was established this way, Rawls concludes
that everyone would favour the option were the worst-o  individual in society is as well-o  as
possible, or a least not below the minimum one would in objectivity sets for oneself. There
3. This argument is back in full force in the context of the current (2007-) financial and economic crisis. It
is common to hear commentators argue that the crisis is the consequence of market mechanisms eroding the
social structures on which they rest.
4. We worked with the 1987 French edition which translation was supervised by Rawls himself. The edition
is amended to take into account some of the reactions and critique to the original edition.
5. This is obviously not the sole impact of Rawls’ work, but the most relevant one to the study of the
formation of the sustainability paradigm we are conducting here.
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should therefore be a minimum of intragenerational equity, were individuals who are better-o 
than the position they choose behind the veil of ignorance o er a “fair” compensation to the
people that are worse-o . But one should also be concerned with intergenerational equity,
as the fact that some generations are better-o  than others would also be a breach of the
“original position” argument. A theory aiming at producing the best possible social outcome
should therefore be concerned with intergenerational and intragenerational equity if it is to be
a theory of fairness.
Our aim in this chapter (and the next one) is to propose a conceptual framework for sus-
tainability. To highlight the key concepts we use to do so, we will use boxes such as the box
1.1 below to highlight the milestones of the framework formation.
Box 1.1: Intergenerational and Intragenerational equity
Sustainability is first and foremost a normative choice, anchored in a theory of equity and
justice. The need to preserve the fate of future generations emerges as human beings increase
their ability to shape in the lifetime of a single generation the future of the planet and its ability
to support life. But inter and intragenerational equity also have an instrumental value in shaping
sustainability. Equity increases trust, confidence and stability in social choices and institutions,
all of which makes a more e cient allocation of resources more likely.
I.1 The DHSS model and a erent controversies
The environmental and social critiques conflated to make the neoclassical model look out of
touch on social and environmental imperatives. Potentially harmful market imperfections and
absolute scarcity problems entered the economic agenda, even though those were beyond the
scope of usual problems based of relative scarcity. All three criticism crystallised the issues that
would be the core studies of sustainable development (see section II.2). The foundations of the
theory of value, market mechanisms and the theory of capital as understood by neoclassical
economists (usually on the Cambridge, MA side) were all under fierce criticism. Neoclassical
economists addressed criticism in three steps, tackling problems in order of urgency. They
rea rmed that the theory of utility and capital theory combined are an e cient way to solve
potential problems regarding the relation of human needs and wants and the environment
providing the means. The newly constructed model build to back this claim makes extensive
use of the new optimal control theory (see Bellman (1957), Chiang (1992) and Dorfman (1969))
to address issues regarding inter-temporal management of resources.
The first response was directed to Rawls. According to the maximin, what matters is not
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the average or maximum level of well-being reachable in an economy, but the level of well-being
for the worse-o  individual. In a first contribution Arrow (1973b) proposes some objections to
Rawls’ principles. In a follow-up contribution (Arrow 1973a) he applies his interpretation of the
maximin criterion to the problem of intergenerational equity. He mentions that Rawls warned
him he did not intended the criterion to be used in this context, but Arrow does not see why
the criterion would not be applicable. 6 Arrow (1973a) shows that if the current generation is
assumed to care for the future one, even at a discounted rate, then as long as the productivity
gains in the current generation are higher than the discount rate applied to the later generation
utility, the current generation will save. He generalises this result showing that if the horizon
of the problem is extended to infinity, then the altruistic maximin criterion is equivalent to the
utilitarian program of maximising the sum of discounted utility flows. The need to consider an
infinite horizon is justified again in Dasgupta (2001) who argues against the possibility to set a
limit for a shorter horizon. It seems indeed dubious that a rationale can be found to consider
six generations and not seven or twenty-five.
Solow (1974) proposed to test the maximin criterion to integrate Rawls’ idea in the neo-
classical model with an exhaustible resource. He proposes an adapted program derived from
the maximin (1.4). This is the program the social planner should maximise and not the usual
level of utility. He notes that Rawls advocated the maximin for many problems, but not in the
case of intergenerational equity. He endeavours to do so even if Rawls stated again in a note
about taxation, that the maximin could not be used to determine the just rate of savings and
held only within generations (Rawls 1974, p.142). It is interesting to note that the objective
of maintaining consumption constant over time derives from Solow and Arrow’s mathemat-
ical interpretation of Rawls’s critique as the maximin, so that the social objective becomes
MintU(c(t)) (Arrow 1973a, p.325). In the first Solow (1974) article, the production function
takes the form:
Y = F (Kp,Kl,Ke) (1.1)
Where Y is production, Kp in produced capital, Kl is labour and Ke is an exhaustible resource.
The production function form retained is the Cobb-Douglas, as it is the simplest function form
making all the entrants needed, so that if Ke = 0,Y = 0. If one assumes the following particular
function:
Y = emgtKgpK
1≠g≠h
l K
h
e (1.2)
6. The chronology of the articles commenting on Rawls’s principle and the DHSS model is somewhat puzzling.
In the 1973 article Arrow already refers to the forthcoming 1974 articles of Dasgupta and Solow, suggesting he
had the opportunity to review them before publication.
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With mg the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress. Let C be consumption. Taking per
capita values and controlling for technical progress, take r = KeKlemt , z =
Kp
Klemt
and c= CKl . The
income constraint is defined as Y = Q˙+C which yields the di erential equation:
z˙ = z1≠g≠hyh≠ (n+m)z≠ ce≠mt (1.3)
Where n is population growth. This yields an optimal path of given starting values z(0) and
K(0). The problem of the management of a stock of finite resources under a maximin criterion
is therefore “to find the largest constant c0 for which there exist a function y(t)Ø 0 for all tØ 0”
(Solow 1974, p. 13) subject to:
Kl0
Œ⁄
0
y(t)e(m+n)tdt Æ R¯ (1.4)
Using equation 1.4 with the di erential equation yields the highest level of produced capital
allowing for the largest constant consumption over time constrained by the finiteness of the
exhaustible resource. Reformulating the problem as a more conventional minimisation problem
and assuming the existence of a relative shadow price of produced capital in terms of the
exhaustible resource then yields (with p the shadow price):
p˙
p
=≠(1≠g≠h)z≠g≠hyh (1.5)
Equation 1.5 states that the rate of change of the shadow price for the exhaustible resource stock
should equal the sum of the rate of change of the shadow price for produced capital and the
rate of return of the use of produced capital to reproduce produced capital. The representative
agent is therefore indi erent between those two forms of capital. This rule of optimal depletion
(use) for exhaustible resources bears an obvious resemblance to the Hotelling rule. Using the
maximin criterion as a way to interrogate the neoclassical model on intergenerational equity,
Solow finds ambivalent conclusions. His results depend on assumptions regarding the form
of the production function, population growth and technical progress. The Cobb-Douglass
functional form makes all the instruments of wealth indispensable in the production process,
but it also builds in perfect substitutability between those at shadow prices.
The results of the Solow (1974) model can be summarised by considering three keys factors
for sustainability. When considering resource allocation, one has to inquire about substitutabil-
ity between instruments of wealth, the number of people sharing the use of those instruments
and the possible improvements in the production of those instruments. Those factors can be
organised as an impossible trinity (see figure 1.1) following Mundell, as it is possible to have
two of those factors only by giving up on the last one. If one considers no technical progress,
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Figure 1.1: The impossible trinity to maintain consumption constant
Source: Author from Solow (1974)
then one needs no population growth and perfect substitution. If one has population growth
then one needs perfect substitutability and technical progress. If one has imperfect substitution
then one needs technical progress and no population growth to ensure sustainability. Solow
(1974) is only concerned with one angle. If there is no technical progress, capital must be
accumulated fast enough (through perfect substitution of the exhaustible resource by produced
capital) to drive the produced capital/labour ratio to infinity as the exhaustible resource/labour
ratio goes to zero. Conversely if you have population growth, you need technical progress and
perfect substitutability to maintain consumption constant, especially if population growth is
geometric or more.
The exploration of the final case (the no substitutability between di erent instruments of
wealth case) will be presented in section II. Solow (1974) is quite optimistic as he notes from
studies of factor shares in production that produced capital already enters for much more than
exhaustible resources in the production process (Solow 1974, p. 17). Works from Dasgupta
and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) reach similar conclusions, setting more accurate conditions
regarding the shape of the optimal path and the mathematical conditions surrounding the
maintenance of constant consumption. The Dasgupta and Heal (1979) textbook summarises the
findings. Those conclusions gave birth to the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model, still
the workhorse neoclassical model for the treatment of exhaustible resources. It is worth stressing
that in this model, the result of the production process (the monetary value of income) can be
used both for consumption and investment. The DHSS model inaugurates this assumption in
models with exhaustible resources and it is still used by default. It is not clear whether this
assumption is made as a simplifying assumption or in an explicit reference to Fisher.
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It is interesting to see how Solow used the maximin criterion to tackle intergenerational
equity when Rawls never intended it to be used this way. There is a “fundamental disequi-
librium” between generations. Indeed, future generations can inherit capital, institutions and
other benefits from present ones, but the inverse is not true. Egalitarianist intergenerational
equity ensures that the next generation inherits at least what the current generation inherited
from the previous one. But it precludes any increase in the inheritance as then the next genera-
tion would be better-o  than the current one. This would also be a breach of intergenerational
equity. Intergenerational equity understood as intergenerational equality leads to the purest
egalitarianism and the impossibility of progress. Solow (1974) also shows that the maximin
criterion is highly dependent on the initial condition. “if the initial capital stock is very small,
no more will be accumulated and the standard of living will be low forever” (Solow 1974, p.11).
Therefore an application of the maximin in economics should be understood as:
– The objective of constant consumption over time as the condition for intergenerational
equity.
– The underlying condition on the capital stock from which the flows of services (i.e con-
sumption) were to be derived. Early generations can have a higher consumption/capital
ratio, because what they need to pass is a proper technical progress adjusted capital to
the next one.
The maximin was used as ethical basis for an implicit behavioural rule regarding con-
sumption and savings (in fact investment) in economics. But this “social contract” between
generations was sealed in an implicit way and is based on relatively strong assumption regard-
ing substitutability, the course of technical progress and productivity gains. As for population
growth, it is assumed to be exogenous, as in the Solow (1956) model. Therefore, just like
Malthus, the DHSS model does not integrate a mechanism of endogenous growth. As Solow
(1974) and the other founding articles of the DHSS model are concerned with finite resource
management, they do not tackle the prime concern of Rawls’ work, intragenerational equity.
Although the DHSS model would become the basis of the neoclassical treatment of sustainabil-
ity, the question of intragenerational equity is, to our knowledge, never mentioned. It is usually
argued that intragenerational equity is addressed with di erent tools and in di erent models
which ambition it is to tackle this particular issue.
Rawls (1974) reminds us of the principle of democratic justice: “Each person has an equal
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties for all” and “social and economic
inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the
least advantaged members of society (the maximin equity criterion) and (b) attached to o ces
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1974, p.142).
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Any e ort to provide guidance regarding the transmission of capital that claims to rest on a
form of maximin should therefore be preoccupied with point (a). A transmission of capital from
a better-o  individual in the (theoretical) early generation should therefore be scrutinised to
make sure this transmission will be to the benefit of the “least advantaged members of society”.
The DHSS model confirms the status quo in economics: market mechanisms take respon-
sibility for capital accumulation and redistributive policies take responsibility for tackling in-
equalities. So economists continued to study inter and intragenerational equity separately.
Intergenerational equity is the basis of capital accumulation and it is as such fully integrated
in the economic analysis. Intragenerational equity is a second rank objective as far as eco-
nomic e ciency is concerned. It should be dealt with using the relevant redistributive policy
(depending on the preferences of voters) as “No reliable theory exists to integrate those to a
comprehensive economic development approach” (Arrow et al. 2010).
This is in itself a major issue when using the DHSS model to build a theory of sustainability.
Still, as in the Cambridge/Cambridge controversy, one is left with the impression that while
Rawls’ objections where not completely addressed, the other side of the argument won by
proposing a convenient, intuitive and formal approximation. Environmental economists seized
the opportunity of a formal framework, compatible with tools such as the Hotelling rule to
propose extensions on the theme of optimal resources management.
I.1.1 Sustainability from the DHSS model: The Hartwick rule
A first seminal contribution to the corpus of natural resources optimal management would
soon come with John Hartwick (1977) and his article on Intergenerational Equity and the In-
vesting of Rents from Exhaustible Resources. Using the Solow model as a background, Hartwick
shows that under the assumption of zero population growth, investing all profits and rents from
exhaustible resources into produced capital was the way to prevent “over-consumption” of re-
sources by one generation and insure equity between generations. This result is crucial as it
provided the first policy rule to manage exhaustible resources at the macroeconomic level. The
“Hartwick rule” has been intensely debated since. A first generalisation is provided by Dixit
et al. (1980). Solow (1986) links it to the welfare approach developed by Weitzman (1976) (see
below). For a recent review of the multiple interpretations of the Hartwick rule see Asheim
et al. (2003). Sato and Kim (2002) o er a comparison of the Hartwick rule against another rule
based on conservation laws.
The Hartwick rule is critical to the emergence of weak sustainability as it gave the field a
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clear and intuitive yardstick to assess sustainability. It also provided weak sustainability with an
agenda. Sustainable reinvestment demands estimates of the current natural capital available
since only “What gets measured, gets managed” (Heal 2011, p. 1). As such, the Harwick
rule creates the need for environmental accounting (see section I.2). If natural resources can be
integrated in an accounting framework, they can be optimally managed using shadow prices like
any other asset. Dynamic optimisation can take place. Under the mathematical translation of
the neoclassical theory of value, marginal costs and marginal utility are shadow prices, values
that are the mathematical solutions of the optimisation problem and therefore the socially
optimal ones as well. If markets are e cient, market prices are shadow prices and represent the
prices maximising the allocation/depletion problem considered. A set of complete and e cient
markets in a utilitarian society theoretically delivers the social optimum also for natural capital.
With a policy rule for optimal reinvestment and an agenda to develop natural capital ac-
counts, the weak sustainability paradigm was only missing indicators to make sustainability
issues explicit to economic agents. The most natural was to link the Hartwick rule to existing
indicators, which were after all also sourced in optimal control theory. The first contribution
to that tradition is doubtlessly the seminal article of Weitzman (1976) which provided a wel-
fare interpretation of the Net National Product (NNP). This e ort is to be understood in the
context of the redefinition of the goals of development and the role of GDP growth. Weitzman
(1976) shows that under relatively strict (heroic) assumptions, NNP is also an indicator of
dynamic welfare. Therefore, as the DHSS model and the Hartwick rule are also grounded in
welfare theory, natural capital management can be linked to the welfare interpretation of the
NNP. Solow (1986) extends the Weitzman model in the context of an exhaustible resource, then
Hartwick (1990) extends it again for pollution and renewable resources. Asheim (1994) inves-
tigates the potential impact of a non-constant rates of utility discounting. Weitzman (1997)
provides another extension for technical progress and Asheim and Weitzman (2001) show that
real NNP is an accurate indicator of dynamic welfare variations.
Starting with the Repetto et al. (1989) practice of accounting, empirical measures of wealth
and instruments of wealth are proposed by Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Hamilton (1994).
As a consequence, the debate shifts from the importance of income derived from instruments
of wealth to the importance of wealth itself. This shift is far from minor. Under mainstream
welfare analysis, what matters is income from instruments as the final aim is to improve welfare.
Optimal management of wealth instruments is only instrumental to this end. But the results of
the “London school” (Victor 1991) on wealth accounting raises the profile of worries regarding
substitutability. This leads the welfare school to pay more attention to wealth and investment
in wealth. This shift is made easier by the simultaneous demonstration by Hamilton and
Clemens (1999) and Dasgupta and Maler (2000) that dynamic welfare is also related to wealth
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variations (from the capital theoretic perspective for the former and the welfare perspective
for the later). With this, the welfare school gradually gives up on NNP and GDP, to adopt
the capital theoretic perspective derived from the newly established “green national accounts”
(Dasgupta 2009).
The reunion of the two traditions inside the weak sustainability paradigm allows for a
better understanding of the links between optimality and sustainability. Contributions relying
on optimal control theory focus on producing a path, stressing the optimal way to transition
from current conditions to a Pareto-optimal steady-state. But a competitive and optimal path is
not necessarily sustainable in the maximin or utilitarian sense. To achieve sustainability under
optimality, the literature stresses the need to use shadow prices to evaluate assets. This debate
is a natural extension of the debate on the Hartwick rule as the Hartwick rule is demonstrated
to represent the rule for sustainability. A first contribution to this debate is Asheim (1994) who
studies the conditions under which the Hartwick rule might lead to sustainability. He shows
that “Hartwick’s rule characterises a sustainable development; it is not a prescriptive rule for
sustainable development” (Asheim 1994, p. 262). Hence, a sustainable economy follows the
Hartwick rule but following the Hartwick rule does not guarantee sustainability.
Arrow et al. (2003) show that population should be included in any model of sustainability
and discuss the conditions of this inclusion. If population is assumed to be exponential, then
per capita sustainability should be assessed on an optimal path. If not, all the assets considered
in the model should have at least a non negative rate of growth to ensure sustainability (and the
relevance of population growth). Buchholz et al. (2005) demonstrate then that if a competitive
path if equitable, it must satisfy the Hartwick rule. Following the Hartwick rule generates an
optimal path and an optimal path necessarily follows the Hartwick rule. ? then investigate the
relationship between population growth and the savings rate. They show that in the DHSS
model with an e cient path and constant savings rates, population growth has to be quasi-
arithmetic for the path to be a maximin or classic utilitarian, ensuring sustainability. D’Autume
and Schubert (2008) propose a DHSS model where the exhaustible resource has an amenity
value. They notably show that under a CES function with a low elasticity of substitution, it is
optimal to preserve a minimum level of natural capital to ensure sustainability. Hamilton and
Withagen (2007) explore the links between the rate of change in utility and genuine investment
with multiple instruments and externalities. Cheviakov and Hartwick (2009) finally extend
the model of ? including decay in produced capital and exogenous technical progress. Under
this setting, there is a “race” between the rate of decay of produced capital and technical
progress. Only a high enough rate of technical progress can maintain sustainable per capita
consumption. 7
7. The Marxist parentage of this last result is quite interesting.
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Those contributions illustrate the diversity of the reinvestment rules depending on the model
used and the assumption regarding technical change and population. Hamilton and Hartwick
(2005) and Hamilton and Withagen (2007) both study the possibility of paths where consump-
tion is unbounded and not kept constant over time. The later show how unbounded consump-
tion may in the end lead to higher wealth. Of importance to a sustainability framework here is
the notion of the development path. Sustainability is defined as a state, an ensemble of static
desirable characteristics and as a path to transition from the current state to this sustainable
state (see section II.2 for a discussion on the steady-state as an analytical tool). This begs
interrogations on the possibility to run comparisons between periods and countries. Asheim
(2007) tackles the first problem by pointing at the importance of having proper price indexes
to evaluate capital and welfare at di erent points in time 8. In a similar exercise for compar-
isons between countries (Asheim 2010) he stresses the necessity to use purchasing-power-parity
measures to accommodate di erences in the structures of economies, notably in terms of envi-
ronmental amenities.
The Hartwick rule o ered momentum to investigate the use of rules based on the analysis
of development states and paths. The weak sustainability literature emerges at the end of
the 1980’s (Pezzey and Toman 2002) from attempts to better characterise the instruments of
wealth needed along those paths and at those optimal states. The emphasis on sustainability
and the maintenance of wealth according to the neoclassical theory of value and the principle of
intergenerational equity gradually overtakes more conventional indicators such as the NNP. The
new field merges methods from environmental economics, resource economics, capital theory,
welfare theory and growth theory to produce prescriptive rules regarding the management of
resources in the economy: natural capital to start with, but produced and human capital as
well as the original DHSS model is developed and extended.
Box 1.2: Maintaining Wealth
The Hartwick rule stresses the need maintain the productive base of the economy, as income and
consumption are derived from it. Consuming the income derived from an instrument of wealth
is possible only if consuming this income does not preclude the capacity of the instrument to
yield income in the subsequent periods (see the discussion on the concepts of income in the
general introduction). When it is impossible to obtain income without depleting the instrument
the Hartwick rule commands to use the income as outgo to a new instrument of wealth to
avoid overall wealth losses. We derived from Hicks (1946) the need to dedicate the di erence
between gross and net income to the maintenance of the instruments of wealth. This intuition
is comforted by the Hartwick rule. Maintaining overall wealth is a prerequisite for sustainability,
whether the Hartwick rule is seen as prescriptive of just characterising sustainability.
8. Notably a Divisia index see Asheim (2006, p. 24) for a presentation of the original article by Divisia
(1925).
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I.1.2 The Treatment of time and uncertainty
The characterisation of states requires an evaluation of the states and paths. Evaluation
of the path requires a model and current value indicators, while states can be assessed using
current value and/or present value indicators (see section II.2). Present value indicators and
dynamic modelling both require a way to account for the time passing. As we saw supra
in the debate over Rawls’ maximin criterion, the treatment of time is quite a topical issue.
This is because time involves the comparison of instruments of wealth and individuals that are
not available in the same market, making the determination of relative prices between those
complicated and somewhat controversial. We covered the analysis of future income flows from
capital units in Fisher (1906) and Hicks (1946) in the general introduction. Those are still the
basis for today’s research on those issues.
In Fisher (1906) the interest rate is the value return and is determined as the agents know
with certainty future income flows. Income flows don’t need to be constant but they need to be
known. Uncertainty about future flows becomes a problem when dealing with intergenerational
equity. If the present generation cannot estimate the value of the income flows it will pass on to
the next generation, then it is impossible to assess equity. In DHSS-like models, this problem
is solved by linking the pure rate of time preference to the utility function. The weight given
to the future is represented by the rate of interest and/or the pure rate of time preference,
depending on the model. If the pure rate of time preference is high (low), agents have a strong
(weak) preference for the present and care less (more) about the costs and benefits occurring
far away in the future.
Estimating a rate of time preference is not easy, but the implications are important. As
suggested by Hicks (1946) The question of convergence is critical to the application of the
neoclassical theory of value. One of the main critique coming from ecological economics (see
section II.2) is precisely that convergence towards a steady-state is not guaranteed and probably
more the exception than the rule. Still, most mainstream neoclassical economists accept this
as at least a good enough approximation to understand the real world. Either as a concession
to ecological economists or a tribute to the real world, authors have started to investigate the
transitional dynamics, that is the evolution of the system between steady-states of toward the
steady-state.
There are not many models of transitional dynamics applied to the study of sustainability,
although it is certainly a promising lead. Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) investigate such
a model with a resource sector and labour allocation over time. They also investigate the
consequences of several shocks and parameters values on the dynamics. Another example is
I. The development of the weak sustainability paradigm 59
the article by Cheviakov and Hartwick (2009) mentioned above. An interesting lead is proposed
by Pemberton and Ulph (2001) who show that what they term “inclusive income” is equal to
the amount the economy can consume at one point in time while keeping the expected present
value of utility for all generations constant. To do this, they add a new asset, “time”, associated
with a shadow price that they treat as another capital stock. This technique will be used by
Pezzey (2004) to capture the impact of international trade and exogenous changes in technology
in a model to test the relevance of sustainability tests. It is also used in Arrow et al. (2010)
(see section I.2).
The main bone of contention regarding the treatment of time is however centred on the
discount rate. The discount rate is applied as a mean to calculate the present value of future
income flows. It takes origin in the trade-o  between two di erent instruments of wealth yielding
income (the opportunity cost) and the preference for the present of agents. The discount rate
was opposed by economists such as Frank Ramsey (1928) who judged the idea of discounting
future flows akin to discounting future generations. He considered this “ethically indefensible”.
Still the discount rate remains in favour, as it is now accepted that most agents e ectively
discount future flows whether they should or not. It is also convenient as a mathematical tool
for facilitating convergence towards the steady-state. 9 Discount rates have a major influence on
the outcome of any inter-temporal valuation and come regularly under fire as the controversy
over the Stern (2006) review illustrates. A high discount rate was used in the report resulting
of relatively low impact of climate change in the long run. Li and Löfgren (2000) investigate
the impact of the variations in time preferences for consumption and resources amenities.
Gollier (2010a) discussed the role of expectations and uncertainty in the Ramsey rule (which
is used to determine the discount rate applied to future consumption flows in wealth calcula-
tions, see section I.2). Di erent rates can be estimated depending on the level of certainty and
the time horizon. Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007) discuss the consequences of introducing
an endogenous discount rate, growing with environmental quality. Gollier (2010b) studies dis-
counting when there are concerns regarding biodiversity. He shows that changes in biodiversity
should be discounted less than changes in consumption under certainty in the Cobb-Douglas
case. Traeger (2011) shows how imperfect substitutability a ects discount rates.
The literature on discounting is obviously voluminous and the articles mentioned here are
merely examples. Decisions regarding discounting crystallise many underling assumptions. An
interesting contribution from Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2004) investigates the possibility
9. Ramsey (1928) who didn’t used a discount rate assumed instead there was an upper-bound to the level
of “felicity” attainable by individuals. An interesting idea based on the assumption that the marginal utility
of consumption is zero above the bound. Ayong Le Kama (2001) shows how, following the same philosophy,
convergence towards the green golden rule path can be obtained.
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that future generations may have di erent environmental preferences. They stress how beyond
the formation of preferences, many path dependent factors will impact future environmental
quality. As expressed for example in Neumayer (2000), discounting is related to the actual level
of substitutability between the instruments of wealth. A high discount rate is much less of a
risk for intergenerational equity if the substitutability of natural capital is high than when it is
low.
This concludes our presentation of the DHSS model. The weak sustainability paradigm is
organised as the merger in the contemporary versions of the DHSS model of the “welfare school”
and the “London school” of sustainability. The latter brought another significant contribution
to the paradigm, producing a present value indicator of sustainability: the Adjusted Net Savings
(ANS). Using ANS sustainability can be assessed in conjunction with path assessments using
the Hartwick rule and states assessments using present value indicators.
Box 1.3: Constant consumption over time
The imperative to maintain consumption constant over time comes from the Ordinalist transcrip-
tion (Arrow 1973a) of Rawls’ principle of justice in the DHSS model (Solow 1974). Maintaining
consumption constant over time is the only ethically defensible position in terms of intergen-
erational equity, as it allows for both constant well-being and capital accumulation. Recent
contributions from Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) and Hamilton and Withagen (2007) explore
the possibility of unbounded consumption path which are compatible with sustainability. We
will keep constant consumption over time as our goal in line Arrow et al. (2003) to take into
account the possibility of a growing population.
I.2 Quantifying sustainability
The elaboration of the DHSS model of sustainability started in the early 1970’s and although
the basic framework was set by the end of the decade, it has been improved incrementally ever
since. In the meantime, techniques were developed in environmental economics to estimate
shadow prices in the absence of markets. Contingent valuation is the most commonly used
method. It is based on willingness to pay (WTP), willingness to accept compensation (WTAC)
and surveys of users of ecosystem services. Those sets of prices allowed for estimates of non-
market components that were, according to the theory, part of Comprehensive Wealth. The
development of contingent valuation is to be understood in the context of the broader use of
market mechanism to solve environmental problems understood as externalities, as alternatives
such as taxes face problems of social acceptability. Contingent valuation is valuable in itself,
as a way to increase understanding of local human/environment interactions. Hence, this ex-
pensive technique is in most cases used to shed light on policy issues. The works on indicators
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of sustainable development started when policy makers requested indicators to help better un-
derstand the impact of development and/or more local policies on sustainability. Reciprocally,
after the first Rio summit in 1992, quantitative data was needed to bring flesh to Agenda 21 and
other sustainable development initiatives. In the same vein, contingent valuation was included
in the greater e ort to produce Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for policy makers on environmen-
tal issues. Those initiatives stress a point which became increasingly clear for ecologists and
economists alike: costs outside of any accounting framework do not exist.
After the Brundltand report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987),
a first study by Repetto et al. (1989) tried to estimate to impact of resource depletion on
national accounts. This was the starting point of a general push to expand national accounts
to better value environmental assets. Those e orts will lead to the creation of the System of
Environmental Economic Accounting (SEEA) developed and maintained by the United Na-
tions. A presentation of the latest version can be found in Dietz and Neumayer (2007). In this
presentation of the empirical estimates of sustainability the terms “income”, “investment” and
“savings” are to be understood as referring to the accounting concepts, unless otherwise spec-
ified. One of the consequence of the Brundltand report was the development of capital-based
measures of sustainability. Members of the “school of London” (Victor 1991) proposed what
would become the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) (Pearce and Atkinson 1993). This is the fruit of
an e ort coordinated by the late David Pearce (Pearce and Atkinson 1992, Turner and Pearce
1992) to produce an empirical indicator able to determine if a country was on a sustainable
development path. The first version of the indicator was termed genuine savings, which is still
used today by many researchers, but for the clarity of exposition we shall use ANS only to
designate the indicator. The authors writing on the DHSS model who favoured the Green NNP
found common ground with the ANS, notably through further investigation of the Hartwick
rule (see section I.1).
I.2.1 Presentation of the two approaches and the contemporary models of Wealth
and Savings
In their first presentation of ANS, Pearce and Atkinson (1993) made a clear reference to the
use of capital theory as a way to measure sustainability. The authors convincingly pushed for
the development of natural capital measurement, as even imperfect accounting on the economic
weight of environmental assets would be the best possible first step towards a comprehensive
“economic-ecological” model. ANS are build from the start on the assumption of substitutabil-
ity between natural capital and other forms of capital (Pearce and Atkinson 1993, p. 104). The
idea of ANS is to build on the Hartwick rule and the formalisation of Solow (1986) to calculate
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an aggregate rate of savings on all the instruments of wealth. This savings rate will represent
the evolution of wealth between two periods for a given economy. Following the DHSS model,
this rate will be an indicator of sustainability. In this first article, the empirical test is simple.
If Z is a given sustainability index then Z > 0 if and only if:
(S
Y
)> [(”M
Y
)+(”N
Y
)] (1.6)
Where S is Gross Savings, Y is income, ”M is the depreciation of man-made(produced) capital
and ”N is the depreciation (depletion) of natural capital. ANS make explicit use of monetary
values for natural capital, in the line of capital theory and the DHSS model. From inequality
1.6:
Zt = (
S
Y
)≠ (”M
Y
)≠ (”N
Y
) (1.7)
Where Zt is ANS in t. In this first version of the indicator, Pearce and Atkinson (1993)
claim that countries with positive ANS are sustainable and countries with negative ANS are
unsustainable. From this original claim, only the later will survive the subsequent development
and investigation of the properties of ANS. ANS is in fact a one-sided test: A negative rates of
savings indicates un-sustainability, but a positive value does not guarantee sustainability.
Hamilton et al. (1997, 1998), Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) have reviewed the evolutions of
ANS at di erent points in time. Subsequent study have since improved the measure. Hamilton
(1994) investigates whether GNNP or ANS are the best indicator of sustainability from a welfare
point of view, and concludes that ANS should be preferred. Hamilton (1996) discussed the role
of defensive expenditure and the incorporation of pollution and pollution abatement. In an
important article, Hamilton and Clemens (1999) present new ANS estimates and following
Hartwick (1990) present ANS as the product of an inter-temporal optimisation problem. This
problem yields a current value Hamiltonian:
H = U +“KK˙+“XX˙+“SS˙+“N N˙ (1.8)
where U is the utility function (utility depends on both consumption and pollution), K is
produced capital, X is the stock of pollution, S an exhaustible resource stock and N the
human capital stock. The “s are the shadow prices. Dots indicate time varying variables.
Adding international trade and capital depreciation, the measure of NNP is given by:
NNP = C+ K˙≠ ”K+E≠M + iA≠ (1≠ beF )Fr(R≠g)≠ b(e≠d)+ qqÕ (1.9)
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With C consumption, E exports, M imports, iA interests on foreign assets, R resources deple-
tion, g renewable resources growth, d the dissipation of pollution, e the abatement of pollution,
q the function of human capital accumulation, ” the produced capital depreciation, Fr is the
resource rental rate, b the marginal cost of pollution abatement and beF is the e ective tax rate
on production set by emission taxes. It should also be noted that under the assumptions of the
model, human capital investment brings endogenous technical progress. Finally, the formula
to calculate ANS from data is given by:
G=GNP ≠C≠ ”K≠n(R≠g)≠‡(e≠d)+m (1.10)
ANS are equal to Gross Savings (Gross domestic product minus consumption) minus the de-
preciation of produced capital, minus the net resource rental rate times the variation of the
stock of exhaustible resources, minus the marginal cost of social pollution times accumulation
minus dissipation of pollution plus investment in human capital.
This method have been used ever since by the World Bank to propose estimates of ANS. In
a series of reports (World Bank 1997, 2006, 2011) the World Bank presented ANS estimates,
discussed empirical challenges and potential applications. Besides yearly estimates of ANS
using accounting data, the World Bank provides an estimate of comprehensive wealth. The
method is best explained in World Bank (2011, p. 94). Wealth is defined as:
Wt =
Œ⁄
t
C(s)≠r(s≠t)ds (1.11)
Where C is consumption, s in the current period and r is the social rate of return. r is calculated
using the Keynes-Ramsey formula:
r = ﬂ+‹ C˙
C
(1.12)
Where ﬂ is the pure rate of time preference and ‹ is the elasticity of utility with respect to
consumption. The final term is the rate of growth for consumption, assumed to be constant.
This value of wealth is obtained by assuming that the original observed level of consumption
is sustainable. This value of wealth gives an upper bound to the estimate of wealth for a given
country. The next step is to estimate the relative size of the instruments of wealth. Indeed,
the very rationale for looking for an upper bound for wealth is precisely that some instruments
of wealth can not be estimated in their entirety, or completely ignored. This claim is backed
by the very high implicit rate of return on wealth if wealth was only composed of produced
capital. 10
10. In the example of Canada presented in World Bank (2011, p. 94) the implicit rate of return on produced
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Figure 1.2: A proposed decomposition for intangible capital
Source: World Bank (2006)
The authors decompose wealth into three instruments: produced capital, natural capital
and intangible capital. Produced capital is estimated using the Perpetual Inventory Method
(PMI). Natural capital is estimated using value for urban land, energy and mineral resources,
timber and non timber resources, crop land, pasture land and protected areas. Intangible
capital is estimated as the residual of wealth once the two previous instruments have been
subtracted. 11 An attempt to estimate the subcomponents of intangible capital can be found
in the previous report (World Bank 2006, chap. 7, p.87 ). This disentanglement is critical
as intangible capital appears to be the main source of wealth for every country where wealth
estimates are available (see figure 1.2). By means of econometric estimates, the authors show
that the biggest component of intangible capital is likely to be institutions, followed by human
capital (see section II).
From the underlying theory of the DHSS model and the Asheim/Wietzman amendments
regarding sustainability and optimality, the World Bank provides estimates using what we would
describe as a “Top-Down” method: first estimate comprehensive wealth and then estimate the
sub-components. This estimation method derives logically from data limitations and the rate
of return puzzle. But another method is proposed in Arrow et al. (2010), method we would
describe as “Bottom-Up”. It expands a previous article centred on the US and China (Arrow
capital is 35.9%.
11. See World Bank (2011, p.141) for more details.
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et al. 2007). Using a starting point similar to Hamilton and Clemens (1999) the authors define
sustainability as dVdt Ø 0, with:
V (t) =
Œ⁄
t
[U(C(s))e≠”(s≠t)]ds, ” Ø 0 (1.13)
Loosely speaking, sustainability is characterised by the non declining present value of discounted
utility flows at any point in time. Arrow et al. (2010) do not present an explicit model but they
assume that V will depend on the current stock of assets and on expectations regarding the
evolution of that pool of assets. They treat institutions as exogenous, as they claim no theory
of political economy is available to “track the co-evolution of economic development and the
economy’s institutions” (Arrow et al. 2010, p. 6). As with the first method, there is therefore
no explicit concern for intragenerational equity. They then define shadow prices in a somewhat
similar fashion to Hamilton and Clemens (1999), with the notable di erence that they make
felicity (utility flow) as the numéraire of the economy. Shadow prices are defined as:
qi(t) =
ˆU(C(t))
ˆCj(t)
(1.14)
The shadow price of consumption of good j in time t is the partial derivative of the utility of
total consumption in t with respect to the consumption of good j in t. As for the shadow price
of capital goods they are characterised by the two equations:
dV (t)
dt
= ˆV
ˆt
+
ÿ
i
[( ˆV (t)
ˆKi(t)
)(dKi(t)
dt
)]Ø 0 (1.15)
pi(t)© ˆV (t)
ˆKi(t)
(1.16)
Where pi(t) is the spot shadow price of the ith asset in t. Arrow et al. (2010) then makes
explicit use of the trick proposed by Pemberton and Ulph (2001). They regroup all the exoge-
nous variables (institutions included) into another asset which represents the value of the time
passing:
r(t) = ˆV
ˆt
(1.17)
With r(t) the shadow price of time. It is now possible to define comprehensive wealth as the
value of all capital assets at shadow prices:
W (t) = r(t)t+
ÿ
pi(t)Ki(t) (1.18)
From this fully optimised framework it naturally flows that the evolution of intergenerational
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well-being is perfectly correlated with the variation of comprehensive wealth. Therefore “com-
prehensive investment” in “comprehensive wealth” is:
”V (t) = r(t)”t+
ÿ
pi(t)Ii(t)”t (1.19)
This comprehensive investment is in fact a theoretically rigorous formulation for adjusted net
savings. Arrow et al. (2010) then expand the scope of wealth to include explicitly popula-
tion growth (stressing that what matters is per-capita comprehensive wealth), health capital,
transnational externalities and total factor productivity growth.
The main di erence between the “bottom-up” and the “top-down” method is therefore the
way wealth is calculated. A first remark is that the second method is more encompassing,
explicitly grounded in welfare theory (with the still controversial use of the statistical value of
a life) and very data intensive. The first method is a priori less theoretically ambitious but
provide a clear and detailed empirical background that is used to collect and build the dataset
of the World Bank, used in the empirical test of the second methods. It seems that the two
methods are more complementary than anything else. The World Bank’s method provide an
upper-bond for wealth estimates, likely to overshoot especially if current levels of consumptions
are not sustainable. The Arrow et al. (2010) method aggregates all available data and is likely
to undershoot as the components of “intangible capital” are hard to estimate. It is interesting
to note that the World Bank put an emphasis on the savings perspective by calling its measure
Adjusted Net Savings, whereas Arrow et al. (2010) termed their equivalent “comprehensive
investment”. As discussed in the introduction, in the long run in the neoclassical approach
I = S and both concept should yield an equal amount. But the Arrow et al. (2010) study
should be given credit for being closer to the original Fisherian idea of outgo.
I.2.2 Development and discussion of ANS
Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) started as an empirical indicator of sustainability and was
subsequently given theoretical foundations in Hamilton and Clemens (1999). But the original
aim of Pearce and Atkinson (1993) was to provide policy makers with an indicator to assess
policy regarding sustainability. The fall of natural resources price in the 1980’s (culminating
in the counter oil shock of 1986) seemed to contradict the alarmed predictions of the Club
of Rome report (Meadows et al. 1972). After a modest fall between 1958 and 1980, natural
resources prices fell sharply (see figure 1.3) and stayed relatively cheap until the end of the
century (Maizels 1992). This seemed to prove the Club of Rome wrong and cost Paul Erlich
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Figure 1.3: Trends in commodities terms of trade 1958-1988
Source: UNCTAD Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin (various issues) in Maizels (1992)
some money. 12 Still, Repetto et al. (1989) proposed convincing evidence that natural resources
were still wasted.
Adjusted Net Savings can be seen as an original attempt to reconcile physical estimates of
natural resources scarcity (how many tons of x left into the ground) with value-based estimates
via the integration of those resources into an economic system. We explored in section I.1
the convergence of the “welfare school” and the “London school” over Adjusted Net Savings
(see figure 1.4). The authors on the welfare side are behind the intellectual foundation of the
“bottom-up” method. But a symmetric move was made by authors starting from capital theory
and accounting, using the conclusions drawn from welfare theory to ground ANS more firmly
in economic theory. This cross fertilisation would lead to an overall improvement in both the
measure of ANS and the interpretation and reach of the indicator.
Pezzey (2004) proposes a theoretical foundation for ANS in situations not assessed in the
original Hamilton and Clemens (1999) article: amenities, population growth, international
trade and technical changes. Pezzey (2004) notably uses time as a productive stock following
Pemberton and Ulph (2001). Dasgupta (2009) pushes further the case for ANS and compre-
hensive wealth estimates showing they are both a good policy evaluation tool and an indicator
of sustainability. Hamilton and Bolt (2004) and Hamilton (2009) further investigates the links
12. The “Simon and Erlich” bet between Paul Erlich and Julian Simon is quite famous in the scientific
community. Simon bet Erlich that the price of natural resources would fall during the 1980’s as proxied by a
basket of five commodities: copper, chromium, nickel tin and tungsten. In 1990 Erlich send Simon a 576.07
USD check by mail.
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Figure 1.4: Intellectual convergence towards Adjusted Net Savings
Source: Author
between theory and empirics, showing how to properly measure changes in the measured stock
of natural capital, especially under exogenous world prices. 13 Adjusted Net Savings estimates
are provided by the World Bank, but some regional estimates have been computed by Pezzey
et al. (2006) for Scotland and Ferreira and Moro (2011) for Ireland. The former find Scotland
to be on a sustainable course and the later produce estimates that are consistently smaller than
the World Bank but include a broader range of assets. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) link the
resource curse to sustainability and ANS, o ering further evidence that the resource curse is a
mix of institutional problems and resource management issues.
The indicator gained ground as a predictor of sustainability and is increasingly used in
academic studies. Bobylev (2005) uses ANS to back the need for environmental friendly fiscal
reforms in Russia. Shmelev and Rodríguez-Labajos (2009) and Shmelev (2011) use ANS to
build a multidimensional indicator of sustainable development. Heal (2011) proposes a review
of sustainable development based on ANS. The United Nations now fully support comprehensive
wealth as a critical tool to assess development prospects (Atkinson et al. 2012). Finally, the
extension of green accounting lead to the creation of a natural capital committee in the United
Kingdom, followed by the first World Natural Capital Forum in Edinburgh in 2013.
ANS also provide a clear framework to assess traditional questions in resource and envi-
13. See chapter 2 section II for further discussion on exogenous world prices.
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ronmental economics. Van der Ploeg (2010) explores the rationality of postponing savings and
investments of rents from natural resources in resource-rich countries. Van Der Ploeg (2011)
stresses the role of ANS in determining whether or country falls prey to the resource curse or
not. But the emblematic use of ANS as a policy indicator is provided by Hamilton et al. (2006)
who conduct a counterfactual exercise, estimating the counterfactual comprehensive wealth of
resource rich countries had those followed the Hartwick rule. The exercise is presented again in
World Bank (2006). ANS are a current value indicator, so that information about the future is
theoretically incorporated into it. This information covers the transition from the present state
to the steady-state (notably regarding consumption) and information about the steady-state
itself. Still, as stressed in Hamilton and Withagen (2007) there can be multiple path to the
same steady-state, or even a multiplicity of conditional steady-states. The use of counterfactual
scenarios based on several sustainability rules makes the comparison of several sustainability
scenarios possible (see chapter 4 section III).
Beyond the question of current sustainability, authors have also tested the ability of ANS
to predict future level of consumption: negative ANS should indeed reduce future consumption
as the productive base of the considered country is shrinking. Ferreira and Vincent (2005)
observe that ANS tend to perform relatively better as a predictor of sustainability for developing
countries than developed ones. They conclude this is related to the inaccuracy of human capital
measurement which is critical to understand the sustainability of developed countries. Ferreira
et al. (2008) investigate the impact of population growth on the reliability of ANS as a predictor
of future consumption. Beyond the potential problems associated with data and amenities,
technical progress and population, one of the potential shortcomings of ANS are on the demand
side. ANS are a traditional supply side indicator from a macroeconomic perspective, in the
sense that the welfare theory it is related too assumes the standard neoclassical dispositions
regarding the price adjustment of demand. But it goes even further with ANS as the top-
down method is explicitly build not only on this but also on the assumption that current
levels of consumption are sustainable (see World Bank (2011, p. 142)). Arrow et al. (2004)
identify theoretical reasons under which consumption could be above the level compatible with
intergenerational equity in a DHSS model.
ANS are now firmly established as a current value indicator of sustainability. The indicator,
although still criticised, is the most consensual inside the weak sustainability paradigm. As for
the neoclassical theory, the weak sustainability paradigm is made attractive by its internal
consistency and ability to provide an allocation rationale for all the instruments of wealth.
ANS, eventually completed by counterfactual studies and present value indicators (see section
II.2) can theoretically characterise a development path and allow comparisons between times
and places. Stiglitz et al. (2009) advocated its use instead of GDP in their report on the
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measurement of social progress. Nevertheless, sustainability is not sustainable development.
Some important elements, such as institutions, are relevant to sustainable development and the
definition of the ends (the social aims of development). They also happen to have instrumental
importance for sustainability, as institutions condition to a large extend the e ciency of re-
sources allocation mechanisms. In the second part of this chapter we present this instrumental
value before discussing the concept of steady-state. We conclude with the first presentation of
our framework for sustainability and sustainable development.
II Institutions, the Steady State and uncertainty: sus-
tainable development in closed economy
Institutions are the key to resources allocation as they define and regulate interactions
and conflict resolution between agents and/or social groups. A schematic characterisation can
yield important insights into their impact on sustainability. Institutional evolution is better
understood using the scale of a development path, stretching over several generations. Taking
into account institutional dynamics requires a good assessment of the tools relevant for this kind
of time frame, most notably the use of equilibrium analysis and the steady-state. Taking into
account institutional dynamics allows us to propose a framework for sustainable development
based on sustainability. We notably insist on the importance of the geographical scale and
separate the analysis of the means from the analysis of the ends of development.
II.1 Policy and Institutions
It is useful to first define institutions. The most widely used definition is proposed by
Douglas North in his 1991 article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. Institutions are
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of con-
duct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” (North 1991). It comes naturally
from this definition that market mechanisms can be analysed as another social institution. Fol-
lowing those early works there has been a growing body of literature trying to analyse the role
of a set of institutions (beyond market mechanisms) in the success or failure of economies. In-
stitutional factors are especially solicited when explanations from mainstream economic theory
seem to fail. This is also true for the analysis of the environment and sustainability.
Environmental and sustainability issues as they extend over a time frame far beyond the
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horizon of a single individual, can only be solved by commitment over several generations. In-
stitutions (formal and informal) are supposed to maintain this credible commitment. Ostrom
(1990) stresses the fundamental role of those institutions for governing the commons. Institu-
tions both formal and informal are critical to understand policy design and policy enforcement.
Once a given policy in enacted (usually by an institution) it is enforced through another insti-
tution (the law, or market mechanisms). As an example, the failure to follow the Hartwick rule,
which should be theoretical enshrined in sustainable reinvestment policy, is usually blamed on
institutional weaknesses in (mostly developing) resource rich countries Hamilton and Atkinson
(2006). The resource curse (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003, Van Der Ploeg 2011) is another
example.
Institutions are complicated to consider from a sustainability perspective as they are shaped
by both the ends of development and the appraisal of the means. The role of the ends in
institutional formation is illustrated by the diversity of formal and informal institutions on the
planet, largely responsible for the diversity of the human experience. Ends, as presented for
example in the universal declaration of human rights from 1948 define social values and inspire
rights (or liberties) and responsibilities. Dasgupta (2001) distinguishes between civil, political
and socio-economic rights. In all those observable categories, societies may choose a quality
associated with the considered rights. The ends can then be observed either as presence or
absence of a considered right or responsibility, or by a qualitative di erence in the extend to
which it is observed in society. Again, those rights and responsibility can be enforced via a
formal definition of rights in a legal system, or more informal institutions like customs.
We argue that the definition of the ends should be left to societies and defined by a political
process. This societal discussion of the aims, the balance between several dimensions of life,
is the essence of social or individual development. What we have to consider now is the share
of the institutional setting that is instrumental to the rest of the development ends, namely
the institutions that have an impact on the means of development. This is by the joint (but
separated) consideration of ends and means, development and sustainability, that sustainable
development can be achieved.
A good example of the definition of an instrumental value is the debate over substitutability.
Real, physical substitutability is defined by physical characteristics that are in most cases
observable in physical dimensions. Turning coal into energy requires a combination of physical
forces resulting in an alteration of the form taken by matter and an increase in entropy. Real
substitutability is therefore not an institutional process as it exists outside of any institutional
settings. What does not exist outside of an institutional setting is money-value substitutability.
Money-value substitutability represents the summation of the social conditions presiding over
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the action of converting coal into energy. Under free-market economics, coal will be burnt if it
is optimal to do so considering consumer and producer preferences and budget constraints. It
is therefore idle to try to base money value substitutability exclusively on real substitutability.
The two are necessarily related, but value is needed to trigger any substitution and value
requires an institutional framework which will condition actual, observed actions of substitution
and hence substitutability.
In their much-debated book on Why Nations Fail? Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) define
institutions as “the rules influencing how the economy works, and the incentives that motivate
people”. This definition is arguably more restrictive that the 1991 definition from North, but
it fits the instrumental perspective on institutions. They use a set of historical evidence to
propose a classification of institutions. They first di erentiate between political and economic
institutions. In a well functioning society, political institutions protect pluralism, give every
citizen a say in the future of society and hold accountable political leaders. Well function-
ing economic institutions give opportunity, foster innovation and propel a merit-based society
via the encouragement of creative destruction. They make for the best possible allocation of
resources. Well functioning political and economic institutions are defined as “inclusive” and
those undermining those desirable properties are “extractive”.
Inclusive political institutions protect inclusive economic institutions (property rights, patent
system) which encourages innovations. From a systemic perspective, inclusive political institu-
tions encourage pluralism and many di erent ideas lead to innovation trough confrontation and
creative destruction. They also secure a large distribution of power, which prevents one group
from becoming powerful enough to overthrown the system, or even one group to become pow-
erful (economically rich or ideologically dominant) enough to have an interest in overthrowing
the system. Inclusive political and economic institutions trigger a virtuous circle of develop-
ment (see figure 1.5). The authors stress the distribution and redistribution of income as a key
element of stability in the virtuous circle.
Institutions tasked with organising the level of the redistribution of means, in the usual
functional separation between allocation (to the economic institutions) and redistribution (to
the political institutions) are therefore critical. Inclusive institutions preserve the equilibrium
between the pledge of greater wealth to innovators and protection of the place of the less well-
o . A system of checks and balances illustrates this tension: there should always be a power
to stop another power.
On the contrary, extractive institutions concentrate economic and political power into the
hands of an elite, or even a single absolutist leader. Extractive institutions are well-structured
and very rigid and usually, by nature, present a high level of centralisation (at least com-
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Figure 1.5: The virtuous institutional circle
Source: ?, representation from the author
pared to the institutions they replace). This is the reason why the tend to spur growth in
the short/medium run after implementation. But, as by their very conservative nature they
discourage if not forbid creative destruction and the emergence of competing economic and po-
litical forces, they tend to reach a stalling point, if not stagnation degrowth or impoverishment.
The last important feature of institutions is centralisation. Institutions governing a social group
need a high enough degree of centralisation to make sure enforcement is possible. Rules, laws
and customs have limited impact if not enforced.
Other interesting contributions in the book are the ideas of critical juncture and institutional
drift. The institutional drift is a phenomenon of institutional evolution. Very few (if any)
institutions are completely stable and unchanged over long periods. Most evolve via a slow
process of sedimentation. A small di erence at one point can result in a major institutional
di erence a century later. A critical juncture is a game changing event (such as the discovery
of the Americas, the industrial revolution or the emergence of Islam). When a given set of
institutions in a given social group is exposed to a critical juncture, institutions will adapt, and
depending on the form of the adaptation, the social group may change course completely, for
better or worse. A critical juncture is a chance to change, an opportunity to seize. Societies
using this shock to increase the inclusiveness of their institutions thrives (as in England after
the Magna Carta) while others ultimately stall and crumble (as in the USSR).
Although probably simplistic for specialists of the field, this functional analysis of institu-
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tions is quite operational for economics and sustainability. The reality of the concept of society
is often debated in economics as utilitarianism only considers individuals 14 and individual in-
terests. It sheds in our view a very interesting light on the issues of sustainability and has been
recognised as such in the literature on the resource curse (Van Der Ploeg 2011). The literature
on the resource curse investigates the negative relationship between resource abundance and
economic growth. Purely economic explanations for the relationship will be detailed in chap-
ters 2 and 4 but the resource curse can seductively been explained in the context of extractive
institutions. ? cite as an example the enforcement n the 16th of forced labour by the Spanish in
modern day Bolivia. The prevalence of this institution entrenched inequalities and rent seeking
in society, making optimal management of resources in Bolivia impossible.
Still, extractive institutions cannot strive without value to extract. They can stay stable for
a long time, but are very vulnerable to external technical shocks, conquest and more generally to
critical junctures. Sometimes, the source of value just disappears (as when Europeans managed
to short-circuit Islamic routes of trade) and the institutions based on it crumble. The period of
institutional re-composition can be long and dramatically painful, especially if the government
collapses in the process and centralisation is reduced.
There is however a danger in considering any sustainability issue only through the insti-
tutional lens. Acemoglu and Robinson focus on exhaustible resources, and seem to see the
environment as a mere external factor on which human institutions are being applied. The
case they cite, on the population of North America by the English, is here particularly interest-
ing. Acemoglu and Robinson claim that although the English tried to implement institutions
similar to the extractive system enforced by the Spanish in the Caribbean and South America
they failed. They explain this failure by the low population density that tilted the balanced in
favour of the newly arrived colonists against the ruling English elite. As colonists could just go
settle outside of the areas ruled by the English, the elite had to relinquish some of its political
power to make the colonies attractive enough. They make a similar case for the penal colony in
Australia. It strikes us as obvious that in both cases, it is not so much the dynamics between
the colonists (and prisoners) and the elite that shaped the institutions, but the shift of bar-
gaining power introduced by the very nature of the environment. In those extreme cases, the
environment was not only a feedback mechanism, but the main driver of institutional design.
As is often the case, the limiting factor gets the last word.
Institutional design and evolution is the product of a mix of factor, in which economics
14. A recent illustration was given again during the American presidential election of 2012. The running
president Obama declared during a speech about infrastructure and institutions “you didn’t build that” talking
to American entrepreneurs. This sentence started a storm in a teacup as entrepreneurs are more prone to believe
that “there is not such thing as society” to maintain and build those institutions and infrastructure.
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Figure 1.6: Institutions and resources
Source: Author
plays one role. As long as a society stays within the limits of absolute scarcity and absolute
abundance, then institutions are mostly shaped through drifts (see figure 1.6). When, either
because of a drift or a critical juncture, institutions reach the upper bond, the access and
distribution to resources is such that extractive institutions cannot survive. Conversely, when
resource scarcity is absolute, the power of those having access to those resources grows ex-
ponentially and institutions turn instantly extractive. If resources are too scarce, obtaining
them becomes the sole purpose of institutions (to prevent starvation for example) or if they are
plentiful, no resolution mechanism is needed as there is nothing to allocate or struggle for, any-
one can meet their needs costlessly. 15 The most common situation is observed when resources
and the environment are relatively scarce, so that people can’t evade the constraints they pose
on consumption and maintenance of living standards and therefore have to meet, argue and
struggle over those resources and modify resolution mechanisms and institutions accordingly.
Institutions play an important role in explaining why resources are managed the way they
are. The development of new inclusive institutions is a necessity to improve future management.
But the role played by the environment on institutional design should not be underestimated,
especially in the context of absolute scarcity. Sustainable development is constrained by sus-
15. The scenario is explored by Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012) as presented in The Financial Times Alphaville
Blog: .
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tainability precisely to avoid this particular path. But sustainability does not exist without
inclusive institutions. It is therefore essential to comment briefly on the links between intra-
generational equity and inclusive institutions.
We saw in section I.1 how the DHSS model leads to the dissociation of intergenerational
and intragenerational equity. The task of monitoring intragenerational equity is left to a re-
distribution mechanism, which force depend on country policies. A potential problem to this
view is that assuming that the Rawlsian argument about the “original position” does not pre-
vail, there is a strong possibility that income, wealth or both are asymmetrically distributed
in a given country. Asymmetric distribution of wealth or income will reinforce extractive eco-
nomic institutions, which in turn is likely to lead to extractive political institutions. Therefore,
the Rawlsian argument for justice and intragenerational equity is also of instrumental value
for sustainability. A skewed distribution of wealth or income can only negatively a ect the
inclusiveness of institutions and put sustainability in jeopardy.
Institutional design is key to sustainability, but many institutions are formed endogenously
in an informal fashion. They usefully complete market mechanisms in their allocation duties
when property rights are ill-defined or proper enforcement is impossible. Pargal and Wheeler
(1995) show “informal regulation” to be important in Indonesia, as a way to express local pref-
erences in terms of pollution. Informal institutions in general improve social ties and reinforce
formal contracts through the building of trust. Informal regulation is one of the reasons behind
the e ectiveness of decentralised resource allocation mechanisms. Allocation tasks are better
treated at the institutional and spatial level where information about preferences, resources,
technology, etc. are best known. This means that allocation decisions should be taken at the
smallest possible scale as defined by the need to collect required information.
This makes the case for an organisation based on subsidiarity. Allocation decisions should
be undertaken at the level where the risk of institutional capture is the lowest. It is the lowest
when no more than the required resources are involved in the allocation and the preferences
of all the interested agents, with an equitable say in the process are best know. Subsidiarity
is therefore the rule of spatial and institutional organisation best suited for sustainability as
it protects and fosters inclusiveness. With this emphasis on the need for subsidiarity to foster
inclusiveness, we conclude our presentation of the instrumental value of institutions. We have
all the tools needed to assess the states of the world. We now need to turn to the issues raised
by the characterisation of development paths, and the properties associated with a particular
state of development: the steady-state.
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Box 1.4: Real/money value substitutability and subsidiarity
Substitutability is probably the main issue between environmental and ecological economics. It
sets the line between proponents of weak and strong sustainability (Neumayer 2010). Real sub-
stitutability depends on physical factors, when money value substitutability depends on allocation
mechanisms. The degree of substitutability between instruments of wealth depends on the social
limits sets to intergenerational and intragenerational equity. At such, it should be considered
when assessing sustainability. A social, institutional organisation is best able to produce e cient
allocation under a decentralised structure of allocation mechanisms. Those mechanisms, market
and non-market, are better able to reflect preferences and resolve information issues at a geo-
graphical scale that matches the allocation problem at hand. Doing so prevent biases introduced
by excessive concentration of political or economic power and makes enforcement easier based
on a better perception of common interests and common informal norms.
Box 1.5: Intergenerational and intragenerational equity in institutions
Institutions are the favoured vehicle for intergenerational equity as institutions usually last over
several generations (especially the formal ones). Well-conceived institutions, build on a shared
conception of the ends of development should support the ethical commitment to intergener-
ational equity. But those institutions could be undermined by a drift away from equity and
turn slowly into extractive institutions. To prevent this, intragenerational equity should also be
guaranteed. An equitable distribution of wealth in each generation is required to create the
incentives to maintain economic and political inclusiveness. Intragenerational equity is instru-
mental to sustainability and sustainable development, as much as it can be one of the ends of
development.
II.2 Steady-State economics
This section on steady-state economics is not meant to cover the topic exhaustively. Our aim
is merely to expose the issues associated with the concept of steady-state and how those issues
impact the definition of sustainability. We saw how the treatment of time in sustainability
requires first to define states, which can be characterised using indicators of the dimensions of
interest in sustainability. It is then necessary to characterise paths, which are defined by the
evolution over time of the values associated with the dimensions in the states. If one defines a
given state by a value v for consumption, the path will be defined by the evolution of v values
that may lead to this state. It makes intuitive sense that a path needs to be bounded by two
states, defining initial and terminal conditions. The three together define transitional dynamics
between two states.
Optimal control theory, whether Bellman (1957) equations or the Pontryagin maximum
principle establish paths that maximise or minimise the values characterising the path and can
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therefore qualify it to optimality. Optimal control theory is about the selection of one path out
of a potential infinity. Used in the model, paths and states selection and definition require the
selection of those characteristics amongst the multiplicity needed to exhaustively characterise
a given path. This is a major hurdle. In economics and sustainability analysis, those paths are
usually explicitly constrained, using for example a budget constraint. The implicit assumption
is always made that the path is also constrained by the many excluded characteristics that were
not selected to define the path. Institutions are usually implicit constraints (assumed constant)
to an optimal growth path.
In economics, optimal growth theory is used to define convergence towards the steady-state,
a particular state with desirable mathematical properties of uniqueness and stability, mirroring
the properties of the economic general equilibrium. The path from a randomly chosen (or
more commonly set at the current conditions) state to the steady-state is then assessed and
commented. Considering the desirability of the steady-state, the most common modelling
strategy is to assume that the economy already converged to the steady-sate and then study
how under a given shock, the economy will return to this steady-state. This choice is motivated
by both the mathematical convenience and the economic properties of the steady-state.
This strategy is sensible and justified in economic models. Those are and will remain simpli-
fied representations of the reality. More problematic would be a tendency to confuse the results
of a model with an accurate representation of the reality. Even more problematic would be a
tendency to let the constraints set by available modelling tools shape perceptions of the reality.
A first warning for this comes for example in Hicks (1946) where he explores the dangers associ-
ated with ignoring the “short term” in economic analysis. Some economic relations may hold in
the short run because of uncontrolled characteristics, and not in the long run or vice versa. As
reported by Cohen and Harcourt (2003), Robinson insisted during the Cambridge/Cambridge
controversy on the di erence between di erence and change. Comparing two states of the world
without regard for the evolution implied to go from one to the other would be simplistic. One
should at least provide a presentation of the dynamics, of the characteristics of the path to get
there. An illustration of that problem is given in figure 1.7. Consider the di erence between
A Leontief and a Cobb-Douglas production. Transition between the conditional steady-state
1 and 2 will take the form of a gradual change in the Cobb-Douglas case. It is only possible
through an instantaneous jump in the Leontief case.
Georgescu-Roegen (1971), writing at a time when optimal control theory already o ered a
potential answer to this problem, insisted on the qualitative dimension of a path. The notion
of process underlines the incremental nature of evolution and the need to consider an adequate
time frame for great changes. The fact that an optimal path defined by some characteristics
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Figure 1.7: Di erence and change
Source: Author
exists does not mean that the path is achievable in the considered time frame. This could be
either because real life processes do not exist, demand more time, or are simply inhibited by
unobserved characteristics. This is a powerful argument to introduce two critical elements for
sustainability. The first element is the likely existence of multiple equilibria, many potentially
satisfying steady-states because of the dynamics of a given problem or a change in initial
conditions. The idea that the same problem may lead to a di erent solution depending on
initial condition is an especially severe blow to the neoclassical theory. The second element is
the potent role of uncertainty in shaping outcomes. If the steady-state is determined by the
path used to reach it, there is “path dependence” in the economy. The opportunity to use
current value indicators is greatly diminished as those would be conditional to the realisation
of the whole path. A single shock would change the steady-state and cancel any validity for
the indicator.
The dynamics are obviously critical to sustainability and those objections do not mean that
optimal control theory cannot be used to assess them. It is just important to realise that the
possibility of persistent disequilibria compared to a given steady-state is real. It also means that
the higher the number of potential paths (and ideally conditional steady-states) considered, the
better the understanding of the problem at hand. Those objections also make a case for the
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study of transitional dynamics from a variety of original conditions to steady-states, in departure
of the usual practice of studying departure from the steady-state. The notion of steady-state
is employed quite ambiguously in sustainability studies. In the weak sustainability paradigm
it refers to the neoclassical steady-state in its somewhat evanescent conception. Economies
still experience growth in many dimensions, when neoclassical economics focus on the moment
when those economies will be at the steady-state.
Faced with this ambiguous position, most ecological economists followed Daly (1996) who
calls for “true” steady-state economies and the logical end of growth. Path dependence and
technical progress may explain this. Environmental economist revise regularly their vision of
a steady-state for the means of development mostly because of technical progress 16, when
ecological economists tend to focus on presently available means and have a much more stable
perspective on the steady-state. This makes for probably too pessimistic views on the future
in ecological economics and too optimistic views in environmental economics (see section II.2.1
below).
So, is there an end to development, a “Greek” steady-state from which societies would only
depart for the worst? The weak sustainability paradigm does not seem to think so, although
the perturbations introduced by dysfunctional market mechanisms and societies are studied
in numerous contribution. Dasgupta (2001) proposes a di erence between Agathotopia and
Kakotopia to describe the di erence between a well-functioning society and a dysfunctional
one. Those two societies would naturally converge to di erent steady-states even with similar
characteristics. In our view, this makes the case for using sustainability rules and scenarios to
assess the consequences of allocation decisions on the steady-state. Sustainability rules such
as the Hartwick rule should in this setting not be followed to the later but as a benchmark to
assess a “distance to an optimal path”.
If development is a cumulative, drifting process, then present uncertainty about the future
is compounded by the uncertainty introduced in future periods. Heal (1998) presents the
debate over the use of di erent discount rates to measure this uncertainty. The most natural
solution, a time varying-discount rate, leaves the analyst facing a major trade-o  between added
complexity and added analytical power. Although discussions over the discount rate may prove
fruitful and reduce uncertainty, it seems unlikely that the margin of error over the very long
run might be significantly reduced. It seems more promising to us to focus on the problem of
short to medium term consistency. Introducing time dependence in the discount rate is helpful
if the structure of the model is constant over time. But if functional relations are also time
dependent, then the best strategy is to build di erent models for di erent time horizons and
16. Although path dependence may play a bigger role.
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make sure that those models are consistent with one another.
The ine ectiveness of sustainability policy is usually put on short-termism at the scale of a
century or more. This is especially true for climate change studies. In fact, time inconsistency
is much more of a problem for shorter horizons. A political cycle lasts on average five years,
a generation thirty years, a life in employment between forty and fifty and life expectancy in
developed country now flirts with eighty-five years. Sustainability development policies can only
be implemented under time consistent settings at the political and generational scales. Lack of
time consistency over the next five to ten years makes a thirty or sixty years target impossible
to hit. There is an inevitable tension between the need for consistency and the legitimate
desire of new generations to explore their own options regarding development. We o er the
idea that subsidiarity and our narrow definition of sustainability o er a way to minimize this
tension. By separating the management of the means from the definition of the ends, the
room for inclusive institutions over the definition of those ends can be preserved. Subsidiarity
may also help to reduce constraints on the definition of the ends by limiting the scope of
sustainability constraints to their relevant scale. At the same time, subsidiarity imposes limits
on the potentially damaging consequences of ill-defined ends which may exceed sustainable
limits.
A single current value indicator, even completed by several scenarios, cannot reflect on
all the characteristics of a state. Assessment of present institutional inclusiveness, observed
substitutability, etc. should all be part of a broad assessment of sustainability. Finally, beyond
indicators to monitor sustainability, other indicators are needed to monitor the realisation of
the social ends in development.
Box 1.6: Consequences of uncertainty and path dependency for sustainability:
the precautionary principle
The mathematical tools at our disposal do not allow for either an unequivocal definition of a
steady-state, nor an exhaustive inventory of the path leading to a given constrained steady-
state. Uncertainty and path dependence call for precaution regarding future substitutability,
as non-linearities in the development path prevent extrapolation based on current levels. Still,
uncertainty can be mitigated by a clear definition of the scope of sustainability and an application
of the subsidiarity principle. Subsidiarity creates room for decision making at local scales, while
reducing the impact of local mismanagement. Uncertainty over the rate of wealth accumulation
makes intragenerational equity more important, as present generations cannot count on the
preservation of their relative political and economic influence in the next generation. Climate
change illustrates how uncertainty makes the consideration of future generations critical as the
impact of present actions on future generations becomes harder to forecast.
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II.2.1 Is a single indicator of sustainability enough?
The use of multiple indicators in sustainability derives from the need to o er a complete
characterisation of a state (steady or not). Problems arise when trying to di erentiate between
characteristics that are only instrumental to sustainable development and the very ends of it.
The need to make this distinction is usually brought forward by proponents of a single indicator
for sustainability. What matters is to monitor the ability of the economy to support the ends
of development and then other indicators can be used to monitor the fulfillment of those goals.
As shown by Dasgupta (2001) the use of multiple indicators to asses the ends of development
is quite consensual as those ends reflect the multiple dimensions of the human existence. As
documented in Neumayer (2010) the debate over the use of more than one indicator of sustain-
ability comes from the controversies over substitutability. In a weak sustainability perspective,
the only thing that matters is the maintenance of the overall productive base, assessed by the
contribution of all the instruments of wealth in the economy. One indicator to monitor the level
and variation of total wealth is then enough. But if there is uncertainty over substitutability,
then several indicators may be required to assess the contribution of all instruments of wealth
separately and the possible substitutability between those instruments.
This is the view taken by ecological economists. When doing sustainability assessments,
most authors in the paradigm argue for more than one indicator. Martinet (2011) presents
the di erence between criteria and indicators: criteria are usually variables or conditions taken
from a model, whereas indicators are characterised by intervals and thresholds calling for policy
action. Heal (2011) presents several indicators and stresses the need to go “beyond GDP”,
insisting countries adopting Hartwick rule-like policies were already seeing the positive results.
A similar call is made by Kubiszewski et al. (2013) who compare several indicators against GDP
for seventeen countries. Nourry (2008) assesses sustainability in France using ANS, GNNP,
the ecological footprint, the Indicator of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), a pollution-
sensitive HDI, the Sustainable Development indicator and the French Dashboard on Sustainable
Development. She concludes that France is sustainable in the weak sense but not in the strong
sense between 1990 and 2000 and that the Dashboard approach is probably the best. A similar
conclusion is reached by Musson (2013) who review several indicators in her e ort to combine
sustainable development and attractiveness. Mayer (2008) pointing at the well-known potential
flaws of index and aggregated measures also favours the use of a dashboard of indicators to
be weighted in the decision process by policy makers. The is even more important as often
indicators draw opposite conclusions, as showed by Ollivier and Giraud (2010) in the case of
Madagascar. Pillarisetti (2005) criticised ANS on the ground that it leads to the wrong policy
regarding sustainability.
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The quest for “the” indicator of sustainability is probably endless but authors keep suggest-
ing new methods, empirically or theoretically grounded. Martinet and Doyen (2007) o ered
to use the viable control approach instead of optimal control theory, that is to focus on the
viability of a system based on resource constraints and a minimum consumption level instead
of focusing on optimality. Shmelev and Rodríguez-Labajos (2009) and Shmelev (2011) suggest
a methodology for multidimensional assessments (i.e. social, environmental and economic),
applied to Austria and Russia. Kulig et al. (2010) support the use of capital theory but call for
the use of non-monetary units instead of the usual monetary ones.
It seems that if the debate is still largely open in academia, two indicators now have the
leading role in terms of sustainability assessment: ANS and the Ecological footprint. ANS
have the favour of international institutions and is supported by both the World Bank and the
United Nations (Atkinson et al. 2012). The Ecological Footprint is widely used in the business
community and the broader civil society, especially under its “carbon footprint” declination.
The point of this thesis is not to compare those two indicators. But it is worth pointing
at two facts about those indicators. First, it seems that both indicators have found there
audiences. The logic of the footprint makes it more amendable to consideration by a general
audience. Although it is potentially subject to overshooting, in the current environmental
context it seems preferable to an indicator underestimating problems. The message send by
the ecological footprint is simple: the aim is to minimise it. Conversely, ANS being closer
to usual macroeconomic indicators is better armed to fit in macro-management state policy.
The second remark comes from Hanley (2011). Quoting on Pezzey and Burke (2010), Hanley
suggests that part of the gap between the conclusions of the Ecological Footprint and the ANS
is related to the pricing and the assessment of some dimensions of environmental damage.
In figure 1.8, the Ecological Reserve is derived from the ecological footprint 17 and the
“modified Genuine Savings” dotted line is obtained by increasing the price of carbon. It seems
therefore that at least part of the gap between the two measures can be addressed by making
comprehension wealth more “comprehensive”, i.e. including assets that might be under-priced
today. We would add to this comment that this hints towards a potentially unsustainable level
of consumption, not in the narrow sense but in the Fisherian sense of services consumption.
This comparison illustrates the complementarity between current value indicators, which
can be used to assess the evolution of the productive base, defining both a state and a path
towards that state, and present value indicators assessing the productive base in t. If the
message on sustainability di ers between present and current value indicators, it is likely that
either uncertainty or actual substitutability between instruments of wealth is over (or under)
17. ER=1-(Ecological Footprint/Biocapacity).
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Figure 1.8: Carbon pricing and indicators
Source: Pezzey and Burke (2010) in Hanley (2011)
estimated. The di erence could naturally come from measurement errors, or biased valuation
because of market imperfections. Still, it seems necessary to address inconsistencies between
indicators as they may reflect a critical but missing dimension of sustainability in one indica-
tor. As discussed above, we believe that the use of counterfactual scenarios can address this
problem, while showing the necessary amendments to the underlying model for a given indi-
cator. Adjusted Net Savings seems best suited as an indicator of the evolution of the means,
completed by regular present value assessments for the evolution of real substitutability and
market imperfections. Present value indicators are also best able to monitor the evolution of
preferences, especially shifts in consumption patterns.
Those remarks conclude our presentation of the issues related to the notion of steady-
state as an analytical tool for sustainability. We stressed potential issues associated with
uncertainty which makes multiple equilibria likely and may bias indicators based on steady-state
convergence. Multiple equilibria can also be generated by di erent perceptions of sustainability,
as di erent sustainability rules may result in di erent steady-states. Present value indicators
are then critical to reassess sustainability paths from time to time and provide knowledge of
the current sustainability trajectory.
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II.3 Sustainability: an integrated framework
In the previous sections, we presented the building blocks of sustainability and how the
theory of sustainability yields information on the state of sustainable development today. In
this final subsection we will propose an integrated framework for sustainable development and
sustainability. We hope it will help to highlight challenges left to be addressed in the field. This
section will also be the basis of our assessment of the role of trade in sustainability. It is fair
to ask why an encompassing theory of sustainability is needed. The answer is twofold. First,
both the neoclassical and the ecological economics paradigm fail to address consistently all the
questions of interest in sustainable development and sustainability. Second, beyond theoretical
satisfaction, policy evaluation requires this consistent framework to make sense of the mass of
data provided by current and present value indicators.
Sustainable development and sustainability are two di erent concepts. Sustainable devel-
opment is the concept describing the all encompassing problem of development. Sustainable
development is simply development once the possibility of unsustainable development is ruled
out. Development is the process by which human beings evolve from a given state, summation
of conditions and characteristics, to another. Development is to be understood as a set of goals,
observables or not, decided and implemented by individuals and groups in a given institutional,
legal and societal environment. Formally, development can be characterised in discrete time
as a succession of states representing the state of completion of the goals set in the origin.
Those conditions encompass all the dimensions of the human experience: physical constraints,
institutional organisation, perception of the environment.
From a logical perspective, the challenge is therefore to define development, and then to
identify conditions of “un-sustainability”. We set out several times in this chapter how de-
velopment goals should be chosen by social groups and will therefore not propose any set of
development goals. What matters to our presentation is a definition of “un-sustainability”. A
first category of unsustainable development is development which goals are de facto contra-
dicting the proclaimed aims of development. The (inaccurate) metaphor of the Easter island
is a good illustrations of this. A second category of unsustainable development is development
whose goals are unattainable under a set of perfectly known current and future conditions. The
great leap forward in China is the perfect example of this, where too many constraints (time
and qualification of the manpower to name only two) were put on the development process to
make it sustainable. The final category can only be described taking uncertainty into account.
Can be characterised as unsustainable a development that relies for the assessment and
the fulfilment of its goals on elements which availability or occurrence cannot be associated
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Figure 1.9: Development paths
Source: Author
with a probability. In this category are therefore developments that are ex-ante unsustainable
and could be either sustainable or unsustainable ex-post. This sends us back to box 1.6 and
the importance of precaution in the wake of uncertainty. Action should only be undertaken in
conditions of minimal uncertainty. Reducing issues commanding action to a more commendable
size, following the subsidiarity principle, is a necessary first step to reduce uncertainty.
Under this definition, sustainable development is therefore a development that, under all the
present conditions and future conditions for which a probability of occurrence can be computed,
is characterised by non-contradictory goals (i.e goals that do not exclude on another). It is at
the same time a path for the goals and steps involved in the considered development that does
not include at any time a situation of uncertainty regarding achievement of the goals. Those
goals are derived from the set of values ruling the considered society, this very set being the
product of human interactions.
In figure 1.9 sustainable developments are composed of states S0,S2 and S5 and S6 as any
path going through S1 ends up in uncertainty and falls back into third category unsustainable
development. It may be that radical uncertainty cannot be ruled out for any path of develop-
ment. A sensible rule would be to choose the path where radical uncertainty comes the latest.
This way, present value indicators used at every step and counterfactual scenarios may allow to
turn uncertainty into risk before the period of uncertainty is reached. In that sense time con-
sistency is critical to sustainable development and sustainability. When means are mobilised to
face short term development goals, this can not be done in contradiction to long run goals. This
may prove troublesome in countries where either the long run goals are unclear, or the struc-
ture of power (and the timing of decisions) favours short-termism or present interests against
future ones. Still, sustainable development is in essence consistency between the means and
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the ends of development. Sustainable development calls for precaution in the wake of radical
uncertainty. Precaution starts with consistency in means and ends over time. Respecting the
precautionary principle reduces uncertainty and helps to build consensus around the definition
of the goals of development.
From this definition of sustainable development, it is easier to define sustainability. Sustain-
ability is the set of instruments of wealth (total and distribution) and rules of allocation that are
compatible with the realisation of sustainable development. Sustainability is therefore condi-
tioned by the set of values consistent with sustainable development. To phrase this di erently,
sustainability is the characterisation of the instantaneous or discreet conditions in t that are
necessary and su cient to achieve sustainable development. Sustainability is preconditioned
by a given set of values. Those values should be consistent with sustainable development. Sus-
tainability cannot yield a “best set” of values guaranteeing sustainable development. It can
only, via the need for consistency, limit the set of potential values upheld by a given society.
Dasgupta (2001) wonders whether people agree on goals (and values) and disagree about facts,
or disagree on facts an therefore rout for di erent goals (and values). A similar question is
implicit when scientists (especially in natural sciences) feel frustrated by the lack of political
action in the face of overwhelming evidence. Is it the political will that is missing, or the
evidence that, however strong, is not yet compelling enough? Dasgupta (2001) believes it is
the di erent perception of facts that leads to seemingly “bad” decisions. He therefore pushes
for more accurate evaluation as a way to make choices more compelling.
It seems indeed hard to imagine a lack of consensus over the idea of “improving well-being”
or “improving the quality of life”. But sustainable development as we defined it necessarily
include values providing “upper bounds” on those abstract goals. No one is against “freedom”
in abstracto but many disagree on the limits on individual freedom to preserve the freedom of
every individual. Values do pre-condition development, and in that sense people can disagree on
the relative merits of di erent values. Sustainable development is indeed a postulate, although
a protean one. One’s vision of sustainability is shaped by it. Ethical choices are necessary. They
are and should be the ultimate guide of human action. The World Commission on Environment
and Development (1987) definition stresses what is maybe the common ethical denominator of
sustainable development policies, that current and future members of a human cohort matter.
They should be considered in the economic and political decision taken today. Even more
than economics, sustainability economics require consistency in human decision-making and
decision-taking processes. It should be clear that other human-beings matter not only for their
hypothetical instrumental value, but in a more fundamental way. This postulate is one of
the living expression of human dignity, a fundamental right to the opportunity of honourable
existence within and between generations.
88 Chapter 1. The Emergence of Sustainability
Figure 1.10: Subsidiarity and the four physical dimensions of development
Source: Author
Sustainability studies focus on the allocation of resources, also presented as the source of
material well-being. Sustainability deals with the rule of proportion, ensuring the means are
a match for the ends. It is concerned with ruling out unsustainable path and can produce a
sustainable path under the constraint of its theory of value. In line with the concern for future
generation, sustainability considers long run consistency in the management of resources needed
by human societies. Considering the growing importance of uncertainty and the incremental
coming of age of new generations, consistency and precaution command proportionality between
the scale of the means and the horizon considered. Longer time horizons should only be applied
on larger scales, and vice versa. This gives us the figure 1.10 where proportionality is more
appropriately defined as subsidiarity.
Sustainability is based on the articulation of a theory of the means available to the ends,
and a theory of value. The first theory rules the relations between human-beings and their
environment and the second one links human needs and wants between one another. The
use of market instruments and the utilitarian theory of value allows for the preservation of
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individual opportunity.
Resources management requires, as presented above, a conceptual framework to organise
the relationship between mankind and its environment. Capital theory stricto sensu is nothing
if not a theory of the relations between human beings and their environment. Capital theory is
build on the assumption that human-beings consider their environment as a pool of instruments
of wealth. This has been translated later into the characterisation of capital as productive
assets. Fisher’s definition (anything that is material and can be owned) is less restrictive.
His analytical framework based on services, wealth and outgo provides us with a way to link
the wants and needs created by the human mind to the environment. The environment is
then redefined as potential and actual instruments of wealth, generating services and needing
disservices/maintenance to deliver.
This very general definition has the great advantage of solving, at the conceptual level some
of the objections raised by the proponents of strong sustainability. Any item providing services
to humans is wealth and therefore the question of ecosystem services is solved in this context:
ecosystems are valuable and needed as even if humans do not always realise it, they provide
services, are part of wealth and should therefore be maintained (in this case protected) to be
able to keep providing the services. Di erent perceptions regarding the value of an instrument
of wealth are possible. Even what is regarded as non-productive can be valuable. Property
right regimes are the precondition of value, as property creates the possibility of action, and
action the possibility of a flow of service. Much more than productivity, it is property that
defines the relationship between humans and their environment, and therefore capital theory.
Creating explicit property rights and ownership is a powerful way to distribute responsibility
for wealth. With explicit responsibility and reward will come better management of wealth.
The definition of Fisher needs only to be completed for the new immaterial forms of wealth,
such as software, which can be owned and leased but are not material. They are however a
form of wealth, as they are a new source of services for the human mind that Fisher could
not possibly imagine. From this, we draw this imperative of the preservation of the productive
base, in the broad sense of instruments of wealth as capital. Only when the perimeter of capital
is clearly established should a theory of value be applied. Starting here and to avoid future
confusions, we will use the following terms to di erentiate between the instruments of wealth:
– Produced capital refers to capital as defined in the mainstream economic literature. Pro-
duced capital is exemplified by machines and more generally investment goods and ser-
vices. Produced capital also includes the growing immaterial assets (brands, software).
– Natural capital is the sum of all the assets available in nature and form the environment
in which human beings evolve. Natural capital can be divided between ecosystems and
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resources and again between renewable and non renewable resources.
– Human capital represents the direct contribution of labour to the production process, plus
the general contribution of education to collective well-being (better law enforcement, etc.)
– Institutional capital is the instrumental value of the rights and responsibilities defined by
the institutions. This instrumental value is a form of wealth as it adds up to the value of
material consumption.
Wealth represents the sum, the entirety of the material and immaterial assets and capabil-
ities available in a given geographic and social object. Wealth is instrumental to development,
as it represents the resources, of any nature, available to a group of human being to achieve
development. From the presentation of Hicks (1946) in the introduction, it is clear that the
concept of income can be problematic. However, the distinction between gross and net income
is important and solves many potential issues. Beyond raw accounting it stresses the responsi-
bility of wealth owners regarding the maintenance of any form of capital (see chapter 4 section
III).
Resources management then requires a conceptual framework to allocate, distribute the
resources henceforth identified within society. This theory of value should aim at allocating
the services from instruments of wealth in an optimal fashion. This theory of value should be
guided by ethics. An ethical position consistent with sustainable development commands that
the optimal allocation is fair for current and future generations. Utilitarianism is shown by
Solow (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal (1974) to create Pareto-optimality within and between
generations. Fairness or justice proved harder to be put in the theory. Arrow’s argument
about the inequality between generations necessary to capital accumulation is powerful and
proved su cient to shift the burden of fairness away from allocation to redistribution. Poverty
reduction by growth in the most destitute parts of the world shifted the emphasis on creating
the conditions for growth, and therefore on promoting non utilitarian components of well-being
(rights and capabilities). Giving people opportunity and rights where they were needed most
would make everybody better-o . The use of market instruments and the utilitarian theory of
value allows for the preservation of individual opportunity while guaranteeing inter-temporal
optimality.
The di erence between money-value substitutability and real (physical) substitutability is
here critical. Physical substitutability is modified by technical progress, the human ability to
create or restore a given ecosystem. As money-value rests on ethics and principles, allocation
mechanisms never reflect substitutability in its physical dimension. Money-value can only
reflect the perception of scarcity, the evolution of substitutability with respect to "present
and/or current value" human needs. Uncertainty will always prevent money to be a “seamless”
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instrument of wealth and market mechanisms to reflect physical substitutability. From this
conclusion, either the neoclassical theory of value needs to be amended, or market mechanisms
need to be completed by other institutions.
Capital theory and utilitarianism combined ensure consistency under the assumption of a
complete set of markets. Those theories knew several ramifications since they were first formu-
lated. Knowledge expansion is a process that is neither predictable nor exempt of stagnation
or regression. It is useful to get back to the branching out point, the “common ancestor”
to understand the original intention and therefore the current applicability of a concept. In
the case of capital theory, it seems that Fisher’s vision of capital is more operational in the
current context than the now conventional “productive” view on capital. Capital theory and
utilitarianism give a clear scope for sustainability. Sustainability formulated on the basis of
those two theories yields principles for sustainability assessment. The current integrated model
of sustainability (the DHSS model) produces three criteria:
– Constant consumption in value over time
– Maintaining global productive base over time (weak sustainability) or maintaining each
component (strong sustainability)
– Intergenerational equity: apply the consistency principle
We insist on the central role of precaution in dealing with uncertainty on the development
path. Precaution leads to proportionality (or subsidiarity) in scale and time when tackling
development issues. Proportionality and precaution are hard to incorporate in sustainability
theory because they can either be sourced in e ciency concerns or in ethics and values. In
the first case they should be incorporated in a more comprehensive theory of value and in the
second case they come into well-being as a non material component and therefore are not a
sustainability concern. The DHSS model and the literature on sustainability do not make claims
about precaution. Subsidiarity can be understood as nothing more than the usual constitution
of decentralised markets. But in the context of sustainability, the call for decentralisation rests
on more than e ciency (and inter-temporal consistency). Subsidiarity in sustainability is also
about precaution. Tackling issues at the relevant scale leaves room for policies best fitted
to local preferences, but also to the possibility of experimenting and amending sustainability
policies over time. In that sense, subsidiarity is key to equity and e ciency.
Subsidiarity is also important for substitutability. Fisher (1906) did not make any explicit
assumption regarding substitutability, but capital theory is clearly based on the logic of perfect
substitutability. The strong sustainability critique appears therefore very relevant as the actual
degree of substitutability between di erent instruments of capital is at best estimated to be high
but not perfect (World Bank 2006). Neumayer (2010) makes it clear that actual substitutability
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is the main, if not the last real di erence between weak and strong sustainability paradigms.
However we argue that the critique is not incompatible with capital theory and the definitions
adopted above. In Fisher’s theory, perfect substitutability is based on the use of money funds
to transfer seamlessly stocks of wealth. In capital theory, it is not technical, entropic or physical
perfect substitutability that is assumed, but value-substitutability. Money being neutral in the
neoclassical sense, it is a perfect instrument to this end. But nothing in the theory prevents us
from barring some form of conversion from one instrument of wealth to another, or impose a
penalty on such a conversion. Assuming we can produce an estimate of the degree of physical
substitutability (as an objective base) then instead of a system where 100 units of wood can
be converted to 100 units of chairs and then to a 100 units of paper, one can imagine a system
where 100 units of wood can be turned into only 80 units of chairs but into 90 units of paper.
Quasi religious faith is placed on technical progress today, many arguing that only a new
industrial revolution can bring the technical tools to solve sustainability issues. But the limiting
factor is in most cases not the technical feasibility of a given project. Studies such as Jacobson
and Delucchi (2011) and Delucchi and Jacobson (2011) exemplify this. If technical progress
was always the limit, then no allocation mechanism for investment would be needed as the best
project would always be the obvious choice. The basic problem lies in the distribution of wealth
with respect the the relevant scale and the lack of adequate allocation mechanism when this is
not the case. Beyond the design of complete markets to narrow the gap between market and
shadow prices, a more fundamental rethink of the role of money-capital is essential. Money
capital is filling too many roles today, being trusted to be both the neutral neoclassical tool and
a policy instrument to control the business cycle. A fine demonstration of this is inflation. In a
money-neutral setting inflation yields an information about economic substitutability. But in
the current context, inflation is determined by a wide set of factors, the most prominent being
money creation by commercial banks. To solve this problem, one should solve the paradox that
money is money because it is liquidity, and liquidity is the reason why money cannot be used
for its theoretically core function: indicating substitutability.
Subsidiarity is the “missing link” between the short run and the long run. When confronted
with issues lasting over time, one should neither loose sight on the long run or the short run.
Guaranteeing opportunity to each generation involves making sure that no one is left behind
in the current generation. If so, increased compensation is needed for future generations by
the better-o  in the previous ones. Therefore, a final principle of intragenerational equity is
needed, to correct short run discrepancies that have cumulative impacts in an accumulation
process. The vision of what the long run equilibrium is can be quite di erent depending on the
starting point chosen for the analysis. This situation is strikingly similar to the pictures drawn
by ?. Extractive institutions will soon emerge from the growing concentration of wealth in the
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hands of an ever tinier minority.
Therefore, if one subscribes to the need for inclusive economic and political institutions as
a way to maintain desirable elements of well-being (both material and immaterial) then one
should also subscribe to the ethical imperative of intragenerational equity. Intragenerational
equity is both an indicator of institutional inclusiveness 18 and one of the necessary values of a
sustainable development path. 19
Another way to define the imperative in terms of consistency is to thing of an overlapping
generations model. If one defines the theoretical length of a generation to be short, at least
shorter than life expectancy then generations will overlap. Assuming that the new generation is
better-o  thanks to capital accumulation, then people leaving at the same time but belonging
to di erent theoretical generations may have quite di erent levels of wealth. We can there-
fore conclude that intragenerational equity is the first step towards intergenerational equity,
as both imperatives may merge in an overlapping generations setting. Inclusive institutions
and intergenerational equity both aim at preserving opportunities for all individuals in one
generation. If sight is lost of this imperative, then numerous unsustainable path can be chosen
as they maintain consumption at least constant over time, but fail to keep relative equity in
opportunity constant.
Potential links between intragenerational equity (income inequalities) and intergenerational
equity (environmental issues) have been studied mostly in the wake of a possible Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC, see chapter 2 section I). An early contribution by Boyce (1994) proposed
as an hypothesis that inequalities in wealth and power would lead to higher environmental
degradation. Scruggs (1998) tried to test the hypothesis and failed to obtain a clear cut re-
lationship between income or wealth inequalities and the environment. Although the tests of
the relationship are conducted in cross section, results suggest that structural characteristics
(first and foremost political institutions) are critical. Torras and Boyce (1998) reach a similar
result, showing that the political structure (civil and political rights) weight strongly on the
relationship. Those studies predictably stress the need for political inclusiveness to foster en-
vironmental awareness. Intragenerational equity and inclusive institutions are again the basis
for intergenerational equity.
Intragenerational equity helps with a wide range of problems as increased downscale power
allows for increased e ciency under the subsidiarity principle. Intragenerational equity there-
18. When intragenerational equity is understood as an equitable share of the return on overall wealth. It then
warrants access to the political process and the economic institutions via investment.
19. When intragenerational equity is understood as equity in opportunity from birth throughout life, as in
Rawls (1971).
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fore scores on both improved e ciency and consistency in institutional and economic organisa-
tion, improving sustainability and equity. It also makes enforcement of property rights regime
easier, providing more adequate means of protecting property for the worse-o . It is also worth
noting that intragenerational equity helps addressing the issue of discounting, at the core of
intergenerational equity issues. The standard criteria as presented for example in Dasgupta
(2001, p. 24) is to choose current and future states according to Pareto-optimality. In this
setting, the pure rate of time preference is critical as it states the preference of current decision
makers along the path over an infinite amount of time.
The long distance debate between Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1974) settled for a relatively
high rate of discount of future generations. In this context, the more likely it becomes for
future generations to face daunting challenges (such as global warming) the more the current
generations should save. A strong intragenerational equity reduces the size of this provision,
as inclusive institutions provide a better bu er for the majority. In a similar vein, short term
shocks may require the conduct of short run adjustment policy that may prove inconsistent with
the long run sustainable path of development. Intragenerational equity reduces the size of this
adjustment, which proves to be politically and economically harder to implement. The consis-
tency (and therefore e ciency) gains of intragenerational equity should not be underestimated,
although they are, like any counterfactual gains, hard to estimate.
In the conceptual perspective of this section those conflicts between short run stabilisation
and long run optimality need not arise, but neither is there anything to prevent them. Therefore,
the allocation system that would complement or substitute to the neoclassical theory of value
should have built in either an allocation compatible with both intra and intergenerational equity,
or an allocation and a redistribution mechanism. The general course of the field has been to
separate allocation and redistribution, and to promote the development of market mechanisms
for the former and redistributive institutions for the later. This strategy has so far failed to
produce a state of greater equity, at least in income distribution. If the operational distinction
between primary allocation and redistribution fails to produce an outcome consistent with a
sustainable development, then an alternative should be found. Our demonstration suggests that
the weight does not rest on the shoulders of capital theory. It is a theory of value consistent
with both intergenerational and intragenerational equity that is needed. We think this is the
key behind the theory of “social interactions”, the missing link in the model presented by Arrow
et al. (2010). In the meantime, it is to say the least troubling to be more worried about the
future of a distant generation compared to the worst-o  elements of the current generation.
This concludes our attempt to propose a conceptual definition for sustainable development
and sustainability. We stressed the importance of an all-encompassing capital theory to define
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the relationship between human-beings and their environment. We then presented the limits
of the current theory of value and highlighted the role of intragenerational equity in solving
issues regarding the internal consistency of the theory, especially regarding sustainability and
the time horizon. It seems that incorporating intragenerational equity in the theory of value
associated with sustainability is the next frontier for research in the field. This is certainly the
key to the maintenance of the virtuous circle (see figure 1.5) promoted by ?. We propose five
dimensions for sustainability assessment:
1. Maintaining comprehensive wealth over time, that is preserving exhaustible resources,
productive systems and ecosystems. Increasing resilience and opportunity within and
between generations.
2. Maintaining consumption constant over time (and therefore maintaining income) as a
minimalist imperative for material well-being maintenance.
3. Controlling for consistent levels of substitutability in both physical and money-value
substitutability for any instrument of wealth.
4. Guaranteeing intergenerational equity, ensuring consistency along the development path.
5. Fostering intragenerational equity, increasing inclusiveness of institutions and promoting
opportunity within generations.
Those five dimensions should be controlled for when assessing sustainability. They allow
for a characterisation of sustainability in both states and paths and should be used as basis
for sustainability indicators. Both current and present value indicators of sustainability should
be designed taking one of those dimensions into account at least. Measures of comprehensive
wealth and Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) are grounded in the neoclassical theory of value.
They provide a first indication regarding criteria 1,2 and 4. As an all-encompassing indicator
of long-run sustainability, ANS need to be completed by tests regarding substitutability and
assessments of intragenerational equity. Following the logic of subsidiarity, those long run
indicators should be completed by indicators with reduced scope in time and space.
Those “forward indicators” would be useful notably to assess the impact of the business
cycle on sustainability, or regional level variables on national level. This distinction is not the
distinction between present and current value indicators. Both kinds of indicators can be used
at any scale, depending on relevance. Subsidiarity is very important here to avoid both the trap
of missing a short term variable with long run cumulative e ect and the trap of focusing on
the long run while forgetting about current issues. Adopting this “dashboard” (Musson 2013)
strategy of forward guidance could also help to address the uncertainty issue. Dasgupta (2001)
stresses the di erence between the perfect society, the “good enough society” (agathotopia)
and the dysfunctional society (kakotopia). Sustainability assessment requires the assessment
of those best case and second best scenarios. The generalisation of those tools (as scenarios or
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confidence intervals associated with mono-scenario studies) is a good starting point and should
be encouraged.
With present indicators to monitor the present state of sustainability in both time and
space, broader indicators for longer horizons and larger areas could be amended regularly to
solve consistency issue and detect deviations from the long run path. Critically, using those
present value indicators of sustainability will allow a di erentiate treatment for instruments
of wealth depending on scale and time horizon. Water needs to be managed consistently over
long horizons and in every region, when a harvest can be a sustainable issue only in some areas
and for short periods. Articulating in a consistent manner the challenges brought by space
and time to resource allocation is the core of economics. Our conviction is that sustainability
needs to add equity and power concerns to the list to produce a meaningful theory to support
sustainable development.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a framework for sustainable development and sustainability
analysis. The weak sustainability paradigm is slowly erected from the early works on the DHSS
model (Dasgupta and Heal 1974, Solow 1974, Stiglitz 1974) to answer the Rawlsian critique
regarding the lack of intragenerational equity in economics. A second source of opposition
to neoclassical economics can be traced back to the Club of Rome report (Meadows et al.
1972) which raised concerns about absolute resources scarcity. From this early work and the
theoretical thinking of Georgescu-Roegen (1971), emerged the strong sustainability paradigm,
concerned with physical substitutability and the carrying capacity of the environment. Con-
cerns regarding sustainability clearly relate to an ethical, philosophical postulate about the
importance of equity and justice in society. In that sense, sustainability is necessarily inserted
in sustainable development. Sustainability can be defined as sustainable management of the
means, when sustainable development link those sustainably managed means to the socially
defined ends of development.
Assessing sustainability requires current value indicators, as sustainability has a temporal
dimension. Sustainability is defined by a succession of states with suitable characteristics,
forming a path that should be not only optimal but sustainable. In section I.2 we presented
Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) which from the early works of Pearce and Atkinson (1993) grew
to become the main current value indicator of sustainability. This single indicator provides
a full characterisation of a development path. As we will see in chapter 4, it also provides
a fair picture of the sustainability of development. Still, sustainability being one dimension
of sustainable development, other elements need to be taken into account to characterise a
sustainable development. In section II.1 we review the key role of institutions for sustainable
development and their instrumental value for sustainability. We then show how the inherent
uncertainty of the future and the need to assess the means and ends of development separately
make the case for a coherent strategy for sustainable development, based on subsidiarity and
the use of several indicators.
In the final part of the chapter we presented an integrated framework for sustainable devel-
opment and sustainability. We conclude that sustainability can be reached by action on five
dimensions: maintaining comprehensive wealth over time, maintaining constant consumption
over time, controlling for money-value substitutability to be consistent with physical substi-
tutability, guaranteeing intergenerational equity and fostering intragenerational equity. Cou-
pled with the subsidiarity principle, those criteria should be assessed by current and present
value sustainability indicators at di erent geographical scales. Current value indicators should
be tested in scenarios to reduce uncertainty and maintain consistency in sustainable paths,
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following the precautionary principle. ANS are ideally suited to perform this task of path mon-
itoring, as counterfactual studies can be build in a theoretically consistent fashion using this
indicator (see chapter 4).
Armed with this framework, we can now assess the consequences of international trade
for sustainability. In the next chapter we review the existing literature on sustainability and
international trade. We then propose an open-economy version of the framework presented
in this chapter. Our aim is to focus on sustainability, the means of sustainable development.
We will therefore not come back to the discussion over the goals of sustainable development.
Nevertheless, further remarks on the instrumental role of institutions are provided in chapter
4.
Chapter 2
International trade and sustainability:
exploring the linkages
1
1. This part is co-published with Matthew Agarwala in the second edition of the Handbook of sustainable
development (forthcoming). I would like to thank him again for his patience with my often muddled thinking
and his help and advice in setting up the presentation of the chapter in the Handbook, from which the cur-
rent presentation heavily draws. Comments and suggestions from Giles Atkinson and Eric Neumayer are also
gratefully acknowledged.
100 Chapter 2. International Trade and Sustainability
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
I Trade and the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
I.1 The Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
I.2 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
II Open economy sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
II.1 Sustainability and Reinvestment in open economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
II.2 International trade in empirical sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
III Trade and sustainability: a synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
III.1 Trade liberalisation and trade policy: challenges for sustainability . . . . 138
III.2 A model for trade and sustainable development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
101
Introduction
We presented in the previous chapter the current state of the literature on sustainabil-ity. We concluded this presentation with a definition of sustainable development and
sustainability. This definition led to the five dimensions of sustainability assessment. We high-
lighted the importance of consistency in scale and space when assessing sustainability, mostly
by applying the subsidiarity principle. Current value indicators are better able to assess sus-
tainability issues, but they need to be completed by medium scope indicators to assess the
impact of medium to short run variables on sustainability. Finally, we stressed the role of
intragenerational equity in minimising the consequences of uncertainty and the need for redis-
tribution to maintain institutional sustainability. With those elements in mind, it is now time
to turn to the second term in the dialectic of this thesis, namely international trade.
We would like to make a methodological point first. There is a great diversity of sources on
the topic of international trade in a sustainability context. As in the first chapter, our aim is not
only to undertake a review of the relevant contributions to our topic. As a consequence, in this
chapter we conduct an exercise in classifying contributions using the definition of sustainability
from chapter 1 as our guide. We believe the ever increasing number of contributions to the
topic makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive assessment of the links between trade
and sustainability without first conducting this classification work.
It is interesting to note there is no “sustainability study of international trade” or “theory
of international trade and sustainability” as such. This does not mean that international
trade has not been studied in the literature on sustainability. Nonetheless, the current state
of the literature does not include a comprehensive analysis of the interactions between the
study of sustainability and international trade. The study of international trade linked to
sustainability issues is split between at least three fields: trade and the environment, open
economy sustainability in resource economics and empirical sustainability. This absence of
unity in itself is a motivation for this chapter. We would like to o er a potential reason for
this absence. International trade has been used in sustainability studies mostly for specific
questions: the resource curse, the pollution haven hypothesis, etc. The method of investigation
involved building up on trade theory conclusions to complete the findings of closed economy
sustainability studies. This led to skilful and elegant borrowing on both sides, but apart from
the Copeland and Taylor (1994) model, no real synthesis.
Another potential explanation is methodological. Classical trade models are mostly based
on comparative statics when sustainability is in essence a dynamic notion. The marriage of
trade and sustainability therefore starts with the methodological di culty of either studying
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sustainability in a two-periods model or estimating dynamic patterns of trade. The first solution
is of limited interest and the second might not yield original enough conclusions to justify the
e ort. Cross-fertilisation is much more frequent between macroeconomics and sustainability,
were the tools are quite similar. A final potential reason is that sustainability study is relatively
recent and not yet unified, with field specific questions such as pollution, climate change, etc.
Building a theory of sustainability and trade is therefore first building a “unified” theory of
sustainability, starting with a potential synthesis between weak and strong sustainability.
The literature on trade and the environment should not be confused with the emerging
literature on trade and sustainability. The models in the trade and the environment literature
are concerned with either the impact of trade on the management of a renewable resource
(mostly fisheries and forests), or the impact of trade on the management of the assimilative
capacity of pollutants as set by regulation. Those are important issues but the impact of
trade on sustainability is more comprehensive, especially across time. In this chapter, we will
first present several contributions to the understanding of the relationship between trade and
sustainability. We then assess the impact of trade on the conclusions reached in chapter 1. In
that sense, our aim is indeed larger than in most contributions in the trade and the environment
literature. 2
There are several reasons why the e ort to build a “theory of international trade and sus-
tainability” should be undertaken. A first reason is the emphasis put on export-led growth by
the expansion of developing economies in Asia. This resulted in tensions on natural resources
stocks worldwide. In the context of globalisation, sustainability is still mainly a national re-
sponsibility, even for issues such as global warming (after the failure to ratify international
treaties). In the predominating view, trade is just a technical, welfare improving link between
countries. The economics of the global supply chain are di erent, balancing international gains
from specialisation with national gains from agglomeration and diversification. The debate
over the pollution haven hypothesis (see section I) illustrates those contradictory forces at play.
Studying the re-composition incentives of the global supply chain is therefore key to understand
the potential impact of trade on sustainability. This motive could be related to the “space”
dimension in figure 1.10 (see section III).
The second motivation is related to the “time” dimension. Beyond the methodological issue
raised supra regarding dynamic trade models, the key question is the consistency between long
run and short run imperatives. Nothing illustrates this better than the nature of development.
In endowments terms, development is characterised by an increase in produced and human
capital and by a reduction of the intensity of natural capital use. This transformation is
2. An interesting survey with a similar aim can be found in De Melo (2012).
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usually termed structural change (López et al. 2007) and demands an evolution in the trade
specialisation of the domestic economy, a move upmarket. When should a country abandon
its static comparative advantage? Is the process driven by market forces, policy intervention?
When and how should the shift occur?
This debate is far from over with Collier (2013) arguing for a focus on swift structural change
and Yi-fu Lin (2012) insisting on strengthening comparative advantages first. Views on this
point seem to depend on the time horizon adopted by the author. Still, as argued in section
II.2, short-to-medium term decisions shape long run outcomes. It seems therefore impossible
to settle for the absorption of trade impacts into a productivity term (Hartwick 1995), which
is a perfectly sensible assumption in the long run but a poor policy guide on shorter horizons.
The gains from trade are short term compared to the usual horizon of sustainability issues, but
the economic structures under which they are obtained is relevant to sustainability.
The existing literature focus on more immediate questions and therefore use ad-hoc models
to answer them. The most sustained e ort to build a comprehensive theoretical framework
is the Copeland and Taylor (1994) model, presented in section I. Built on the Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model of international trade it helps to predict the overall impact of trade on the
environment. The model is used to investigate the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and
the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), although the later treatment is completed by economic
geography models. The Copeland and Taylor model is based on the HO assumption that factor
endowments are the determinants of trade. It focuses on predicting the likely split of factor
usage in the context of HO trade patterns.
A second important corpus in the literature focuses on the consequences of opening up
a previously closed economy in terms of natural resources management. This literature is
presented in section II under the label “open economy sustainability”. The conclusion of those
models is that international trade is mostly a utility improving mechanism in the neoclassical
tradition. It generates Ricardian-like productivity gains in countries engaging in international
trade, shifting from a domestic price system to the system of world prices for natural resources.
Interestingly, in both open economy sustainability and trade and the environment models,
the assimilative capacity of the environment is considered to be a stock depleted by inputs of
pollution.
Finally there is an important empirical literature focusing on the property of natural re-
sources and responsibility for depletion. This literature burgeoned with the establishment of
all-encompassing green accounting systems such as the SEEA. 3 These authors focus on the
3. See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp.
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establishment of counterfactual scenarios as a way to evaluate the weight of resources in wealth
and the likely outcome of natural resources policy. From this field emerged recently the concept
of “virtual sustainability”, representing the di erence between sustainability from production
and actual sustainability linked to the final consumption of resources.
The weak versus strong sustainability debate imprinted the study of trade and sustainability.
Trade being presented as a productivity and welfare improving mechanism in the neoclassical
tradition, it is regarded with deep scepticism by ecological economists and proponents of strong
sustainability, who consider it to be yet another element of the neoclassical economics they
reject. In ecological economics, the perspective on the links between trade and sustainability is
quite di erent. Daly (1992) pointed at the factor mobility argument (some also pointed at other
fragile assumptions such as the factor price equalisation hypothesis), while Rees (2006) stressed
the sociological consequences of trade. A tendency towards autarkic solutions predominates,
for the sake of ecosystem managements and protection at the local level.
Whether to welcome or to criticise it, the di erent contributions to the literature find a
significant impact of trade on sustainability. This impact is e ciently summarised in the
Copeland and Taylor model under three e ects: composition, technique and scale. Openness
also creates the possibility to benefit from terms of trade variations in resources prices, which
impact the valuation of domestic natural capital. As a result, sustainability on a development
path is hard evaluate (let alone predict) because of those prices fluctuations. Openness to
trade creates the possibility to invest the rent from resources in other countries, either to
get better returns or for security reasons. Trade can also be a way to “cherry-pick” the less
environmentally damaging elements of a production process while outsourcing the others. In the
way it might improve overall production e ciency and reduce global pollution. The terms of the
debate on trade and sustainability echo the debate on the social consequences of globalisation.
Neoclassical models of trade yield the same contrasting picture of overall improvement, with
the possibility of local losers. Mitigation of potentially harmful consequences of trade needs
global coordination. We discuss in the final section the state of sustainability issues in trade
policy.
As we saw in the previous section, the weak sustainability paradigm finds its expression in
ANS and the Hartwick rule. Faced with the potential impact of international trade, Hamilton
and Clemens (1999) propose an amendment to Adjusted Net Savings (see section II.2) to include
net foreign assets holdings. Although significant, this amendment addresses only partially the
original critique of Daly regarding factor mobility. Here are at stake the global trends, processes
and interactions between countries. The study of international trade in sustainability has
largely followed the principle of international trade as given (the open economy perspective).
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This principle made sense for studies focusing on the impact of economic variables determined
under international trade but only marginally (if at all) influenced by the domestic economy
(such as natural resources prices).
Our objective here is to explore the relationship between trade and sustainable development,
which is to be distinguished from the trade and the environment literature. Although some
overlap is inevitable, this part is written from a sustainable development perspective, and
requires the combination of theory from three sources: international trade, resource economics,
and empirical sustainability. Analysis of the links between trade and sustainability naturally
draws from international trade theory (Copeland and Taylor 1994, 2003, Grossman and Krueger
1991). But another important part of the literature, most closely associated with resource
economics, investigates the links between trade openness and resource depletion (Hartwick
1977, Dixit et al. 1980, Asheim 1986, Asheim et al. 2003). We also draw from this tradition.
It is easily conceivable that trade directly a ects sustainability through natural resources
exchanges, but important indirect impacts derive from further consequences of trade liber-
alisation. Hence, we argue that trade policy should be assessed in the light of the impact
on sustainability and sustainable development strategies. Although e orts have been made
to present the theoretical impacts of international trade on sustainability, most of the recent
work has been empirical (Atkinson and Hamilton 2002, Proops et al. 1999). The literature
flourished in the analysis of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), the pollution haven hy-
pothesis (PHH), and the resource curse (Dinda 2004, Grossman and Krueger 1991, Van Der
Ploeg 2011). Many attempt to quantify the impact of international trade on sustainability
through partial or general equilibrium analysis (Bailey and Clarke 2000, Turner et al. 2011)
and amend sustainability indicators (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). This chapter also reviews
those e orts.
Hence, in section I we present the literature on trade and the environment. In section II
we focus on open economy resource economics and empirical sustainability. We then discuss
the impact of the timing of trade liberalisation and the potential usefulness of trade manage-
ment instruments. Finally, in section III we assess the impact of those contributions on the
conceptual framework for sustainability presented in chapter 1 section II.3 and o er new fields
of investigation to expand the knowledge on trade and sustainability.
106 Chapter 2. International Trade and Sustainability
I Trade and the environment
International trade is explained since Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1817) using the logic
of comparative advantage. A comparative advantage is an advantage in production derived
from several sources, creating an incentive to specialise. A country following its comparative
advantages can expect income gains from international trade. The first model in Smith (1776)
presents absolute comparative advantages. An absolute comparative advantage exits when a
country can produce more e ciently than any of his partners a given good. All countries in
this situation should specialise in that one good. The limit to this situation appears when one
country is less e cient than all its potential partners in the production of every good.
In this case Ricardo (1817) shows that even a relative comparative advantage should induce
specialisation. The more e cient partner should specialise in its strongest advantage and leave
its least strong positions to the less e cient country. The Ricardian motive for trade is based on
overall productivity in the production process. Di erences in productivity between countries are
the source of comparative advantage as factors are assumed to be homogeneous and immobile
across countries. The Ricardian theory was formulated in terms of labour value and would be
reformulated using marginal utility by Haberler (1930). Deardor  (1980) provides the modern
general equilibrium formulation. The extend of specialisation in the case of a continuum of
goods is debated in Dornbusch et al. (1977) and in a probabilistic setting in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Costinot (2009).
Productivity di erences are not the only source of comparative advantages. Berthil Ohlin
(1933) and Eli Heckscher explained the patterns of trade by the relative factor endowments
of the exchanging partners. Their framework of analysis is based on the 2 countries, 2 factors
and 2 goods case. Despite the simplicity and illustrative power of this basic Hecksher-Ohlin
(HO) theory, a rigorous analysis of factor content in international trade requires greater dimen-
sionality than permitted by the 2-2-2 framework (Leontief 1953). The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
(Harkness 1978, Vanek 1968) extends the H-O model to the n-goods case. The empirical validity
of the model is still debated, although the most recent attempts using country-specific technol-
ogy matrices are encouraging (Burstein and Vogel 2011, Leamer 1984, Trefler 1993, 1995). A
review of HO models and results is available in Baldwin (2008).
Although clear and intuitive, the HO motive for trade fails to explain the development
of intra-industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd 1975) after the second world war. The idea that
countries could trade broadly similar goods could not be accommodated by the HO framework
and the standard definition of preferences. The development of monopolistic competition and
the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Lancaster 1980) opened the way to models
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of intra-industry trade based on national (Krugman 1980, 1981) and international economies
of scale (Ethier 1982). More will be said on intra-industry trade in chapter 4. The intuition
in Krugman (1980) about the prominent role of agglomeration forces in the wake of increasing
returns to scale in production reinstated geography in trade with the seminal contribution of
Krugman (1991).
Those are the three main theoretical and empirical fields in international trade. Several
sources of comparative advantages have been identified throughout the decades:
– di erences in productivity
– di erences in factor endowments
– gains from the international division of labour
– advantages arising from the taste for variety
– advantages from di erences in regulation
– advantages from the relative distribution of firms size
Exploiting comparative advantages have an impact on resources allocation patterns, produc-
tivity, maximum consumption attainable, etc. On the basis of those comparative advantages,
environmental economists tried to predict the impact of trade liberalisation on the environment
(Baumol and Oates 1988). The first subsection below is dedicated to the presentation of the
theoretical models on trade and the environment. The second subsection details empirical re-
sults. We notably insist on the roots and relative validation of the two main hypothesis in the
literature: the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) and the factor endowment hypothesis (FEH).
I.1 The Theory
Sustainability issues are usually framed in a dynamic model, due to the intergenerational
dimension of the problem. In the natural resources context, the sustainability literature de-
scribes how much of a natural resource should be used at any point in time, and how it should
be used (Hartwick 1977). The question answered by the trade and the environment literature is
somewhat di erent. It emerged from the growing concern surrounding the notion of pollution.
Pollution is assimilated to the degradation of the environment, the man-made alteration of an
ecosystem, usually with both health and environmental consequences. Dealing with pollution
required the implementation of gradually more stringent environmental norms.
Those norms tackle mostly pollution emissions from production and consumption. Reducing
CO2 emissions or rain acidity through regulation of fume filtering at factories reduces produc-
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tion emissions. Designing cars so that exhaust fumes are filtered from heavy metals reduces
consumption emissions. The final aim of norms regarding emissions is to reduce concentrations
of pollutants. Atmospheric pollutants are chemical components available in the atmosphere
at concentration levels superior to a given level. Those sustainable levels of concentration are
defined according to two criteria:
– The toxicity of those concentrations for human-beings.
– The assimilative capacity of an ecosystem, represented by the amount of dissipation
physically possible.
A given chemical component can be more destabilising for human health than for the envi-
ronment and vice versa. A similar logic can be applied to water pollution. Toxic concentration
of a given pollutant can rapidly destroy ecosystems by making critical wildlife presence un-
sustainable. It can then harm the human population directly because of the toxicity from
concentration, or indirectly by destroying human life-support functions in the ecosystem.
Environmental economics aimed at devising economic mechanisms (mostly incentives) to
reduce pollution and to preserve ecosystem services that are by definition valuable for human-
beings. This usually implies a trade-o  between economic e ciency and environmental preser-
vation. Before environmental norms, pollution was not valued, as the epitome of production
externalities. In a closed economy settings, it makes perfect sense to arbitrage in favour of
environmental preservation, as the “internalisation” of this externality would improve overall
economic e ciency (Baumol and Oates 1988). The polluter would finally bear the true cost
of production. Hanley et al. (2001) present how valuation of environmental benefits and costs
improves decision-making, especially in infrastructure projects. Internalising externalities usu-
ally requires agreement upon market mechanisms to transfer rights or compensations between
polluters and pollutees.
The question is more complex for an open economy. If discrepancies in environmental
policy exist between two trading countries, the one favouring the environment is at a potential
comparative disadvantage. Producers in the less regulated countries do not pay the full cost
of production. This objection was raised in the United States during the negotiations leading
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at the beginning of the 1990’s. As
the Mexican environmental legislation (and enforcement) was weaker, voices in the industry
and environmentalist movements claimed the free trade agreement would result in sub-optimal
outsourcing and regulatory “race to the bottom”. Confronted with unfair competition, there
could also be strong lobbying against US regulation and pressure to water it down.
To address this concern, a technique to integrate pollution in a general equilibrium setting
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was needed. Pollution is typically a by-product of the production process, an undesirable out-
put. This feature makes it less tractable in a traditional setting where the output in its entirety
should be maximised. It is however possible to consider pollution as an input in the production
process. Pollution can be assimilated to the use of some of the stock of assimilative capacity in
the environment, whether it be atmospheric degradation or water filtration. The assimilative
capacity is the amount of a given component an ecosystem can tolerate before irremediable
degradation of its functions. There is an amount of natural dissipation of pollutants, which
can make optimal pollution management similar to other renewable resources. Formally, the
inter-temporal optimisation problem can be formulated as:
Max:
⁄ Œ
0
[B(Et)≠D(Zt)]exp≠rt dt (2.1)
(2.2)
Subject to:
dZt
dt
= Et≠ ”At (2.3)
Zt = A(0) (2.4)
Zt Ø 0 (2.5)
Where E is the level of emissions and B the benefits from it (in terms of output), D the cost
function and Z pollution concentration. ” is the rate of natural decay in the atmosphere, with
absorption capacity A. r is the rate of interest. The steady state first order conditions are:
ˆB
ˆE
=
ˆD
ˆZ
r≠ ” (2.6)
”Z = E (2.7)
At the steady state, the extra benefit granted by an extra unit of emission must be equal to the
extra cost from pollution, weighted by the interest rate net of decay. The value of emissions is
equal to the value of concentration minus natural decay. Hence, from an economic perspective,
the assimilative capacity should be optimally used, the “right amount” of pollution should be
tolerated neither more nor less(Hanley et al. 2001). This optimal amount depends on physical
parameters (the natural rate of decay and the damage function) and economic values (the rate
of interest and the benefit function). The optimal level of emissions determined in this manner
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can then be integrated into standard economic calculus. Consider a sector where good x and
pollution z form the joint output (Copeland and Taylor 2003). The joint production functions
are:
x= (1≠ )F (Kx,Lx) (2.8)
z = Ï( )F (Kx,Lx) (2.9)
Where   represents the allocation of resources between production of good x and abatement of
pollution z. If there is no abatement ( = 0), then each unit of output w produces one unit of
pollution. Under the specific form Ï( ) = (1≠ ) 1– , substituting 2.8 into 2.9 gives to following
production function:
x= z–[F (Kx,Lx)]1≠– (2.10)
Where pollution, labour and capital are the inputs in the sector. The demonstration holds for
any functional form for F and Ï that are linearly homogenous. It does not hold for functions
exhibiting increasing returns to scale. It is therefore equivalent to consider pollution as an input
in the production process or a by-product. This assumption gave birth to the use of tradable
permits to give value to pollution. The right to deplete part of the assimilative capacity of the
environment resides in the permit. Markets for those permits have been used locally and more
ambitiously to reduce global CO2 emissions (see for example Dijkstra et al. (2011)).
Using this technique, it is possible to introduce pollution in standard trade models. A 2-2-2
version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model has been adapted by Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Grossman and Krueger (1995) to fit the analysis of the potential environmental consequences
of the NAFTA 4. They find that three e ects of trade on the environment are at play, and the
combination of those e ects will determine the actual impact. Those e ects are:
Scale e ect: As an economy grows, emissions rise through a simple quantitative e ect.
Technique e ect: When the income of an economy increases, productivity gains and the
larger share of resources available for pollution abatement reduce the overall level of
pollution emissions.
Composition e ect: Demand for environmental quality rises with living standards as a result
of (trade induced) economic growth. Higher demand for the clean good results in a
relative increase in the clean good sector size, lowering overall production pollution in the
economy.
4. For North American Free Trade Agreement, a free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the US.
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Those e ects are computed assuming pollution concentration and emissions are internalised
either via a tax, emission norms or tradeable permits. The nature of the composition e ect
changes if environmental policy is exogenous.
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is derived from the three e ects. The Kuznets
curve is a U-shaped empirical relationship between inequality and GDP per capita. The EKC
is also a U-shaped relationship, between pollution emissions and GDP per capita. The EKC is
based on the three e ects. As GDP per capita increases, pollution emissions will first increase as
economic activity expands. Then, after a given peak, mounting pressure from citizens concerned
with the environment will lead to more stringent environmental regulation. This should prop up
innovation and bring down emissions. The economy will also have a tendency to produce higher-
value goods, using more produced capital and becoming relatively less intensive in pollution.
The combination of the technique and composition e ect explain the downside of the curve.
This approach was formally described in Copeland and Taylor (1994) and Copeland and Taylor
(2003). In the third chapter of their book, Copeland and Taylor (2003) present the theoretical
foundation of the EKC based on the threshold and income e ect. They also examine the
validity of increasing returns to scale in abatement. As abatement becomes more productive,
firm allocate more resources to it. 5
Copeland and Taylor (2003) propose a trade model with endogenous environmental policy,
where better-o  consumers lobby the government for more stringent environmental regulation.
The government taxes pollution, so that increasing production brings both rewards (profits
from increased sales) and costs (taxes from the increase in the pollution stock). The economy
produces 2 goods, x and y, x generating pollution. y is the numéraire (py = 1). Two factors
are used in the production process to start with, K and L, which supply is exogenous. Returns
for K and L are r and w respectively. x is capital intensive and y is labour intensive:
Kx
Lx
Ø Ky
Ly
(2.11)
There are two countries. The North is capital intensive and specialises in x, the South labour
intensive and specialises in y. Both goods are produced using constant returns to scale tech-
nology. The production functions are:
y =H(Ky,Ly) (2.12)
x= (1≠ )F (Kx,Lx)z = Ï( )F (Kx,Lx) (2.13)
F is increasing, concave and linearly homogeneous. The firm splits inputs between abatement
5. Considering the somewhat disappointing results of empirical tests for the EKC, we won’t present the
extensions of the Copeland and Taylor model here. For empirical results, see section I.2.
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to reduce emissions Z and production of good X. As F (Kx,Lx) is potential output without
abatement ( =0) then x= z =F (Kx,Lx). Abatement creates the di erence between potential
and net output. Using the transformation described above, the production system reduces to
equations 2.12 and 2.10. Once the abatement function is defined, firms will minimise the cost of
production depending on capital, labour prices and abatement costs in sector x and only labour
and capital in sector y. Equilibrium prices for labour and capital can be obtained subject to
optimal abatement set by either taxation or tradeable permits. In this setting, the standard
Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Ohlin theorems hold. The Rybczinski theorem holds for
a given level of emission intensity. Under the separability assumption, in an HO type setting
factor prices are independent of endowments. The adjustment is made via output and therefore
emissions. Pure scale and technique e ects have straightforward implications: a more stringent
regulation of emissions will ceteris paribus reduce the emissions, while a multiplication by a
given factor of the size of the economy will increase them.
As the Rybczinski theorem holds, it is possible to obtain the net impact of capital accumula-
tion on pollution and the impact of the composition e ect. The impact of capital accumulation
can be assessed via the three e ects:
dz
dK
z
=
dx
dK +
dy
dK
S
+
d( xS )
dK
Ïx
+
de
dK
e
(2.14)
The impact of capital accumulation on pollution can be decomposed into the variation of goods
output divided by the scale S of the economy (scale), the impact of the increased output of x
relative total output scaled by pollution intensity (composition) and the evolution in pollution
intensity of production (technique). The impact of capital accumulation on pollution is positive:
more capital abundant countries will pollute more. It should be noted this also implies an
increase in labour endowment will reduce pollution emissions. This result flows naturally from
the Rybczinski theorem.
The Copeland and Taylor model can be used to assess the impact of trade liberalisation
on the environment, the potential formation of a pollution haven and the impact of factor
accumulation on emissions. A question arises very quickly when the consequences of the three
e ects are clear. Under the composition and scale e ects, countries relatively well endowed in
produced capital (the North) should produce the “dirty” 6 good x, and increase the production
more than proportionally as capital is accumulated (Rybczinski theorem). In the meantime,
those countries face growing pressure from a better-o  population with a strong preference for
environmental quality. Produced capital-intensive goods can then still be made in the North
but with reduced emissions (technique e ect) because of the more stringent environmental
6. Pollution intensive, that is.
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policy. Alternatively, they could be outsourced in the South were regulation is less stringent.
This conclusion leaves the North and the South in an awkward position. The South have
to arbitrage between industrialisation via emissions or environmental quality and continued
poverty. The North should balance the demand for environmental regulation with the risk of de-
industrialisation. To make things worse for the environment, it is quite common that property
rights in the South are ill-defined. Some important natural resources are common access natural
resources, subject to free riding and poaching. Chichilnisky (1994) shows that in this context
inputs from the commons are supplied at sub-optimal prices relative to actual scarcity and
subsistence labour. This leads the South to trade environmental quality for industrialisation
at unfavourable terms. International trade in this setting results in over-exploitation of the
commons and accelerated depletion. Similar observations lead ecological economists such as
Martinez-Alier (1995) to observe that perspectives on the environment ought to be di erent
in the North and the South. Southern countries are likely to consider the environment as
an “una ordable luxury”. Trade does not seem to make the conciliation of environmental
preservation and economic development easier.
Those models are build on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the criticism addressed to the
HO approach is still valid. If factor price equalisation (FPE) breaks down either because of a
non-traded good sector in the economy or because factor endowments are too diverse across
countries, then the “canonical” theorems (HO, Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynsky) no longer
hold (Deardor  1994b). Factor price equalisation is an essential assumption to prevent full
specialisation in the clean or the dirty good. Umanskaya and Barbier (2008) consider an
HO model where factor price equalisation does not occur. Factor prices may now di er and
therefore relative factor prices matter more than relative endowments as prices are the variables
of adjustment. The authors start from the 2003 Copeland and Taylor model, with abatement
as in equation 2.10. In this setting, a country can specialise completely in the dirty good as long
as the relative factor prices di erential is wide enough. The North can specialise completely in
the dirty good sector if the factor price di erential is large enough compared to the regulation
di erential.
Empirical violations of the underlying assumptions of the HO models are one potential
issue. Equally problematic is the fact that these models adopt a static 7 framework, even
though technical change and accumulation paths are obviously dynamic issues. The impact
of dynamic structures will be detailed in chapter 3. We can nonetheless already mention that
Bogmans and Withagen (2010) show how di erences in the pure rate of time preference between
7. “We also worked within a static, perfectly competitive framework where [...] dynamic and strategic issues
are entirely absent. This choice limited our methods and our results.” Copeland and Taylor (2003, p.280).
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countries can result in the concentration of the dirty good production in the more impatient 8
country.
Concentration of the capital intensive good production in the capital intensive country
is a standard prediction incarnated in the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. In the trade and the
environment debate it is referred to as the factor endowment hypothesis (FEH). Verification
of the FEH leads to the concentration of produced capital in the North and continuation of
the usual North/South specialisation. Still, industries may want to avoid regulation in the
North and take advantage of the large “assimilative capacity” available in the South. Southern
countries have a strong incentive to use their lpow environmental regulation to attract produced
capital and hasten development. This capital flight (in violation of the factor immobility
assumption) is known as the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH).
Under this hypothesis the North specialises in the production of the clean good, as the price
of emission increases. The South specialises in the production of the dirty good as the price of
pollution is lower there. Under the PHH factor usage of capital decreases sharply in the North
and increases in the South as a consequence of trade liberalisation. In this case, it is not so much
outsourcing, but the opportunity cost that matters: investment that could have been made in
the North is made in the South instead. The PHH, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem before
it, stresses that the global competition is as much between factors as it is between countries.
Under free trade, even if overall pollution is reduced and gains from trade materialise, the South
can be economically better-o  and environmentally worse-o  by welcoming pollution-intensive
production processes.
The relative prevalence of FEH motives over PHH ones is in essence an empirical question
(see section I.2). The other solution would be to study the dynamics of capital accumulation
and the potential impact of other sources of comparative advantages. Industrial composition
questions are fundamentally general equilibrium issues. In this scenario, the evolution of global
environmental regulation and investment in produced capital in the North and the South should
be endogenised. In the long run, as income increases, citizens in the South should start lob-
bying for stronger environmental regulation. In the meantime, as the South puts pressure on
the remaining polluting industries in the North to outsource to the South, lobbying against
environmental regulation in the North is likely to intensify. In this scenario, there is the real
risk of a global race to the bottom in environmental standards.
Alternatively, one could consider that the gains from trade will bring environmental concerns
in the front line so quickly that regulation will be tightened in the South before it is loosened in
8. Which is naturally the country with the highest pure rate of time preference.
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the North. Expectations regarding this timing creates an opposition between “trade optimists”
and “trade pessimists”. The FEH is based on the HO model, and translates into the Copeland
and Taylor model. It is possible to modify the model to present the mechanisms behind the
PHH. A first description is presented in Copeland and Taylor (2003), completed by empirical
tests in Levinson and Taylor (2008). Starting with the same structure (see equation 2.8) the
authors assume an exogenous pollution tax to regulate emissions. The North has a stricter
pollution policy than the South, which results in higher emissions in the South (e < eú where
* indicates the South). As py is the numéraire, the relevant world price is the price of x. The
supply of x and y depends on those two factors, plus factor endowments:
x= x(p,e,K,L) (2.15)
y = y(p,e,K,L) (2.16)
See Copeland and Taylor (2003, p. 146). The expressions for the South are the same,
emission intensity aside. The relative supply curve in each country of the dirty good x can be
obtained as the ratio of expressions 2.15 and 2.16. As demand functions are the same across
countries, if emissions intensity were similar, relative supply functions would be the same and
there would be no trade. Lower emissions in the South make the relative price of x lower there,
resulting in an increase in production of x in the South to export in the North. It should be noted
that as emissions are capped, overall pollution is unchanged. Di erences in regulation create the
opportunity to trade and the formation of a pollution haven in the South. The authors present
several other cases based on di erent motives for the di erence in environmental regulation
stringency. The di erence can also arise from discrepancies in environmental resilience (the
environment in one region can absorb more pollution) or asymmetries in income level. The
overall impact of trade liberalisation in the context of discrepancies in environmental policies is
always the concentration of the polluting industries but the overall impact on the environment
is less clear. The formation of a pollution haven can be beneficial if it takes place in the country
were the assimilative capacity is the strongest. The overall e ect can be null if overall caps on
emissions are in place and properly enforced.
Concentration of the dirty good production in one country suggests that agglomeration
forces and increasing returns to scale have a critical impact on pollution haven formation.
Intuitively, internal economies of scale would only magnify the results obtained under constant
returns to scale. External economies of scale and the formation of true “pollution intensive
Marshallian districts” could provide a powerful rationale for both the formation and persistence
of pollution havens. A first contribution by Benarroch and Weder (2006) is based on a 2
countries setting with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Only trade in intermediate
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goods take place while pollution comes from the use of pollution intensive intermediates. In
this setting, pollution is lowered by economies of scale and trade tend to improve environmental
quality in pollution intensive countries. Zeng and Zhao (2009) use a spatial model to explore
pollution haven formation and also conclude that the addition of agglomeration forces can
reduce the likelihood of a pollution haven formation. Theoretical results are therefore leaning
on the “trade optimists” side.
Trade pessimists are numerous amongst ecological economists. After Daly (1992) they re-
fute the conclusions of the Copeland and Taylor model, arguing that factor mobility greatly
diminishes the value of Ricardian arguments. Proponents of strong sustainability often take
a critical view of international trade: it exacerbates stress on ecosystems, disturbs local and
global socio-ecological balances and may hasten the depletion of the critical natural capital.
International trade analysis derives from neoclassical theory. The neoclassical misconceptions
regarding the ability of the environment to withstand continuous growth are also present in
international trade analysis. Moreover, international trade could export unsustainable devel-
opment strategies to the South and exert erosive pressure on environmental regulation in the
North (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001, Schneider et al. 2010).
Proponents of strong sustainability are often concerned about transboundary pollution flows
(Maddison 2006, 2007) although recent works within the weak sustainability paradigm also ad-
dress this issue (Arrow et al. 2010, Atkinson et al. 2011, 2012). Finally, because the place of
extraction and final consumption may lie thousands of miles apart, international trade short-
circuits traditional (local) feedback mechanisms that might provide advanced warning and
prevent excessive environmental degradation. Natural resources trade implies that unsustain-
able regions can rely on sustainable regions’ resources, ultimately compromising sustainability
everywhere (Rees 2006). This point will be discussed further in subsection II.2.
The Copeland and Taylor model proved to be a powerful tool to assess the impact of trade
on the environment. The redefinition of pollution concentration and emissions issues into a
factor endowment one (conditioned by environmental policy) allowed the treatment of a wide
variety of cases. The model manages to support the treatment of both the factor endowment
and the pollution haven hypothesis. The decomposition of trade impacts between the scale,
composition and technique e ect help to evaluate policy measures accurately. The model is
nonetheless limited by the standard HO framework it rests on. The relation between factor
usage and factor accumulation is only described in comparative statics, under the assumption
of full employment.
As for the PHH, the latest work explicitly modelling agglomeration forces seem to do a better
work at assessing concentration. Nonetheless, even under this di erent modelling strategy, the
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risk of seeing pollution havens emerging is still low. When confronted with conflicting theoretical
prediction, empirical validation is needed. The next section reviews the empirical evidence on
the EKC, the FEH versus the PHH and estimates of trade-induced elasticities.
I.2 Empirical Evidence
Conclusions of the theoretical models in the trade and the environment literature demand
empirical validation. The first empirical tests were conducted on the EKC to address the
arguments of trade pessimists regarding environmental damage and growth. The literature
is rich in plain empirical tests but also in tests based on the Copeland and Taylor model.
Gradually, the interest in the field moved to tests regarding the pollution haven hypothesis and
the relative size of the three e ects. An interesting conclusion notably emerges from Cole and
Elliott (2003a), who focus on trade-induced e ects. They conclude that trade is generally not
the main driver of negative environmental impacts, but acts as a magnifying force.
The biggest bone of contention in the literature was doubtlessly the EKC. As a straight-
forward relationship commanding applicable policy to protect the environment (favour fast
growth), it could vindicate the trade optimists. The question of PHH versus FEH is critical
in terms of policy. If FEH dominates, high environmental standards can survive globalisation.
Conversely, if PHH dominates, a race to the bottom in environmental standards is most likely
as the North will try to prevent capital flight to the South. The first test bringing evidence of
the EKC was conducted by Grossman and Helpman (1991). Analysing trade between the US
and Mexico, the authors use comparative statics to determine whether the composition and
technique e ects dominated the scale e ect. If so, per capita GDP growth would reduce pollu-
tion. The authors use sulphur dioxide and dark matter concentrations as proxies for pollution
stocks. They conclude that trade brings a net benefit to the environment, the turning point of
the EKC being between 4000 and 5000 1985 USD.
Building on this first study, they seek evidence (and formalise the concept) of the EKC in
a later contribution (Grossman and Krueger 1995). They test for a larger range of pollutants
including in excess of the previously cited heavy particles. They also test for water pollution.
The authors conclude that although turning points vary from one pollutant to another, in “most
cases” they are reached before the country reaches a per capita income of 8000 1985 USD. From
those early contributions, a very rich literature on the EKC followed. Comprehensive surveys
include Gallagher (2008, Part 1), Dinda (2004) and Kijima et al. (2010). The econometric
model varies depending on the number of controls, but the basic form is always the same:
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yit = –i+—1xit+—2x2it+—3x3it+—4zit+ ‘it (2.17)
Where y is the indicator for environmental degradation (usually sulphur or CO2 concen-
trations, and latter emissions), x is income and z represent the sets of controls (Dinda 2004).
The EKC is characterised by —1 > 0, —2 > 0 and —3 = 0. A first convincing case was brought by
Hilton and Levinson (1998) using data from the automotive industry. Andreoni and Levinson
(2001) build up on those results, testing for macro indicators such as institutions and the busi-
ness cycle. Harbaugh et al. (2002) complete this first set of specification tests, controlling for
lagged GDP and situational variables (city centre, residential area, etc.). This study compares
the original Grossman and Krueger (1995) results with its revised dataset and finds a signifi-
cant increase in the value of the peak in the bell. From 4000 USD it is now estimated to be
13741 USD when considered the original sample with extra controls and 20081 USD with the
full size of the new dataset. The slops are also far less steep, suggesting a slower build-up of
concentration, but also a slower reduction after the peak.
Subsequent studies have enlarged the range of pollutants involved (Frankel and Rose 2005)
and the nature of abatement costs (Managi et al. 2009). Maddison (2006) included tests for
spatial spillovers, one country’s emissions depending on its neighbours’ policy. The emerging
consensus in the literature is that the EKC might be misspecified (Kijima et al. 2010) or just
a particular case in the relationship between income and the environment (Wang 2013). The
relationship between GDP per capita and pollution is probably more complex. As some key
variables in the relationship are missing, estimates find a tipping point in the conventional
bell curve only the highest-income country can reach. Critics of the curve warned that the
relation probably did not exist, first on strong sustainability and institutional grounds (Tisdell
2001), then on the basis of the need to take consumption of resources into account to gauge
environmental quality (Mills Busa 2013). It seems safe to say that the EKC failed to be an
all-encompassing empirical regularity in environmental economics (similar to gravity equations
in trade analysis).
The Copeland and Taylor model is designed to present the links between the scale, technique
and composition e ects. Empirical tests of the model are based on observable variables (such as
concentrations of pollutants) that varies in line with the predictions of the model. A first test
provides estimates of the relative magnitudes of the pro-environment technique e ect and the
anti-environment scale e ect. A second test investigates whether the composition e ect leans
towards the FEH (building up pollution in rich countries) or the PHH (building up pollution
in poor countries). In Antweiler et al. (2001), the authors use equation 2.14 as the basis for
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their test on the relative magnitude of the three e ects. The model requires data on emissions
levels, but only data on concentrations are available. To solve this problem, data from local
measurement stations are used and scaled by city size, capital labour ratio and trade intensity.
Stations become in this manner an approximation of local firms. As many relevant variables
are unobservable, the authors decompose their fixed e ects into three:
‘ijkt = ›t+ ijk+‹ijkt (2.18)
The total fixed e ect for station i in city j in country k in year t is a function of a time-specific
e ect ›, a site-specific error   and an idiosyncratic measurement error ‹. The econometric
strategy allows for the join testing of the three e ects, in line with the theoretical predictions
of the model. The results from Antweiler et al. (2001) are reproduced in table 2.1. The
scale e ect appears clearly with the significance of the variable GDP/km2 across all models.
The composition e ect embodied in the Capital abundance (K/L) ratio is positive (increases
emissions). This result is also, as the authors note, to the credit of the HO model and proves its
validity at least at the aggregate level. Finally, the technique e ect represented by the (lagged)
per capita income is strongly negative across specifications. The results on the trade-induced
composition e ect are somewhat weaker, but indicate on average a negative relationship. The
trade-induced composition e ect reflects the reaction of the country to trade liberalisation,
and should therefore be either positive or negative, depending on country factor endowments.
Overall, the authors find trade to be good for the environment: the scale e ect is dominated
by the technique e ect and the overall composition e ect (trade induced and not) is negative.
The conclusion also broadly supports the FEH against the PHH, as capital intensive countries
retain their specialisation even as the technique e ect marks down emissions.
The emphasis put on trade-induced e ects as a part of plain e ects was key to test the rel-
ative importance of the FEH against the PHH. Another important question was the validity of
the results in Antweiler et al. (2001) with emissions instead of concentrations as the dependant
variable. Finally, pollutants other than SO2 matter for the environment: focusing on a single
pollutant because of data availability also narrows the range of industries studied. Cole and
Elliott (2003a) address those issues by assessing the composition e ect using four pollutants
as the dependent variable. They conclude that the composition e ect is small relative to the
other two and support the findings from Antweiler et al. (2001). The factor endowment e ect
is at best stronger than the pollution haven e ect, at worst equal. Finally, they confirm that
trade lowers the pollution intensity of output, but can not confirm unequivocally that trade
liberalisation will lower overall pollutants as the result vary depending on the pollutant. The
conclusion is enriched by a follow-up article which concludes that the di erential in environ-
mental regulation is likely to influence the share of inter-industry against intra-industry trade
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Table 2.1: Testing the Copeland and Taylor model
Source: Antweiler et al. (2001)
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in a trading relationship (Cole and Elliott 2003b).
Those early tests suggested that environmental regulations do not play an important role
in shaping trade patterns. This result being at odds with anecdotal but persistent evidence,
specific tests for the PHH were subsequently proposed. Cole (2004) linked the test of the PHH
to the EKC, investigating whether the downward slopping part of the bell could be explained
by industry migration to the South. Testing the EKC for several pollutants (NOx, SO2, CO,
SPM , V OC, CO2) they add a variable for the weight of net pollution-intensive good exports
relative to domestic consumption and find no evidence of durable pollution havens. More en-
couraging were the studies of Ederington et al. (2005) and Cole et al. (2010) which control for
the nature of trade (North-South or South-South) and the industry. They find support for the
PHH in South-South trade, and Cole et al. (2010)) show that the e ect gets stronger when
environmental costs are high and geographical immobility (“footloose” industries) is taken into
account. Kellenberg (2009) finds evidence for the PHH in the context of strategic environment
and trade policy. Those results suggest that domestic agglomeration forces are especially strong
in capital intensive industries, making them less sensitive to di erential in environmental reg-
ulation. If those forces, while driving trade flows, can be controlled for, then pollution haven
e ects can be found for some industries and some countries. All in all, environmental regula-
tions have a stronger impact on more mobile industries and sectors and mostly in South-South
trade. Both PHH and FEH are at work to explain the trade/environment relationship, one
being stronger than the other according to the level of development and the industrial special-
isation (Kellenberg 2008). It should be borne in mind that the results are however sensitive to
the pollutant used.
This concludes the section on the trade and the environment literature. After more than
twenty years of modelling and testing, the potential impact of environmental regulation and
pollution on trade flows seems in the end to be statistically significant but limited in size.
When reaching this somewhat disappointing conclusion, it is useful to remember that trade
flows themselves (goods and services) are not a large part of overall output. It is nonetheless
surprising that beyond some renewable resources and trade-induced composition and technique
e ects, the impact of trade on the environment remains minimal. However, this literature is
only one of the literature investigating the links between trade and sustainability. The impact of
trade openness on domestic decisions and endowments may be a bigger contribution from trade
than trade flows themselves. It is this literature, we define as the “open economy sustainability”
literature, that we will now investigate.
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II Open economy sustainability
In the previous section we reviewed the literature on trade and the environment, culminating
in the tests regarding the pollution haven hypothesis against the factor endowment hypothesis.
Those two hypothesis illustrated the possible divergence in trade impacts, depending on the
theory used. They converged however in explaining some domestic sustainability issues (such
as the EKC) with trade models. The literature on trade and the environment mostly deals with
stock pollutants as a proxy for environmental quality, and to some extend with renewable re-
sources. It analyses the impact of environmental factors on trade flows. The scope of empirical
validation is limited by the data available, although this problem is getting less acute as envi-
ronmental accounts develop. The literature we will now present takes a di erent perspective.
It finds its source in resource economics, dealing mostly with valuable exhaustible resources.
It is concerned with optimal planing of depletion and investment of natural resources in an
open economy. The models in this literature consider national economies trying to address
sustainability issues under the changing circumstances determined by world prices (as opposed
to domestic) and a wider (worldly) array of investment opportunities for natural resources
rents. From a conceptual perspective, the literature on trade and the environment focuses on
producing a more sustainable global outlook. The current literature takes the implicit view
that sustainability will be achieved country by country at the national level.
Weak sustainability has historically emphasised domestic management of instruments of
wealth following the Hartwick Rule, as exemplified by the capital theoretic approach (Hartwick
1977, Neumayer 2010, Pearce and Atkinson 1993). A first object of inquiry is therefore the
translation of closed economy sustainability rules to the open economy setting (Asheim 1986). A
second important avenue of investigation tackles the impact of di erences, now and in the future,
between domestic and world prices (Hartwick 1995). Variations in world market resource prices
introduce uncertainty in optimal depletion paths at the national level (Pezzey 2004). Those
contributions need taken into account when estimating the empirical impact of international
trade on sustainability and sustainability indicators (World Bank 2006). New perspectives on
sustainability indicators could lead to a shift in the responsibility for depletion and therefore
in the country by country sustainability outlook (Proops et al. 1999, Atkinson and Hamilton
2002).
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II.1 Sustainability and Reinvestment in open economies
As presented in section I, the main sustainability model is the DHSS model. Under stan-
dard assumptions, optimal depletion paths for natural resources are a necessary condition for
sustainable development. Empirical assessment of the DHSS model is usually conducted using
the Hartwick (1977) rule, which actual meaning and scope have been debated long after its
first formulation(Asheim et al. 2003). Some controversies over the rule remain, but the general
message that a “sound” reinvestment policy for resource rents is a pre-requisite for sustainable
development is now well-established. The original Hartwick rule is enunciated using a closed
economy model. Opening up the economy leads to amendments to the rule, first presented by
Asheim (1986) with subsequent extensions in Hartwick (1995) and Vincent et al. (1997). The
Asheim (1986) argument lies on those very underlying assumptions regarding constant tech-
nology and population. Asheim shows that terms-of-trade variations for a price-taking open
economy are equivalent to a violation of the constant technology assumption.
In a closed economy setting, the path for resources depletion as specified according to the
Hotelling rule is perfectly defined. As the resource gets scarcer through depletion, the price
increases. In an open economy setting, this price increase goes with a betterment of terms-of-
trade, generating a proportional extra inflow of income. This is similar to productivity gains
coming with resource extraction in the closed economy setting. The Hartwick rule should
therefore be amended for this gain from the terms-of-trade e ect, as it reduces the amount of
reinvestment needed today. Future generations can rely on the windfall from the terms-of-trade
e ect, and be better-o  with less physical resources. Hartwick (1995) builds on this conclusion
to build a dynamic Solow (1974) model with two countries engaging in free trade. Countries
exploit a resource S(t) depleted of quantity R(t) each period to produce Q(t) with capital
K(t) and the standard function F (K(t),R(t). K(t) does not depreciate and K(t) and R(t) are
perfectly substitutable. Population N is constant. The rule for investment is assumed to be:
K˙(t) = “(t)R(t)FR(t) (2.19)
With FR(t) the first derivative of F with respect to R. Under the Hotelling rule, following
the Hartwick rule (“ = 1) yields constant consumption over time. From this one country
setting, resources are split unequally between two price-taking countries, similarly endowed in
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population and capital:
K1(t) =K2(t) (2.20)
K1(t)+K2(t) =K(t) (2.21)
N1 =N2 (2.22)
N1+N2 =N (2.23)
S1(t)< S2(t) (2.24)
S1+S≠2 = S(t) (2.25)
Country 1 imports ‘(t) of resources from country 2 at each date. Since capital endowments
and technology are similar, resource imports are used to balance resource endowments at every
period. For country 1, consumption equals output minus investment and imports:
C1(t) = F (K1(t),R1(t)+ ‘(t))≠ K˙1(t)≠ ‘FR1(t) (2.26)
The savings rule requires investment to cover for the depreciation of the resource stock, so
country 1 covers the depletion of its own stock, minus the share of natural resources use that
is imported. This adjustment is the key di erence between the autarky and trading scenarios.
Under this adjustment, the original savings rule (C˙1 = 0) requires:
(1≠“1(t))(R1)
‘(t) = FK(t) (2.27)
The rate of interest on capital is equal to the amount of resources extracted domestically minus
the volume imported, discounted by the price of those imports. ‘(t)F˙R(t) represents the terms-
of-trade e ect in natural resources trade: it should be subtracted from the level of constant
consumption to pay for natural resources imports. Without the constraint of the constant
savings rule, country 1 exhibits an interesting behaviour. In period 1 it pays the highest price
for natural resources imports and “under-saves” to be able to pay. As substitution occurs over
time, it slowly erodes the bill and the maximum attainable level of consumption converges
toward the long run level of the autarky model. The situation in country 2 is the exact mirror.
This result can be extended to the n country case as long as starting endowments in K are
still equal. A full trade model should be used to make predictions if it were not the case.
The conclusions of the model are therefore similar to Asheim (1986) although the nature of
the adjustment (i.e the terms-of trade e ect) is grounded in the trade pattern. The treatment
of this issue was latter completed by Vincent et al. (1997) which characterised the size of the
adjustment to the terms-of-trade e ect as “capital gains” as they would ultimately be added to
wealth through reinvestment. Vincent et al. (1997) also investigate further, with the empirical
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Figure 2.1: Open economy resource management under exogenous prices
Base year 2005=100
Source: Vincent et al. (1997)
example of Indonesia, the theoretical distinction between constant exogenous world prices 9 and
endogenously determined world prices.
The nature of world prices has an impact on the size of the terms-of-trade e ect. They are
endogenous in Asheim (1986), and both cases are examined in Hartwick (1995) and Vincent
et al. (1997). If we take the perspective of resource exporters, endogenous prices systematically
yield capital gains, raising questions regarding primary and secondary reinvestment. Exogenous
prices prevent price adjustment in a dynamic setting, which is then performed by quantity
adjustment. Quantities extracted diminish over time as the prices paid cannot increase 10
(figure 2.1) but rents in excess of current consumption are invested abroad.
To maintain consumption constant over time, the optimal planner uses current non invested
rents and interests on previous investments. Therefore, the turn back to the closed economy
9. A standard assumption in “small open economy” models.
10. The authors assume the Hotelling rule holds, so that marginal rents increase over time. It is therefore
optimal to extract the resource as long as the marginal rent is in excess of the rate of interest, but only as long
as the rent is non-negative. If the price is constant, quantities extracted must fall to maintain marginal and
Hotelling rents.
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setting is much quicker as quantities extracted shrink faster. Exogenous and endogenous world
prices only make a di erence in terms of size and duration of the capital gains. Conclusions
regarding the capital gains are obtained in dynamic settings optimised over an infinite period. In
chapter 1 section I.1 we observed how the literature treated the impact of time and uncertainty,
assimilating the time going by as an investment in an instrument of wealth. The time horizon
when assessing the impact of trade on sustainability is incorporated in a similar fashion.
We saw supra that when Asheim (1986) looked at the impact of opening-up economies on the
Hartwick rule, he assimilated it to a productivity shock. This makes sense as for the domestic
economy, the capital gains are similar to Hicks-neutral technical progress (the same amount for
a higher selling price against the same amount for a lower buying price). This also makes sense
from a methodological perspective as Hicks-neutral technical progress is easy to investigate in a
Solow (1974) model. The impact of trade is then merged with other unobservable dimensions of
development (such as e ciency gains from improvement in institutions) into a time-dependent
variable. This strategy is adopted in several contributions (Arrow et al. 2010, Pezzey 2004,
Pezzey et al. 2006, Rubio 2004) where the passing of time is assimilated to investment into
a productive stock. Pemberton and Ulph (2001) first formalised this intuition, based on the
seminal model in Weitzman (1976).
The original aim of the Weitzman (1976) article was to investigate technical change. The
author shows that if technical progress is exogenous, it is possible to preserve the welfare
properties of comprehensive wealth indicators by introducing time dependence as investment
in time in the optimal planning process. This reduces the problem of optimal planning with
exogenous technical progress to optimal planning without technical progress with one extra
form of capital to invest in. Formally:
(ct, It, I(n+1)t) œ … ()(ct, It,Kt) œ Ft,K(n+1)t = t and I(n+1)t = 1 (2.28)
With ct consumption in t It investment in t, Kt the stock of capital in t, Ft the time dependent
production set and   the time independent production set. This redefinition of the optimum is
quite similar to the one undertaken by Solow (1974). A simple illustration of this can be found
in Arrow et al. (2010):
W (t) = r(t)+
nÿ
i=1
pi(t)Ki(t) (2.29)
Where W (t) is comprehensive wealth 11 at time t, pi(t) the shadow price of asset i in time t,
11. Comprehensive wealth is a dynamic analogue of real national income. See Arrow et al. (2010) for more
details.
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Ki(t) the stock of asset i in t and r(t) the shadow price of time in t. Pezzey (2004) uses this
same technique to propose an assessment of Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) as a sustainability
indicator with changes in technology, trade and pollution. The adjustment for trade, our source
of concern here, is conducted on the basis of the exogeneity of world prices. The theoretical
expression obtained for the overall time dependent gains (including trade, but also exogenous
technical progress) is similar to the one in Hartwick (1995). 12 The “price of time” is evaluated
using future prices, which can only be observable on forward markets under the hypothesis of
market e ciency. This makes estimates of the price of time over an infinite horizon especially
hard to compute.
Variations in world market prices and uncertainty over the size and timing of those varia-
tions are more problematic to estimate than capital gains. This amounts to a violation of the
e cient market hypothesis. From a sustainability perspective, exogenous changes in natural
resources prices command countries to invest (consume) the negative (positive) di erence be-
tween Hotelling rents and the discounted sum of future terms of trade e ects. The Simon and
Erlich bet reminds us that scarcity and the implied raise in the Hotelling rent is dependent on
global demand, exploration and technical progress. The treatment of capital gains in empirical
estimates is rendered di cult by this uncertainty over the course of world resource prices. A
country could calibrate reinvestment policy and reasonably expect a stable improvement in its
terms-of-trade in line with increasing scarcity, to find itself confronted with abrupt phases of
decreasing prices.
This makes the estimation of capital gains hard to perform, a fact acknowledged in Hartwick
(1995). Whether or not this element of uncertainty should be considered is still debated on
two grounds: it is notoriously hard to estimate and resources prices fluctuations may result
in an evening out of the negative and positive capital gains. Hamilton and Clemens (1999)
and Vincent et al. (1997) decided against including them, but Arrow et al. (2010) decided
for doing so. This issue should be weighted according to the empirical importance of capital
gains. Inclusion is also highly dependent on the time frame considered. In their study, Arrow
et al. (2010) find the time dependent variable, measuring amongst other things the impact of
trade, to account for more than 50% of the change in comprehensive wealth between 1995 and
2000 for the five countries 13 investigated. Those recent results suggest that capital gains are
important and that the impact of trade is likely to be more than marginal (see subsection II.2
below). Confronted with this potential magnitude, capital gains can hardly be neglected. Time
dependence should be included if the components contributing to it cannot be measured.
12. See equation 23 in Pezzey (2004).
13. Brazil, China, India, The US and Venezuela.
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The role of anticipation in the bad sustainability performance of natural resources rich
countries has been investigated in Rubio (2004) and Van der Ploeg (2010). Rubio (2004) finds
evidence of under-reinvestment in the case of Mexico and Venezuela considering ex-post the
evolution of the terms-of-trade. Either investment policy in those two countries is inadequate,
or they over-estimated the capital gains from trade. Van der Ploeg (2010) builds on the early
findings of Hartwick (1995) to develop an analysis based on the possibility to arbitrage between
domestic and foreign investment of the rent, controlling for monopoly power and the structure
of domestic property rights. Van Der Ploeg (2011) confirms the findings in the field, stating
that “the saving of the nation equals the marginal Hotelling oil rents minus the discounted
value of the sum of expected capital gains on oil reserves, expected increases in interest income
on net foreign assets and expected reductions in oil extraction costs (due to improvements in
extraction technology) plus the amount by which the permanent level of government spending
exceeds the current value of government spending.”.
More intriguing are his findings about the power struggle over resources. If many domestic
groups fight over natural resources and sell them in bigger quantities, increased depletion creates
higher prices, forming a vicious circle of increased depletion rate. The conclusion that weak
property rights accelerate depletion is similar to the findings of Chichilnisky (1994). The
mechanism is however quite di erent. In the Chichilnisky model, it is below-marginal cost
pricing that creates incentives to deplete natural resources faster. In order to see whether
natural resources are depleted faster when they are cheap or expensive, empirical work is needed.
The e ect is likely depend on the institutional configuration prevailing over the extraction. A
situation where cheap resources are depleted because an agent can free ride on the rent (because
of ill-defined property rights) is consistent with a story where a resource is oversold as many
agents need the income for a political struggle.
All in all, Van der Ploeg (2010) provides a better description of the formation of the ex-
pectations behind resource depletion. The nature of those expectations provides a rationale
for postponing genuine investment but does not solve the problem of consistency in time hori-
zons. 14 Forming rational expectations in the context of high volatility in commodities markets
borders on the impossible. Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the “All Commodities Price in-
dex” and its obvious correlation with the business cycle. As such, estimating capital gains boils
down to the usual di culty of producing accurate macroeconomic forecasts. This is instead
the whole process of development that needs to be overhauled in its institutional, financial and
economic dimensions (Van Der Ploeg 2011). An illustration of this can be found in the resource
curse (see chapter 4).
14. This issue is discussed in section III.
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Figure 2.2: Correlation between commodities prices and macroeconomic events
Source: Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities
In this section we presented the impact of opening up to trade on optimally managed
economies. If world prices are endogenous, trade flows should “die down” after an initial
phase of trade as accumulation of produced capital makes the use of non-renewable resources
irrelevant. If prices are exogenous, as in the “small open economy” case, trade generates every
period gains akin to exogenous technical progress. Those gains should be accounted for in
wealth assessment as they may justify under-reinvestment of resource rents in the short run,
changing the outlook on unsustainable resources rich economies. This inclusion rests on future
prices, which may be hard to estimate in an uncertain context for resource prices. We cited the
empirical estimates from Arrow et al. (2010) which suggest that capital gains are important,
but meddled with the impact of other variables. Disentangling the numerous trade induced
impacts on sustainability remains an empirical question.
Box 2.1: Capital gains from international trade and uncertainty
Open economy settings introduce an element of uncertainty in optimal/sustainable development
paths. This uncertainty is born out of the “cohabitation” of domestic conditions of exhaustible
resources exploitation with the world system of relative prices. As a price taking economy, a
resource intensive country is subject to variations in the price system that reflect the conditions of
all the trading partners, beyond its own characteristics. Consequently, the consistency of current
prices with a less predictable forward prices path is not guaranteed. As a result, sustainability
rules are adapted to take into account those potential gains from exogenous price increases in
the future, but cannot do this in an optimal fashion.
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II.2 International trade in empirical sustainability
The literature on open economy resources economics propose a rationale for the conse-
quences of international trade on optimal depletion path. This theoretical foundation has also
been used in the emerging literature on comprehensive wealth. Following Asheim (1986) and
Hartwick (1990) sustainability indicators should be amended for openness. We use Adjusted
Net Savings (ANS) as our indicator of sustainability as it is most closely related to our con-
ceptual framework (see chapter I). As a consequence, we review the amendments performed on
estimates of ANS as proposed by the World Bank. The basis for the World Bank estimates is
the contribution of Hamilton and Clemens (1999). After estimating the relevant current value
Hamiltonian which rate of change is the ANS rate, the authors propose to incorporate the
current account:
A= iA+X≠M (2.30)
“Net foreign assets A accumulate as a result of exports X and de-cumulate with imports
M” (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). i is the interest paid on those assets. Exports give the
home country a claim on its trading partner by the mechanics of the balance of payments.
Symmetrically, imports give the foreign country a claim on the home country. Finally, the
interest on the total claims held by the home country are a part of wealth as any income flow
derived from a given source of wealth, even from a foreign one. This amendment is already
included in the Net National Product (NNP) calculations. Therefore, assessing open economy
adjusted net savings only requires to start from the NNP.
It should be noted that this adjustment does not solve the question of the volatility of
investment. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are defined according to the share of capital
owned, not to the length, or the aim of the investment. Therefore, all wealth from FDI is
accounted into national wealth, regardless of its volatility. A common sense rule would be
to consider as domestic wealth only sunk investment, regardless of nationality, and classify
other investments depending on nationality. There is to our knowledge no study in the field of
sustainability investigating this point. Still, this simple method is the basic (and broadly used)
way to account for international trade in sustainability indicators.
We saw in the previous section the di culty to discriminate between the impact of trade
and other variables in the time dependent term. The World Bank (2006) provides a first answer
to this question, although by trying to address another one. In chapter 7 of the report, the
authors o er a decomposition of intangible capital estimated as a residual. In this residual are
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Figure 2.3: A decomposition of Intangible Capital
Source: World Bank (2006)
regrouped several instruments of wealth (See figure 2.3): human capital, institutional capital,
foreign financial assets and errors and omissions.
The term iA is approximated using remittances. To assess the relative weight of the compo-
nents in intangible capital the authors run a regression using proxies for human and institutional
capital:
R = AS–SF–FL–L (2.31)
With R the intangible residual, A a constant, S years of schooling per worker, F remittances
from abroad and L the rule of law index. The –s are the elasticities of the variables with
respect to the residual, as in any Cobb-Douglas function. Estimating the model with dummies
to control for country income groups, the authors find the rule of law index dominating with
57% of the total, followed by schooling with 36% and remittance with 7%. More than half of
the intangible capital is institutional capital, the bulk of the rest being human capital.
This small remittances e ect captures the current account impact on wealth. The authors
also tried to take into account the time dependent, technical progress-like e ect of international
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trade. The constant term A in regression 2.31 is country specific, capturing individual e ects
such as geography and institutional characteristics (on top of those already controlled for by
the indexes). The authors then run a regression with the same econometric structure (World
Bank 2006, p.113) to estimate actual substitutability between produced capital and exhaustible
resources. The term A in this econometric test represents total factor productivity. It is
estimated as a decomposition of variables in line with the theory:
A= ⁄1TOPEN +⁄2PCREDIT +⁄3V A+⁄4PIV +⁄5GE+⁄6RB+⁄7RL+⁄8CC (2.32)
TOPEN is trade openness, PCREDIT measures private sector investment and the 6 others are
institutional variables for corruption, governance e ectiveness, political instability, regulatory
burden, the rule of law and voice and accountability. TOPEN is statistically significant and
positive. Trade is positively correlated with total output, with a strong elasticity (0.5 or 0.47
depending on the specification). This result, although more of a confirmation of the positive
relationship between trade and growth, is consistent with the theory. It also suggests that
trade improves substitutability between produced capital and exhaustible resources. In those
estimates trade is a statistically significant purveyor of Solow-neutral technical progress.
Those tests were conducted to assess the robustness of ANS as an indicator of sustainability.
Due to data limitation, there is to our knowledge only one contribution which investigated the
magnitude of capital gains. Hamilton and Bolt (2004) used the Vincent et al. (1997) model to
estimate those capital gains using the World Bank dataset. The results by regions are displayed
in table 2.2 and the results by income in table 2.3.
The present value of capital gains is relatively small compared to the ANS rate, with the
notable exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Some country level e ects reported in the appendix
of the article are even more substantial. Beyond this contribution, Pezzey et al. (2006) who
followed Pezzey (2004) and Arrow et al. (2010) produce estimates for the overall price of
time without di erentiating between the capital gains and the exogenous technical change
component. 15 Even if calculations were possible, a comparative exercise would be hard to put
together because of the weight of uncertainty in natural resources prices. In Vincent et al.
(1997), the projections regarding capital gains from oil extraction are largely positive from
1985 onwards. The same country is characterised by negative capital gains in the assessment
for year 1999 in Hamilton and Bolt (2004).
The gains from trade prove hard to estimate, making the contribution of exogenous prices
15. Pezzey et al. (2006) presentation of the term Q˙R≠RX ≠RM representing the capital gains suggests that
the calculations were made but not reported in the article. Arrow et al. (2010) present the calculation of the
capital gains from oil but do not provide the numbers.
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Table 2.2: Capital gains by regions
Source: Hamilton and Bolt (2004)
Table 2.3: Capital gains by income
Source: Hamilton and Bolt (2004)
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to country by country sustainability hard to assess. The point of environmental accounting
was to assess country by country sustainability, but also to identify the biggest contributors to
environmental degradation. Hence, a first survey by Lee (1996) established the state of natural
resources over the planet according to available data. As it became clear that natural resources
accounted for a significant part of world merchandise trade (World Trade Organisation 2010)
authors started to investigate the natural resources content of trade country by country. The
simple but powerful intuition was, (following Martinez-Alier (1995) and the emerging trade
and the environment literature) that some countries may be “buying sustainability” (Atkinson
and Hamilton 2002) by importing resource-intensive goods and selling human capital-intensive
ones. Martinez-Alier (1995) showed that developed countries tend to have higher ANS rates
than resource exporting developing countries, and wondered whether this “masked” resource
dependence.
This empirical literature opened a still vigorous debate about responsibility, for both re-
sources conservation and depletion. This argument is implicitly about substitutability. If nat-
ural capital is perfectly substitutable physically and in money-value, now and over time, then
responsibility in a free trade world matter little. One’s losses in natural capital today are one’s
gain in produced capital through investment, at home or abroad, over time. De facto seam-
less substitutability via financial markets for natural capital, reinforced by the presumption of
capital gains, is precisely what is luring many resources rich countries into un-sustainability
today.
This intuition was reinforced by the conclusions of Asheim (1986) who stressed that un-
der endogenous world prices the consuming country is responsible for the transformation of
natural capital into produced capital, a result reproduced by Hartwick (1995). Sefton and
Weale (1996) also demonstrate that part of the optimal depletion path adjustment of exporting
countries should be supported by the importing countries. Finally Klepper and Stähler (1998)
show that under several sustainability rules, unilateral trade and resource management policies
systematically fail to reduce the rate of resource extraction. The corollary is that countries
are e ectively trying to import sustainability, but only manage to secure unsustainable income
gains.
To assess responsibility, a set of empirical contributions used input/output (I/O) tables à la
Leontief (1936) to determine the resource content of trade flows. Using Multi Regional Input-
Output (MRIO) analysis, several studies develop models that trace the resource content of
trade flows all the way from extraction to final demand, including trade in intermediate inputs
between and within sectors and regions (Miller and Blair 2009). Proops et al. (1999) use a
twelve region MRIO, with further decomposition for Western Europe in 17 countries to test the
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sensitivity of accounting practices of open versus closed economy models. They conclude that
closed economy models overstate sustainability in developed resource importing regions like
the US and Western Europe, but understate sustainability for developing resource exporting
regions like the Middle East.
Atkinson and Hamilton (2002) also use ANS as an indicator of sustainability, building an
MRIO model that functions similarly to an “ecological balance of payments.” Tracing flows of
both direct and embodied resources, they reach a similar conclusion: developed countries are
major resource importers, but manage to maintain positive genuine savings once those natural
resources imports are subtracted. Some, but not all, resources rich developing countries have
negative genuine savings, even as natural resources exports are added to their “balance of
payments.” This is why Atkinson and Hamilton (2002) suggest that resource importers may
wish to assist resource exporters in managing resource sustainability. The di erence between
responsibility in management and depletion is key here. Importing countries may care for
resource management in trade partners for three reasons:
– World resource prices are not shadow prices because of market ine ciency or short term
volatility.
– Importing countries have a strategic interest in ensuring a steady supply of resource,
which is not guaranteed if resources are managed un-sustainably.
– Importing countries care for ethical reasons about resource management (for example
about human right violations related to rent seeking) and support sound management
strategies in exporting countries for this reason.
The market ine ciency problem was noted as early as Asheim (1986). The strategic ar-
gument is mentioned in Atkinson and Hamilton (2002) and fully developed by Oleson (2011)
insisting that the security of importers might be compromised by a reliance on unsustainable
trading partners. The ethical argument echoes strongly amongst authors starting with the
assumption that international trade creates interdependency and the need for cooperation. Re-
lationships need not be symmetric in this interdependence, and they rarely are. In this setting,
cooperation is an ethical imperative in the perspective of sustainable development.
Those considerations are to be disconnected from the responsibility for depletion, which is
more of an accounting, and potentially legal concern as the issue is clearly related to property
rights and legal responsibility. A country can find it ethically important to cooperate for
better natural resources management in exporting countries, without being responsible for a
large amount of depletion itself, and vice-versa. Responsibility of deletion is obviously also
of prime importance in climate change negotiations, if for example quotas were restricted for
those responsible for the greatest share of depletion.
136 Chapter 2. International Trade and Sustainability
To further the exploration of the responsibility for depletion Atkinson et al. (2012) intro-
duce the term “virtual sustainability” – analogous to the notions of virtual water (Allan 1998)
and virtual carbon Davis and Caldeira (2010) – as a way of thinking about the degree of sus-
tainability implicitly embodied in international trade. Using an environmental MRIO with
57 sectors and 112 regions, Atkinson et al. (2012) demonstrate that this distinction can be
significant. 16 Figure 2.4 reports the 15 economies with the greatest (dollar value) di erences
between production- and consumption- based resources depletions. Positive (negative) values
indicate net resources exporters (importers) with production based depletions in excess of (be-
low) consumption based depletions. It is important to note that both developed and developing
countries feature prominently here.
Figure 2.4: Production- Minus Consumption-Based Resource Depletion (in millions, 2004 USD)
Raw data from GTAP v7, see Narayanan and Walmsley (2008) available online. 17
Source: Atkinson et al. (2012)
Rest of West Asia includes Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, and United Arab
Emirates. Rest of North Africa includes Algeria and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The concept of
virtual sustainability will prove a useful tool in the debate over the responsibility for depletion
and its consequences on resource management. The exercise is only limited by the underlying
assumptions built on input/output functions. Those tables are built using Leontief produc-
tion functions, assuming complementarity between factors. It may seem paradoxical to test
responsibility for depletion under the assumption of perfect complementarity when most of the
16. Their model incorporates resource depletions in forestry, fisheries, coal, oil, gas, and minerals, and includes
deductions for carbon emissions, valued at USD50/tCO2 or just under USD14/tCO2.
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theoretical conclusions are derived from models assuming at least perfect substitutability in
money-value. Policy implications based on I/O model are potentially biased in this context.
A way out of this dilemma is to use I/O tables in a computable general equilibrium model,
to test the evolution of economic specialisation (and resulting trade flows) in a dynamic set-
ting. This approach was first followed by Bailey and Clarke (2000) who used the dynamic
general equilibrium approach to build sustainability scenarios over fifty years. The base model
is the GREEN model developed by the OECD. The standard scenario delivered continued sus-
tainability over time, and only the most pessimistic scenario (which included no energy saving
technologies or backstop fuels) predicted un-sustainability for the US and Brazil only, alongside
weaker growth. Turner et al. (2011) propose a CGE model for carbon emission to demonstrate
that un-sustainability for Wales (assessed using the carbon footprint) comes from the export
orientated steel making sector. This result is interesting as it suggests that the finality (domes-
tic or foreign markets) makes a di erence when assessing sustainability. It is another aspect of
the responsibility for depletion issue.
In this section we presented the empirical evidence on the capital gains from international
trade. Capital gains are theoretically well defined, but they are hard to predict as they require
a perfectly known path for future prices. Attempts at forecasting commonly result in errors in
both magnitude and sign of the capital gains, making those quite unreliable to guide resource
management policy. More successful are the attempts to estimate capital gains jointly with
others productivity improving variables. In the wake of those di culties, a second important
stream in the literature decided to focus on the measurement of “virtual sustainability”, the
resources content of trade. Many countries have a stake in sound resources management for
various reasons and this literature proves helpful in bringing facts about the trade-adjusted
sustainability positions of resources importers and exporters.
Box 2.2: Responsibility for depletion and international substitutability
The concept of “virtual sustainability” emphasises the challenge brought by international trade
in terms of responsibility for depletion. Under international trade, the seamless exchange of
instruments of wealth which di er in nature is possible. International trade theory makes the
money-value exchange of goods produced under di erent factor intensity a source of comparative
advantage. The seamless exchange should be reconsidered if exhaustible resources are asym-
metrically traded so that international trade fosters wealth erosion in natural resources intensive
countries.
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III Trade and sustainability: a synthesis
In this final section of the chapter, we present the last two issues in open economy sustain-
ability. We first discuss the problem of the time horizon when assessing trade impacts. We saw
that depending on the assumption regarding world prices (exogenous and endogenous), capital
gains di er in nature and magnitude. We believe this question to be better addressed through
the perspective of trade liberalisation. A growing line of evidence suggests that the timing of
trade liberalisation matters, and that the consequences of this one-o  decision could be lasting.
The question of trade liberalisation can be associated with the issue of time consistency.
As presented in chapter 1 section II.3, steady-state analysis with its emphasis on convergence
is not best-suited to assess shocks with lasting structural consequences. The structural rules
presiding over long run convergence should be reassessed regularly as shocks may generate
hysteresis. The same limit makes the joint analysis of trade and sustainability in a dynamic
setting more complicated: trade shocks (variations in volume and content) are short term
problems compared to the usual sustainability horizon. This problem may call for at least
temporary management of trade flows using trade management instruments. In this perspective,
we review the contributions on trade management instruments and sustainability, concluding
with Ederington and Minier (2003) that trade and environmental policy are de facto already
intertwined.
Finally, we present a conceptual framework for trade and sustainability, similar to the one
presented in chapter 1 section II.2. While we certainly agree with the practical distinction drawn
in the literature between international trade and open economy, we argue for a common set of
principles when exploring the links between trade and sustainability. This set of principle will
be derived from the framework exposed in chapter 1. Following those principles will maintain
consistency in the analysis. One lesson that seems to be drawn by many authors in the literature
is that trade is a complex mechanism, in itself a synthesis of closed economy e ects tackled
in a di erent context. Those e ects include property rights issues, specialisation, weak versus
strong sustainability and responsibility for depletion.
III.1 Trade liberalisation and trade policy: challenges for sustain-
ability
We saw with Hartwick (1995) that a marginal di erence in resources endowment could
generate trade flows with consequences on the sustainable path. From this observation, it is
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legitimate to inquire about the impact of trade liberalisation on sustainability. The answer
is likely to depend on the way trade would be modelled. The essence of a trade model is to
estimate the gains from trade (see notably Arkolakis et al. (2012)). The results in the trade
and the environment literature are in favour of trade liberalisation, defined as shifting from a
state of autarky to a state of free trade. Fewer articles investigated the possible relevance of
the timing for such a move.
The literature on income convergence addressed this issue, mostly based on Heckscher-
Ohlin patterns of trade. A first contribution by Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) stressed the dif-
ference between “early bloomers” and “late bloomers”. Their model picture a world of small
open economies, similar in their preferences, technology and starting capital stock. The early-
bloomers reach the steady-state before the late-bloomers start to develop. In this setting, the
late bloomers converge to a permanently lower level of output per capita. Lack of income
convergence is in itself a telling result. More interesting are the mechanisms behind this result.
Both countries are composed of two sectors. In line with the factor price equalisation
prediction, there are more than one capital-labour ratio compatible with equilibrium. In a one
sector model only one ratio is compatible with steady-state output. This result is a direct
consequence of the separability assumption in HO models, by which the amount of produced
capital has no impact on the rental rate. It produces a situation were the signals sent by world
prices and endowment distribution get late bloomers stuck in a cone of diversification which
promises them permanently lower output. The timing of trade liberalisation is as important as
the measures of trade liberalisation themselves. A second contribution by Bajona and Kehoe
(2010) furthers this initial finding, showing that convergence in income depends on the elasticity
of substitutions between the goods produced in the two sectors.
Those findings deserve to be brought to the light of the institutional analysis from chapter
1. ? describe at length how the opening of transatlantic trade constitutes a critical juncture
in institutional terms. Yi-fu Lin (2012) presents the failure of newly independent countries in
the 1960’s to develop an indigenous industry based on imports substitution. Faced with the
critical juncture of trade liberalisation, a developing country has no choice but to enter trade
in line with its comparative advantage and specialise. The dividends of specialisation should
then be used to develop new high return specialisations and to catch-up this way with the level
of development of trading partners.
The findings of Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) are a big question mark on this last step, depicting
countries stuck in their early specialisation and incapable of catching-up. The observer is
left with the uncomfortable choice of choosing between blaming the logic of specialisation or,
noticing that a handful of countries succeed in crossing the threshold, dissecting the reasons
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behind this success. ? and Yi-fu Lin (2012) concur in placing their bets on institutions. If
the economy opening-up to trade is “ready,” (able in its very structures to make the most of
income gains from trade that is) the outcome is likely to be positive and lasting.
A suitable insertion in international trade, in terms of timing and specialisation is critical
for structural change. Structural change is the critical process under which the economy trans-
fers its reliance from natural capital and labour to more sophisticated (or just transformed)
instruments of wealth. Le Van et al. (2010) explore this necessary transition and stress the role
of the initial level of capital and pure rate of time preferences in escaping natural resources
dependence. Natural resources management in the wake of trade liberalisation is critical to the
future of the country. If the comparative advantage of the developing country comes from ex-
haustible resources, it will receive an important windfall that needs to be properly reinvested.
Lacking proper resources management mechanisms, resources rents are likely to be wasted
through wasteful investments or unsustainable consumption, as international demand will not
abate (Atkinson and Hamilton 2002).
There are still doubts over the suitability of trade liberalisation regarding natural capital.
Bouët et al. (2005) show how trade liberalisation might not be to the benefit of agriculture de-
pendent developing countries. Bouët et al. (2010b) then study the conditions under which trade
liberalisation might be profitable for the least advanced countries. In the timing of development
(and structural change), management of the years separating specialisation gains into resources
intensive goods from diversification into produced capital is critical. This management should
be properly assessed in models of sustainability. Unfortunately, sustainability models do not
contemplate the potentially destabilising e ects of the timing of trade liberalisation. Mostly
comparative statics models frame the model under the “Dutch disease” and the resource curse
(see chapter 4 section II).
Here lies the second problem regarding the timing of trade liberalisation. Sustainability
issues are assessed in inter-temporal optimisation models, over an infinite horizon. Compared
to this kind of horizon, those critical years of transition do not weight much. The limit of using
a time dependent variable as a proxy for capital gains and trade impacts appears clearly here.
Models of inter-temporal optimisation are applied on shorter horizons 18 but only as a proxy
and still require convergence as presented in chapter 1 section II. What is needed is a model
nested in the broader sustainability models (broader in the sense of the classification in figure
1.10), a tool of “meso-economic analysis” consistent with the larger sustainability message.
As short-to-medium term shocks may have a deep impact on specialisation and structural
18. Pezzey et al. (2006) use 20 years and the World Bank 2006, 2011 typically uses 25 years of future prices.
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change they should be rationalised into long run sustainability. This challenge is one of the
core question of the literature on structural change. Some contributions assessed the impact of
trade openness and natural capital availability on structural change. López et al. (2007) find
no relationship between resource abundance and economic growth in the context of structural
change. Antoci et al. (2009) are less optimistic, observing that strategies based on natural
resources are likely to yield less favourable outcomes than those based on labour and produced
capital. Lederman and Maloney (2003) find resource abundance to have a positive impact
on growth but export concentration to have a negative impact, suggesting that the relation
between domestic engines of growth and export specialisation is ambiguous.
More work is needed to build on those promising leads. Still, the case for delaying trade
liberalisation depending on the international context and the domestic structures is strong.
countries liberalising trade are at risk to be trapped in an unsustainable cone of diversification.
For example, Bouët et al. (2010a) question the environmental benefits of biofuel production,
in terms of land use reallocation in producing countries. The contradictory evidence on the
relationship between specialisation, sustainability and growth certainly calls for precaution in
the way trade liberalisation is handled. In the context of ill-enforced property rights and
institutional failures, some authors have argued for a review of the usefulness of trade policy
instruments.
Although those tools are second best tools in a perfectly competitive context, they may
perform better than market mechanisms in kakotopia. In countries plagued by the resource
curse, trade management instruments are likely to have a net negative impact as they may be
used to protect monopolies and political rents. However, trade management instruments are
also shown to benefit both economic growth and environmental quality, particularly when open
access resources are involved (Flaaten and Schulz 2010). Proponents of an active trade policy
are getting more vocal over concerns regarding absolute scarcity. Bouët and Laborde Debucquet
(2010) show how export taxes can be used to stabilise domestic prices in large countries with
a comparative advantage in agriculture in the context of a food crisis.
Regardless of whether we retain a weak or strong sustainability perspective, the e ect of
trade on sustainability clearly depends on trade policies and institutions. The structure of taxes
reflect the transmission of those policy variables to their objectives. An important part of the
economic literature has argued that tari s should be avoided on e ciency grounds (Baumol
and Oates 1988, Burguet and Sempere 2003). Nonetheless, Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) show
that under an ine cient tax system, trade liberalisation can lead to increased emissions. Can
e cient tari s render trade liberalization and environmental protection simultaneously achiev-
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able? Hecht (1997) reviews the literature on tari  escalation 19 and the environment, finding
no evidence that escalation exacerbates degradation or reduces e ciency.
This consensus is nonetheless contested, especially after the Seattle meeting of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) (Tisdell 2001). A good starting point is o ered by Kellenberg (2009)
who shows that when trade, environment and property rights are considered simultaneously,
relaxing environmental regulation can stimulate economic growth. Okumura and Cai (2007)
show that if all factors of production are essential in the production function (i.e. complemen-
tary), countries will tend to deplete foreign exhaustible resources first (via imports) as a way
to protect national instruments of wealth. Shimamoto (2008) shows that tari s can promote
sustainable forest exploitation if marketable commodities and forest externalities are imperfect
substitutes. Brander and Taylor (1998) show that under an HO-type setting where one sector
relies on an open access renewable resource, export taxes can have a positive economic, envi-
ronmental and social e ect. This result is confirmed by Flaaten and Schulz (2010) who add
to the conservation gains for the renewable resource consumption and production gains for the
domestic economy with an export tax. The importance of asymmetric information to legit-
imise protectionism is also stressed by Bouët (2005). Although the two sets of findings appear
contradictory, closer examination shows complementarity in results and recommendations:
– Reducing tari s is likely to bring e ciency gains by reducing dead-weight losses and
local monopoly rents accumulated under those tari s. Lower tari s bring more stringent
environmental regulation via EKC-like e ects.
– Strategic, circumstantial tari s can be used to address a particular problem (such as over-
exploitation of a common-pool resource) when no other instrument is available or proper
enforcement of environmental regulation impossible.
Trade policy instruments are second best economic tools: they should therefore be used
when no first best is available. They can be e cient transitory tools in periods of general
trade liberalisation as safeguard measures in conjunction with quotas. Moreover, they can be a
tool for reducing global pressure on stressed natural resources. When the opportunity of trade
management instruments is raised, the trade-o  between global gains from trade resulting from
less protection and local gains in environmental and social terms must be properly assessed.
Trade Pessimists such as Daly (1996) and Muradian and Martinez-Alier (2001) consider
that “Eco taxes” (or more accurately Eco Tari s) should be imposed systematically as a way to
internalise trade partners’ externalities. If externalities are associated with the production of
goods beyond the particular cases enumerated above, this policy could also improve e ciency.
19. “tari  escalation refers to a pattern of import duties which rise with the level of processing of the goods
purchased” Hecht (1997).
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To prevent trade wars, trade management instruments should be agreed at the global level.
Traditionally, responsibility for assessing instrument merits and legality falls to the WTO,
which allows the use of safeguard measures on environmental grounds, but only as an exception
to the rule. The burden of proof currently lies with those opposing trade on environmental
grounds, and many stakeholders contend that the WTO disproportionately favours trade over
the environment.
In response, the idea of a “World Environmental Organisation” to address global issues
related to the environment and sustainability has been on the academic and political agenda
for years, but with little real progress. Similarly, the acknowledgement of an environmental
“responsibility to protect” global resources and ecosystems for present and future generations
triggered little political action (particularly in times of austerity and economic stagnation).
This section is written under the assumption that trade policy will continue to be debated at
the global scale in the WTO. But the current stalemate over the Doha Development round il-
lustrates the fact that in international trade the interests of developed and developing countries
often diverge, and reaching multilateral consensus may be increasingly di cult. In the context
of raising concerns about the sustainability of agriculture and more generally strategic natu-
ral resources management worldwide 20, beggar-thy-neighbour resource policies will become a
permanent risk. In this perspective, resource-deprived economies are likely to lose in bilateral
trade agreements compared to multilateral ones. Sustainable development and sustainability
are not possible without a “sustainable trade policy.”
Box 2.3: Structural change and the timing of trade liberalisation
The timing of trade liberalisation matters as trade liberalisation means both a shift in domestic
patterns of production and making domestic instruments of wealth available for international
demand. Although trade liberalisation usually results in e ciency and consumption gains, coun-
tries with marked comparative advantages may get trapped in a narrow specialisation, especially
in natural capital intensive goods. This will then reverberate on the whole development path,
durably altered by this short-run shock. Should the shift in production patterns implied by
trade liberalisation deplete some instruments of wealth too quickly, the transitory use of trade
management instruments is warranted.
20. See the latest Chatham house report on managing resources.
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III.2 A model for trade and sustainable development
In this chapter we review the relationship between international trade and sustainability,
and observe that doing so requires the convergence of trade theory, natural resources economics
and both sustainability paradigms. We put into perspective di erences between open economy
sustainability and trade and the environment. We stress the potential role of trade policy
instruments in solving theoretical inconsistencies and empirical di culties emerging within and
between those approaches. We concluded that despite recent e orts to quantify the e ects of
trade on sustainability, it remains a relatively open research area.
Trade theory brings important lessons and relatively robust results relevant to sustainabil-
ity. Countries abiding by the logic of comparative advantage can expect income gains and
technological spillovers that enhance global welfare. There are, however, important caveats to
this story. The magnitude of the gains from trade depend on the conditions (timing, endow-
ments) under which a country liberalises trade. Countries could end on the “wrong” side of
specialisation, trapped in the production of low value-added, exhaustible resources intensive
goods. We believe those mixed conclusions support our original intent to design a “framework
for trade and sustainability”. We will now o er a first sketch for this framework and use this
as a justification for the work undertaken in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
The key components of our sustainability framework are highlighted in boxes through chap-
ters 1 and 2. We use those components to present the trade-induced changes in our sustainabil-
ity framework in chapter 1 subsection II.3. In box 1.6 we stressed how subsidiarity naturally
follows from the precautionary principle, while in box 1.5 we presented the role of institutions
for sustainability. The very existence of international trade creates a potential inconsistency in
our presentation of those notions. International trade theory studies the exchange of goods and
services in a world that is neither perfectly integrated (as understood in an analogy for a func-
tional country) nor a collection of autarkic (island-like) countries. This situation of imperfect
integration creates a “grey area”, traditionally ruled by country negotiations.
Two starting points are usually used to analyse this “grey area”. One perspective is to con-
sider the world as a whole, investigating how agents can allocate resources in the most e ective
manner under some negotiated institutional constraints. In this perspective, international trade
does not di er in essence from interregional trade. The world is best described in the “angel
parable” from Samuelson (1949): an open space burdened by non-deterministic 21 borders that
should ideally be overcome and/or suppressed for the sake of e ciency. International trade is
in the perspective the main tool of a two steps strategy.
21. In the sense that they are not structuring the analysis and could be removed.
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The first step is to create an international optimal allocation of resources using trade.
Incentives to do this exist as consumption and welfare gains from trade can be expected.
The main obstacle is to overcome friction, whether institutional (national borders) or physical
(transportation costs). One needs also to control allocation for undesirable outcomes such as
pollution havens. In the second step (once a steady-state is reached) private incentives coincide
with social incentives at the global level. Global “bads” (such as global warming) can be
tackled e ciency via market mechanisms or other newly created global institutions. Under this
scenario, consistency with the closed economy framework from chapter 1 is restored via ever
increasing integration. As a consequence, international trade issues can be reduced to closed
economy issues over time.
The second perspective, routed in a more traditional country-based approach to sustain-
ability, sees the world as a collection of countries trying individually to reach sustainability.
In this perspective, trade is more a coordination mechanism, bringing benefits but also costs
and constraints on the domestic strategy. This perspective is also grounded in the observation
that the state level is still the most relevant level for sustainability issues (law enforcement,
redistribution, natural resources management policy).
Models developed by proponents of this approach are more of the “open economy sustain-
ability” kind, focusing on domestic optimal planning under (usually exogenous) world prices
and the impact of trade variations on national economies. If each country reaches sustainability
individually, the world will be sustainable under the assumption that each country incorporates
in its strategy a “fair share” of global bads (fish overexploitation and ocean acidification to name
only two). The obvious challenge against this perspective is the need to agree to first and then
enforce rules corresponding to the global optimum at the country level. Any coordination
equilibrium includes an opportunity for free-riding.
Those are the two sides of sustainability: focusing on optimal trade may yield income
gains and improve the global outlook but leaves some countries worse-o , or shouldering a
disproportionate share of the global un-sustainability. Conversely, focusing on country by
country sustainability may lead to beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies or lead observers to
miss a potential “imported sustainability” in an otherwise favourable domestic picture. Hence
the existence of international trade comes from imperfect integration while imperfect integration
creates inconsistency in our framework for sustainability.
This inconsistency comes from the impossibility to organise natural resources management
under the subsidiarity principle (see box 1.6 and figure 1.10). inconsistency has consequences
for the ability to tackle uncertainty and select optimal paths as (to take the second perspective)
imperfect integration changes the setting of domestic prices. As domestic instruments of wealth
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face a global demand reacting to conditions in other countries, uncertainty increases. This
uncertainty makes the management of capital gains particularly complicated (box 2.1). It
should be noted that increased uncertainty makes the use of scenarios and counterfactual studies
even more necessary, as sustainable paths need now to be computed contingently to a broader
set of exogenous conditions.
We will illustrate the consequences of this for the maintenance of wealth (box 1.2) and
constant consumption over time (box 1.3) using an example. Let us consider a closed economy
that is relatively well-endowed compared to the world average in a given (exhaustible) natural
resource. This economy previously ran under the preferences of its agents without economic
interactions with the rest of the world. Still, we assume that those agents have preferences
similar to the rest of the world nonetheless. Hence, this economy is relatively more diversified
compared to the rest of the world, so as to produce a wide range of goods and services and
satisfy local demand.
The decision is made to open-up to trade to benefit from a) specialisation gains in the HO
logic, b) productivity gains from the insertion in the global supply chain, by increasing returns
to scale and attract foreign direct investments and c) to satisfy potential global demand for
the domestic exhaustible resource at a higher price than the domestic price (the global market
is assumed to be bigger than the domestic one). We assume also that trade liberalisation is a
one-o  decision but the domestic economy needs time to make the adjustment in consumption
and investment decisions. The domestic economy will take world prices as given, as in Asheim
(1986) and the second scenario in Hartwick (1995). It should therefore take capital gains into
account and adapt natural-capital use policy accordingly.
We consider the impact on factor endowments using a standard HO setting with two coun-
tries, two goods and two factors (produced capital and exhaustible resources). 22 We suggest a
simple comparative statics exercise where good x1 is relatively intensive in produced capital and
good x2 is relatively intensive in the exhaustible resource. Consider the impact of an increase
in the world price of good x2 as a result of trade liberalisation:
– As the price of the exhaustible resource intensive good goes up, resources are reallocated
to the sector of good x2 so that the production of good x1 falls and the use of exhaustible
resources increases (Stolper-Samuelson theorem).
– This increase in the use of the exhaustible resource should trigger a more than proportional
increase in production of good x2, following the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. All in all,
trade openness creates a more than proportional increase in exhaustible resources use in
22. In a standard HO model, endowments are constant. The dynamics described here are to be understood
as illustrations of the dynamic impacts of the canonical theorems (see chapter 3.
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a dynamic setting.
The transition from autarky (state 1) to free trade (state 2) is presented in ﬁgure 2.5.
Without speciﬁcs, the net eﬀect on wealth is conditioned by the reinvestment of the rent from
exhaustible resources in other instruments of wealth. Still, it is clear that international trade
increases specialisation. Beyond trade liberalisation, trade in an HO setting with capital gains
has a quasi-ricardian productivity improving impact. The nature of those productivity gains
is conditioned by the distribution (and redistribution) of the rent. With limited inequality,
productivity gains are likely to be Solow-neutral. A shared windfall favours investment in all
sectors, resulting in general productivity gains. But would there be strong inequalities between
rent owners, then productivity gains are likely to be concentrated in the exhaustible resource
sector as in the resource curse. This decision is sensible from an economic perspective as it is
the only sector able to maintain competitiveness internationally (see chapter 4).
Figure 2.5: Trade liberalisation with a natural resources intensive sector
Source: Author
This investment strategy could strengthen the country’s comparative advantage, increase
income gains and entrench specialisation. Productivity gains also make extraction more eﬃ-
cient and/or less costly. The necessary development of up-market comparative advantages in
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then delayed, while the “deadline” represented by the stock is brought closer 23. The optimal
depletion path in autarky was calibrated on domestic demand and domestic preferences. Even
if we assume that domestic and world preferences are the same 24 the added world demand will
skew the optimal depletion path towards extraction. The overall impact should therefore be
accelerated depletion even if the new world interest rate is less than the former autarky interest
rate.
Once the domestic economy improves its competitive positions in other sectors, additional
rents can be invested domestically. But why would this domestic economy diversify its produc-
tion? Trade encourages specialisation as a source of income gains, while sustainability would
require diversification away from natural capital as a way to preserve the stock and its services
(Hartwick 1977). The logic of the comparative advantage is based on an increased division
of labour at the international scale. Productivity gains are obtained through increased spe-
cialisation, which goes against the implicit diversification advocated by the substitution in the
Hartwick rule. As a consequence, trade generates strong composition e ects on comprehensive
wealth, which makes assumption on money-value and physical substitutability critical (see box
1.4).
The factor constituting the comparative advantage will be used more intensively. This will
in turn increase income for the owners of that factor. There is a strong empirical correlation
between high rents from natural resources and comparative advantage in natural resources
(see figure 4.2 in chapter 4). Hence, international trade may create incentives regarding the
composition of wealth that goes against sustainability rules. This impact of international trade
on wealth composition can be o set by domestic reinvestment of the resource rent, impacting
favourably other factor’s income. But in an open economy setting, as in Van der Ploeg (2010),
rents can also be invested abroad.
It is likely that at this stage, better opportunities of investment are available in the rest of
the world than in the domestic economy. This is especially likely if the rest of the rest of the
domestic economy is uncompetitive compared to the natural resources intensive sector. At this
point, international trade seems more likely to generate the kind of rentier economy described
by Van der Ploeg (2010) than diversification in comprehensive wealth. One could argue that the
domestic economy still get income from its overseas investments. But why would this income be
reinvested domestically, let alone outside the natural resources intensive sector? Still, against
23. Although if the natural resource price is reduced by diminished extraction costs, the backstop is pushed
further in time.
24. We assume notably similarity in their preferences regarding the environmental degradation resulting from
the exploitation of resources. According to the literature on trade and the environment and informal regulation
(Pargal and Wheeler 1995), this is likely to be untrue.
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the logic of specialisation, diversification should also be supported because of uncertainty over
actual substitutability (box 1.4).
The logic of capital substitutability is justified by the standard tenets of resource opti-
mism (Neumayer 2000, for an excellent review), historical experience (Krautkraemer 2005),
and empirical estimation (Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato 2007, World Bank 2006). Ex-
tending beyond domestic borders, trade presents further opportunities for substitution and
enhances e ciency; international carbon trade and biodiversity o sets are two such examples.
We stressed the limit of this logic under autarky in chapter 1. The problem remains under free
trade: organising markets providing de facto value-substitutability between di erent instru-
ment of wealth does not provide information regarding physical substitutability and neglects
opportunity costs.
Market o setting is based on the same theory of value in open economy and su ers from the
same flaw regarding intragenerational equity. Neumayer (2010) is right to stress that the actual
amount of substitutability is the last and principal bone of contention between environmental
and ecological economics. In the face of uncertainty, organising international markets on the
basis of perfect substitutability clearly violates the precautionnary principle. It also makes
the potential violation of intragenerational equity worse, as there are virtually no international
redistribution mechanism and those are anyway short circuited by domestic institutions.
From an intergenerational perspective, as long as the resource windfalls are reinvested into
other forms of capital and income is guaranteed, there is no di erence between domestic and
foreign investment. Intergenerational challenges lie in making adequate comprehensive wealth
investments to account for traded resources, and addressing potential capital gains, which have
the ability to trade consumption and investment over time. From an intragenerational equity
perspective, diversification and specialisation are not perfect substitutes. Neither are domestic
and foreign investment.
Non-resources factors already see their income reduced by the first reallocation e ect after
trade liberalisation. They can then be deprived from the “trickle down” e ect caused by
domestic reinvestment of windfalls from the natural resources sector. This composition e ect
reduces the use of other factors in the rest of the economy without rising by the same extend
(because of relative intensity) employment in the resources intensive sector. This e ect is
then amplified by the Rybczynski e ect, increasing more than proportionally the size of the
exhaustible resources sector. In the Copeland and Taylor (1994) model, this e ect played for
the environment as the use of pollution decreased. It plays against sustainability here by rising
natural resources use.
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Natural resources being scarcer than other factors, the general prediction of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem is likely to come true. Trade liberalisation results in lower income for
the more abundant factor in both regions, so that both produced capital and labour might
eventually be worse-o . Trade will provoke a reallocation of resources across sectors and is
therefore likely to o set the previous balance between interest groups in the country: the
potentially positive impact of trade is dependent on the structure of ownership and resulting
rent capture. Trade may have little positive impact if lobby groups are able to use trade
management instruments or legislative influence to protect against distributional e ects.
Dealing with wealth inequalities is the core intragenerational challenge of international trade.
Despite global income gains, trade liberalisation results in widening inequalities between factors
and potentially narrowing inequalities between countries. In this, international trade is also a
challenge for the imperative to keep consumption constant over time when agents have property
rights over dissimilar bundles of instruments of wealth (box 1.3). Even if foreign investment
of the rent is temporary, a generation worth of human capital can be wasted by the delayed
domestic reinvestment. In addition, countries also face an increase in the likelihood of future
investment to be wasteful, by lack of domestic demand and skills.
Reallocation from specialisation in international trade empowers owners of natural resources
relatively to owners of other instruments of wealth. This assumption is supported by the
recent findings of Carmignani (2013), studying the relationship between resource abundance
and inequalities. It should be noted that reallocation towards the natural resources sector
also reinforces the power of resources owners on institutions. Growing inequalities in income
diminish the general inclusiveness of institutions, breaking the virtuous circle presented in figure
1.5.
According to ?, if institutions are politically and economically inclusive, then domestic
demand generated by the resource sector should increase possibilities of investment in human
capital in the population, generating other comparative advantages from the newly trained
population. From there, the accumulation of domestic produced capital should start. Still,
if intragenerational equity is non-existent or discouraged, rents may and will stay invested
overseas. Lack in intragenerational equity creates a breach in intergenerational equity as the
current generation is frustrated from potential social accumulation of wealth.
The consequences of international trade on within-country distribution of wealth and income
came under close scrutiny on employment grounds. The second globalisation, accelerating with
the fall of the Berlin wall, saw an increase in job losses in the manufacturing sectors of developed
countries. Wood (1994) insisted that in line with the Stolper-Samuelson prediction, inequalities
would rise with globalisation as labour would be less demanded in developed countries. Another
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potential culprit for those losses was technical progress, pushing to substitute produced capital
for labour. Testing the idea that firms could shed jobs by increasing productivity against a
direct trade-induced composition e ect, Cardebat and Teiletche (1997) find mixed evidence, if
anything slightly in favour of the technical change hypothesis.
Still, later contributions conducted on broader samples give more weight to the impact of
international trade on sectoral composition. As reported by Cardebat (2009), both the World
Trade Organisation (2008) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) believed at the end
of the last decade that international trade could take responsibility for almost half of the job
losses over the decade. Chusseau et al. (2008) review the theoretical and empirical literature
and find that international trade increases inequalities mostly via incentives to outsource pro-
duction abroad. Increasing inequalities from increased specialisation are a major sustainability
issue as reduced within-country intragenerational equity impacts negatively political inclusive-
ness via reduced economic inclusiveness (see box 1.5). It also violates the Rawlsian argument
regarding the “original position”. Strong redistribution mechanisms become critical to ensure
sustainability, which becomes also less likely as the income and wealth gaps widen.
Those redistribution mechanisms are needed for the protection of the rights of current
domestic generations against foreign generations, and the rights of future domestic generations
against all present generations. This protection is theoretically guaranteed by e cient market
mechanisms, or e cient hedging in the face of uncertainty. Yet, basing a strategy on the ability
of international markets to yield a) a consistent system of current and future relative prices and
b) send the right incentive in terms of instruments of wealth allocation should raise concerns
following our presentation.
The elements we presented question the suitability of specialisation in an exhaustible re-
source as much as they question specialisation away from labour. Countries will get into a cone
of diversification, related to their endowments. As an industrial specialisation intensive in a
given resource is chosen, there are large switching costs (and a risk to become uncompetitive)
in changing specialisation. The country is likely to be stuck into a production pattern that
will exhaust its resources and hamper structural change in wealth instruments. This resources-
abundant country is then likely to fail to diversify its productive base into several sources of
capital.
Focusing on the productivity-improving side of trade while occulting the potentially damag-
ing composition e ect is therefore reckless. The irony in our analysis is that the very mechanism
of comparative advantage that is the source of initial development should be slowly overthrown
to reach sustainability. Once the social need for sustainability is accepted (see box 1.1), it
should be clear that trade-induced composition e ects cannot be relied on to trigger sustain-
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able structural change.
Those links between intragenerational, intergenerational equity and international trade have
already been unearthed in the literature, although to our knowledge their importance for sus-
tainability has not yet been presented in an integrated framework. Although awareness of
those issues can be assumed, the translation of this awareness into a strategy for sustainability
is often puzzling. Trade mechanisms are usually advocated to be left alone so as to provide
productivity gains while “structural reforms”, are assumed to yield to necessary push for diver-
sification. This boils down to assuming that trade cannot go against the goals of those reforms.
Assuming (maybe kindly) that structural reforms are about increasing political and economic
inclusiveness, there is room to question the e ciency of leaving trade incentives unscathed in
the process.
How to develop those other sectors, how to create the economic incentives to distribute or
redistribute income from wealth beyond institutional reform? A first fact coming to mind is that
the existence of sectors not compatible with comparative advantages is justified by transaction
costs. In Dornbusch et al. (1977) where trade is determined by a ricardian pattern, the existence
of transaction costs determine the existence of a set of non-traded goods and sectors, preventing
complete specialisation. Transaction costs are a first source of diversification as they create the
rationale for developing a domestic industry in goods that are too costly to import.
One could argue that those theoretical results are obtained under the restrictive assumption
of factor immobility. We saw when testing for the PHH against the traditional FEH that larger-
than-present regulation-induced costs would be needed for a massive reallocation of production
across countries. This may change quickly should environmental costs (real or regulatory-
induced) increase. But in the meantime, substantial trade costs, whatever the source, make
the case for industries (especially immobile industries) to be developed on domestic soil.
A second rationale for diversification lies in investment in instruments of wealth. Instru-
ments of wealth are assumed to be perfectly money-substitutable. Investments imply compara-
ble returns as well as di erent sunk costs and opportunity costs. It is also impossible to invest
in exhaustible non-renewable resources beyond e ciency and exploration investments. Those
investments typically involve sunk costs. 25 Concerns over substitutability, sunk costs and re-
silience should be taken into account when comparing the relative returns of instruments of
wealth. The development of option values to complete current estimates of opportunity costs
could be promising. Returns should be balanced against not only immediate environmental
and social costs, but also composition costs associated with increased specialisation based on a
25. Sunk costs associated with natural capital involve the destruction of ecosystem services and the definitive
exhaustion of some physical elements.
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dwindling 26 instrument of wealth.
The opportunity cost of investing in labour/human capital should be considered beyond
traditional returns. Although the country may not have a comparative advantage in human
capital, human capital provides a hedge against the likely evolution of specialisation. A similar
property is observed with some forms of money capital 27 and produced capital involving the
least sunk costs. Opportunity costs are represented by the fact that investing in one speciali-
sation means there is no investment in any other specialisation. Under uncertainty, only time
can tell if the sustainable benefits of investing in one specialisation are greater than the oppor-
tunity costs represented by the benefits of developing other specialisations. At some point the
trade-o  presented here makes hedging by investment in other instruments of wealth necessary.
The consideration of those opportunity costs opens new perspectives on the links between
subsidiarity, structural change and the timing of trade liberalisation. An early opening to
international trade based on a comparative advantage defined by a handful of instruments of
wealth looks much more costly than usually assumed (see box 2.3). This scenario makes an
important specialisation of the economy quite likely, with the political, sunk, opportunity costs
associated. This scenario makes massive transfers of “virtual instruments of wealth” likely, with
all the problems regarding money-value substitutability and rent extraction that this implies
(see box 2.2). The safe move from here is to purely and simply delay trade liberalisation until
the distribution of instruments of wealth is less asymmetric.
Still, this is potentially unsatisfactory as some gains from trade can be expected. It is
also possible that for strategic reasons or because of enforcement costs, prolonged autarky is
not an option. This is where the subsidiarity principle is critical. If the domestic economy
is properly organised under the subsidiarity principle, it is possible to let international trade
shape specialisation at the national scale while keeping some room for manoeuvre at the regional
scale. This possibility emerges from the existence of transaction costs, local preferences and
international economies of scale (see 4 section II).
In this setting, countries could integrate the global supply chain to benefit from the gains
from trade and other benefits of globalisation (mostly technical spillovers and product diversity)
while using the regional scale to experiment diversification. Regional units are likely to be less
26. The logic, straightforward when considering exhaustible resources, is not so di erent when considering
labour. Remember that in Fisher (1906), instruments of wealth that are qualitatively di erent (a fertile field
against a less fertile one) are considered to be of di erent nature. Conversely, if instead of assuming that
labour is commensurable in terms of qualification (the idea that a labourer can become an engineer under the
optimal system of relative prices) imperfect if not un-substitutability was assumed, adequate policies for labour
management should be revisited.
27. Including safe assets such as government bonds.
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prone to market ine ciencies, while increasing voice and accountability, making those the ideal
receptacles for economic experiment. Still, the country level is needed to coordinate regional
units while monitoring the evolution of overall specialisation. A final critical role for country
level institutions is to organise interactions between agents organising the global supply chain
(first and foremost multinational firms) and regional endowments. A fine balance must be
found between resources devoted to local experiments and instruments forming the comparative
advantage at the disposal of the global supply chain (Costinot et al. 2012).
In this final respect, subsidiarity finally links with substitutability in money-value. Substi-
tutability is usually considered in the literature in line with absolute scarcity concerns. Greater
emphasis should be put (at least in the short/medium term) on geographical substitutability,
investigating who should decide to which end a given instrument of wealth should be used. 28
Should the rules associated with market mechanisms and perfect substitutability/fungibility 29
still be used in our framework?
In our view the question of substitutability/fungibility cannot be detached from the issues
surrounding the concept of liquidity. Issues regarding substitutability/fungibility do not in-
validate Fisher’s theory of capital, but they do raise questions regarding the theory of value
used in association. The core issue behind substitutability/fungibility is therefore the question
of liquidity between markets trading in incommensurable instruments of wealth. Uncertainty
imposes a trade-o  between liquidity and precaution, which is nothing else than risk in financial
terms. Reducing risk according to the precautionnary principle would involve the reduction
of money-value substitutability via money, degrading money as the epitome liquid instrument.
This may sound like a radical step, but markets already have ways to degrade substitutability
between financial instruments. Making provisions for uncertainty does not necessarily require
a complete redesign of markets, but it certainly requires to reinvestigate the role of money.
In the end, Neumayer (2010) is right to focus on the issue of substitutability. We would only
insist on substitutability to be understood in its broadest meaning of substitutability/fungibility.
Exploring this idea led us to conclude that the role of money in trade should be revisited, an
idea familiar to the careful reader of Keynes (see the analysis in Maurin (2013)). This idea will
also come as no surprise to specialists of the study of international dis-equilibria and the role
of financial flows in international debt and exchange rate crisis. The study of open economy
sustainability should be extended in that direction to provide a firmer theoretical foundation
for the notion of “virtual sustainability”. Investigating the factor content of trade flows and
28. And therefore in our framework at which level, regional or country level?
29. We propose to use the concept of substitutability to refer to issues regarding substitution between two
qualitatively (and probably incommensurable) instruments of wealth, while saving fungibility to indicate po-
tential geographical substitution, between the regional and country management.
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substitutability amongst traded instruments of wealth will inevitably lead to questioning the
free flow of financial assets that are the counterparts of those real flows.
Back on the real side of the balance of payments, taking into account those elements would
create along sustainability lines a set of tradable and non-tradable instruments of wealth. We
saw that the limit can be set by transaction costs (Dornbusch et al. 1977) but the literature
provides other explanations such as the lack of factor price equalisation in an HO model. More
recent attempts also include the Melitz (2003) model where the decision to export is based on
firm productivity. Taking a sustainability perspective would add another motive to separate
industries producing tradables and non-tradables, between country-level exports and regional-
level sustainability.
The global supply chain is based on the exploitation of the international division of produc-
tion processes. Exploiting countries’ comparative advantages, the global supply chain organises
production at the world level, providing opportunities for individuals and firms in more coun-
tries than ever before to get involved into global production (Friedman 2005). But there is no
institutional framework comparable to the state level framework to regulate this global layer
of production. A firm should be regulated at the adequate level in terms of institutions and
wealth mobilised. If the counterfactual prevails, the risk is generalised free-riding, imperfect
enforcement and internationalisation of externalities (Ostrom 1990). This violation of the sub-
sidiarity principle creates a basis in our theory of sustainability and trade for the expansion of
the scope of non-tradable goods.
This finding is in line with the observations made for example by Schneider et al. (2010)
and could give a basis in sustainability theory for the “de-globalisation” of part of the global
supply chain. The risk here would be to go to far, forgetting that there are powerful income
gains from trade attached to the global supply chain, as long as it is organised in line with
comparative advantages. The considerable work at hand is therefore two-fold. At the global
level, institutions should be created to regulate the global supply-chain, implying a “scaling-up”
of some responsibilities. At the regional level, more room for instruments of wealth management
should be given at the scale best suited to manage sustainable those instruments. In the biggest
countries more regional power might imply to “scale-down” some responsibilities and introduce
an amount of political and economic decentralisation.
Under this organisation, consistency could be restored in our sustainability framework. This
organisation is clearly a second best compared to the creation of an integrated world economy.
It might nonetheless be the only workable option between the status-quo and an integrated
world economy that might not properly consider sustainability issues. Our current organisation
seems closer to the country perspective, with little scope for convergence towards the first best
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of global integration. In this context, the use of policy instruments to protect conjecturally
threatened 30 instruments of wealth seems warranted by the precautionary and the subsidiarity
principle.
Safeguard measures will be needed in an open economy sustainability strategy, as a second
best for the institutions missing. Those measures will be crucial not so much during the
development of industries according to comparative advantages, but much more during the
transition towards diversification when traditional advantages fade. Safeguard measures could
then help countries to go upmarket without running the risk of depleting instruments of wealth
which would e ectively “pay” for the transition. They could also be warranted in sectors
plagued by externalities when complete internalisation is not possible.
Safeguard measures would lead to a decline in size of the global supply chain and a re-
localisation of part of the global production process. This phenomenon seems to us inevitable.
Rising energy costs, competition between factors and social unrest are already pushing for
re-localisation. The move is made more important by traditional agglomeration forces. The
hopefully compelling case we made for a consistent organisation under the subsidiarity principle
would only exacerbate those trends. An interesting question would be to compare the size of the
global supply chain under several scenarios regarding externalities, money-value substitutability
and level/organisation of institutions for inclusiveness.
It would then be possible to assess how far the world economy is from sustainable integration
and in need of our proposed second best. This logic is in our view implicit behind the debate
about responsibility for depletion. Multi-Regional Input-Output analyses o er important in-
sight into how resources are actually extracted, traded, and consumed. The idea of “virtual
sustainability” expresses the shallow nature of a sustainability based on the depletion of re-
sources elsewhere. It also stresses the danger of depending on exports of exhaustible resources
in development. Oleson (2011) already questioned the dependence of countries on imported
resources as a potential violation of the social contract between the government and its citizens.
A final note should be made regarding indicators of sustainability. Adjusted Net Savings
(ANS) stand as the prominent indicator of sustainability being forward looking and grounded
in theory. Under the assumption of the inter-temporal model used as a foundation for ANS it
is a predictor of future sustainability. The literature on open economy sustainability already
included suggestions to amend ANS for capital gains which would correct the indicator for the
long run impact of trade. Considering our previous objections, it is clear that ANS should also
be amended for a measure of the opportunity cost of specialisation, to reflect the potential future
30. We are referring here to both over and under-exploitation of some instruments of wealth.
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cost of diversification and its drag on the country’s wealth. A measure of the cost associated
with an unsustainable institutional organisation should also be included. We explore those
points in chapters 3 and 4.
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Conclusion
Those observations conclude this chapter on trade and sustainability. This long journey
started with the review of the models and results in the literature on trade and the environment.
The environment has been incorporated into prominent trade frameworks, most notably the HO
model. This was a natural starting point for exploring sustainability and international trade
driven by factor endowments as well as how key trade theorems relate to the environment.
The lasting contribution of the field is doubtlessly the decomposition of trade impacts on the
environment depending on the composition, technique and scale e ects. The decomposition
is especially helpful when assessing the likely consequences of trade liberalisation on polluting
emissions. This literature, based on trade models, o ers a global outlook on environmental
issues setting the conditions for optimal pollution at the international level.
A di erent perspective is presented in the literature on open economy sustainability, fo-
cusing on country by country sustainability in an open context. Openness bring challenges for
instruments of wealth management, natural resources especially. Exogenous world prices create
capital gains from trade, as the value of natural resources can be expected to increase over time.
Investing those gains sustainably and adopting the right savings policy is then critical to sus-
tainability. Authors in this literature naturally orientated themselves towards institutional and
property rights issues, of prime importance when considering sustainable reinvestment policies.
The models developed to assess responsibility for depletion corroborate those findings,
stressing that a large share of natural resources depletion in resources rich economies is under-
taken for exports. This makes the timing of trade liberalisation critical, as incentives to spe-
cialise may trap natural resources rich economies into an unsustainable specialisation. Should
such a specialisation emerge, trade policy instruments are warranted to avoid over-exploitation
of natural resources. Those very rich and versatile contributions to the understanding of the
links between international trade and sustainability should be mobilised to propose a frame-
work for sustainability in open economies. We believe that the pieces of this puzzle are already
there, they are just scattered across di erent fields in the literature.
We defined sustainability in chapter 1 as the need to maintain comprehensive wealth over
time, maintain constant value-consumption over time, control for money-value substitutability
to be consistent with physical substitutability while guaranteeing inter and intragenerational
equity. International trade brings a fundamental challenge to this vision of sustainability as
international trade is born out of the imperfect organisation of the world, between full inte-
gration and complete country level autarky. International trade creates exchanges of goods
and investment flows between countries, altering domestic development paths without global
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institutions to control for sustainability.
Faced with this “grey area” for sustainability, we can not maintain consistency by just
scaling-up at the world level the within-country optimal organisation. The decision to open to
trade alters the optimal development path while increasing the specialisation of the domestic
economy in line with world level relative preferences. Still, the application of the subsidiarity
principle is valid as an instrument to minimize uncertainty in the development path while setting
and preserving inclusive institutions, accountability and voice for all agents. Subsidiarity allows
for a better match between physical and money-value substitutability via a better accounting
of local preferences. This idea needs to be extended in the open economy context.
We propose to consider the concept of fungibility to describe the need to take into account
not only physical substitutability but geographic substitutability. Regions should be allowed to
preserve a greater diversity in instruments of wealth than would be commended by international
incentives to specialise, as a way to hedge against uncertainty and foster structural change.
Only by controlling both physical and spatial substitutability (substitutability and fungibility)
is it possible to take advantage of the gains from trade (productivity and specialisation gains)
without compromising the needed future diversification of the economy. This observation is
the basis for a dissociation between the country contribution to the global supply chain, guided
by comparative advantages and specialisation, and a regionally sustainable organisation of
instruments, aiming for symmetry in use, diversification and equity.
In this perspective, factors limiting perfect substitutability are not necessarily bad. Some
existing rigidities such as cultural preferences and transaction costs can play for sustainability
by limiting resources depletion. In situations of increasing asymmetry in the distribution of
instruments of wealth, countries should be allowed to use trade policy instruments to reduce
the use of some instruments of wealth while encouraging the use of others. Asymmetry should
be reduced in terms of comprehensive wealth, but also in terms of spatial distribution of wealth
instruments.
This conceptual framework sets a clear research agenda while leaving us with many ques-
tions. What is the actual size of the regions? How to draw the line between domestic diversified
production and global specialisation? What should be the role of policy makers? How to use
financial counterparts of trade flows in case of unbalanced trade? Those many questions (to
which many can be added) can only be answered once the potential impact of the agents
involved, their potential role for sustainability is better understood.
We stressed how the combination of present value, current value indicators, counterfac-
tual studies and scenarios could form the basis for sustainability assessment and guide policy
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makers. As the leading current value indicator of sustainability, Adjusted Net Savings should
be the cornerstone of sustainability assessment (see chapter 4 section III for an application).
Nonetheless, the indicator needs to be amended for the constraints on the optimal development
path brought by international trade to be used in an open economy context. Present value
indicators needs to amended only if they interact with a component of the global supply chain.
As a first contribution to this agenda, we propose in the next chapter to investigate the
impact of international trade on the use of wealth instruments. Using a dynamic HO model,
we can consider factor usage along the development path, comparing wealth and consumption
in autarky and free trade under several sustainability scenarios. This model also addresses
the problem of convergence in consumption and income under di erent configurations in world
prices and the resulting steady-state levels. In chapter 4 we focus on the insertion of resources
rich countries in the global supply chain, often characterised by the well-known resource curse.
We show, using a counterfactual exercise, that sustainability rules are regularly violated in
resources rich countries and stress the correlation between this finding and an HO pattern of
trade. We conclude, using the Ethier (1982) model that resources rich countries should turn
to a more intra-industry pattern of trade to avoid being stuck in the middle income trap,
providing further evidence that trade plays a major role in sustainability and the “switch” to
diversification.
Chapter 3
International trade and structural
change: a dynamic model of weak
sustainability
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Introduction
In the previous section we presented the impact of trade on our definition of sustainability.We stressed the need for a comprehensive approach for trade and sustainability. Most of
the literature, starting with the Copeland and Taylor (1994) model, concludes that trade has a
positive impact on sustainability and/or the environment. International trade makes resources
allocation more e cient as countries specialise according to their comparative advantage. In-
ternational trade also alters domestic prices when opening-up to free trade. World prices reflect
world demand for resources. Depending on the domestic distribution of endowments relative
to the world distribution, instruments of wealth will see their price increase or fall. Countries
relatively well endowed in natural resources can expect capital gains from international trade,
as higher global demand pushes domestic prices up.
The “open economy sustainability” literature focused on the time dimension and the capital
gains. Early articles by Asheim (1986) and more recent publications by Vincent et al. (1997)
and Pezzey (2004) suggest that opening up to trade and then being subject to the forces of
international trade could have a major impact on country level sustainability strategies. As
capital gains generate resource windfalls for the domestic economy, resources rich countries are
expected to use the extra income in a sustainable manner. The Hartwick (1977) rule promotes
sustainable reinvestment of the rent into produced capital to maintain wealth and consumption
as exhaustible resources are depleted.
Responsibility for sustainability falls mostly on domestic management. Implicit in this argu-
ment is the notion that under free trade, trade partners will converge in levels of comprehensive
wealth, income and consumption per capita. This may not be the case depending on the original
situation of the country (Atkeson and Kehoe 2000). Trade liberalisation should be undertaken
considering the situation of future partners, their relative distribution of endowments. Trade
induces several evolutions for individual countries and is one of the key determinants of a suc-
cessful development strategy. Early specialisation in line with comparative advantages must
pave the way for some diversification in order to go upmarket and pursue development beyond
the middle income trap. This is the problem of structural change.
As the current questions surrounding sustainability in China suggest, there is no easy answer
with respect to how structural change is supposed to happen without impeding the standard
engines of growth based on comparative advantages. Some favour a rebalancing towards internal
demand and investment, while others stress the inflation risk, which could wipe out a large
part of the previous gains from trade. Structural change is in essence a gradual evolution
in the composition of the economy. Any “trade-induced composition e ect” is based on the
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assumption that the domestic economy can reallocate factors to booming sectors. The domestic
economy should also be able to substitute instrument of wealth for one another. Analysis of
trade-induced composition e ects in international trade are therefore based on the assumption
of perfect money-value substitutability.
Countries willing to enter international trade should consider the timing and the opportunity
to adjust their distribution of instrument of wealth to the needs of the trading system. We
saw in the previous chapter the importance of maintaining comprehensive wealth as a whole
as much as maintaining diversity in the instruments composing it. Without similar levels of
comprehensive wealth, it is unlikely that trading partners can obtain symmetric gains from
trade or converge in levels of consumption per capita. A successful insertion in international
trade rests on both comparative advantages and the ability to adapt the composition of domestic
wealth to the changing reality of international exchanges.
Those observations are to be put in the context of the violation of some assumptions associ-
ated with standard trade theory, the most famous one being the factor price equalisation (FPE)
condition in HO models. The robustness of the results regarding convergence in trade models
when the FPE condition is violated has periodically come under scrutiny (Cuñat and Ma ez-
zoli 2004, Ventura 1997). Di erences in technology and productivity are usually put forward
to explain the poor empirical performance of HO models (Trefler 1993). The explanation is
seducing and is doubtlessly a major part of the story. Still, the development of comprehensive
wealth accounts, accounting for the value of natural capital, human capital and institutions,
gives some renewed credit to the classic explanation for FPE violations: major discrepancies in
factor endowments.
Table 3.3 and appendix D show the ventilation of produced capital, human capital 1, re-
newable and non-renewable exhaustible resources. Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) studied the
likelihood of factor price equalisation in the world economy and conclude it is systematically
violated between developed and developing countries (see section III.2). Di erences in factor
prices is therefore the norm and not the exception in international trade. This is likely to upset
many conclusions on the impact of international trade on sustainability. If natural resources
are priced di erently depending on the distribution of endowments in all the potential trading
partners, it is possible that trade liberalisation is not always beneficial. Trade liberalisation
may be profitable when higher world prices can be expected. But this benefit can be o set by
1. A presentation of the method used by the World Bank to obtain the three basic components is available in
chapter 1 section I.2. Intangible capital is then broken down using the estimates from the World Bank (2006),
where human capital is on average 36% of total intangible capital across countries in 2000. Those results using
an average are therefore to be taken more as medium values of an interval of trust than robust approximations.
see section III.2 for more details
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larger fall in other factors income, conditional to the prevailing trade setting. As a consequence,
world convergence in the distribution of instruments of wealth can no longer be expected, even
in the long run. Countries may react to trade liberalisation by further increasing their compar-
ative advantage to increase the resource windfall. Alternatively, they may hasten reinvestment
in produced capital as trade liberalisation reduces overall income and wealth.
If trade is to foster sustainability, management of the productive base in a given country
should be undertaken under valid assumptions regarding the trade position. The generalised
Hartwick rule (Asheim et al. 2003), the basic rule to orientate investment and reinvestment,
should be modified to consider its impact on the distribution of endowments. The Hartwick
rule may create a tension in the context of structural change. There can be an incentive to
invest in factors that are not the factors on which future prosperity is based, but factors that
are cheap relative to the rest of the world and the basis of the comparative advantages. We term
the policy of following the general orientation of the Hartwick rule structural change (SC) as it
leads countries to substitute for natural capital, building a renewable productive base centred
on produced capital. The alternative would be to focus on the enhancement and maintenance
of the endowments sources of the comparative advantage. We term this policy the comparative
advantage (CA) strategy.
The literature beforehand focused on the time dimension and the capital gains. We believe
the CA versus SC debate is more important in terms of sustainability as it has lasting impacts
on the structure of the economies. It is also relevant to the controversy about weak and
strong substitutability. If comparative advantages rest on one particular instrument of wealth
or factor endowment, then the management of this instrument becomes critical even under
perfect substitutability. In this chapter we investigate how the need for structural change may
impact countries depending on the nature of trade and relative factor endowments. We hope
to shed some light on the relationship between wealth, consumption and specialisation and
define sustainable paths. In this context, the need for a consistent long run path (Heal 1998)
must be balanced with short run imperatives regarding income gains from trade and short-run
rigidities. This arbitrage could lead countries to favour depletion of critical natural capital to
gather income gains, destroying in the process both their current comparative advantages and
the possibility to build new ones.
We propose to study the investment/consumption behaviour of a representative agent in a
2 countries, 5 goods, 4 factors HO model. We study the behaviour of the representative agent
following both SC and CA strategies. Within those two investment strategies we consider the
possibility of trade under FPE (the integrated equilibrium (IE)) or without it (the complete
specialisation equilibrium (CS)). The model is based on Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) who elab-
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orated the original 2 countries, 3 goods 2 factors version. This model follows the early work
of Ventura (1997). This modelling strategy unites three fields: weak sustainability (perfect
money-value substitutability), Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade and neoclassical growth. Al-
though this strategy imposes some strong restrictions on the dynamic optimisation process, it
yields interesting insights on the arbitrage between consumption and investment in di erent
trade settings.
We first show how international trade can reduce consumption and wealth in both countries.
Both countries need to alter the relative intensity of their autarkic production to produced goods
that are intensive in either labour and produced capital or exhaustible resources. As a result,
extra coordination costs occur under free trade and steady-states level of consumption and
wealth are lower. This result is unusual. Still, we believe it illustrates an important dilemma
for sustainability. In autarky, the best possible use of instruments is simply to use all the
instruments available to maximise production. After trade liberalisation, countries have to
find a source of comparative advantage, to produce goods that might be exchanged with their
partners. Hence, our modelling strategy allows us to show this dilemma of diversification versus
specialisation in international trade.
We then show how consumption and wealth are reduced by an increased asymmetry in
the distribution of endowments. Asymmetry in endowments is defined as the spread between
one country’s endowment in produced capital and labour on the one hand and exhaustible
resources on the other hand. As a consequence, countries have an incentive to reduce asymmetry
through the adequate investment strategy. Both countries systematically loose out entering
international trade. Still, they may be interested in entering international trade in situations of
high asymmetry. Under free trade, the cost of structural change from high to low asymmetry
is lower than in autarky. Trade grants access to instruments of wealth scarce in the domestic
economy but abundant in the trading partner. As a result, factor prices increase less rapidly
with scarcity under free trade than in autarky and countries may reduce asymmetry at a quicker
pace.
Our comparison of the trade settings reveals an asymmetry in the incentives to open-up to
trade. The country intensive in exhaustible resources will favour free trade when asymmetry is
high but not when asymmetry is low. On the contrary, the country intensive in produced capital
and labour will try to preserve free trade (once enforced) under any level of asymmetry as a
reversal to autarky would leave it relatively worse-o . This feature comes from the dynamics
of accumulation where renewable exhaustible resources yield a bonus every period, whereas
produced capital depreciates. Another consequence of this is the fact that regardless of the
investment strategy followed (CA or SC) the country relatively well endowed in exhaustible
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resources has no incentives to enter international trade when asymmetry is low.
We finally investigate some scenarios, to assess the consequences of country-specific shocks
on our constrained steady-states equilibria. We stress how the introduction of free trade allows
idiosyncratic shocks to reverberates in both countries. We call this property the “burden
sharing” capability of international trade. More originally, we show how the trade setting has an
impact on which countries bears the greatest consequences from the shock. When factor prices
are equalised, the adjustment is stronger in the country where the shock did not take place.
The opposite in true under complete specialisation. In this respect, factor price equalisation
certainly creates co-responsibility in the trading system and requires a global management of
idiosyncratic shocks on di erent instruments of wealth.
Our results have many implications for both sustainability and international trade. We
believe our results provide a theoretical rationale for the computation of “virtual sustainability”
(Atkinson et al. 2012). As di erent distributions of endowments lead to di erent options
regarding trade liberalisation, monitoring of the factor content of trade is necessary to avoid
excessive trade-induced depletion of natural resources. This observation lead to our proposal to
amend Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) to take into account the impact of international trade on
reinvestment strategies. The savings from trade when going from low to high asymmetry should
be added to ANS when they are saved to be reinvested. They should be subtracted if they are
consumed or invested abroad. Our results also stress how asymmetry in the distribution of all
instruments should be considered when setting trade relations. As a consequence, asymmetry is
an indicator of the opportunity of economic integration as in the Balassa (1961) scale. Following
those two findings, we believe our result legitimise the use of trade management instruments
to a) collect the extra savings required because of international trade and b) foster regional
integration in line with sustainability and the subsidiarity principle.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section I we review the literature on dynamic
models of trade and justify our modelling strategy. In section II we present the model, notably
the important assumptions on the production system. We also demonstrate how the separation
of the price setting mechanism from the dynamic model allows us to test several trade settings.
In section III we present the simulations under all the scenarios and cases. In section IV we
interpret the results before concluding.
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I Literature review
When assessing the impact of trade on natural capital, attention is usually drawn to the
works of Copeland and Taylor (Copeland and Taylor 1995, Antweiler et al. 2001). The de-
composition of the impact of trade into scale, technique and composition e ects is a powerful
way to discriminate between the contradictory impacts of international trade on the environ-
ment. However, the Copeland and Taylor approach is limited as it is essentially static. Also,
by focusing on pollution to represent the environment, it emphasises the role of environmen-
tal regulation over the role of direct availability of natural resources in the production process.
Therefore, a complementary approach with an emphasis on resources over pollution is required.
Resources have been studies before pollution in trade settings. The framework presented
in Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Dixit and Norman (1980) set the norm for the study of
resources in international economics still in use in many models today. Resources analysis in
open economies is based on standard results in trade theory. To be able to use trade theory
to o er predictions on resources prices in an open economy setting, trade theorems and results
must stay valid under relatively loose assumptions. Deardor  (1980) undertook to generalise a
formalisation of the average gains from trade. The results are extend in a later contribution to
account for trade distortions (Deardor  1994b).
Some uncertainty remained on the generalisation of the theorems associated with the Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model. One of the most obvious violation of the Heckscher-Ohlin, Stopler-Samuelson
and Rybczinsky theorems was the lack of worldwide factor price equalisation (FPE). FPE is
much debated in trade theory as it is a key condition behind many results. Still, as Baldwin
(2008) reminds us, Ohlin himself didn’t believe FPE to be a realistic precondition for trade
analysis. Deardor  (1979) shows that the chain ranking of comparative advantage established
by Vanek (1968) holds when FPE is not verified if either impediments to free trade or inter-
mediate goods are introduced. The chain prediction breaks down if both modifications are
involved. Trefler (1993) investigates a weak version of FPE to allow for productivity di erences
between countries and finds a significant predictive power to the HO model.
Interrogating the validity of the HO theorem, Deardor  (1982) shows that it holds regardless
of FPE or tari s and export taxes in the absence of transportation costs. The factor content
version of the HO theorem is generalised by showing the negative correlation between autarky
prices and the factor content of trade. Discussing FPE again, Deardor  (1994b) stresses the
usefulness of the concept of the “integrated world economy” from Dixit and Norman (1980).
The integrated world economy concept bears similarities with Samuelson’s “Angel parable”
(Samuelson 1949). The possibility of FPE is assessed based on the comparison between the
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factor endowment lens an the factor use lens. If the factor endowment lens passes outside the
factor use lens, FPE will not occur. FPE will break down if the asymmetry in the distribution
of factor endowments across countries becomes “excessive”.
An empirical test based on this prediction conducted by Debaere and Demiroglu (2003)
shows that the dissimilarity of endowments is too high for FPE to occur at the global scale,
but can occur between OECD countries. Bernhofen (2009) explores this case, extending the
test of Helpman (1984), based on the absence of trade costs, similar technology across countries
and diversity of endowments incompatible with FPE. He shows how, as endowments determine
a given cone of diversification, countries can not produce goods requiring factorial intensities
outside of this cone e ciently. In a n country world, this means that predictions about factor
flows needs information about factor distribution in all the trading partners, not only the
considered pair. Information from all the cones of diversification needs to be considered.
The breakdown of factor price equalisation creates multiple cones in a Lerner-Pearce dia-
gram, and the possibility that the “integrated world economy” turns into a place of separate
cones of complete specialisation based on relative world endowments. Exploring the breakdown
of FPE yield interesting insights about the factor content of trade. For example, Umanskaya
and Barbier (2008) explore the pollution heaven hypothesis while relaxing the FPE condi-
tion. Without FPE they show that the rich country is a potential pollution haven under some
conditions for the endogenous environmental policy.
A second important step would be to analyse the standard four theorems in a dynamic
context. We conducted a simple assessment of those theorems in chapter 2 section III. A
country relatively well-endowed in an exhaustible resource opens-up to trade. In a two countries
setting, this would result in an increased use of the exhaustible resource as the price falls.
Following the Hotelling rule, a lower resource price reduces the rent and the incentive to extract.
Conversely, consider a resource boom resulting in an increase supply at lower prices. Following
the Rybczynski (1955) e ect this would have a more than proportional e ect on specialisation
which could feed lasting higher depletion. The key to distinguish between those two potential
e ect is to consider the dynamics between the endowments in the considered country.
The analysis of the dynamic properties of trade is somewhat tricky in the context of tra-
ditional trade models. Accumulation (or productivity) dynamics can lead to a change in the
position of a given country relative to its trade partners. A large body in the literature in-
vestigates dynamic comparative advantages in various context. Krugman (1987) examines the
consequences of a dynamic comparative advantage based on learning-by-doing in the context of
the resource curse. The impact of dynamic advantages on innovation are presented in Grossman
and Helpman (1991). In HO theory, factor accumulation may lead to a reversal in the compar-
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ative advantage for the considered country, as a previously scarce factor is accumulated. Factor
intensity reversal confuses the prediction of the gains from trade and is generally avoided.
Stiglitz (1970) tested the three theorems of the HO approach and the resilience of FPE in
a dynamic context. He concludes that the pattern of trade depends on the decision by trading
countries to specialise or not, either in the labour or the capital intensive good. Di erentials in
pure rate of time preference will also make a di erence. A similar point is made by Bogmans and
Withagen (2010) who construct a dynamic HO model to investigate pollution haven formation
in a dynamic context. They explore the conditions for complete specialisation in the dirty good,
pinning down cases under which it may happen in either country.
From a sustainability perspective, the HO approach in international trade is quite appealing.
As international trade is explained by factor endowments, the link is easy to do with the
capital theoretic approach in sustainability. Factor endowments of the H-O model are capital
stocks of the sustainability literature. Arrow et al. (2010) proposes to distinguish between 5
di erent types of capital: health, human, produced, natural and social capital. Although it
can be empirically valid and important to distinguish between several di erent capitals, from
a theoretical perspective, it matters only to distinguish between capitals which accumulation
patterns are di erent.
Early dynamic models of sustainability focused on non-renewable exhaustible resources.
Dasgupta et al. (1978) present a dynamic model with the possibility of foreign investment. After
the Hartwick (1977) rule generalised by Dixit et al. (1980), Asheim (1986) put the contribution
of trade to sustainability rules in perspective by introducing the concept of capital gains. Based
on exogenous prices, capital gains demand amendments to the standard Hartwick rule (see
chapter 2). Hartwick (1995) explores the consequences of endogenous world prices. Vincent
et al. (1997), Hamilton et al. (1998) and Pezzey (2004) present a rigorous treatment of capital
gains as productivity gains.
Brander and Taylor (1998) present a model based on a renewable exhaustible resource with
open access as in Chichilnisky (1994). They confirm Chichilnisky’s static results as the resource
exporter experience a significant decline in steady-state utility. An all important article by Van
der Ploeg (2010) summarises the impact of openness on sustainability when overseas investment
of rents is possible and trade is treated as a time dependent productivity improving variable.
He concludes that trade provides a rationale for domestic underinvestment of the rent (hence
negative adjusted net savings) as it is more rewarding to invest rents abroad instead. This
corroborates the empirical results of Rubio (2004) and is consistent with the conclusion of the
model of Okumura and Cai (2007) based on factor complementarity. The authors show how,
when factor endowments are complementary inputs, it makes sense to turn domestic assets into
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foreign ones and enjoy the income flows from abroad.
Empirical exercise based on input/output tables bring confirmation of those theoretical
results in terms of factor content of trade. Proops et al. (1999) and Atkinson and Hamilton
(2002) quantify the amount of natural resources embodied in trade flows. Atkinson et al.
(2012) expand those early results on a wider sample of countries and find increasing imbalances
(see chapter 2). Despite those results, the emphasis put on capital gains resulted in reduced
academic interest for the overall impact of international trade on sustainability. The best way
to account for the impact of trade seemed to be to set domestic and international prices at the
optimal level, matching market prices with shadow prices. As advocated by Van Der Ploeg
(2011) e orts should be directed towards institutional improvements.
Still, our review of international trade and sustainability in chapter 2 suggests it is worth in-
vestigating trade mechanisms further. Based on the contributions of Solow (1974) and Hartwick
(1977) sustainability characterises development paths, beyond the standard imperatives of in-
come gains and growth in output per capita. As presented in chapter 1 sustainability inter-
rogates the nature of development and its intensity in resources and endowments. In ?, it is
shown that many countries have grown by substituting produced capital for natural capital.
Structural change usually goes hand in hand with sustainable development as demand switch
from natural capital intensive goods to more human capital intensive ones. This point is made
by López et al. (2007). The exhaustible resources dynamics of structural change are studied in
Faber and Proops (1993). The Hartwick rule and structural changes are two sides of the same
coin. Substitution of produced capital for natural capital is obtained via the Hartwick rule and
structural change happens by substituting produced capital for natural capital. Nevertheless,
the two are not synonyms. Any amount of substitution for natural capital is structural change,
but only the reinvestment of all depleted natural capital can potentially qualify as following
the Hartwick rule.
The literature on structural change considered the critical role of trade in influencing if not
setting reinvestment policies. The core of the analysis is the balance between domestic and
foreign incentives for depletion and the use of the di erent components of wealth. Chichilnisky
(1993) investigates the impact of property rights on the composition of production when an open
access renewable resource is involved. Klepper and Stähler (1998) stress that unilateral sustain-
ability policies with competitive world prices may lead to income gains without sustainability.
As in Okumura and Cai (2007), countries import sustainability from their partners. Redding
(1999) touches at the core of the structural change versus comparative advantage argument,
investigating how a developing country can diversify away from its comparative advantage. He
presents a model of endogenous growth where comparative advantages can be build out of the
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large productivity growth potential. He concludes that in this setting, Ricardian trade might
be welfare reducing and state intervention is desirable.
The links between trade and structural change are explored at regular intervals but do not
seem to come under intense scrutiny. We believe the study of open economy sustainability
makes the case for putting structural change again at the core of trade studies and policy
design, in order to improve the management of the instruments of wealth. Developments in
dynamic macroeconomic model could certainly help to model realistic dynamics compatible
with endowments-based trade models. Since Arrow and Debreu (1954) macroeconomic models
study growth and factor accumulation. The Lucas critique and the development of rational
expectations opened the field to a class of perfect foresight deterministic models (Stokey et al.
1989) used to study economic dynamics.
A large part of the “rational expectation revolution” was devoted to endogenous growth
models and innovation (Aghion and Howitt 1998) but many kept using deterministic models
applied to dynamic problems. A seminal article in this field is Ventura (1997). The author
endeavours to explain the higher growth rate in developing countries combining a Ramsey
growth model with an HO model. Although his results are based on exogenous cross-country
di erences in labour productivity, he demonstrates how the very Rybczinsky e ect we discussed
above can o set the tendency of produced capital return to decline with accumulation (through
increased demand of the capital intensive good). Trade is here the mechanism behind quicker
capital accumulation in southern countries, fostering structural change and convergence in
income.
The Ventura model is explored further by Atkeson and Kehoe (2000), searching for factors
a ecting the rate of convergence. They find the distinction between early and late bloomers to
be relevant, late bloomer ending with a lower level of steady state income than early bloomers.
Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) explore the dynamics of a renewable resource in an endogenous
growth framework. They find the renewable resource sector to reach a constant steady state
size while the rest of the economy keeps growing. Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) examine the
consequence of FPE breakdown on convergence. They find that the lack of FPE prevents income
convergence in per capita produced capital. This result is confirmed by Bajona and Kehoe
(2010) who investigate under which conditions opening-up to trade causes either divergence or
convergence. They stress the importance of the elasticity of substitution between traded goods
in determining the outcome. Critical to our object, they show that FPE in one period does not
guarantee FPE in other periods.
Other articles relevant to this discussion involve Deardor  (2001), Cheviakov and Hartwick
(2009) and Bazhanov (2010). Deardor  (2001) presents how behaviours derived from the neo-
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classical growth model can explain empirical regularities in international trade. In line with his
previous works he shows how the breakdown of FPE yields diversification cones and resulting
discrepancies in steady state income levels. Cheviakov and Hartwick (2009) provide a stress
test of the rate of decay associated with produced capital in the context of exogenous techni-
cal change as in the Solow model. They confirm that a high rate of decay is associated with
economic collapse, so that high enough technical progress is required to maintain economic ac-
tivity. Bazhanov (2010), also using a DHSS model, takes issue with the compatibility of initial
conditions with a desirable per capita consumption path. He o ers leads to transition from an
unsustainable initial state to a state consistent with sustainable steady state consumption.
Those mostly theoretical models are designed to address salient empirical regularities or
to test scenarios. E orts to provide such tests usually involve computable general equilibrium
models (CGEM). Bailey and Clarke (2000) conducted an assessment of sustainability in an
open economy context with predictions running to 2050. They test for lower technical change
and lack of backstop technology, still finding the world to be sustainable as a whole. Another
example is the model developed by Turner et al. (2011) concluding that non-sustainable carbon
emission in Wales are concentrated in exporting industries. A similar distinction around the
responsibility for depletion is at the core a recent works on “virtual sustainability” (Atkinson
et al. 2012).
Our review of the three fields of international trade theory, neoclassical growth models
and sustainability in chapter 2 presented the common tools and models developed to build
bridges between the fields. The shorter presentation of the literature in this section exposed
the common underlying concepts in international trade and sustainability. In HO models, factor
price equalisation (FPE) is determined by asymmetry in endowments. A breakdown of FPE
generates multiple cones of diversification, de facto reinforcing specialisation. As a result, in
both international trade and sustainability theory, asymmetry in endowments is therefore a key
driver of specialisation and a potential impediment to structural change.
The second conceptual common point is the notion of convergence. Convergence in income
and comprehensive wealth is important in the definition of sustainability we proposed in chapter
1. Although technically constant consumption over time does not imply the steady state level to
be similar across countries, this position would be incompatible with intragenerational equity
at the country level. The question of convergence in income is also associated with wealth
management, as convergence in income convey a message about the structure and the return
on domestic wealth. The possibility of convergence towards the steady-state is therefore critical
to predict trade patterns and set fair factor rewards and goods prices.
Similarly, if convergence depends on substitutability between traded goods in an HO model,
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it implies that it depends also on substitutability between factors. As stressed by Neumayer
(2010), substitutability in production is key to sustainability, while the literature suggests that
substitutability in preferences is also important. Convergence is therefore critical for both sus-
tainability (via its impact on intergenerational and intragenerational equity) and international
trade in a dynamic setting (via its impact on specialisation).
Those elements lead us to build a dynamic model with perfect money-value substitutability
to assess the impact of HO trade on convergence and asymmetry in endowments. As conver-
gence and asymmetry are the two critical theoretical dimensions of sustainability in an open
setting we will investigate two di erent possibilities. First, we will examine a world where both
countries accumulate the same endogenous instrument of wealth, as in situations of structural
change when this instrument is produced capital. We term this scenario SC for Structural
Change. We then investigate the scenario under which countries focus on the instrument of
wealth constituting the source of their comparative advantage, so that di erent instruments
are accumulated in di erent countries. We term this scenario CA for Comparative Advantage.
We will compare the evolution of consumption and wealth in the CA and SC scenarios
under two di erent trade settings: an integrated equilibrium for the world economy (IE) and
lack of factor price equalisation leading to cones of complete specialisation (CS). To this end,
we build a computable general equilibrium model to test several scenarios related to capital
accumulation and resources depletion. Our framework allow us to examine the conditions of
convergence in international factor prices, producing some results regarding initial and steady-
state position of our trading countries. In the next section we present the model, composed
of two components: a static trade model (section II.1) and a dynamic model with four factors
(section II.2).
II The model
We build on Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) to propose a “generalised” model of neoclassical
growth. The model is based on the articulation of two components:
The static trade model: at the beginning of every period the static trade model is used
to calculate the new factor prices and factor price ratios from the international trade
production equilibrium.
The dynamic model: period prices and price ratios are then inserted into the dynamic model.
The dynamic model computes the new stocks of capital that will be used in the subsequent
periods to obtain new prices, until the steady state is reached, where both prices and factor
II. The model 175
Figure 3.1: Resource abundance and inter-industry trade in natural resources
Source: Author’s calculation from the Wealth Accounting and Comtrade Databases
use are constant.
We take the traditional production based perspective on sustainability, as our central aim
is to describe the evolution of consumption and wealth with its subcomponents in an open
economy context. Trade is a well-established source of productivity enhancement. It also has
an impact on the productive structure of countries. This impact is important for sustainability
as it may hasten the depletion of natural capital and reduce incentives for optimal domestic
reinvestment. Our results have implications for sustainability indicators, suggesting that income
gains from increased specialisation should be reinvested if they are obtained through increased
natural resources intensity in production.
An interesting feature of our setting is the possibility to control for the degree of openness,
in direct relation with the production functions. The model also allows for the comparison of
di erent trade patterns. Traditionally, sustainability models of international trade were set in
a Ricardian framework, as in Brander and Taylor (1998). We chose an HO structure as better
suited to assess the evolution of relative endowments. An other important motivation for an
HO structure is the observation (explored further in chapter 4 section II) that resources rich
countries tend to stick to traditional inter-industry trade in natural capital intensive goods (see
figure 3.1).
The multi-cone world derived from the breakdown of FPE seems also to be a valid start to
study trade relationships between countries with strongly asymmetric endowments (see figure
3.3). It should also be noted that even if HO theory somewhat fell from grace with the explosion
of intra-industry and intra-firm trade, its validity is regularly reasserted in a variety of studies
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from Trefler (1993) to Antweiler et al. (2001) and Crozet and Trionfetti (2013). The functional
separation between the static and the dynamic model allows us to impose a trade structure
and derive conclusion on price formation, while having (relative) freedom on the dynamics. It
seems also consistent with the reality of firm production, where factor endowments are fixed in
the short run, not in the long run.
In section II.1 we present the static trade equilibrium, describing production technologies
and the conditions associated with the integrated equilibrium (IE) and complete specialisation
(CS) equilibrium. In section II.2 we present the dynamic model, notably the dynamics of factor
accumulation.
II.1 The static equilibrium
We consider two identical countries. Those two countries have the same production tech-
nologies and preferences. Each economy is composed of a set of identical consumers, who owns
all the instruments of wealth/production factors. There are four factors in this economy: labour
Kl, produced capital Kp, non-renewable exhaustible resources Ke and renewable exhaustible
resources Kr. The economy produces one final good Y which is not traded. This good can be
consumed or invested. There are then five intermediate goods that can potentially be traded.
Those intermediates are produced using factor prices according to the production functions.
Those intermediates are then used to produce the final good. We assume perfect competition
and perfect information regarding factors. Consequently, the long run profits are null and full
employment is guaranteed.
The entirety of a given endowment is used every period so that factor use is equal to factor
endowment. This assumption is problematic for the dynamics of non renewable exhaustible re-
sources. We discuss this in section II.2. We also assume that capital is immobile internationally:
accumulation and de-cumulation occur through the investment dynamics. This assumption al-
though unrealistic in the case of labour and produced capital, makes sense for natural capital.
Exhaustible resources are always transformed, even marginally, in the country of origin. The
model is divided between a static component, setting prices and controlling for market general
equilibrium and a dynamic component determining the optimal investment/depletion path.
The general structure of the model is summarised in figure 3.2.
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II.1.1 Production Technologies and trade patterns
Consider two countries with the same production structure, one final good and five interme-
diate goods. The final good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas function 2, while intermediates
are produced using a simple one for one production function. As a consequence, we also assume
constant returns to scale in production. The production function for the final good Y is:
Y =  y–/41,i y
–/4
2,i y
1≠–
3,i y
–/4
4,i y
–/4
5,i (3.1)
Countries are indexed using the letter j and goods using the letter i. yi and xi are respectively
quantities produced and consumed. Those are necessarily the same in autarky but they need
to be balanced under trade.   represents total factor productivity (assuming Hicks-neutral
technology) while – is the usual Cobb-Douglas parameter for input allocation. There are five
intermediate goods x1,x2,x3,x4 and x5 in both countries. Those five intermediate goods can
potentially be traded. They are produced using the following production functions:
y1,i =Kl,i (3.2)
y2,i =Kp,i (3.3)
y3,i = (Kl,iKp,iKe,iKr,i)
1
4 (3.4)
y4,i =Ke,i (3.5)
y5,i =Kr,i (3.6)
With Kl labour, Kp produced capital, Ke exhaustible non-renewable resources and Kr ex-
haustible renewable resources. Factors are allocated between intermediates, which are in turn
used for the production of the final good. Our economies are therefore maximising (3.1) subject
to intermediate production functions (3.2) to (3.6):
y1,i = ⁄Kl,i (3.7)
y2,i = “Kp,i (3.8)
y3,i = ((1≠⁄)Kl,i) 14 ((1≠“)Kp,i) 14 ((1≠Ê)Ke,i) 14 ((1≠ ÿ)Kr,i) 14 (3.9)
y4,i = ÊKe,i (3.10)
y5,i = ÿKr,i (3.11)
3ÿ
i=1
pixi,j =
3ÿ
i=1
piyi,j (3.12)
2. In an early version of their model, Cunat and Ma ezzoli (2003) use CES functions instead, which allow
them to control for the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between factors of production.
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With —,“,Ê and ⁄ the shares used in the production of the intermediates and (3.12) the
market clearing conditions 3. Let us assume for the moment that factor endowments are the
same across countries. This allows us to ignore the market clearing conditions, as presented
below. As shown in appendix A, this yields “ = ÿ= Ê = ⁄= –. The coe cient – determines the
allocation of factors across intermediates and at the same time the relative use of intermediates
y1, y2, y4 and y5 against the use of y3 in the production of the final good.
A first observation regarding – is warranted. If – = 0, good y3 is the only one entering in
the final good production. In this scenario, allocation shares are meaningless and endowments
are allocated entirely to the production of good y3. Symmetrically, if – = 1, good y3 does not
enter in the production of the final good. With the good three sector non existent, each factor
is used by a single sector, and the full endowment of a given factor is therefore allotted to the
relevant sector.
Consider now that endowments di er across countries. Assume country 1 is relatively well-
endowed in labour and produced capital and country 2 is relatively well-endowed in renewable
and non-renewable exhaustible resources. Assume also that trade is always balanced between
the two countries. We adopt here a rather traditional pattern of specialisation between devel-
oped and developing countries, North and South. But it also matches the pattern of structural
change (López et al. 2007) as countries switch from exhaustible sources of wealth to instruments
based on human capacities. Countries will engage in trade of intermediates as asymmetric factor
endowments give each country a comparative advantage in the production of two intermedi-
ates. To predict the pattern of trade in a world with more than two factors, we use the chain
ranking of factor endowments, as defined by Vanek (1968). World capital stocks are the sum
of countries’ capital stocks:
Kl =Kl,1+Kl,2 (3.13)
Kp =Kp,1+Kp,2 (3.14)
Ke =Ke,1+Ke,2 (3.15)
Kr =Kr,1+Kr,2 (3.16)
The chain ranking prediction states that a country will produce the goods intensive in factors
it is relatively well endowed with. With more than two factors, those are all the factors for
which the country has a world share superior to its share of world income. A country’s income
is expressed as the sum of factor payments times factor use, therefore countries income can be
3. Which are non-binding under autarky.
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expressed as:
W1 = w1Kl,1+p1Kp,1+ e1Ke,1+ r1Kr,1 (3.17)
W2 = w2Kl,2+p2Kp,2+ e2Ke,2+ r2Kr,2 (3.18)
W =W1+W2 (3.19)
With w the payment for labour, p for produced capital, e for non-renewable exhaustible re-
sources and r for renewable exhaustible resources. Considering our assumption regarding en-
dowment distribution, we obtain the following chain ranking:
Ke,1
Ke
Æ Kr,1
Kr
<
W1
W
<
Kl,1
Kl
Æ Kp,1
Kp
(3.20)
Kl,2
Kl
Æ Kp,2
Kp
<
W2
W
<
Ke,2
Ke
Æ Kr,2
Kr
(3.21)
This is the multi-factor version of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem, as presented by Vanek
(1968). A first observation is needed here. As in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004), we have more
goods than factors, hence under FPE we only know that the North will export labour and
produced capital intensive goods, while the South exports exhaustible resources intensive ones.
This does not prevent the equilibrium to be unique as any distribution of factor endowments
yields a single set of prices for goods and factors. Full employment requires both countries, for
as long as they have positive endowments in all the factors, to produce intermediates using all
endowments for – œ]0 : 1[ .
As presented in Ohlin (1933), FPE depends on the distribution of factor endowments. If
the distribution is “too diverse”, FPE will not occur. When FPE breaks downs, countries give
up on the two goods in which they have no comparative advantage to produce good y3 and
the two in which they have a comparative advantage. The trade pattern is then conform to
the “complete specialisation” (CS) case in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004): instead of using world
prices, firms use domestic prices. The breakdown of FPE ends the “separability” property of
Heckscher-Ohlin model, under which an evolution of domestic factor output had no impact on
factor prices. In a HO model factor prices only depend on world factor ratios.
The CS case is therefore really interesting in a dynamic setting, allowing to investigate
the behaviour of agents confronted to free trade with unequal factor prices, a more realistic
situation. Our model manages to replicate this nice “nested” setting from Cuñat and Ma ezzoli
(2004). The price to pay for this is to maintain the symmetry in the model, so that each
country’s endowments entitle it to a comparative advantage in two sectors. As in Deardor 
(1994a), FPE breakdown confines countries into overlapping cones of diversification based on
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Figure 3.3: A multi-cone two country setting
Source: Author
comparative advantage. Both have a specific part of the cone where goods y1, y2, y4 and y5 are
produced, and an overlapping part with the other for good y3. A diagrammatic representation
of the FPE case can be obtained under the assumption that Kl = Kp,Ke = Kr,w1 = p1 and
e2 = r2 (see figure 3.3).
A crucial feature of the model is therefore the determination of the FPE condition, the
factor endowment ratio for which global FPE is impossible. Once it is carried out, the model
allows the investigation of several scenarios (autarky, free trade under CS and free trade under
FPE). Those possible settings are the core of the analysis. We will compare the evolution of
factor use in autarky and free trade, questioning in line with Bazhanov (2010) the importance
of initial conditions on convergence when opening-up to trade. We will now present those two
equilibrium setting under FPE and CS articulated around the FPE condition.
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II.1.2 The Integrated Equilibrium
Free-trade under FPE yields an integrated equilibrium in the sense that confronted with the
same factor prices, goods prices, production functions and preferences, the two trading countries
e ectively behave as one, in line with the angel parable (Samuelson 1949) and the integrated
world economy in Dixit and Norman (1980). Factor prices are equalised across countries:
w = w1 = w2 (3.22)
p= p1 = p2 (3.23)
e= e1 = e2 (3.24)
r = r1 = r2 (3.25)
The integrated equilibrium is characterised by the separability assumption as in any model
of the HO class. Factor prices depend on the world ratios of factor endowments. This fits
the exogenous prices perspective of capital gains from trade (Hartwick 1995). A comparison
between the integrated and the autarky equilibrium will be presented in section III. In this
section we drop the country subscript and solve for total world endowments. To solve the
integrated equilibrium for factor prices, we use equations (3.1) and (3.2) to (3.6). We first
minimize the budget constraint:
Py = P1x1+P2x2+P3x3+P4x4+P5x5 (3.26)
Subject to (3.1). We take the final good Y as the numéraire, so that Py = 1. This gives us the
marginal cost of the final good:
1 =Xp1≠–3 (P1P2P4P5)
–
4 (3.27)
With:
X = [( (–4 )
–(1≠–)1≠–)]≠1 (3.28)
(3.29)
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See appendix B for more details. To obtain the unit cost in the intermediate goods sectors, we
maximise profits sector by sector:
 1 = P1y1≠wKl (3.30)
 2 = P2y2≠pKp (3.31)
 3 = P3y3≠wKl≠pKp≠ eKe≠ rKr (3.32)
 4 = P4y4≠ eKe (3.33)
 5 = P5y5≠ rKr (3.34)
The first order conditions with respect to the relevant factor endowment give us the marginal
cost equations. The program for good y3 is slightly more complex, requiring to derive the four
FOC with respect to the four factors, then to simplify through substitutions. This gives us five
marginal cost equations for the intermediates:
P1 = w (3.35)
P2 = p (3.36)
P3 = 4(ep rw)
1
4 (3.37)
P4 = e (3.38)
P5 = r (3.39)
(3.40)
The technical-economic equilibrium is reached when it is equivalent to use one intermediate or
the other. Using the first order conditions for cost minimisation of the final good, we obtain
the following market share conditions:
P1x1 = P2x2 (3.41)
P4x4 = P5x5 (3.42)
P1x1 =≠ –P3x34(–≠1) (3.43)
P1x1 = p4x4 (3.44)
(3.45)
See appendix B for details. Finally we set the market equilibrium conditions on all markets.
This is straightforward for the intermediates. Market clearing for factor endowments require
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the marginal contribution of the considered factor to equate its costs:
5ÿ
i=1
xi = yi (3.46)
5ÿ
i=1
ci(w,p,e,r)
w
=Kl (3.47)
5ÿ
i=1
ci(w,p,e,r)
p
=Kp (3.48)
5ÿ
i=1
ci(w,p,e,r)
e
=Ke (3.49)
5ÿ
i=1
ci(w,p,e,r)
r
=Kr (3.50)
With X > 0. The system has 19 equations and 19 unknowns. The unknowns are P1, P2, P3,
P4, P5, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, w, p, e and r. We solve the system by substituting
marginal costs and market shares equations into the market clearing conditions. This gives us
the following solution for factor prices and goods prices:
P1 = w = E(K
≠3
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
e K
1
4
r ) (3.51)
P2 = p= E(K
≠3
4
p K
1
4
l K
1
4
e K
1
4
r ) (3.52)
P4 = e= E(K
≠3
4
e K
1
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
r ) (3.53)
P5 = r = E(K
≠3
4
r K
1
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
e ) (3.54)
P3 = 4E (3.55)
(3.56)
With E =X≠14–≠1. As in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004), P3 is invariant because of the symmetry
in the model. Due to the form of the production functions in intermediates, factor prices are
equalised to the relevant intermediate price. The production of intermediates will come as no
surprise:
x1 = –Kl (3.57)
x2 = –Kl (3.58)
x3 = (1≠–)(KlKpKeKr) 14 (3.59)
x4 = –Ke (3.60)
x5 = –Kr (3.61)
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With the sectoral allocation of factors presented above, the description of the integrated equi-
librium is now complete.
II.1.3 The Factor Price Equalisation condition
FPE is determined by the world distribution of endowments, technological discrepancies
and transaction costs. As we assumed away transactions costs and cross-country technological
di erences, FPE depends solely on the distribution of factor endowments. As we saw above, the
parameter – determines factor allocation across sectors. Therefore, it also provides information
regarding trade flows and the likelihood of FPE. The higher – the more of a given endowment
is allocated to the production of intermediates constituting the comparative advantage.
With this in mind, it is easy to picture the distribution for which FPE will occur. The
Vanek (1968) chain ranking states clearly that FPE will de facto occur if factor endowments
are equal. Starting from this theoretical case when endowments are equally distributed between
countries (and the incentive to trade is null in an HO model), FPE will break down at some
point when the distribution becomes too asymmetric. If –= 0 both countries produce good y3
with equal factor intensities. There is no incentive to trade and both countries are e ectively
in autarky.
Conversely, if – = 1, both countries have an incentive to specialise according to their com-
parative advantage, and import the bulk of the other intermediates from the other country.
In this setting, country 1 specialises into goods y1 and y2 and country 2 in goods y4 and y5
respectively. Factors Ke and Kr in country 1 and Kl and Kp in country 2 are residually used to
produce the disadvantaged intermediates, so that specialisation is not complete. Between those
two polar cases lie the area in which all intermediates are produced between the two countries.
Depending on the value of –, the production takes place either in CS under IE.
To determine the FPE condition, it is better to think of the world as a single country and
look for conditions that may lead to the breakdown of FPE rather than imagining how to bring
FPE in a two states setting. Our demonstration for the FPE condition is quite similar to the
one in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) as we also have only two countries. Consider that factor
endowments in one of the two countries, starting from an equal distribution between the two
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countries di er from a symmetric share Á:
Kl,1 = (
1
2 + Á)Kl (3.62)
Kl,2 = (
1
2 ≠ Á)Kl (3.63)
Kp,1 = (
1
2 + Á)Kp (3.64)
Kp,2 = (
1
2 ≠ Á)Kp (3.65)
Ke,1 = (
1
2 ≠ Á)Ke (3.66)
Ke,2 = (
1
2 + Á)Ke (3.67)
Kr,1 = (
1
2 ≠ Á)Kr (3.68)
Kr,2 = (
1
2 + Á)Kr (3.69)
With 0 < Á < 12 . As there are more than two factors, no 2D diagrammatic representation is
possible for the FPE set. What we are looking for is a share of capital in country 1 (and the
symmetric share in country 2) for which FPE cannot occur. Assume – is the same in both
countries. The total demand for factors from the optimal factor allocation is equal to –Kl,1
and –Kp,1 for goods y1 and y2 in country 1 and –Ke,2 and –Kr,2 for goods y4 and y5 in country
2. Under the production pattern identified supra, in IE goods y1 and y2 are only produced in
country 1. Therefore, the share – of Kl,1 and Kp,1 used in country 1 are shares of the world
stock of those factors: –Kl,1 = –Kl and –Kp,1 = –Kp.
Following the same logic, –Ke,2 = –Ke and –Kr,2 = –Kr. If we now focus on labour in
country 1, the rest of the endowment will be used to produce good y3. Assume 0 < – < 0.5.
Assume then that while our hypothetical country 1 is relatively well-endowed in Kl and Kp,
both country 1 and country 2 are endowed with one unit of Ke and one unit of Kr 4. We can
then write for country 1:
Kl,3
Ke,3
(12Ke) =
Kl
Ke
(12Ke) =
1
2Kl (3.70)
With 0 < – < 0.5, Kl,3 cannot be less than half of the total world stock. In the integrated
equilibrium perspective, the local Kl,3 to Ke,3 ratio 5 is equal to the world ratio as the two
dummy regions behave as a single world. Adding the two allocations of Kl gives us a limit
4. This would arguably destroy the incentive for trade in a HO setting as country 2 has now no comparative
advantage. For the sake of the counterfactual we are presenting here, it is better to think in terms of the
breakdown of a country into two regions rather than in terms of convergence by trade.
5. The demonstration can be conducted with Kr instead of Ke as the shares are the same by symmetry.
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KFPE1 = 12Kl+–Kl = (
1
2+–)Kl. Hence, Á can take values in the range (0,–), as an asymmetry
in factor endowments above – would break FPE. It is straightforward to show that the same
limit holds for Kp,1 and with respect to the same factors Ke and Kr. Similarly, a condition in
terms of country 2 comparative advantage could be found based on Ke,2 or Kr,2 with respect
to Kl and Kp. Therefore, FPE breaks down in our case when any of these conditions is broken.
Adding more factors to the original model creates an asymmetry here. The violation of
the FPE condition for one factor is enough to prevent FPE. This assumption implies that
when testing for the violation of FPE one occurrence is enough, but an endowment distribution
compatible with FPE should abide by the FPE condition for all factors. When the FPE
condition is violated, the two countries are behaving again like separate entities, using di erent
factor price ratios. This structure corresponds to the complete specialisation (CS) case we will
now present.
II.1.4 The Complete Specialisation Equilibrium
As FPE breaks down, countries will face di erent domestic factor prices. Country one
becomes the sole producer of goods y1 and y2, while country 2 becomes the sole producer of
goods y4 and y5. Good y3 is still produced in both countries, as it requires the four factors as
inputs. For Á œ (–, 12) we have y1,4 = 0, y1,5 = 0, y2,1 = 0 and y2,2 = 0. The set of equilibrium
equations is extended to take into account di erent factor prices in the two countries, while
P1 and P2 are determined solely by country 1 factor prices and P4 and P5 solely by country 2
factor prices. The price equal unit cost equations are:
1 =  p1≠–3 (p1 p2 p4 p5)
–
4 (3.71)
P1 = w1 (3.72)
P2 = p1 (3.73)
P3 = 4(e1 p1 r1w1)
1
4 (3.74)
P3 = 4(e2 p2 r2w2)
1
4 (3.75)
P4 = e2 (3.76)
P5 = r2 (3.77)
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The consumption shares:
P1x1 = P2x2 (3.78)
P1x1 = P5x5 (3.79)
P1x1 =≠–P3(x3,1+x3,2)4(–≠1) (3.80)
P1x1 = P4x4 (3.81)
See appendix B for details. Finally, the market clearing conditions for both goods and factors:
x1,1+x1,1 = y1,1 (3.82)
x2,1+x2,2 = y2,1 (3.83)
x3,1+x3,2 = y3,1+y3,2 (3.84)
x4,1+x4,2 = y4,2 (3.85)
x5,1+x5,2 = y5,2 (3.86)
y1+(e1p1r1)
1
4 (w1)≠
3
4y3,1 =Kl,1 (3.87)
y2+(e1w1r1)
1
4 (p1)≠
3
4y3,1 =Kp,1 (3.88)
(w1p1r1)
1
4 (e1)≠
3
4y3,1 =Ke,1 (3.89)
(e1p1w1)
1
4 (r1)≠
3
4y3,1 =Kr,1 (3.90)
(e2p2r2)
1
4 (w2)≠
3
4y3,2 =Kl,2 (3.91)
(e2w2r2)
1
4 (p2)≠
3
4y3,2 =Kp,2 (3.92)
y4+(w2p2r2)
1
4 (e2)≠
3
4y3,2 =Ke,2 (3.93)
y5+(e2p2w2)
1
4 (r2)≠
3
4y3,2 =Kr,2 (3.94)
With   = [( (–/4)–(1≠–)1≠–)]≠1 > 0. Note that in CS market clearing is performed at the
global level, as the country level production is traded in the global market. This is a system of
24 equations with 25 unknowns. As P3 depends on both country 1 and country 2 factor prices,
a direct expression for factor prices as a function of capital stocks can not be deduced from the
system of equations. The resolution of the system to provide factor prices expressed in terms
of factor endowments needs to be done in two steps. This is because of the indeterminacy
introduced by unequal factor prices. The first step relates factor endowments to factor price
ratios, while the second step relates factor prices to factor price ratios. Substitution and
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simplification of market clearing conditions gives the equilibrium factor use conditions:
e1
r1
= Kr,1
Ke,1
(3.95)
p1
w1
= Kl,1
Kp,1
(3.96)
p2
w2
= Kl,2
Kp,2
(3.97)
e2
r2
= Kr,2
Ke,2
(3.98)
Those equilibrium conditions are then used to define the relation between factor endowments
and factor price ratios. We define the ratios as:
‡ = w2
e2
(3.99)
· = ( e1
w1
)≠1 (3.100)
Ÿ= p2
r2
(3.101)
‹ = (r1
p1
)≠1 (3.102)
Rearranging the market clearing conditions of the CS equilibrium using equilibrium conditions
to obtain factor price ratios finally yields to following system of four equations:
Kl,1+
Ke,1
·(–≠1) =
(–‡ 12K
1
4
e,1K
1
4
l,1K
3
4
l,2K
1
4
p,2K
1
4
r,2)
((1≠–)· 12K
1
4
e,2K
1
4
p,1K
1
4
r,1)
(3.103)
Kp,1+
Kr,1
‹(–≠1) =
(–Ÿ12K
1
4
e,2K
1
4
l,2K
1
4
p,1K
3
4
p,2)
((1≠–)‹ 12K
1
4
l,1K
1
4
r,2)
(3.104)
Ke,2+
Kl,2‡
(–≠1) =
(–(‡‹ )
1
2K
1
4
e,2K
1
4
l,1K
1
4
l,2)
((1≠–)K
1
4
p,1K
1
4
p,2K
1
4
r,2)
(3.105)
Kr,2+
Kp,2‡
(–≠1) =
(–Ÿ12K
3
4
e,1K
1
4
p,1K
1
4
p,2K
1
4
r,1K
1
4
r,2)
((1≠–)· 12K
1
4
e,2K
1
4
l,1K
1
4
l,2)
(3.106)
This is the first step of the definition of factor prices. For the second step we use the unit cost
equation for the final good 3.71, to obtain factor prices as a function of endowments and factor
190 Chapter 3. International Trade and Structural Change
price ratios:
w1 = E(
Kp,1
Kl,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)14≠–8 (3.107)
p1 = E(
Kl,1
Kp,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)14≠–8 (3.108)
e1 = E(
Kr,1
Ke,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)≠ 14≠–8 (3.109)
r1 = E(
Ke,1
Kr,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)≠ 14≠–8 (3.110)
w2 = E(
Kp,2
Kl,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8+ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.111)
p2 = E(
Kl,2
Kp,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8+ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.112)
e2 = E(
Kr,2
Ke,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8≠ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.113)
r2 = E(
Ke,2
Kr,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8≠ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.114)
Factor prices are a function of both factor price ratios and factor use. Goods prices can be
deducted from the unit cost conditions:
P1 = w1 = E(
Kp,1
Kl,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)14≠–8 (3.115)
P2 = p1 = E(
Kl,1
Kp,1
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8 (‹·)14≠–8 (3.116)
P3 = E(
(Ÿ‡)–2
(‹·)–2
) 14 (3.117)
P4 = e2 = E(
Kr,2
Ke,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8≠ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.118)
P5 = r2 = E(
Ke,2
Kr,2
) 12 (Ÿ‡)–8≠ 14 (‹·)≠–8 (3.119)
As one would expect from the trade patterns, prices for goods y1,y2,y4 and y5 are equal to
the relevant domestic prices, depending on domestic factor endowments. The price for good
3 depends on neither country’s factor endowments but on both country’s factor price ratios.
This is what we would expect from figure 3.3. Our presentation of the CS equilibrium is now
complete. We can now compute the static equilibrium for unequal factor prices. We will now
turn to the dynamic equilibrium.
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II.2 The dynamic equilibrium
To model the dynamics of capital accumulation, we use the discrete time Ramsey model
as in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004). Recursive growth model as in Stokey et al. (1989) and
Mehra (2006) allows for the use of dynamic programming to obtain the steady-state values of
a system. The development of numerical methods helps in solving problems such as ours when
an analytical solution cannot be found. The two static trade configurations in our setting will
determine factor prices, goods prices and the quantities produced.
The dynamic recursive model is concerned with investment in and depletion of factor en-
dowments. Consider that country one and country two are populated with a continuum of
identical and infinitely lived agents. In line with the assumption of perfect competition in the
static model, we assume perfect information and foresight. Agents being infinitely lived, we
also assume de facto intergenerational equity. Our continuum assumption allows us to use a
single representative agent for all the agents in the economy. This rational agent maximises
utility over an infinite horizon. Utility is the sum of discounted consumption flows over an
infinite number of periods:
Uj,t =
Œÿ
s=t
—s≠t lncj,t (3.120)
— is the pure rate of time preference, c is consumption, s indicates the starting period and t the
current period. We assume that the representative agent owns all the instruments of wealth
available in his country. The use of labour Kl and produced capital Kp generates the usual
income flows. Non-renewable exhaustible resources are assumed to be extracted against the
payment of a royalty e set at the marginal cost so that extraction is optimal. The same logic
applies to renewable exhaustible resources, with the exception that the resource pool regenerates
itself via natural growth and pays a royalty r. We assume there are neither commons nor free-
access resources in both countries, so that property rights definition is not an issue. There is also
no transboundary ownership of resources, so countries can only rely on their own capital stocks
to maintain consumption. We assume that decisions are taken under perfect foresight so that
the representative agent optimises future consumption based on wealth, in a permanent-income
perspective (Ventura 1997).
The four factors have their own dynamics of accumulation, based on physical di erences:
Labour Kl is accumulated by investment in education. The labour endowment of a given
country is equal to the part of the population with adequate training to enter the produc-
tion process. Therefore, the value of labour is the monetary equivalent of all the training,
or education, embedded in the labour force. The reward for labour is the wage w.
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Produced Capital Kp is accumulated through investment. It depreciates every period by a
constant parameter ”. Produced capital in owned by consumers and rented by firms at a
rate p to produce intermediate goods at every period.
Non-Renewable Exhaustible Resources Ke can only be used in the production process,
there is no investment. The representative agent does not include exhaustible resources
in its budget constraint, as he can not invest to renew them. The reward for exhaustible
resources use is the royalties e paid to the representative household by the firms using
exhaustible resources in the production process.
Renewable Exhaustible Resources Kr have a rate of natural growth ﬂ at every period,
applied to the current stock. Natural growth is a bonus over investment in renewable
resources which takes the form of fish farming for example. The use of the pool is
sanctioned by a royalty r.
As we impose on our dynamic model a production structure from the static trade equi-
librium, the technical allocation is summarised by two sets of equation. We saw above that
factors enter in a symmetrical pattern into intermediate goods production. Intermediates also
enter symmetrically into the final good production. Hence, there is no substitutability in factor
inputs for the production of intermediates. This production structure strikes us as surprisingly
realistic in a world of intertwined supply chains. This limited substitutability also implies that
it is more realistic to impose exogenous constraints on the optimisation process regarding some
factors to get insight on the actual ceteris paribus investment decision.
Based on this stance, we can define our two scenarios of structural change (SC) and increas-
ing comparative advantage (CA). In SC, representative consumers in country one and country
two both set the investment path for produced capital to maximise consumption, constrained
by exogenous path for labour, exhaustible resource and renewable resources. In CA, country
one stick to the SC optimisation plan, but country two optimises investment in renewable re-
sources, constrained by exogenous paths for labour, produced capital and exhaustible resources.
The di erent exogenous paths simulated will be presented in section III.
Formally, the dynamics for the endogenous investment paths 6 are:
Kp,t+1 =Kp,t≠ ”Kp,t+ IKp,t (3.121)
Kr,t+1 =Kr,t+ﬂKr,t+ IKr,t (3.122)
With IKp,t and IKr,t investment in t. The natural (net) growth of the renewable resource acts
as a bonus on top of the needed investment to expand the stock. Each dynamic is applied to
6. It should be noted that de-cumulation of the stock is possible for any instrument of wealth, so that IKp,t
and IKr,t can be negative.
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the relevant country in the relevant scenario. Even if the other capital stocks are exogenous,
they earn income to the consumer while potentially costing him maintenance costs. Special
attention was devoted to the dynamics of exhaustible resources. We do not have a standard
co-state equation of the usual S ØqTt ≠Rt form with S the total stock and Rt depletion in t.
Our assumption of an exogenous path prevents the formation of an optimal path, based on a
specification of the Hotelling rule. Still, to model increased scarcity we add a variable cost of
extraction for exhaustible resources of the form:
TC = xKe,j (3.123)
With TC total cost and x an exogenously determined parameter. Under a scenario where
quantities extracted are constant, a fixed maintenance cost is paid. This cost turns into a
variable cost based on the volume extracted in a scenario of increasing or decreasing extraction.
This seems to us an intuitive and realistic way to integrate the pressure induced by increasing
scarcity on the consumption possibilities of the representative consumers. We do not impose a
similar cost on labour, assuming unless otherwise scripted in the scenario that the representative
consumer level of steady state consumption defined by the optimisation process corresponds to
a constant population.
Those assumptions illustrate the di erence between factor usage in trade models and stock
management in environmental and resources economics. In an optimal control problem, the
representative agent would decide to use a share of the exhaustible resources stock depending
on its return relative to others instruments of wealth. The mathematical modelling behind
recursive models is based on the assumption that the whole stock of a given instrument of
wealth is used every period. In this setting, the variation of the stock depends on depreciation
and investment which subtract or add to the stock.
Combination of this full factor use (full employment of instruments) with an explicit mod-
elling of a stock management behaviour would add greatly to the complexity of the model. Our
aim is to study the impact of asymmetry in endowments on steady-state formation and factor
use, so that optimal management of each instrument is somewhat secondary. Our modelling
strategy based on variable cost of extraction sends the correct incentive in terms of price (the
more exhaustible resources are used, the more expensive they get) while keeping the calculation
of optima investment reasonably simple. Therefore, we abstract from the explicit modelling of
a fixed stock of exhaustible non-renewable resources.
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Under SC, both countries face the same budget constraint:
wj,tKl,j,t+pj,tKp,j,t+ ej,tKe,j,t+ rj,tKr,j,t
= cj,t+Kp,j,t+1≠Kp,j,t+ ”Kp,j,t+xKe,j,t≠ﬂKr,j,t
(3.124)
Under CA, country one stays under the same constraint while country 2 invests in renewable
resources:
w1,tKl,1,t+p1,tKp,1,t+ e1,tKe,1,t+ r1,tKr,1,t
= c1,t+Kp,1,t+1≠Kp,1,t+ ”Kp,1,t+xKe,1,t≠ﬂKr,1,t
(3.125)
w2,tKl,2,t+p2,tKp,2,t+ e2,tKe,2,t+ r2,tKr,2,t
= c2,t+Kr,2,t+1≠Kr,2,t≠ﬂKr,2,t+ ”Kp,2,t+xKe,2,t
(3.126)
Every period the representative agent gets income from the factors rented/extracted by the
representative firms in the intermediate goods sectors and has to choose between consumption
and investment.
Maximising (3.120) with respect to (3.124) gives us the following two first order conditions
for the SC case:
cj,t+1 = —cj,t(1≠ ”+pj,t) (3.127)
Kp,j,t+1 = wj,tKl,j,t+(1+pj,t≠ ”)Kp,j,t+(ej,t≠x)Ke,j,t+(rj,t+ﬂ)Kr,j,t≠ cj,t (3.128)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t≠æŒ—t
kp,j,t+1
cj,t
= 0 (3.129)
Maximising (3.120) with respect to (3.125) and (3.120) with respect to (3.126) gives us the
following three first order conditions for the CA case:
c1,t+1 = —c1,t(1≠ ”+p1,t) (3.130)
c2,t+1 = —c2,t(1+ﬂ+ r2,t) (3.131)
Kp,1,t+1 = w1,tKl,1,t+(1+p1,t≠ ”)Kp,1,t+(e1,t≠x)Ke,1,t+(r1,t+ﬂ)Kr,1,t≠ c1,t (3.132)
Kr,2,t+1 = w2,tKl,2,t+(1+ r2,t+ﬂ)Kr,2,t+(e2,t≠x)Ke,2,t+(p2,t≠ ”)Kp,2,t≠ c2,t (3.133)
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And the transversality condition:
lim
t≠æŒ—t
kp,j,t+1
cj,t
= 0 (3.134)
Details about the calculations are presented in appendix C. This concludes our presentation
of the model. We now have all the equilibrium and definition equations to simulate our model.
In the next section we present the scenarios and the results for the simulations.
III Simulations
In this section we present the results of the simulations of the model. After discussing the
parametrisation, insisting notably on the current asymmetry in the distribution of wealth, we
present simulations of the benchmark autarky model. The autarky model allows us to set a
baseline for results regarding convergence in wealth without the possibility to trade. We then
proceed to the assessment of convergence and sustainability in our two base scenario, CA and
SC. In their presentation Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) defined a policy function to regroup the
simulations of trade IE and CS equilibrium. Because of the di erent shapes of the functions in
IE and CS, they end up using di erent sets of coe cients adapted to the polynomials of the
policy function.
Our treatment of this issue is di erent. We start from the empirically more realistic sit-
uation of the CS equilibrium and study the dynamics of this equilibrium using shocks. We
then force convergence to values compatible with FPE according to the FPE condition. This
procedure produces counterfactual dynamics for capital stocks and prices, which likelihood can
be compared to real world evolution in wealth. We then test the dynamics under FPE as a way
to assess convergence. This strategy seems more adapted to our purpose of monitoring conver-
gence, consumption, wealth levels and e ective substitution under di erent trade settings. We
believe it is the most realistic theoretical approach to trade and sustainability considering the
evidence on “virtual sustainability” (Atkinson et al. 2012).
III.1 Parametrisation
Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) take – to be the average ratio of total trade to GDP for the US
between 1947 and 2001. This gives a value of 0.15 for –. They choose the initial values for the
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capital stock arbitrarily, and follow Cooley and Prescott (1995) for the parameters — = 0.949
and ” = 0.044. The value of   is defined to yield a world produced capital steady-state equal to
1. Cheviakov and Hartwick (2009) examine at length the relation between technical progress
and capital depreciation. Their scenarios imply a range of 0.0015 to 0.0444 for ” and a Solow
neutral productivity term of 0.00384, although in a Cobb-Douglass function with three factors.
The value for ” in Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004) is slightly above the value tested by Cheviakov
and Hartwick (2009) so we will use a value of 0.44.
We will keep the same value for —. We know from the integrated equilibrium conditions
that – balances factor endowments between goods x1, x2, x4,x5 and x3. In CS, the higher
the value of – the greater the number of intermediates constituting the country’s comparative
advantage produced. We therefore keep the value introduced by Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004),
submitting it to sensitivity tests in the last subsection. Variations in the value of   result in
less than proportional variations in the value of E. We will therefore set a value for   in the CS
model under the SC scenario that yields a world steady-state level for produced capital equal
to 2.   is set at 0.607.
Compared to those studies we have extra parameters. The price to pay for our modelling
strategy centred on trade regimes is the lack of detailed modelling of the resources intensive
sector. Finding an estimate for the parameter x boils down to estimating an aggregate cost
function for the sector intensive in exhaustible resources. Cost functions are notoriously hard
to estimate, especially in sectors using exhaustible resources as they have an obvious impact
on the negotiations regarding royalties. Beyond this, geological parameters and size of the
endowments matter. Our objective here is to conduct a simulation exercise centred on trade
regimes. Back-of-the-envelop estimates of marginal extraction costs 7 oscillate between 20%
and 40% of the marginal product. In the IE model where we have a world price, this gives a
value for x of 0.03 as 30% of total cost.
In a similar vein, the parameter ﬂ reflects the natural increase of the stock for a renewable
resource. In a typical exhaustible resources model, the dynamics of the stock depend on several
parameters. One of them is the rate of e ort or stress put on the renewable resource by fishing,
cutting down or harvesting. In our modelling strategy, ﬂ is the opposite to ” in the sense that
it alleviates the maintenance cost of the stock. ﬂ is a bonus, equivalent to the marginal benefit
of time. Every period, part of the resource grow to maturity without extra investment. The
best proxy for this parameter would be the biological rates of growth for a range of renewable
resources. However, those rates di er widely across species. Price responses are as a result
inhomogeneous within and between exhaustible resources (Figure 3.4).
7. Commonly approximated with the average cost.
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Figure 3.4: Growth rate in resources production with respect to price
Source: Chatham House report, p.53
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values
– 0.15
— 0.949
” 0.044
  0.607
ﬂ 0.015
x 0.03
Source: Cuñat and Ma ezzoli (2004), Author’s calculations
Faced with this uncertainty we approximate the rate of growth using production data,
assuming that an increase in production is based on the rate of biological renewal. The OECD
and the FAO forecasts an average annual growth in net agriculture and fish production of 1.5%.
We take this number for the value of ﬂ.
The values for   and E are deduced from   and –:
 = 1( ú (–4 )– ú (1≠–)(1≠–))
= 3.095 (3.135)
E = 4
(–≠1)
  = 0.099 (3.136)
This concludes the presentation of the values assigned to our parameters. We will now discuss
the distribution of endowments.
III.2 Asymmetric distribution in endowments and the scenarios
Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) conducted a thorough empirical examination of the violation
of FPE. Their application is based on the Deardor  (1994a) “lens of diversification” test of factor
intensity. The test itself is based on the di erence between factor use, the needed factor flows
to a given productive structure and factor endowments and the available flow in the country.
The figures presented in Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) are rigorous in their attempt to amend
raw input/output data for country di erences in productivity and human capital. Table 3.2
displays the likelihood of FPE violation, understood as the superposition of the factor use and
endowment lenses. The possibility of FPE for the world is ruled out. FPE is however very
likely between OECD countries.
The evaluation of the factor content of trade in Atkinson and Hamilton (2002) follows a
somewhat similar logic. The evaluation is based on domestic resource depletion to support
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Table 3.2: Violation of FPE in Debaere and Demiroglu (2003)
Source: Debaere and Demiroglu (2003), p.118
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a given level of output. This highlights for the di erence we mentioned in the introduction
between the potential meaning of factor use. When exhaustible resources are involved factor
use matters against the needed optimal depletion of resources in a dynamic (intergenerational
perspective). Even if the accounting framework use is in essence static, the reasoning and
the rationale for the assessment is dynamic. Usual exercises regarding factor content are not
concerned with exhaustible resources and do not face this hurdle.
Taking those remarks into account leads us to conclude that, under the important reservation
of an added production pattern 8, the distribution of wealth components (stocks) gives an
indication of the nature of the flows (endowments) in the economy and so of the likelihood of
FPE. Comprehensive wealth is an indicator of specialisation through endowments derived from
it, in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
To obtain the predicted dispersion, we extract comprehensive wealth data from the World
Bank 9database. All data are in constant 2000 US dollars and available in three waves: 1995,
2000 and 2005. We then divided total wealth into four components. Produced capital Kp
is obtained directly from the produced capital column. Exhaustible resources Ke is the sum
of subsoil assets and renewable resources Kr is the sum of crop, forestry and pasture lands.
Intangible capital is decomposed using the 2000 estimate of the average share of human capital
(skilled and unskilled labour) in intangible capital by the World Bank (2006). It should be
noted that this is an average, and that the share of labour in intangible capital is likely to be
higher in less advanced countries (low income) than in more advanced ones (middle and high
income). In terms of asymmetry in endowments, this means that the comparative advantage
in labour is likely to be overestimated from intangible capital. Labour (human capital for the
World Bank) Kl is assumed to be 36% of intangible capital for all countries.
The results of the decomposition are available in appendix D for the three waves in 1995,
2000 and 2005. A selection is displayed in table 3.3. To position countries in terms of com-
parative advantage, we consider a comparative advantage in exhaustible resources (renewable
and non renewable) on the one hand, and a comparative advantage in labour and produced
capital on the other hand. The distribution of specialisations is quite telling. Figure 3.5 shows
the distribution of countries for the three waves. Countries are ranked in terms of country 1
type comparative advantage, that is weight of labour and produced capital in total wealth. We
add on those diagrams the 50% factor intensity reversal line. We also add two lines indicating
the number of countries satisfying the indicative FPE condition under our parametrisation (see
appendix D).
8. A production structure associated with amendments for productivity, etc. A production structure is
implicit in wealth accounting as production functions are used to construct wealth estimates.
9. See http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Countries in wealth
(a) Total Wealth (b) Consumption Levels
(c) Factor Prices
Source: The World Bank wealth accounting database, Author’s calculations
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Table 3.3: Capital stock shares in comprehensive wealth
Country Country 1 Specialisation Country 2 Specialisation FPE
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
Australia 87.2940471 84.2604816 86.2496896 12.7059529 15.7395184 13.7503104 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
Canada 86.3054385 84.706197 86.6271915 13.6945615 15.293803 13.3728085 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
Cameroon 54.0782139 51.3426453 53.5090651 45.9217861 48.6573547 46.4909349 FPE FPE FPE
France 96.2096665 94.8192153 96.8764731 3.7903335 5.18078467 3.1235269 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
Germany 97.6356442 96.6146916 97.8126273 2.36435578 3.38530836 2.18737265 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
Gabon 51.306419 36.1529162 33.1943701 48.693581 63.8470838 66.8056299 FPE No
FPE
No
FPE
Iran, Islamic
Rep.
47.318638 36.9396631 40.0445353 52.681362 63.0603369 59.9554647 FPE No
FPE
FPE
Russian Fed-
eration
N/A 41.485027 45.8184628 N/A 58.514973 54.1815372 N/A FPE FPE
Saudi Arabia 37.775119 40.4626837 26.3827497 62.224881 59.5373163 73.6172503 No
FPE
FPE No
FPE
United King-
dom
97.0659405 97.1791225 97.908853 2.93405951 2.82087747 2.09114702 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
United
States
95.2206733 95.3549561 95.9313002 4.77932672 4.6450439 4.06869978 No
FPE
No
FPE
No
FPE
Source: The World Bank wealth accounting database, Author’s calculations
In line with Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) results, wealth shows a distribution that is
strongly asymmetric in subcomponents. Beyond the level of wealth, it is the distribution of the
sources of wealth that will impact specialisation. We find here a confirmation of the unlikelihood
of world FPE in the context of exhaustible resources. Exhaustible resources abundant countries
appear to be less numerous overall, but more of them fulfil the FPE condition. More strikingly,
the divide is not between OECD countries on one side of this specialisation and the rest of
the world on the other. High income countries are all at the very right end of the divide.
On both sides of the 50% can be found developing countries such as Vietnam, Cameroon or
Côte d’Ivoire. Those results are a confirmation that global trade liberalisation under FPE is
impossible, but that regional free trade agreements might result in FPE.
The FPE condition in our model is defined by the equality KFPE1 = 12Kl+–Kl = (
1
2+–)Kl.
Every factor endowment in both countries should stay below the level KFPE1 for FPE to occur.
Since the level and composition of wealth is one of our main objects of interest, we test our
model for a broad range of endowment distribution instead of calibrating the model for a given
pair of economies. With – = 0.15 and each country endowed with one unit of capital, FPE
breaks down for an asymmetry above 0.701.3 in exogenous endowments. Table 3.4 shows a random
distribution of wealth where FPE is violated for values above 1.19. As capital accumulates or
de-cumulates, the threshold varies accordingly.
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Table 3.4: Assessment of the FPE condition
kl kp ke kr Total
Country 1 1.31 0.98 0.69 0.69 3.67
Country 2 0.69 0.78 1.31 1.31 4.09
Total 2 1.76 2 2 7.76
FPE 1.3 1.144 1.3 1.3
Source: Author’s calculation
III.3 The autarky model
Before proceeding to the test of trade regimes, we set-up the autarky version of our model
as the reference for the results of the trade models. As presented above, the autarky case is in
fact the trade model with –= 0. As there is no trade between the two countries they will both
produce only intermediate good y3 as a way to maximize utility, as shown by taking – = 0 in
equation 3.1. This will result in the equivalent of a standard neoclassical growth model with
four factors of production and one final good. This conclusion has important consequences for
our results. In the autarky model the productivity coe cient a ecting factor prices is  4 . In
the IE model factor prices are equalised and the coe cient takes the value E. Finally, under
CS, factor prices di er across countries and the productivity coe cient is also E.
One can easily observe from equations 3.135 and 3.136 that  4 > E for any value of  
and –. An economic rationale for this feature of the model can easily be found in the higher
coordination costs in an economy with five intermediates, compared to an economy with only
one. But this leaves open the question of the raison d’être of intermediate goods in the first
place. In an HO model, trade is motivated by di erences in endowments and the production
structure reflects this with the intermediate goods. Each of those is exclusively produced using
one endowment creating the possibility to exploit the comparative advantage. The rationale
for intermediate goods in our model is trade, and it is sensible that under autarky only one
intermediate is produced, making de facto production equivalent to a single final good case.
The development of the global supply chain (Berger 2006) is a case in point that international
trade translates into a more complex production structure.
The dynamic component in autarky is the same as under free trade:
cj,t+1 = —cj,t(1+pj,t+1≠ ”) (3.137)
Kpj,t+1 = wj,tKlj,t+(1+pj,t≠ ”)Kpj,t+(ej,t≠x)Kej,t+(rj,t≠ﬂ)Krj,t≠ cj,t (3.138)
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The maximisation of production yields the following first order conditions for factor prices:
wj,t =
 Ke
1
4
j,tKp
1
4
j,tKr
1
4
j,t
4Kl
3
4
j,t
(3.139)
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(3.142)
We use the autarky model to present our procedure. We first inquire about the consequences
of asymmetry in endowments between the two countries. To this end, we produce diagrams
with the evolution of the steady-state as a function of increasing asymmetry in our exogenous
endowments 10 for wealth, consumption, produced capital and factor prices. We denote in the
rest of the chapter a situation of asymmetry in exogenous variables the following way. k = 1.20
means that the distribution of exogenous variables is Kl,1 = 1.2,Ke,1 = 0.80,Kr,1 = 0.8,Kl,2 =
0.8,Ke,2 = 1.2 and either Kp,2 = 0.8 in CA or Kr,2 = 1.2 in SC for country 2.
We then present the motion from a high asymmetry steady-state to a low asymmetry one.
The high asymmetry equilibrium is k= 1.75 and the low asymmetry one is k= 1.19, the highest
values compatible with FPE for all endowments in the SC scenario 11. In the high asymmetry
case, the less abundant endogenous factor represents 14% of the more abundant one and in the
low asymmetry case 68% 12. We saw above that only 28 countries in 2005 could be considered in
a state compatible with the low asymmetry steady state 13. This comparison will give us a sense
of the size of the adjustment required, in terms of factor prices and capital stock evolution to
reach the area of theoretical convergence in steady-state consumption. In the settings allowing
trade, the high asymmetry equilibrium produces CS, while the low asymmetry equilibrium
produces IE in SC.
10. (Kl,Ke and Kr in SC, Kl,Ke and Kp in CA for country 2).
11. As it will be presented below, FPE never occurs in CA.
12. The di erence between the endogenous factor and the exogenous one is here critical. Although the
distribution of exogenous factors yield a less stringent FPE condition at k = 1.29, the endogenous one, because
of the di erence in accumulation rate between the two countries sets a more stringent rule at k = 1.19.
13. This conclusion is obtained by setting a FPE condition based on the sum of produced capital and labour
on the one hand and exhaustible resources on the other hand. We add factors two by two to obtain an
approximation of the likelihood of FPE as we cannot know which factor will lead to a break down in FPE first.
The figure is therefore to be understood as a lower bound.
III. Simulations 205
We then assess the consequences around the steady state of shocks on our exogenous en-
dowments. We define four scenarios as the framework for the shocks:
Scenario 1: country 1 experiences an increase in population size : temporary increase in its
comparative advantage.
Scenario 2: country 2 experiences an increase in population size: temporary increase of an
endowment outside of its comparative advantage.
Scenario 3: country 1 experiences a increase in exhaustible resource stock size: temporary
increase of an endowment outside of its comparative advantage.
Scenario 4: country 2 experiences a decrease in exhaustible resource stock size: temporary
depletion of a source of comparative advantage.
We compare the results of those shocks on both countries under CA and then SC. The
di erence in the productivity parameter between autarky and the two free trade settings makes
it impossible to compare the size of the shocks. We therefore only compare levels across the three
models and magnitude between IE and CS. Finally, we assess the likelihood of convergence in
consumption at the steady-state and the size of the adjustment required to reduce consumption
gaps between countries. We test those shocks under the transitional dynamics as a way to see
how the shock fits in a broader adjustment.
It should be noted that the relevant transitional dynamic is used. Hence scenarios implying
an increased asymmetry in endowments forming the comparative advantage are assessed in the
context of convergence from low to high asymmetry, so that consumption and wealth are on
a downward trend. Conversely, a shrinking comparative advantage is assessed in the context
of reduction from high to low asymmetry in endowments. To run the simulations, we use the
Dynare software (Adjemian et al. 2011). Dynare is a powerful solution to provide numerical
solutions for both deterministic and stochastic general equilibrium models. We run the model
using our main, benchmark parametrisation, described above.
III.4 Trade simulations
We saw in chapter 2 that “trade optimists” defended trade liberalisation on e ciency
grounds. Should this perspective be vindicated, then going from autarky to free trade would
have positive e ects on wealth and consumption levels. In this section we compare autarky,
the integrated equilibrium (IE) and the complete specialisation equilibrium (CS) under both
comparative advantage (CA) and structural change (SC) patterns of accumulation. Those sim-
ulations form the basis of our analysis on the relative merits of autarky and free trade in terms
of both levels and dynamics of wealth and consumption
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Figure 3.6: Constrained steady-state values under CA in autarky
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
III.4.1 Simulations under the comparative advantage (CA) case
Under the comparative advantage scenario, both countries invest and maintain di erent
factor endowments as they focus on the factor providing their comparative advantage. The
notion of comparative advantage makes obviously little sense under autarky, but is the natural
basis for comparisons with free trade.
The evolution of constrained steady state-values under CA in autarky are presented in
figure 3.6. We observe no convergence in consumption across the steady-states constrained by
asymmetry. It is however notable that steady-state levels of consumption are getting closer
as asymmetry increases 14. Endogenous capital stocks are decreasing with asymmetry but in
a much steeper fashion for country 2. In country 2 wealth decreases by 38% with asymmetry,
while in country 1 the fall is only 30%. Produced capital is down 48% in country 1 and
renewable resources decrease by the same amount in country 2.
14. With consumption in country 1 67% of consumption in country 2 for the high asymmetry equilibrium.
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Movements in wealth and consumptions can be explained by domestic factor prices. The
price of the endogenous capital stocks is constant across specifications at 0.977 for Kp1 and
0.038 for Kr2. Hence the prices of the factors not constituting the comparative advantage
(e1, r1,w2,p2) increase rapidly while the price of the “complementary” factors 15 w1 and e2
decrease. As a result of our production structure, the non comparative advantage factors move
together, so w2 = p2 and e1 = r1. The spread w2r2 goes from 7.01 to 11.81 with asymmetry and
the spread r1p1 goes from 2.04 to 3.43 with asymmetry. In the meantime the spread
e2
r2
goes from
4.51 to 1.68 with asymmetry and the spread w1p1 goes from 1.31 to 0.49 with asymmetry.
As endowments grow more asymmetric, the exogenous factors become relatively abundant
(scarce) with respect to the endogenous ones when they are (not) the source of the comparative
advantage. The price increase in dwindling resources is not enough to compensate the fall in
the price of the increasingly abundant resources, resulting in shrinking consumption and (via
shrinking investment) wealth. The relative reduction in wealth and consumption is greater for
country 2 as its comparative advantage factor yields a discount on the maintenance cost. Under
our benchmark parametrisation this discount is non trivial with a discount of 4.4% on produced
capital and a bonus of 1.5% on renewable resources. Hence one unit less of renewable resources
is a higher opportunity cost for country 2 than one unit less of produced capital for country 1.
We proceed with the assessment of the transitional dynamics under a permanent shock,
moving from high to low asymmetry in exogenous endowments. Results are displayed in figure
3.7. The transition requires 262 periods to be complete, although the bulk of the adjustment
happens in the first 100 periods.
The two steady-states bounding the transitional dynamics are going to be the boundaries
of our studies on shocks. In CA, there is no level of asymmetry for which FPE will occur
as endogenous capital stocks are too di erent when exogenous endowments are close enough.
As a consequence the low asymmetry constrained steady-state is used mostly for comparison
purposes. Transition from the high asymmetry to the low asymmetry steady-state requires
a 32% reduction in the abundant exogenous factor endowment and a 224% increase in the
scarce exogenous factors in both countries. As a result of this quite large exogenous shock,
consumption increases by +90% in country 1 and +104% in country 2. This is paid for via a
92% increase in produced capital in country 1 and the same 92% increase in renewable resources
in country 2. The overall impact on wealth is an increase of 43% for country 1 and of +63% in
total wealth for country 2. As for factor prices, e1, r1,w2 and p2 are all reduced by 40% in the
transition while w1 and e2 increases by 183%, p1 and r2 being stable.
15. That is to say the other factor forming the comparative advantage of the country.
208 Chapter 3. International Trade and Structural Change
Figure 3.7: Transitional dynamics under CA (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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The adjustments involved are very large, reflecting the size of the shock on exogenous
variables. Achieving an adjustment this size internally is certainly not easy, although the
timing of the adjustment suggests a quite long time span of roughly 100 periods for the bulk
of the adjustment. The transition profile is also interesting. Consumption increases steadily
from the beginning, faster in country 1 than in country two, although the increase also stops
much faster: the bulk of the adjustment in made after only 25 periods. The endogenous capital
stocks both drop sharply in period one before increasing steadily with again a much quicker
adjustment in country 1. As the shock on exogenous variables is applied at once in period one,
wealth follows the same pattern. Neither do prices adjust smoothly. All the varying prices
overshoot in period 1, i.e. increasing or decreasing by more than their steady-state level, before
converging slowly in around 70 periods.
The nature of the adjustments in the model is quite close to the real life necessities of de-
velopment. Reducing asymmetry in endowments implies substitution between the components
of the productive base. This rate of substitution is determined by factor prices and occur in
the form of money-substitution as in the Hartwick rule. We described how an increase in con-
sumption requires for country one to reduce its over abundance in labour while increasing its
stocks of produced and natural capital. Country two increases its endowments in all factors
except exhaustible resources.
The behaviour of country 2 fits the story of the Hartwick rule, substituting produced capital
for exhaustible resources. It adds to the Hartwick rule the need to foster a potential source
of comparative advantage, renewable resources. As for country 1, while it may make sense
for labour, produced capital and renewable resources to increase, an increase in exhaustible
resource is subject to discoveries and exploration costs. Substituting produced capital for
labour makes perfect sense for country 1, but rebalancing its components of wealth may prove
harder. Increases of natural capital in country 1 will more likely come from renewable resources
than exhaustible resources, underlying the limits of our assumption of symmetry in the use of
intermediates.
Another fact seems puzzling at first hand. Going from high asymmetry to low asymmetry
requires the build-up of the stock of factors which price is decreasing in the process and vice-
versa. This feature comes again from our production structure where all inputs enter equally
in production in autarky. This result simply expresses the need to make more of some factors
available for production to increase output and consumption. The lost income from cheaper
factors is more than compensated by the extra consumption made possible via the extra in-
come and the extra income from the less abundant factor. Our production structure therefore
suggests than when all inputs are required in the production process it is rational to give up on
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higher return from some factors if a more equal distribution of factors allows for more e cient
production. We will see how free trade a ects this feature below.
Our model yields intuitive strategies for both countries, in line with the sustainability liter-
ature. The framework being consistent with observed facts, it seems fit to test in the context
of real world experiences, embodied in our scenarios. We test the four scenarios as temporary
shocks a ecting both countries in steady-state. Temporary shocks are an interesting way to
introduce exogenous accumulation and depletion constraints on the endogenous accumulation
process in both countries. We fit the scenario in the relevant broader transition path. For
example, if the shock implies as in scenario 1 that the country is in fact drifting from a low
asymmetry steady-state to a high asymmetry steady-state, we “nest” the temporary shock
between the constrained steady states k = 1.19 and k = 1.75.
To decide on the size of the shock, we use the data on comprehensive wealth. We use 2000
as the reference year since we based our decomposition of intangible capital on it. For the
shocks on labour, we look at the sample of countries under FPE in 2000 and we take those
with a northern specialisation. This is a sample of 16 countries 16. We then compute the
variation for the same countries in 2005. The data exhibits strong cross country variations, for
an average increase in labour of 10%. This figure is subject to the strong assumptions we made
earlier regarding the decomposition of intangible capital. We use this number as the order of
magnitude, increasing or decreasing the exogenous labour endowment by 10% over 30 periods.
We take this value of 30 periods since it is the third of the period required for the bulk of the
adjustment in the transitional dynamics.
Scenario 3 and 4 require a similar magnitude for the non renewable component of natural
capital. We use a similar method taking (as in those scenarios the economy converges towards
low asymmetry) the evolution between 2000 and 2005 of exhaustible non renewable resources in
countries with a country two specialisation without FPE. This yields a sample of 30 countries 17,
shortened to 13 to remove zeros and aberrant values. The average variation is this time 23%,
which we take as our shock value, spread over 30 periods.
The results for scenario 1 are displayed in figure 3.8. Convergence from the low asymmetry
to the high asymmetry equilibrium is marked by initial overshoot in wealth and produced
capital. The first impact of the temporary shock is to set wealth on a higher convergence trend
which dies down rapidly when the shock fades. The shock translates into a 6.15% increase
16. It is interesting to note that the same criteria yields the exact same sample size for 2005, but only 4
countries are left from 2000.
17. The 2005 sample is composed of 28 countries and the two samples have 18 common values, suggesting
more stability in country-two specialisation without FPE.
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Figure 3.8: Scenario 1 under CA (temporary shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
in the world stock of labour, and a 1.44% increase in total wealth. Country one witnesses a
1.4% increase in consumption 4.5% increase in wealth and a 2.19% increase in produced capital
compared to the regular convergence path. As for prices, e1 and r1 both increase by 2.26% with
p1 increasing by 0.07% and w1 shrinking by 4.45%. The largest impact are therefore on wealth
and the price of labour, with a notably larger impact on produced capital than consumption.
Reallocation of resources in the face of a positive shock is biased towards investment.
Scenario 2 represents a 1.24% increase in the global endowment of labour. Under scenario 2,
country 2 sees its consumption increased by 0.55% at the peak of the shock against the regular
trend. Wealth increases by 0.82% and renewable resources by 0.77%. Prices impacts are also
larger than under scenario one with p2 and e2 increasing by 0.99% and r2 by 0.21% while w2
is down 2.16%.
Under scenario 3 (figure 3.10), global exhaustible resources raised by 2.86%. Consumption
in country 1 increases by 1.44%, wealth by 2.14% and produced capital by 2.26%. As for
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Figure 3.9: Scenario 2 under CA (temporary shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.10: Scenario 3 under CA (temporary shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
prices, w1 increases by 2.38% relative to the regular trend, p1 by 0.11%, r1 by 2.38% while
e1 is reduced by 4.7%. Scenario 3 pictures an exogenous reduction in asymmetry from a high
asymmetry equilibrium. It is striking that the consumption gains are barely higher than in
scenario 1 although the shock is larger. This is first evidence that the starting point and the
implicit direction of adjustment matters as much as the size of the shock.
Finally, scenario 4 (figure 3.11) shows the impact of a resource depletion shock, which are
much higher than those implied by the addition of the same amount in scenario 3 for country
1. Under scenario 4, consumption shrinks by 5.55% in country 2 compared to the regular
transitional dynamics, wealth by 10% and renewable resources by 7.8%. Price adjustments
are also relatively important with w2 and p2 reduced by 11.2% and r2 by 3.71%. Exhaustible
resources price in country 2 rises by one third (31%) suggesting a more than proportional
reaction.
This concludes our presentation of the autarky model and scenarios. The autarky model
gives us a basis against which the results of the free trade simulations can be assessed. The
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Figure 3.11: Scenario 4 under CA (temporary shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.12: Endogenous endowments and FPE in IE
Source: Author’s calculation
CA case yields a distribution of endogenous capital stocks that is incompatible with FPE
for any distribution of exogenous endowments. As a result, trade-liberalisation in CA never
yields the integrated equilibrium (see figure 3.12). This result is confirmed by the assessment
of the FPE condition in the CS equilibrium. FPE is also violated for any asymmetry in
exogenous endowments, at least for Kr,2 (see figure 3.13a). As a result, we only compute the
trade equilibrium under CS. The distribution of constrained steady-states with asymmetry is
presented in figure 3.13.
The dynamics under CS are similar to autarky. Both endogenous endowments are decreasing
with asymmetry, with Kp1 decreasing by 42.5% and Kr2 decreasing by 37%. Those figures
are significantly lower than under autarky. Consumption in country 1 is reduced by 41% with
asymmetry, compared to 47% in autarky. Those values are 44% and 51% respectively for
country 2. As for convergence in consumption, going from autarky to free trade has virtually
no e ect. In autarky country 1 consumption goes with reduced asymmetry from 63% to 67%
of country 2 consumption. Under free trade those numbers are respectively 64% and 67%.
Opening-up to trade has a stronger e ect on prices. Non comparative advantage factors are
still moving together, with w2 = p2 and e1 = r1. The spread w2r2 goes from 3.78 to 6.77 with
asymmetry and the spread r1p1 goes from 1.07 to 2.01 with asymmetry. In the meantime the
spread e2r2 goes from 3.39 to 1.45 with asymmetry and the spread
w1
p1
goes from 1.04 to 0.40
with asymmetry. Still exogenous factor prices are lower under free trade than under autarky.
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Figure 3.13: Constrained steady-state values in autarky
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Free-trade creates a stronger reaction with prices rising and falling faster than under autarky.
Those findings on prices combined with the evolution of our variables of interest lead us to
conclude that the di erence in the production structure introduced between autarky and free
trade diminishes further the returns to scale. As endowments are now to be split between
three di erent intermediate sectors in each country, a similar shock on the overall endowment
distribution will lead to stronger price responses as the e ect on each individual sector is more
than the shock on the overall structure.
Increasing asymmetry in endowments leads to lower prices for the intermediates constituting
the comparative advantage and reallocation of production between the two countries. One has
to consider that two factors are used only in one sectors while the two others are used in
two sectors. As asymmetry grows, sector 3 must combine a fixed share (1≠–) of increasing
endowments which a shrinking share of the two others. This combination inevitably leads to
stronger price reaction under CS than under autarky, where all endowments enter production
the same way.
While trade magnifies the e ect of the shock on prices, it lowers its impact on consumption
and investment. The same exogenous increase in asymmetry leads to a lower reduction in world
consumption, wealth and endogenous factor endowments. As absolute numbers are higher in
country 2, country 1 benefits relatively more from this milder reduction in world consumption,
wealth and endogenous endowments. The ability to trade, while demanding stronger price
reactions, makes it easier to obtain goods intensive in the shrinking endowment, resulting in
lower losses in consumption and investment. The transitional dynamics are presented in figure
3.14.
Transition requires the same adjustment in exogenous endowments as under autarky ( 32%
reduction in the abundant exogenous factor endowment and a 224% increase in the scarce
exogenous factors). Under free trade, this shock generates a 70% increase in consumption in
country 1 and a 78% increase in country 2. Produced capital in country 1 increases by 74%
and renewable resources in country 2 by 58%. Total wealth increases by 37% in country 1 and
43% in country 2. For an equivalent shock, the adjustment is smaller than under autarky even
if the resulting increase in consumption and wealth are also smaller. Reflecting the change in
the underlying production structure, e1, r1, w2 and p2 are no more moving together, the first
two decreasing by 47% and the two others by 44%.
The adjustment is larger than in autarky. p1 and r2 are still stable. Interestingly, w1 and
e2 vary by less than in autarky. This is also a consequence of the new production structure.
Reduction in factor abundance has a lower impact compared to autarky while alleviating the
constraint from the scarce factor. The shape of the adjustment is virtually unaltered compared
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Figure 3.14: Transitional dynamics in CS (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
III. Simulations 219
Figure 3.15: Noteworthy dynamics in CS
(a) Consumption in Scenario 2 (b) Factor endowments in scenario 3
(c) Total Wealth in scenario 4 (d) Factor prices in Scenario 4
Source: Author’s calculation
to autarky. Adjustment is still quicker for country 1 and the same sharp decline before a strong
bounce-back is observed in the transition path in endogenous capital for both countries.
The figures for all the scenarios are available in appendix E. We only present the most
noteworthy in figure 3.15. The obvious change between autarky and free trade is that the
partner country is now a ected by an shock in the other country. Scenario 1 produces expectable
results, with consumption rising by 1.48% in country 1, slightly more than under autarky, but
consumption is country 2 now also increases by a small 0.13%. The exogenous boost in labour
in country 1 lowers the price w1 by 4.56%, but also lowers w2 and p2 by 0.06% compared to
trend, explaining the surge in consumption.
The accumulation of endogenous capital is also amplified by the shock, with Kp1 and
Kr2 increasing by 2.11% and 0.15% respectively. A positive shock on an exogenous factor
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constituting the comparative advantage has a stronger positive e ect on the country considered
and a milder positive on the partner country. This positive impact is channelled via the
reduction in the factor price in both countries. All relative prices fall even when some absolute
prices increase.
Scenario 2 pictures a more interesting setting. As labour supply increases exogenously in
country 2, consumption increases although by less than in country 1 in scenario 1. This makes
sense as the absolute size of the shock is smaller, since country 2 low asymmetry endowment is
smaller. While consumption increases by 0.48% it shrinks by 0.01% in country one. Wealth and
produced capital also shrink, while renewable resources in country 2 increase by 0.61%. The
transmission of the shock go through relative prices, with three relative prices going up and only
one going down. Hence, a positive shock on a capital stock not constituting the comparative
advantage has a positive impact on the country experiencing the shock, but a negative impact
on the trading partner. As we noted before, this can be explained by the implied reduction in
interdependency. Country 2 now needs country 1 less, but country 1 still needs country 2 the
way it did before the shock.
This interpretation is confirmed by scenario 3, where the situation is reversed and the shock
(relatively) larger. Consumption increase in country 1 by 1.22% while it shrinks in country
2 by 0.04%. Wealth increase in country 1 by 1.98% and produced capital by 1.80%, while in
country 2 wealth shrinks by 0.03% and renewable resources by 0.06%. Note that relative prices
vary in a symmetric manner, with three relative prices decreasing and one increasing.
Finally, scenario 4 presents the shrinkage of an endowment constituting the comparative
advantage in the considered country. The result is unambiguously negative, as it makes the re-
source constraint on that stock more stringent for everyone. The e ect is, as could be expected,
more important in country 2 with consumption down by 5.43% when in country one it is only
down by 1.11%. As renewable resources are also dis-invested because of the shrinking pool of
overall resources, renewable resources are reduced by 6.96% and wealth by 10.44% in country 2.
The fall is only 1.66% in produced capital and 0.49% of wealth for country 1. The ambiguity is
also lifted from relative factor prices. All absolute prices being reduced e2 excepted, all relative
prices are down.
Those are the results of the simulations of the CA case, under autarky and free trade.
We presented the main feature of the autarky model with the interesting consequences of our
choice of production structure. The most interesting result of the CA case is the downward
relationship between asymmetry in exogenous endowments and our variables of interest. Con-
strained steady-states characterised by high asymmetry are dominated by steady-states under
low asymmetry. It should however be noted that the consumption gap between country 1 and
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2 narrows with asymmetry, as do the endogenous endowments and wealth gaps.
The nature of capital accumulation puts country 1 at a disadvantage, as more needs to be
invested there to accumulate produced capital. As a consequence, country 2 is better-o  across
all specifications in autarky. Because of the large gap in wealth implied by this di erence, FPE
never occurs when both country open-up to trade. The CS equilibrium resulting form free
trade is largely similar to the autarky equilibrium in terms of constrained steady-states and
transitional dynamics. It is only natural at this stage to question the rationale for opening-
up to trade altogether. Both countries are worse-o  when going from autarky to free trade,
whatever the level of asymmetry, and the transitional dynamics are similar. The di erences
in the sensitivity to permanent and temporary shocks are discussed below, together with the
production structures.
Nevertheless, the CA case stresses a potent reason for opening-up to trade. Under CS,
factor prices are lower than under autarky. Even more, the price of factors constituting the
comparative advantage rise by a lesser amount than under autarky in the transitional dynamics
while the price of the competing factors decrease by a larger amount. This is a standard result
in HO models, and it is interesting to see it carry through without FPE and in a dynamic
context. To put it plainly, if two countries know themselves to be in a transition from low to
high asymmetry, then it will be less costly, even if less rewarding, to do the transition under free
trade than in autarky. International trade allows both countries to access, via the goods traded,
a wider pool of resources, especially in factors that were scarce under autarky. International
trade acts at least as a tool of cost control by bringing international competition to domestic
factors, a familiar result.
A final note should be made in this intermediary conclusion regarding the temporary shocks.
Our model is parametrised so that there is “symmetry in asymmetry” in endowments. This
extra assumption is relaxed using the temporary shocks that only a ect one factor at the time.
Results under autarky are quite conventional, with an increase in endowment increasing wealth
and consumption. The increase is larger when the factor is abundant and as such a source of
comparative advantage.
Under free trade, the impact of all shocks is stronger, both when positive or negative. In
addition, shocks now reverberate in the partner country, where it can have a negative impact
when reducing the comparative advantage. Scenario 4 is quite telling in that respect: a 20%
reduction in the exogenous factor source of comparative advantage reduces world consumption
by 3.62% in CS against 3.24% in autarky. But in autarky this impact is -5.55% for country 2
and 0 for country 1, when in CS it becomes -5.43% for country 2 and -1.11% for country 1.
Trade generates interdependence so that impacts are both more important and spread between
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the two countries.
Those first results are obtained when factor price equalisation is impossible and both coun-
tries accumulate a di erent endogenous factor. This situation can be associated to a trade
liberalisation between countries that are structurally dissimilar. We can compare those results
with the structural change (SC) case where countries aim for a similar economic structure by
accumulating the same endogenous factor.
III.4.2 Simulations under the structural change (SC) case
The structural change (SC) case describes consumption and wealth convergence when both
countries are accumulating produced capital. The distribution of autarky constrained steady-
states SC are available from figure 3.16. As opposed to the CA case, the consumption gap
is widening with asymmetry until our high asymmetry equilibrium (k = 1.75). While country
1 consumption is constantly decreasing, country 2 consumption increases up to k = 1.31 and
then starts to decrease. Consumption in country 1 represents 88% of country 2 consumption
at k = 1.19, decreasing to 54% at k = 1.75. Wealth is increasing with asymmetry in country 2,
rising by 6.36%, while it shrinks in country one by 30%. Country 1 accumulates less produced
capital than country 2, for any asymmetry in exogenous endowments.
The factor prices pattern is interesting. r1 and e1 are still moving together and increasing
with asymmetry, but the greatest surge is now for w2 which decorrelates from p2. Even under
autarky, both countries have the same constant price for produced capital (0.09774). The
perfect price correlation in country 2 is now between r2 and e2, mirroring country 1. It should
be noted that both countries fulfil the FPE condition for the full range where it is possible in
exogenous endowments. The spread w2p2 goes from 1.46 to 7 when the spread
w1
p1
goes from 1.39
to 0.49 with asymmetry.
We proceed to the assessment of the transitional dynamics under a permanent shock, moving
from high to low asymmetry in exogenous endowments. Results are presented in figure 3.17.
It should first be noted that convergence is faster in SC than in CA. Convergence takes 81
periods against 262 in CA. The shape of the convergence path is regular for consumption in
both countries, but implies an overshoot downward for produced capital and wealth. Similar
overshooting is observed for factor prices, with the exception of p1 and p2. Going along the
transitional dynamics yields a 90% consumption increase, a 92% increase in produced capital
and 43% increase in wealth for country 1. In the meantime, country 2 witnesses a 17% increase
in consumption, a 14.5% increase in produced capital and a 6% reduction in wealth. Overall,
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Figure 3.16: Constrained steady-state values under SC in autarky
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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the world sees a 42% increase in consumption, 12% increase in wealth and 41% increase in
produced capital. Prices move strongly with a 40% decrease for e1 and r1 and a 68% increase
for e2 and r2. w1 increases by 183% and w2 decreases by 64%.
Those figures beg for a comment on the dynamics in SC. Both countries still have an interest
to reduce asymmetry in endowments as this means higher consumption. For country 1, this has
straightforward implications. As country 1 accumulates the source of its comparative advantage,
it can compensate the shrinkage in labour with an increase in produced capital 18. This shift can
be done while the constraint of scarce factors is alleviated as the stock of exhaustible resources
increases.
Country 2 faces a di erence challenge. It already faces an increase in labour so that its
ability to invest in produced capital yields less gains. At the same time, its advantage in
exhaustible resources shrinks. The overall result is reduction in wealth, less gains from the
substitution of produced capital for exhaustible resources and a relatively lower increase in
consumption. Country 2 faces the challenge of substitutability between opposite sources of
comparative advantage 19 when country 1 does not. The world as a whole is still better-o , but
country 2 faces a price structure leading to lower reinvestment and reduced wealth.
As with the CA case, we only present the notable elements in the scenarios, in SC (figure
3.18). All the figures are available in appendix E. In all scenarios, idiosyncratic shocks have no
impact on the other country. A notable feature of the transition from low to high asymmetry
implied by scenario 1 is the overshoot of produced capital in country 1, much larger than in
country 2. As a result, produced capital in country 1 is higher than in country 2 for a couple
of periods. Scenario 2 produces results quite similar to those under CA. The shock is lower in
magnitude than in scenario 1, although still positive via a decrease in the price w2.
Coupling this observation with the results of scenario 3, we can conclude that positive shocks
have less impact on the scarce factor than on the abundant factor in autarky. The 10% increase
in labour raised wealth in country 1 by 4.53% when the 20% increase in exhaustible resources
raised it by 2.14%. Finally, scenario 4 produces as always the most interesting results. The
strong adverse shock on the exhaustible resources creates a 7.10% decline in consumption and
11.8% decline in wealth. Price e2 surges by 30% while all the other prices fall. After the initial
beak from the permanent shock, the path is bell-shaped for consumption, wealth and produced
capital. Those three variables start to decline with accelerating speed as the cumulative shock
gets strong enough.
18. Remember that between the high asymmetry and the low asymmetry equilibrium, the abundant exogenous
factors are reduced by 32%
19. If and when the country opens-up to free trade.
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Figure 3.17: Transitional dynamics under SC (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.18: Scenarios in autarky (temporary shocks)
(a) Produced capital, scenario 1 (b) Total Wealth, scenario 3
(c) Total Wealth, scenario 4 (d) Consumption, scenario 4
Source: Author’s calculation
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The SC case yields constrained steady state values for produced capital that are compatible
with FPE under the CS model, so that it is the distribution of exogenous endowments that
prevents FPE. Therefore, the CS case should cover the range k = 1.31 to k = 1.75. Values for k
below 1.3 should yield FPE. But under the IE model, FPE breaks down because of the increase
in produced capital in country 1 when k > 1.19 under a single world-level system of relative
prices. We therefore extend the CS model to k = 1.19 even if the FPE condition is theoretically
verified. For k values in the range ]1.19;1.31[ we would need a transitory price system where
some factors have a unique world price and some do not. The spread between factor prices in
both countries should decrease, as prices converge from CS values to the IE global price system.
As in the CA case, the CS model in SC yields lower factor prices for any asymmetry than
the autarky model. Consumption, produced capital and wealth are all lower than in autarky.
The constrained steady state values are displayed in figure 3.19. The transitional dynamics are
presented in figure 3.20. The CS transition is similar to the autarky transition, but its features
are more contrasted. Consumption in country 1 increase by 68% against 90% in autarky,
while in country 2 those numbers are 6% and 16% respectively. Interestingly, this means that
consumption in country 1 in 95% of country 2 consumption in low asymmetry. This suggests
that the CS price system in low asymmetry is quite close to the IE price system as we almost
observe convergence in consumption levels.
Similar figures are observed for produced capital with country 1 increasing its stock by
62.06% against 88.21% in autarky and country 2 7.84% against 15%. Finally wealth in country
1 increase by 32.41% against 41.11% in country 1 and decrease by 9.9% against 5.06% in country
2. It should also be noted that for the first time, country 1 ends up with more produced capital
than country 2 in the low asymmetry setting, even with lower consumption and wealth.
As in autarky, consumption in both countries is the only variable of interest not overshooting
during the adjustment. Produced capital in both countries overshoot downwards before going
up to the new steady-state (much more significantly in country 1) and so does wealth. As under
autarky, the price dynamics are interesting. w1 increases by less and e1 and r1 decrease by
more than under autarky, while w2 decreases by slightly more and e2 and r2 increase by less.
While yielding less impressive results in terms of consumption, produced capital and wealth,
free trade proves to be an e ective cost control mechanism, especially for wages in country 1.
The adjustment there is obtained via overshooting in period 1.
Diagrams for the scenarios are presented in figure 3.21. Scenario 1 follows an expected
pattern, with a positive shock on labour in country 1 rising consumption, produced capital
use and wealth in both countries, although much more significantly in country 1. It should be
noted that the increase is slightly higher in country 1 compared to autarky, as the fall in w1
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Figure 3.19: Constrained steady-state values in CS
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
III. Simulations 229
Figure 3.20: Transitional dynamics in CS (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption Levels (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.21: Scenarios in CS (temporary shocks)
(a) Total Wealth, scenario 1 (b) Total Wealth, scenario 3
(c) Total Wealth, scenario 4 (d) Produced capital, scenario 4
Source: Author’s calculation
is slightly larger and the increase in p1 somewhat lower. Country 2 on the other hand sees a
decrease in w2 and p2. This decrease is larger than the fall observed in country 1. Still, the
world consumption, produced capital and wealth increase is larger than in autarky.
In scenario 2, the positive shock on labour in country 2 has mild adverse consequences for
country 1. As consumption increase by 0.66% in country 2 it falls by 0.03% in country 1. A
similar story is observed with wealth, increasing by 0.88% in country 2 and falling by 0.007%
in country one. This is the result of relative factor prices going in opposite direction, with two
factor price ratios going up and two going down, when in scenario 1 they were all moving in the
same direction. Scenario 3 as always mirrors scenario 2, with consumption, produced capital
and wealth decreasing in country 2 while they increase in country 1. As the shock is larger, the
negative impact is more important than in scenario 2.
Compared to autarky, the model replicates its cost control dimension with price w1 and r1
rising by less than under autarky and e1 falling by more. Only p1 increases because of higher
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produced capital accumulation. This is more than compensated by the general fall in factor
prices in country 2. Scenario 4 once again yields the largest response to the largest shock. As
all factor price ratios fall, consumption is reduced by 0.8% in country 1 and 7.15% in country 2.
Wealth and produced capital are reduced by respectively 12.28% and 11.68% in country 2 and
0.42% and 1.46% in country 1. Interestingly, the cost control properties of trade are playing
against country 2 in this negative shock, as the milder price response generates a stronger
reduction in consumption, produced capital and wealth than under autarky. The world is as a
result worse-o  than under autarky, with all variable of interest at the world level reduced in
CS compared to autarky.
We now turn to the IE equilibrium. The IE equilibrium tolerates a maximum asymmetry
in endowments of 68% which is already quite large (see below). But it only represents 5
constrained steady-states, so that we present the results in synthetic table 3.5. As we saw
above, under SC opening-up to trade results in the integrated equilibrium for k Æ 1.19. Under
SC, it is possible to go from autarky to the IE trade model if countries open-up to trade with
low enough asymmetry as the FPE condition is respected in all factors for k Æ 1.30. Both
countries should also move to the IE equilibrium form the CS equilibrium for a similar value.
But as we saw, in the IE setting, FPE occurs only starting with k = 1.19.
We therefore start our study of the IE equilibrium in SC by presenting the transitional
dynamics from the autarky and SC constrained steady-states values to the IE constrained
steady-states values for k = 1.19. As factor prices are equal in IE but not in CS or autarky, we
take the constraint steady-state values for k = 1.19 in the CS model and impose an exogenous
shock of factor price equalisation on those values 20. We then use those shocked values as the
initial values for the transitional dynamics in the IE model, to obtain a transition path from
CS to IE. Results are presented in figures 3.22 and 3.23.
As we saw above, consumption, produced capital and wealth are high in autarky for the
low asymmetry steady-states. As a consequence, opening-up to trade when asymmetry is low
is likely to result into consumption and wealth losses. The transitional dynamics confirm this
intuition, with world consumption reduced by 43%, world wealth by 15% and world produced
capital by 42%. At the country level, consumption is reduced by 39.5% in country 1 and 46.5%
in country 2. Wealth is reduced by 7.5% in country one and 22.8% in country 2. Finally,
produced capital is reduced by 20% in country 1 and a staggering 61.5% in country 2. The
adjustment is carried through a 44% fall in w and a 43% fall in e and r. In the IE equilibrium
factor prices are not only equalised between countries, but also between exogenous variables so
20. As countries are of equal size, we take the average of the steady-states factor prices in both countries as
the shock values.
232 Chapter 3. International Trade and Structural Change
Table 3.5: Transitional dynamics between AU and IE (permanent shock)
regime IE IE IE IE IE IE
hypothesis SC SC SC SC SC SC
size k=1,01 k=1,05 k=1,10 k=1,15 k=1,19 k=1,2
c 0,680031 0,680031 0,680031 0,680031 0,680031 0,680031
W 8,046406 8,046406 8,046406 8,046406 8,046406 8,046406
Y 0,800071 0,800071 0,800071 0,800071 0,800071 0,800071
kp 2,046406 2,046406 2,046406 2,046406 2,046406 2,046406
kl 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000
ke 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000
kr 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000 2,000000
c1 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015
c2 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015 0,340015
W1 4,029022 4,052297 4,081392 4,110487 4,133762 4,139581
W2 4,017384 3,994108 3,965014 3,935919 3,912644 3,906825
Y1 0,400582 0,402766 0,405496 0,408227 0,410411 0,410957
Y2 0,399490 0,397305 0,394575 0,391845 0,389660 0,389114
kp1 1,039022 1,102297 1,181392 1,260487 1,323762 1,339581
w1 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
p1 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741
e1 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
r1 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
kp2 1,007384 0,944108 0,865014 0,785919 0,722644 0,706825
w2 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
p2 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741 0,097741
e2 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
r2 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009 0,100009
sigma 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000
nu 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319
tau 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000 1,000000
kappa 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319 0,977319
FPE condition on kp 1,330164 1,330164 1,330164 1,330164 1,330164 1,330164
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.22: Transitional dynamics between AU and IE (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
that w = e= r while p is slightly lower.
As for the shape of the transition, there is a large downward shock in period 1 for all vari-
ables. While w, e and r slowly converge downward to their steady state level, p converges
steadily upward during the first 50 periods. All prices remain stable at the steady-level after-
wards. Consumption decreases steadily in both countries before converging to the same level
in the last period. Wealth and produced capital move together as in all permanent shocks,
decreasing at the beginning of the adjustment before going upwards in country 1 and down-
wards in country 2 to their steady-state levels. When in autarky country 2 was better endowed
than country 1, the opposite happens in the IE equilibrium although both are worse-o  in the
process.
The transition from the CS equilibrium to the IE equilibrium is a small permanent shock,
as values are quite similar. The CS equilibrium for low asymmetry values already yielded close
values for steady-state consumption. In IE, we finally observe convergence in consumption as
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consumption rises by 2.77% in country 1 and falls by 2.30% in country 2. Produced capital
increases 14% in country 1 and decreases 17% in country 2, widening the gap observed in the
CS equilibrium.
Wealth increases by 4.15% in country 1 and falls by 3.69% in country 2. Although the
adjustment is asymmetric with country 2 losing out, the world as a whole witness an increase
of 0.16% in consumption and wealth, and 0.65% in produced capital so that the overall e ect
of integration is slightly positive. As factor price equalisation was very close under the CS
equilibrium, the price response during the transition is very mild, with w increasing by 0.30%
and e and r falling by 0.68%. As the world economy gets fully integrated, all exogenous factors
have the same price so that w = e= r with p marginally cheaper.
As for the shape of the transition, we kept the same length of 270 periods. Produced capital
and wealth start with a small progressive surge in the first periods, before starting to converge
to the new steady state in around 70 periods. Consumption also surges to start with, before a
sudden adjustment in the last period as the total adjustment is quite small. Prices only move
in the first periods, rapidly reaching their steady-state values.
The integrated equilibrium (IE) fits nicely as a consequence of structural change after the
CS phase. It seems a far less natural and interesting setting to reach from autarky. As always,
we test our scenarios on the IE equilibrium. Notable results are available in figure 3.24. The
k = 1.19 constrained equilibrium being the upper limit of the IE model in terms of asymmetry,
we choose an arbitrary level of asymmetry, k = 1.1 as the “low asymmetry” equilibrium.
Comparison of the temporary shocks between IE and CS or autarky should only be tenta-
tive, as although the shocks are of the same size, they are implied on transitions of di erent
magnitudes. In the transition in IE, asymmetry is reduced by far less than in CS or autarky.
Nevertheless, comparisons of volatility can be made between the percentages of change, as again
the shocks are of the same size. A first important di erence between IE, CS and autarky is the
nature of the adjustment to the shock. In IE, consumption is always equal between country 1
and country 2. What changes under the shocks is the level of produced capital and the com-
position of wealth. In the context of the scenarios, another concern is FPE. In scenario 1, the
shock produces a level of produced capital in country 1 that is above the k = 1.19 steady-state
level. Still, as produced capital in country 2 also increases by a larger percentage, FPE is
preserved. This is however proof than an increase in asymmetry near the FPE limit has the
potential to produce reversion to the CS model.
In scenario 1, the positive shock on labour in country 1 results in a 1.33% increase in con-
sumption is both countries. At the same time, wealth increases by 4.53% in country 1 and
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Figure 3.23: Transitional dynamics between CS and IE (permanent shock)
(a) Factor Endowments (b) Total Wealth
(c) Consumption (d) Factor Prices
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.24: Scenarios in free trade (IE) (temporary shocks)
(a) Total Wealth, scenario 1 (b) Factor Prices, scenario 3
(c) Factor Endowments, scenario 4 (d) Factor Prices, scenario 4
Source: Author’s calculation
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produced capital only by 1.49%. The respective percentages in country 2 are +0.54% and
+2.96%. As country 1 experiences a positive exogenous shock on one of its endowments con-
stituting its comparative advantage, wealth increases more than proportionally and produced
capital less than proportionally. This can be understood as a price-induced internal redistribu-
tion between the productive sectors in reaction to factor prices movements 21. Country 2, facing
a lower price for labour, produced capital and experiencing stability in exogenous endowments
reacts by increasing more than proportionally its stock of produced capital.
The same e ect is observed in all 4 scenarios, for both positive and negative shocks. When
under the autarky or CS equilibria the bulk of the adjustment lied with the country experiencing
the temporary shock, it lies with the trading partner in IE. The second important feature is
the magnitude of the shocks. In scenario 2 and 3, when the factor a ected is not constituting
the comparative advantage, the magnitude of the shock for all the variables of interest is lower
in IE than in autarky or CS. The opposite is true in scenarios 1 and 4.
In scenario 3, world consumption increases by 0.5% in IE, 0.66% in autarky and 0.53% in
CS. In scenario 1, world consumption increases by 1.32% in IE, 0.5% in autarky and 0.63%
in CS. The general conclusion would be that the IE equilibrium reduces the sensitivity to
shocks on the non-comparative advantage factors, but magnifies the shocks on comparative
advantages factors. As we will discuss below, this feature is particularly important for scenario
4, as reductions in the exhaustible resources pools in one country have a) a bigger impact in
IE than in any other case and b) have a larger impact on produced capital in country 1 than
in country 2.
This concludes our presentation of our four scenarios under the two cases (CA and SC) and
three di erent trade settings (autarky, CS and IE). In the next section we discuss those results
and propose lessons for sustainability and international trade.
IV Discussion of the results
We discuss the results in three subsections. We first present the sequential nature of the
decision to open-up to trade. We then assess the rationale behind this decision compared to
autarky. We end the discussion with recommendation for ANS and wealth assessments in open
economies.
21. Bear in mind that in IE, the production structure in indeterminate as there are more goods than factors.
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IV.1 The decision tree
It is necessary to start this commentary by the assumptions of the model. The first assump-
tion is the most important. We assume, in line with capital theory, that any resource can be
considered an instrument of wealth and that all those instruments add to the value and volume
of production in any country. It is desirable to have access to all the instruments accounted
for on the planet, either directly or through imports of goods and intermediates intensive in
those instruments. Instruments can be regrouped into broad categories based on the dynamics
of accumulation and de-cumulation of the instrument. The di erence between instruments, in
our model in particular, is therefore based on the dynamics of accumulation. This assumption
does not preclude fungibility and substitutability in money-value, as it is precisely the interest
of using capital theory.
Based on this first assumption, we assume that goods are produced with more or less of
a given instrument of wealth. We use in our model the corner case where four intermediates
are produced using only one instrument of wealth and one intermediate using all instruments
equally. This assumption is consistent with the first one in the sense that as countries desire
accessing the largest possible range of instruments of wealth under any form, they will be
willing to trade for instruments or instruments embodied in goods, as a way to be better-
o . Therefore, di erences in factor endowments between countries produce a rationale for
trade. A necessary corollary of this assumption is that the more asymmetric the distribution
of endowments between countries, the more trade is likely to take place.
The third assumption is about technology and the production structure we derive from
it. As we assume that both countries produce one final good from intermediates, we assume
also that a) the production process can be divided in substitutable (under constraint) and au-
tonomous entities and b) that domestic resources need to be ventilated between the production
requirements of those intermediates. As we introduce a total factor productivity term   in the
production function, with 0<  < 1 we also assume decreasing returns to scale, that is coordi-
nation and energy 22 costs associated with production. In this perspective, it makes sense that
dividing further the supply chain for the final good by adding intermediates can only impact
negatively overall productivity.
We believe those assumptions constitute a sound basis to assess the options faced by coun-
tries engaging in sustainable development. The conclusions of our model on the issues of
sustainability and structural change in the context of international trade are in our view best
presented as a decision tree. Let us first consider a country endowed with a set of instruments
22. Or entropy.
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Figure 3.25: Decision tree 1
Source: Author
of wealth 23. In line with our assumptions, the first important di erence is going to arise from
the distribution of instruments in the country. Under a given production structure, those in-
struments can be separated in terms of relative intensity with respect to the endowments in the
rest of the world. This gives the basic definition of potential comparative advantages in figure
3.25, applied to our model.
The second element that matters under our production structure is the extend of the asym-
metry. This can be represented by the two constrained steady-states we identified as the low
asymmetry and high asymmetry constrained steady-states (see figure 3.26). As was made clear
in our study of the transitional dynamics, this is critical to identify the potential gains from
reducing asymmetry.
The next step requires the identification of the instruments of wealth forming the basis
of development. What is critical is to assess whether the country is going to focus on the
accumulation of instruments it is relatively well-endowed with (with respect to the rest of
the world) or not. In our model this is the CA hypothesis against the SC hypothesis. In
the model we abstract from the case were several instruments are endogenously accumulated
23. Or capital stocks in the wealth accounting vocable, and factor endowments in the standard economics
jargon.
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Figure 3.26: Decision tree 2
Source: Author
together for the sake of clarity, but also because of the fact that some instruments of wealth
dynamics are a ected by extra economic factors and can therefore be considered as exogenous.
Also, development theory stresses substitution in instrument and the push to accumulate more
produced capital as the most common and salient manifestation of development. We consider
the CA hypothesis as relevant to examine what would happen if two countries were not focusing
on the same instrument of wealth and the SC case as the common case were all countries try
to build-up a produced-capital intensive economy. This gives the next set of choices in figure
3.27.
Our model allows for a comparison between SC and CA under autarky and trade. In autarky,
there is obviously no di erence for country 1. An expected result is that world produced capital
is higher in the SC case. A more interesting observation is the fact that the CA case yields
higher values for consumption, wealth and renewable resources for the world and country 2 when
asymmetry is low, but this advantage narrows as asymmetry increases. Starting at di erent
levels of asymmetry from k = 1.60 the di erence becomes gradually positive. Therefore, the
CA strategy is dominated when asymmetry in endowments is high, and the SC strategy is
dominated when asymmetry is low.
This feature comes, as always, from the di erences in endowments and its consequences
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Figure 3.27: Decision tree 3
Source: Author
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on factor prices. Under the CA hypothesis, the price p2 increases with asymmetry since the
endowment is shrinking in country 2. Under SC, country 2 invests in Kp, preventing the rise
while price r2 is kept stable by the parallel increase of Ke and Kr. We can therefore claim that
the CA strategy, investing in an endowment that does constitute the comparative advantage, is
a dominant strategy when asymmetry is low, that is when the scarce factors are not too scarce.
Conversely, if some factors are becoming scarcer, it makes sense to invest in them instead so as
to alleviate the consequences of scarcity on production, consumption and wealth.
In the next step it is important to consider the consequences of the decision to take three
instruments out of four as exogenous variables. This decision produced a series of steady-states
with an endogenous level of produced capital or renewable resources, constrained by the three
other exogenous instruments. Those constrained steady-states are an approximation, control-
ling for asymmetry in instruments, of what would be a unique steady-state 24 if all instruments
were endogenously determined. Together, they define a path between two steady-states which
correspond to theoretical starting and ending points. The low asymmetry constrained steady-
state is also a switching point to the integrated equilibrium under SC. To define this path, we
assumed a symmetric increase in asymmetry (asymmetric increase in asymmetry being pre-
sented in the scenarios). Still, as illustrated in figure 3.28 other paths are possible depending
on the values of exogenous instruments.
The notion of structural change is indeed at the core of development, usually considered to
be both the signal and the cause of it. Our results show that high asymmetry in endowments
produces lower levels of consumption, wealth and produced capital. We can therefore consider
the push for structural change as a rational desire to increase consumption and wealth, the mean
to this end being reduced asymmetry. Our model does not provide an endogenous mechanism
for the transition from one constraint steady-state to another, but the elements of political
economy, environmental economics and innovation presented in chapter 1 and 2 provide many
rationales for this. As explained in the presentation of the results, for country 2 types the
reduction in asymmetry is mostly about a sound application of the Hartwick rule. For country
1 countries, the background story is the industrial revolution with its large labour/produced
capital substitution, with the joint unveiling of new natural resources such as coal, oil and
a boost in agricultural production. Hence, although the reasons for structural change are of
prime importance, they can here only be postulated in our model. We focus on the “how”
rather than the “why”.
Travelling form high asymmetry to low asymmetry can be undertaken either in autarky or in
24. Or more accurately two steady-states: one under factor price equalisation, another when factor price
equalisation breaks down.
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Figure 3.28: Constrained Steady-States as a function of asymmetry in free trade
Source: Author’s calculation
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Figure 3.29: Constrained Steady-States as a function of asymmetry in free trade
Source: Author
free trade. Choosing free trade under the SC hypothesis will ultimately yield the IE equilibrium,
when in the other cases it systematically yields CS. The final decision tree in 3.29 represents
this trade-o . Here our model produces an interesting insight. Autarky equilibria under any
hypothesis systematically yields higher values for wealth consumption and endogenous factor
endowments in both countries for a given hypothesis (CA or SC).
As presented in figure 3.30 opening-up to trade in our model systematically leads to lower
values for the variables of interest, so that going from autarky to free trade is equivalent to a
permanent shock to a lower path. This leads to the question of why would either country 1
or country 2 choose free trade. The answer to this question depends on where you are on the
decision tree and will be presented below. Before that, it is necessary to discuss further the
rationale behind lower levels of consumption and wealth in free trade than in autarky. As we
saw during the presentation of the autarky model, autarky happens when – = 0 so that both
countries are in fact producing with the sole intermediate y3. This results is a de facto single
aggregate production function for the final good which takes as arguments the total factor
productivity   parameter and the four endowments to the power 14 .
Under our assumptions, opening-up to free trade involves (via the allocation parameter
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Figure 3.30: Constrained Steady-States as a function of asymmetry in free trade
Source: Author’s calculation
α) the allocation of endowments across four intermediates. Intermediates being traded, com-
parative advantages materialise. It is critical that this feature in the production structure is
not an artiﬁcial complexity, but the direct consequence of the assumption that comparative
advantages are shaped by diﬀerences in endowments when trade is in intermediate good. The
need to allocate factor endowments through a cost minimisation process results in lower overall
productive eﬃciency. To be more accurate, free trade does rise the direct factor contribution to
production, but this is more than compensated by the lower total factor productivity term 25.
As discussed below in the section on robustness checks, this is not a consequence of the value
of α, no value in the range ]0;1[ changes this result.
25. Factors contribution is put to the power 14 in autarky and
1+α
4 in free trade, but the productivity term is
Φ in autarky and Φαα(1−α) 14 in free trade.
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These conclusions makes intuitive sense when one considers the complexities and coordina-
tion costs implied by setting-up the global supply chain. Those costs are usually modelled as
transaction costs, but we believe that organisational costs are fundamentally di erent in nature
from other costs, such a customs duties or shipping. Those costs can exist even in a frictionless,
a-spatial model such as ours. Coordination costs are the main costs in a the world of the global
supply chain described by Berger (2006). The production structure and its consequences for
total factor productivity are therefore the explanation behind the counter-intuitive result that
both countries are better-o  in autarky. Still, the study of our scenarios allows us to o er some
reasons for opening-up to trade despite the adverse e ects on consumption and wealth.
IV.2 The impact of trade
Although opening-up to trade systematically reduces consumption and wealth, it should first
be noted that the reduction is not uniform with asymmetry. In both CA and SC, consumption,
produced capital, renewable resources and wealth losses are lower for high asymmetry steady-
states than for low asymmetry ones. This result indicates that for both countries, the incentive
to open-up to trade will be mostly felt in high asymmetry. Discussing country strategy will
yield a matrix of likely outcomes, which depends mostly on the decisions in country 2. Tables
containing the rates of change between the di erent settings are available in appendix F.
Under high asymmetry in autarky, country 2 is better-o  undertaking structural change, as
doing so allows it to compensate for the scarcity of produced capital and labour by accumulating
labour. Under low asymmetry in autarky, as the disadvantage in labour and produced capital
is minimal, country 2 is better-o  pursuing a CA strategy, accumulating renewable resources to
increase wealth and consumption. As for country 1, its situation is obviously the same under
CA and SC.
It should also be noted that for both countries relative losses in wealth and consumption are
higher when opening-up to trade in CA compared to SC. As an example, world consumption
for k= 1.25 is reduced by 42% in between autarky and free trade in SC, but only by 38% in CA.
This result illustrate a interesting situation for country 2. Should it decide to stay in autarky,
it is better-o  turning to structural change (SC). And once it chooses structural change, it faces
a powerful incentive to open-up to trade: better production cost control.
For the same reason that SC makes more sense that CA for high asymmetry, making the
transition from a high to a low asymmetry constrained steady-state is less costly with inter-
national trade. w1, e2 and r2 increase by less while w1 e1 and r1 decrease by more. Reduced
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production e ciency means that consumption, wealth and produced capital also increase by
less in the transition. As a consequence, consumers and producers face conflicting incentives
regarding trade openness.
Therefore, once the initial negative shock is su ered, transition between constrained steady-
states is made at a lesser cost under free trade and under positive short run shocks reducing
asymmetry. There is decreasing loss with asymmetry when opening-up to trade. As a conse-
quence, if a short run shock increases asymmetry as in scenario 1, then the impact is larger
under free trade than in autarky. For example, in scenario 1 under SC, world consumption
increases by 0.63% in free trade and 0.50% in autarky. Asymmetrical variations in asymmetry
have a greater positive impact in free trade than in autarky.
To summarise, although opening-up to trade comes with a strong initial negative shock,
benefits can be expected afterwards. Transition under a permanent shock to low asymmetry is
made at a lesser cost, even with temporary shocks reducing asymmetry in a non symmetrical
fashion. Conversely, if those temporary shocks increase asymmetry (as in scenario one) then
income, wealth and produced capital gains are higher under free trade, which is consistent with
the original observation that free trade is less of a disadvantage when asymmetry in endowments
is high.
Country 2 is therefore in an awkward situation. It is (in high asymmetry) better-o  in SC,
and once it chooses SC, it will face incentives to open-up to trade to obtain cost control gains
from trade as it reduces asymmetry through investment. As the country reduces asymmetry its
incentives to stay under (CS) free trade fade since reduced asymmetry makes the CA scenario
more competitive. Therefore, for country 2, the best strategy starting in high asymmetry is to
turn to SC, open-up to trade to reduce asymmetry at a lower cost and turn back to CA and
autarky when “enough” reduction in asymmetry took place. We would estimate that moment
as the moment where consumption is higher in CA than SC, that is between k = 1.55 and
k = 1.60.
It is however unlikely that country 1 will accept this. Country 1 is not a ected by the
decision between CA and SC in autarky but should it decide to open-up to trade the decision
of country 2 between those two possibilities becomes critical. As is the case for country 2,
country 1 should decide to open-up to trade to exploit the “cost control” property when in high
asymmetry. Contrary to country 2, once under (SC) free trade, country 1 has an incentive to
stay under free trade until the two countries reach factor price equalisation (FPE).
We should first stress that the IE equilibrium brings mild overall gains for the world, but
that those gains are very unequally shared. This is the “burden sharing” advantage of trade.
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In both CS and IE, adjustment to short run shocks depends on the factor hit by the shock.
If the factor is a source of comparative advantage for the country, then the shock is positive
and both countries win in consumption, wealth and produced capital. But if the factor is not
a source of comparative advantage, then the country hit by the shock benefit from it while the
partner loses out. Beyond the price reaction, this is because trade creates interdependence and
allow access to factors outside of the country. Trade is therefore a powerful tool to alleviate
scarcity and create common interests and benefits between countries. As a consequence, any
event reducing this needed interdependence (as in scenario 2 and 3) has negative consequences
for the suddenly “less needed” partner.
This feature is especially striking during the transition form CS to the integrated equilibrium
(IE) in SC. While the world gains from the transition are very mild (0.17% increase in world
consumption, 0.16% increase in wealth and 0.65% increase in produced capital) they are much
larger for country 1 (respectively 2.77%, 4.11% and 14.01%) and turn to losses for country
2 (respectively -2.3%, -3.69%, -17,20%). When the world turns into an integrated economy,
although it allows equalisation in consumption levels, this is made for the benefit of the country
relatively well endowed in the factor desired by both countries. Then, as long as FPE is
maintained, temporary shocks create movements in the production structures of countries 26
while maintaining consumption at equal levels in both countries.
As a consequence, country 1 is relatively better-o  if country 2 a) does not revert to CA and
b) stays under free trade so that the cost control property of international trade is still enforced.
Then, as both countries move the IE equilibrium, large gains can be expected for country 1
when factor prices finally equalise, even if country 2 losses out. We believe this scenario clearly
illustrates the problem of the time horizon. Should both countries consider the long run and all
the possible constrained steady-states, country 2 would revert to autarky and CA as asymmetry
is reduced. Country 1 would do the same as it would also be absolutely better-o  even if it looses
out in relative terms. 27 Alternatively, when considering only the most immediate (in terms of
time horizon) constrained steady-states (as in the scenarios), country 1 has every incentive to
keep the free trade agreement. Assuming that unilateral break away is impossible, country 2
in then stuck in a scenario that is not adapted to its structure of endowments.
It should finally be noted that although the burden of adjustment is shared in trade, it is
not shared the same way in CS and IE. Scenario 4 is especially telling in that respect. In CS,
scenario 4 results in larger losses across variables of interest for country 2 than for country 1.
One can think of the oil shocks of the 70’s as the perfect illustration of this situation. But
26. Although the production pattern being indeterminate, we only see the consequences on produced capital)
27. Under the lowest possible asymmetry (k = 1.01) in CA, consumption in country 1 is 61% of consumption
in country 2 in autarky, when it would be 64% of consumption in country 2 in SC.
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in IE, although wealth is reduce by more in country 2 because of the exogenous shock, the
endogenous response in stronger in country 1 (-6.86% for produced capital) than in country 2
(-4.76%) for produced capital. The “Integrated Economy” balances the equilibrium at the world
level, which in the context of depleting exhaustible resources, means transferring the burden of
adjustment to areas not subject to the new exogenous constraint. This is the finest example
of what interdependence and burden sharing imply under free trade. When interdependence is
maximised as in IE, even if country 2 might be better-o  in autarky, interdependence o ers a
form of protection that can not easily be dismissed.
The above conclusions do suggest that the opportunity to open-up to trade is strongly
dependent on the state of asymmetry and the state of the potential partners. A number of
archetypal countries emerge from the decision tree and the examination of the actual impact
of trade, listed below:
– Countries characterised by low asymmetry and an advantage in Ke and Kr. Those coun-
tries will favour continued accumulation and maintenance of their comparative advantage
(CA) and autarky.
– Countries characterised by high asymmetry and an advantage in Ke and Kr. Those
countries are likely to choose SC and autarky and might be willing to choose free trade
if partners are also characterised by high asymmetry under pressure of the production
sector. This could help balance the strong negative shock with rapid gains from trade.
– Countries characterised by high asymmetry and an advantage in Kl and Kp. Those
countries are likely to choose free trade, as the initial negative shock associated with
openness is the lowest possible and the benefits from access to scarce resources are likely
to be high.
– Countries characterised by low asymmetry and an advantage in Kl and Kp. Those coun-
tries are likely to choose autarky and would only open to trade in case of domestic scarcity
risks. In that situation, they could share the burden of adjustment to scarcity shocks with
their trading partner, especially under IE.
Those categories are arguably vague and demand an arbitrage between the need to ac-
cess foreign factors (when domestic factors are relatively scarce) and the losses incurred when
opening-up. What is certain is that a country 2 type in CA and low asymmetry has no incentive
to open-up to trade and a country 1 type and high asymmetry in endowments has every possible
incentives, especially if it can trade with country 2 types in SC. If relative position matters,
decisions to open-up are more likely in SC as this is the ultimate guarantee of convergence in
consumption levels in IE.
Those results, although quite original are not completely detached from the literature. The
250 Chapter 3. International Trade and Structural Change
problem of consistency between a given starting point and an optimal/sustainable path chosen
ex nihilo is already discussed by Bazhanov (2010). Our results also have parenthood with
the open economy Hartwick rule although we stress the importance of domestic endowment
reaction to an evolution of world prices. Considering world prices without the possibility of
a breakdown in FPE also misses the possibilities introduced by di erences in country factor
prices for sustainability.
We also show how asymmetry matters in international trade and sustainability. Interna-
tional trade does not necessarily provide incentives to reduce asymmetry or at least not in the
best possible manner from a country perspective. This clearly relates to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple as defined in chapter 1. We believe our results provide a rationale for low scale (regional
or national) management of instruments of wealth and stress the need to shield at least some
of those instruments from international trade. Interdependence has its benefits: cost control in
the production sector and “burden sharing” in the event of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless,
interdependence does not foster structural change or reductions in asymmetry. Indeed, inter-
dependence may even prevent factor intensity reversal or reduce reinvestment via movements
in global prices.
The application of the subsidiarity principle therefore calls for a form of protectionism in
the interest of structural change. This protectionism should be centred on critical instruments
of wealth and designed to promote a reduction in asymmetry. Our results also point at an
interesting consequence of interdependence. As is well-known in the trade literature, the Bal-
assa (1961) scale describes economic integration from the preferential trading area to the full
economic integration. We believe that sustainability concerns could provide a new rationale for
economic integration. If free trade results in undesirable specialisations while "burden sharing”
is needed (especially if strategic resources are involved) then economic integration may make
sense. It would also make sense as integration may reduce coordination costs, so that trade
liberalisation becomes a more attractive possibility.
This possibility is quite interesting on paper and would also add a layer on the subsidiarity
framework we presented in chapter 2. It would reduce the “grey area” of international trade
and promote international institutions for international instruments of wealth management.
There is however an issue, well illustrated by the current di culties of the European union.
The perimeter of economic integration should include in our model countries that have quite
asymmetric distributions in endowments. Still, those countries should have close enough insti-
tutions and norms to give legitimacy and enforcement power on the newly formed international
institutions. This balance between high enough asymmetry in endowments and institutional
sameness is not easily found. We discuss it further in the next chapter (see 4 section III).
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International trade is therefore a powerful tool of cost control and a way to share the
burden of adjustment to exogenous shocks. This means both spreading benefits and sharing
losses, under di erent patterns depending on the trade regime. In the final section we discuss
how sustainability rules should be amended using our results.
IV.3 Consequences for ANS and wealth management
As presented in chapter 2, there are numerous reasons to rethink the role of trade in sus-
tainability. Our model shows that even before starting to include concerns regarding intragen-
erational equity, uncertainty, precaution and option value, international trade has an impact
beyond capital gains.
We explored in this model the impact of structural change on sustainability. Our results
are certainly limited by methodological choices inherent to our production structure and HO
modelling. Nevertheless, we kept the main features of sustainability issues intact. As in Das-
gupta and Heal (1979), all factors are required in production. We also study the consequences
of expected substitution between factors as a consequence of the depletion of natural capi-
tal. Since we use an HO structure of trade, our results are not unrelated to the composition,
scale and technique e ects in Copeland and Taylor (2003). They nonetheless go beyond those
findings, mostly through the introduction of dynamic interdependence with four factors. Our
results finally shed additional light on the debate on the “responsibility for depletion” initiated
in the works on virtual sustainability by Proops et al. (1999), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003)
and Atkinson et al. (2012).
We focused on the impact of trade on structural change, monitoring the evolution of con-
sumption and wealth. We also investigated the composition of wealth related to concerns about
strong sustainability. Our first conclusion is that international trade of resources intensive goods
is detrimental to wealth, under our assumption regarding the structure of production. Domes-
tic management of wealth, through the shortest possible supply chain is the best outcome for
wealth (and consumption). An even better outcome is obtained when closed economies focus
on the endogenous management of the factor they are relatively well endowed with, as in the
CA case. Autarky or quasi-autarky is however not the rule. Once interdependence exists it
should be properly accounted for, for the best possible wealth management (in line with the
Hartwick rule).
We show how international trade, via factor prices (either domestic or world prices) changes
the incentives for factor use. In our setting capital gains are endogenous as in Hartwick (1995).
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Capital gains materialise in the evolution of factor price ratios when going from low to high
asymmetry in country 2. Conversely, capital losses are observed in country 1 for natural capital
as it becomes more abundant. Therefore, accounting for capital gains is only one side of the
story of international trade. What is needed is the implicit assumption build-in in our scenario.
Country 2 needs domestic reinvestment into produced capital or labour and country 1 needs
domestic reinvestment into natural capital to expand it, as reliance on labour is reduced.
Hence, Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) should be corrected for structural change. Extra savings
resulting from trading activities should be set aside to finance the development of endogenous
capital and substitution in exogenous variables (as in the transitional dynamics we present).
We hope it is by now clear that those are larger than the capital gains previously identified in
the literature. As capital gains are notoriously hard to estimate, it is worth considering how to
estimate those gains from trade related to structural change. Our model yields a simple answer
to this question. Those gains are equal to the amount saved in free trade compared to autarky
in the transitional dynamics. They are equal to the “cost control” amount we identified above.
Would the considered country still be in autarky, it would encounter neither the e ciency losses
from going to trade, neither the cost control gains. As a result autarky prices are all higher.
An estimate of the extra savings can be provided using the figures from the transitional
dynamics. Let us consider the SC case, in transition from low to high asymmetry. We estimate
that w1 increases by 41% less and e1 and r1 decrease by 4% more in free trade compared to
autarky. Multiplying those percentage by the low asymmetry equilibrium quantities lead to
gains from trade equivalent to 8.02% of steady-state income for country 1. The same calculation
yields a value of 5.48% of steady-state income in country 2. Those figures would represent a
significant addition to ANS as ANS for most countries are in a range of 3 to 10% of income.
It should also be noted that this magnitude would help reconcile ANS with more pessimistic
indicators of sustainability such as the ecological footprint. It suggests that both country 1 and
country 2 types of countries are currently not saving enough.
Saving those gains from trade would also provide a first solution to the debate about re-
sponsibility. It should be stressed that this solution rests upon the assumption of perfect sub-
stitutability, as it implies that capital not accumulated (or depleted) in country 2 and imported
in country 1 is reinvested in domestic capital there and vice versa. This solution involves inter-
national compensation between countries and therefore shared responsibility. It makes sense
even in terms of patterns of trade, as reduced asymmetry will diminish the volume of trade as it
diminishes the rationale for trade (as in any HO model). As countries use trade to slowly level
their endowments, trade becomes unnecessary and die out. The ironic but expectable result is
that sustainable trade is working for its own extinction.
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This does not mean however that all trade will disappear. It is time to stress again that
our model explores international trade in the context of sustainability under one motive for
trade. Other rationales for trade play a big role in today’s organisation: trade based on
di erences in productivity and trade based on variety gains. Trade can and will persist, as
extensively documented in the literature, for as long as productivity di erences will persist.
So will trade flows resulting from the willingness to pay for variety. But those flows are in
our view fundamentally di erent from flows of intermediate goods generated by structural
change and creating the global supply chain as we experience it today. Our model singles
out the gains from trade arising from asymmetry in endowments as the only gains needing
compensation on economic grounds. It is still open to discussion whether other forms of trade
require compensation based on a broader or amended definition of sustainability.
The final point of this long investigation has to do with the somewhat peculiar nature of the
gains from trade in our model. Those are relative gains from trade, generated by the di erent
manifestations of structural change compared to autarky. Our model actually predicts losses
form trade when going from autarky to free trade. Still, the finding that gains from trade
liberalisation can be expected is one of the most robust in economics, resilient to several tests
and model specifications. Based on the results of our model we stick to the position that trade
based on the international division of the productive processes does not generate gains in the
context of constant or decreasing returns to scale.
This observation leads us to believe that the main driver of the massive expansion of the
global supply chain is the materialisation of increasing returns to scale in production. In the
next and last chapter, we extend our analysis to this case, discussing the sources of increasing
returns to scale in production and the impact of their existence on sustainability. We end this
presentation with a set of robustness tests on our parameters, before concluding.
IV.4 Robustness and sensitivity checks
In this section we focus on the impact of the values taken by the parameters on the stability
of the model. We do not perform any additional test on the values for the asymmetry on
endowments. The values represented in the figures in section III.4 already cover the widest range
of values for which all the models (autarky, complete specialisation and integrated equilibrium)
are stable. Stability tends to break down for the CS model in the CA scenario if the parameters
are unchanged compared to lower asymmetry. Still, as our model is not calibrated on real
world data, this does not represent a challenge to the validity of our conclusions. If anything,
it suggests that the main functional relations (utility, production, etc.) are not stable across
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di erent phases of structural change.
We focused our tests on the values of the parameters. The parameters ﬂ and ” have been
calibrated as to be realistic, but their impact on our results is unambiguous. Higher ” values
increase produced capital depreciation so that the steady-state values for produced capital, con-
sumption and wealth are lowered for both countries and any level of asymmetry. Conversely,
higher ﬂ values increase the “bonus” associated with renewable resources. As a consequence,
steady-state values for renewable resources, consumption and wealth are higher in both coun-
tries. As country 1 is relatively more intensive in produced capital is it more sensitive to
variations of ”. The same is true for country 2 with ﬂ.
The two parameters we tested more thoroughly are – and  . We use the CS model to
conduct our robustness tests as it is the most comprehensive one. As discussed above, –
determines the allocation of factors between intermediate goods (see section II.1.1). Higher
– values make for a bigger share of endowments allocated to the intermediate goods forming
the comparative advantage in both countries (goods y1, y2, y4 and y5). As a consequence, the
volume of trade is likely to be bigger. To test the impact of the value of – on steady-stares
values we computed the steady-states corresponding to asymmetries k = 1.19 (for both IE and
CS equilibria) and k = 1.75 (in CS only). We run the test for two alternative values for –.
Results are displayed in tables 3.6 and 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Stressed values for – in the IE model
Robustness checks benchmark –=0,15 –=0,45 –=0,1 variation for –=0,45 variation for –=0,1
c 0,68 0,4684 0,7787 -31,12% 14,52%
W 8,0464 7,4365 8,3309 -7,58% 3,54%
Y 0,8001 0,5616 0,9113 -29,81% 13,90%
Kp 2,0464 1,4365 2,3309 -29,81% 13,90%
Kl 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
Ke 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
Kr 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
c1 0,34 0,2342 0,3894 -31,12% 14,52%
c2 0,34 0,2342 0,3894 -31,12% 14,52%
W1 4,1338 3,7234 4,3252 -9,93% 4,63%
W2 3,9126 3,7131 4,0058 -5,10% 2,38%
Y1 0,4104 0,2865 0,4682 -30,18% 14,08%
Y2 0,3897 0,2751 0,4431 -29,41% 13,72%
Kp,1 1,3238 0,9134 1,5152 -31,00% 14,46%
w 0,1 0,0702 0,1139 -29,81% 13,90%
p 0,0977 0,0977 0,0977 0,00% 0,00%
e 0,1 0,0702 0,1139 -29,81% 13,90%
r 0,1 0,0702 0,1139 -29,81% 13,90%
Kp,2 0,7226 0,5231 0,8158 -27,62% 12,88%
We observe that higher – values systematically reduce consumption, wealth and income in
both countries. Lower – values increase the steady-state levels of those key variables. Inter-
estingly, the overall reduction (at the global level) is the same in both CS and IE, but in CS
countries are not a ected the same way. Country 2 benefits (resp. su ers) the most from lower
(resp. higher) – values. The fact that the global impact is the same in CS and IE is proof
that the model is consistent. The fact that country 2 is more impacted by variations in – is
also consistent with our interpretation of the results. As country 2 has higher steady-states
consumption and wealth values, it is more impacted by evolutions in the volume of trade and
world prices. As seen through the scenario, country 1 benefits most from the “burden sharing”
property of international trade.
We follow the same strategy for the parameter   (Tables 3.8 and 3.9).   is a measure of
total factor productivity in the final good production function. We observe that lower   values
reduce consumption, income and wealth in all three settings (autarky, IE and CS). Conversely,
higher   values lead to higher consumption income and wealth. As with –, the global impacts
are similar under the CS and IE models, showing the robustness and consistency of the model.
As expected, autarky variations are higher. This value reflects the direct impact of   in that
model, when in CS and IE settings the impact of   is reduced by coordination costs.
IV. Discussion of the results 257
Ta
bl
e
3.
8:
St
re
ss
ed
va
lu
es
fo
r 
in
th
e
CS
m
od
el
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
ks
be
nc
hm
ar
k
 
=
0,
60
7
 
=
0,
7
 
=
0,
4
va
ria
tio
n
fo
r
 
=
0,
7
va
ria
tio
n
fo
r
 
=
0,
4
k=
1,
19
k=
1,
75
k=
1,
19
k=
1,
75
k=
1,
19
k=
1,
75
k=
1,
19
k=
1,
75
k=
1,
19
k=
1,
75
c
0,
67
88
86
0,
52
30
22
0,
82
72
79
0,
63
87
88
0,
37
65
1
0,
28
71
3
21
,8
6%
22
,1
3%
-4
4,
54
%
-4
5,
10
%
W
8,
03
31
5
7,
52
35
9
8,
45
87
6
7,
84
25
3
7,
16
59
1
6,
87
37
5,
30
%
4,
24
%
-1
0,
80
%
-8
,6
4%
Y
0,
79
83
45
0,
62
00
61
0,
96
54
65
0,
74
98
59
0,
45
78
1
0,
35
55
73
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
K
p
2,
03
31
5
1,
52
35
9
2,
45
87
6
1,
84
25
3
1,
16
59
1
0,
87
37
04
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
65
%
-4
2,
65
%
K
l
2
2
2
2
2
2
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
K
e
2
2
2
2
2
2
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
K
r
2
2
2
2
2
2
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
c 1
0,
33
08
35
0,
19
63
35
0,
40
26
33
0,
23
82
19
0,
18
45
34
0,
11
09
88
21
,7
0%
21
,3
3%
-4
4,
22
%
-4
3,
47
%
c 2
0,
34
80
51
0,
32
66
88
0,
42
46
46
0,
40
05
69
0,
19
19
76
0,
17
61
42
22
,0
1%
22
,6
2%
-4
4,
84
%
-4
6,
08
%
W
1
3,
97
03
6
2,
95
55
5
4,
21
32
6
3,
10
32
5
3,
47
54
1
2,
65
46
6,
12
%
5,
00
%
-1
2,
47
%
-1
0,
18
%
W
2
4,
06
27
9
4,
56
80
4
4,
24
55
4,
73
92
8
3,
69
05
4,
21
91
1
4,
50
%
3,
75
%
-9
,1
6%
-7
,6
4%
Y
1
0,
39
40
41
0,
23
11
29
0,
47
65
26
0,
27
95
12
0,
22
59
62
0,
13
25
41
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
65
%
Y
2
0,
40
43
04
0,
38
89
32
0,
48
89
38
0,
47
03
47
0,
23
18
48
0,
22
30
33
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
K
p
,1
1,
16
03
6
0,
70
55
51
1,
40
32
6
0,
85
32
46
0,
66
54
08
0,
40
45
98
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
w
1
0,
09
53
06
3
0,
03
94
06
4
0,
11
52
57
0,
04
76
55
4
0,
05
46
53
4
0,
02
25
97
6
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
65
%
-4
2,
66
%
p
1
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
e 1
0,
10
32
17
0,
18
64
13
0,
12
48
24
0,
22
54
36
0,
05
91
89
8
0,
10
68
99
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
65
%
-4
2,
65
%
r 1
0,
10
32
17
0,
18
64
13
0,
12
48
24
0,
22
54
36
0,
05
91
89
8
0,
10
68
99
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
65
%
-4
2,
65
%
K
p
,2
0,
87
27
93
0,
81
80
43
1,
05
55
0,
98
92
84
0,
50
05
02
0,
46
91
06
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
w
2
0,
10
53
18
0,
31
98
25
0,
12
73
64
0,
38
67
74
0,
06
03
94
4
0,
18
34
03
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
p
2
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
09
77
40
8
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
0,
00
%
e 2
0,
09
81
88
7
0,
06
54
34
1
0,
11
87
43
0,
07
91
31
5
0,
05
63
06
3
0,
03
75
23
1
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
r 2
0,
09
81
88
7
0,
06
54
34
1
0,
11
87
43
0,
07
91
31
5
0,
05
63
06
3
0,
03
75
23
1
20
,9
3%
20
,9
3%
-4
2,
66
%
-4
2,
66
%
258 Chapter 3. International Trade and Structural Change
Table 3.9: Stressed values for   in the IE model
Robustness checks benchmark  =0,607  =0,7  =0,4 variation for  =0,7 variation for  =0,4
k=1,19 k=1,19 k=1,19 k=1,19 k=1,19
c 0,6789 0,8287 0,3772 22,06% -44,44%
W 8,0332 8,4748 7,1735 5,50% -10,70%
Y 0,7983 0,9676 0,4588 21,19% -42,53%
Kp 2,0332 2,4748 1,1735 21,72% -42,28%
Kl 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
Ke 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
Kr 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00%
c1 0,3308 0,4143 0,1886 25,24% -43,00%
c2 0,3481 0,4143 0,1886 19,04% -45,82%
W1 3,9704 4,422 3,5466 11,37% -10,67%
W2 4,0628 4,0528 3,627 -0,24% -10,73%
Y1 0,394 0,4974 0,2331 26,23% -40,83%
Y2 0,4043 0,4701 0,2257 16,29% -44,19%
Kp,1 1,1604 1,612 0,7365 38,92% -36,52%
w 0,0953 0,1209 0,0574 26,90% -39,83%
p 0,0977 0,0977 0,0977 0,00% 0,00%
e 0,1032 0,1209 0,0574 17,17% -44,44%
r 0,1032 0,1209 0,0574 17,17% -44,44%
Kp,2 0,8728 0,8628 0,437 -1,14% -49,94%
A final comment should be made on the autarky model (figure 3.10. For lower values of
  we observe that steady-state produced capital, consumption and wealth fall in country 1.
However, in country 2 we see an increase in produced capital and wealth and an increase in
steady-state consumption for the low asymmetry steady-state. This seemingly odd result is
explained by the fact that this is the CS model. As productivity is reduced, all endowments
becomes de facto scarcer. As a result country 2 has to invest more into produced capital to
obtain the same contribution from the factor. Therefore, in high asymmetry consumption falls
while steady-state wealth and produced capital are higher.
When asymmetry is lower, the basic mechanism is the same except that the price reaction
to lower productivity is milder from reduced asymmetry. As a consequence, the representative
agent increases consumption as well as wealth and produced capital. This mechanism could
be expected from the bell-shaped evolution of consumption with asymmetry in the model (see
figure 3.16). It stresses the importance of considering asymmetry in endowments in a dynamic
setting. This final remark concludes our presentation of the robustness checks for the model.
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Table 3.10: Stressed values for   in the autarky model
Robustness
checks
benchmark  =0,607  =0,7  =0,4 variation for  =0,7 variation for  =0,4
k=1,19 k=1,75 k=1,19 k=1,75 k=1,19 k=1,75 k=1,19 k=1,75 k=1,19 k=1,75
c 0,678886 0,523022 1,45423 1,02084 0,673806 0,468293 114,21% 95,18% -0,75% -
10,46%
W 8,03315 7,52359 10,2777 9,02867 8,02847 7,43615 27,94% 20,00% -0,06% -1,16%
Y 0,798345 0,620061 1,67245 1,1841 0,793059 0,561484 109,49% 90,97% -0,66% -9,45%
Kp 2,03315 1,52359 4,27771 3,02867 2,02847 1,43615 110,40% 98,79% -0,23% -5,74%
Kl 2 2 2 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Ke 2 2 2 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Kr 2 2 2 2 2 2 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
c1 0,330835 0,196335 0,682454 0,357 0,317222 0,167312 106,28% 81,83% -4,11% -
14,78%
c2 0,348051 0,326688 0,771777 0,663839 0,356584 0,300981 121,74% 103,20% 2,45% -7,87%
W1 3,97036 2,95555 4,81194 3,28973 3,7593 2,74303 21,20% 11,31% -5,32% -7,19%
W2 4,06279 4,56804 5,46577 5,73894 4,26918 4,69313 34,53% 25,63% 5,08% 2,74%
Y1 0,394041 0,231129 0,78269 0,406496 0,371142 0,192756 98,63% 75,87% -5,81% -
16,60%
Y2 0,404304 0,388932 0,889761 0,777602 0,421918 0,368728 120,07% 99,93% 4,36% -5,19%
Kp,1 1,16036 0,705551 2,00194 1,03973 0,949298 0,493027 72,53% 47,36% -
18,19%
-
30,12%
w1 0,0953063 0,0394064 0,164431 0,0580711 0,077971 0,027536572,53% 47,36% -
18,19%
-
30,12%
p1 0,0977408 0,0977408 0,0977416 0,0977403 0,09774080,09774080,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
e1 0,103217 0,186413 0,241571 0,406498 0,11455 0,192756 134,04% 118,06% 10,98% 3,40%
r1 0,103217 0,186413 0,241571 0,406498 0,11455 0,192756 134,04% 118,06% 10,98% 3,40%
Kp,2 0,872793 0,818043 2,27577 1,98894 1,07918 0,943127 160,75% 143,13% 23,65% 15,29%
w2 0,105318 0,319825 0,27462 0,777602 0,130221 0,368728 160,75% 143,13% 23,65% 15,29%
p2 0,0977408 0,0977408 0,0977408 0,0977408 0,09774080,09774080,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
e2 0,0981887 0,0654341 0,186926 0,111086 0,08863820,052675590,37% 69,77% -9,73% -
19,50%
r2 0,0981887 0,0654341 0,186926 0,111086 0,08863820,052675590,37% 69,77% -9,73% -
19,50%
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Conclusion
In this chapter we o er a review of dynamic trade models, highlighting the most recent
attempts to mesh together dynamic trade models and sustainability/environmental concerns
(Atkinson et al. 2012, Bogmans and Withagen 2010, Van der Ploeg 2010). We stressed how
a dynamic model for sustainability assessment, taking into account both the distribution of
endowments and the price regime (endogenous/exogenous) was missing. Based on the definition
of open economy sustainability in chapter 2 we insist that such a model should consider the
consequences of interdependence, structural change and asymmetry in a range of instruments
of wealth to provide lessons for sustainability. We then propose as a first step towards a
comprehensive model, a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model with 2 countries, 5 goods and
4 factors. The model is based on a production structure adapted from Cuñat and Ma ezzoli
(2004).
Under this structure, international trade of the 5 intermediates goods takes place when
countries open up to trade. We find international trade to reduce consumption and wealth, an
unorthodox result. This feature of the model illustrates the dilemma for sustainability associ-
ated with international trade, the choice between diversification and specialisation. In autarky,
all instruments of wealth enter production in a symmetric manner. This is a consequence of
our assumption that all the instruments of wealth are equality important and needed in pro-
duction. Under free trade, production needs to be reorganised around intermediate goods as
those goods are relatively intensive in one instrument of wealth. This provides the rationale
for trade, but decreases the overall e ciency of production as production factors now needs to
be split between five sectors. Hence, international trade has an important impact on the use of
domestic instrument of wealth: this is a trade-induced composition e ect.
We observe that in line with standard HO theory, higher asymmetry in the distribution of
wealth provides a greater incentive to trade. The larger the potential productive reorganisation,
the larger the gains from trade. All countries, regardless of their comparative advantage should
therefore strive to reduce asymmetry in endowments. This reduction can be obtained either by
reinforcing the country’s comparative advantage (the CA scenario) or by undertaking structural
change (SC), substitution of produced capital for natural capital. We find that choosing one
of those possibilities against the other will have an impact on the incentive to liberalise trade.
The decision to pursue one strategy against the other should be made depending on the
level of asymmetry. If asymmetry in endowments is low then the exhaustible resources intensive
country (country 2) has no incentive to liberalise trade and will be better-o  pursuing the CA
scenario. Country (relatively intensive in labour and produced capital) is then in the worst
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relative situation although it is in absolute terms better-o  than under high asymmetry in
endowments. If asymmetry in endowments is high, country 2 is better-o  pursuing the SC
scenario. It then makes sense to liberalise trade as trade makes the transition to low asymmetry
constrained steady-states less costly, even if both countries face an initial strong negative shock.
Once engaged in international trade, it is in country 2’s best interest to return to autarky as
soon as asymmetry in endowments is reduced enough. The best scenario would be for country
2 to revert to the CA case. Nonetheless, country 1 would not agree to end the trade agreement
as it would end-up relatively worse-o  in autarky and would face a relatively higher cost to
pursue the reduction of asymmetry. International trade allows both countries to share the
burden of asymmetric shocks, a property that benefits country 1 the most in case of symmetric
shocks. If shocks are asymmetric, the country where the shock takes place is most a ected in
the complete specialisation (CS) trade setting. If asymmetry is low enough for the integrated
equilibrium (IE) to be enforced, then the partner country (i.e. the country where the shock did
not take place) is most a ected.
Those results stress how international trade brings interdependence, with important conse-
quences for sustainability. International trade shapes the distribution of instruments of wealth
in all trading countries, encouraging specialisation to generate gains from trade. Investment
and depletion decisions do not depend solely on domestic factors but also on the situation of
the trading partners. Although we assume that both countries aim for a reduction in asym-
metry, our scenarios illustrate how country specific shocks will impact positively or negatively
sustainability in all the trading countries. As a consequence, sustainability assessment cannot
a ord to ignore the dynamics of the international environment to assess a given country course.
A diagnosis on the rationale for trade liberalisation (or trade restriction) should be applied.
We also consider how Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) increases interdependence by enforc-
ing a common price system. Convergence in consumption levels can be reached under SC with
FPE, but it costs both countries compared to autarky. We also find the impact of shocks to be
higher and FPE to be likely to break down considering the relatively low level of asymmetry for
which it can occur. From a sustainability perspective, international trade should therefore be
managed depending on the incentives for domestic reinvestment. Opening up to trade without
considering either the global environment or the likely resulting domestic reinvestment path
paves the way for lower wealth and consumption.
The timing of trade liberalisation is critical to its success. Our results stress that countries
should be ready to withstand the initial negative shock and makes the most of the “burden
sharing” property of trade. This suggests that entering trade might not be the best option
for every country with every potential partner at all time. Our results show that trade is
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more profitable when implemented between country with asymmetric distributions but the
same development strategy. Hence, our results provides a rationale for economic integration
between dissimilar countries. This result is interesting in the light of the recent di culties
in economic areas trying an integration “amongst equals”. From a sustainability perspective,
it seems more promising to undertake liberalisation between countries that are institutionally
similar but dissimilar in endowments. This point in debated in chapter 4 section III.
Since international trade creates interdependence, trade liberalisation should always be
managed using corrective institutions. Some trade flows should be limited or banned if they
work against sustainability. We stressed in chapter 2 how the subsidiarity principle and the need
to preserve diversification could legitimise the use of trade management instruments to foster
early attempts to diversify. In a similar vein, we believe that trade management instruments
could be legitimately used to protect trade relations that are sustainably managed and work for
a reduction of asymmetry. Even before discussing exterior tari s, the negotiation of preferential
agreements on sustainability grounds should be undertaken.
In the meantime, a more accurate picture of sustainability on a country-by-country basis can
be obtained amending the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS). We saw how a reduction in asymmetry
in the distribution of endowments was less costly in free trade than in autarky. Those gains
constitute the main rationale for opening-up to trade in high asymmetry. We propose to
save those gains from trade to finance structural change. Those resources can legitimately be
mobilised for structural change, as an alternative autarky path would have been to the benefit
of the wider society. It is therefore sensible that the gains from trade liberalisation are uses for
to reduce asymmetry and to improve social utility. Trade management instruments could be
used to return those gains to the social planner.
Sustainability demands a di erential treatment for the gains from trade. We propose to
save and reinvest the gains from trade-induced specialisation. Those are the only gains from
trade in our model. Saving and reinvesting those gains is especially important over concerns
regarding the future level of real substitutability between instruments of wealth. In that sense,
our model is the theoretical background behind the measures of “virtual sustainability”. High
rates or resources embodied in trade flows are not per se a problem. But they clearly are a
strong message of trade-induced un-sustainability when domestic investment is inadequate.
Other sources of comparative advantage exist in the real world, generating other kinds of
trade flows. The pattern of trade in our model is inter-industry: countries trade intermediate
goods from di erent sectors. Still, the majority of international trade is conducted today
on an intra-industry basis. Intra-industry trade is based on the existence of economies of
scale. In the next chapter we investigate the consequences of increasing returns to scale on our
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recommendation regarding the reinvestment of the gains from trade.
Inter- and intra-industry patterns of trade are associated with di erent gains from trade.
We saw a qualitative analysis of trade flows is needed in the context of uncertainty regarding
substitutability. To clarify the respective role of inter- and intra- industry trade in structural
change we proceed to study the links between resource abundance and the nature of trade.
Our analysis provided a renewed rationale for economic integration. Still, our results are based
on countries that are similar in every respect but the distribution of their endowments. We
therefore investigate further the links between international trade and institutional settings,
using natural experiment to see how institutional similarities matter to explain sustainability
performance. Those results should allow us to sharpen our recommendations regarding trade
liberalisation and sustainability.

Chapter 4
Increasing returns to scale and
institutions: Sustainability and
interdependence
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Introduction
In chapter 3, we present an amendment based on the gains from trade for Adjusted NetSavings (ANS). This amendment is based on the e ciency gains from trade resulting from
lower factor prices in the process of convergence towards low asymmetry equilibrium. This
theoretical model also yielded interesting insights into the respective positions of country one
types countries (relatively intensive in labour and produced capital) and country two types
(relatively intensive in exhaustible resources) countries.
Comparisons of the CA and SC scenarios show that when countries do not exert control
on the accumulation of the same factors, resource-rich countries are better-o  managing ex-
haustible resources in autarky. The situation is di erent when both countries are accumulating
the same kind of capital. In that case, free-trade with a view on an integrated equilibrium
might be promising especially if, based on other sources of gains from trade, free trade yields
wealth and consumption gains compared to autarky. Finally, we insisted on the role of asym-
metry in endowments. Reduction in asymmetry is in any situation a desirable outcome, as it
systematically yields higher consumption and wealth steady states levels in the setup of the
model.
Under constant returns to scale (CRS), no productivity gains from allocating more resources
to the comparative advantage goods can make free trade more interesting (see model in chapter
3). The idea that international trade may result in a costly reorganisation of production so that
countries are better o  in autarky leads to many questions. Should this theoretical prediction be
empirically validated, the commonly observed gains from trade (Bernhofen and Brown 2005)
would constitute a puzzle. What kind of gains may make free trade more interesting than
autarky?
In this chapter we start by providing a potential source for those gains from trade, based on
the international organisation of production under increasing returns to scale (IRS). When the
international division of the productive processes generates IRS, trade should be beneficial as
IRS may outweigh the additional costs from the domestic reorganisation of production to exploit
comparative advantages. The role of IRS in international trade has been largely investigated
from early empirical evidence in Leontief (1953) and Grubel and Lloyd (1975) to the theoretical
formulations in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1980) and Lancaster (1980).
The sources of IRS in international trade can be internal to the firm. In this situation
agglomeration forces push for the concentration of economic activity (Krugman 1991) to benefit
from those internal economies of scale. Conversely, external economies of scale can be derived
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from the size of the market. A final source of IRS in international trade comes from the
international division of productive processes (IDPP) as presented in Berger (2006) or Friedman
(2005). The formation of a global supply chain by the IDPP is largely a consequence of the
IRS derived from the increased division of labour. This is the situation that is most relevant
for sustainability studies.
We start this chapter by presenting in the context of sustainability the Ethier (1982) model
of international trade. This model stresses the di erence between “national” returns to scale
resulting from geographical concentration of production and “international” returns to scale
resulting from the international division of labour. The framework set by Ethier shed light on
some of our findings in chapter 3. It shows how increasing returns to scale are going to be
more important as asymmetry is reduced, providing a rationale for opening-up to trade even if
autarky is more appealing in the short-run. Convergence to less asymmetrical steady-states will
yield consumption and wealth gains. This brings back our model in chapter 3 in the mainstream
conclusions of the trade literature, although estimates of the extra gains from trade are not
studied.
Based on our exploration of the CA scenario in chapter 3 and the Ethier (1982) model we
assess the importance of another feature in the model. Ethier shows that intra-industry trade
is associated with complementarity (see proposition 11). This means that countries converging
towards what we described as low-asymmetry steady-states should have a predominantly inter-
industry trade structure. Indeed, convergence reduces the incentive for inter industry trade as
di erences in endowments fades. In Ethier’s setting, IRS do not impact the domestic factor
allocation as set by usual HO technology. Still, they do change factor prices which will have a
impact on the dynamics of accumulation.
The impact of IRS can be assimilated to a positive externality, making market prices diverge
from shadow prices. Given that a country relies heavily on some factor endowments without
reducing asymmetry, then its trade will remain dominated by inter-industry trade in goods
intensive in the considered endowments. In the setting of chapter 3 this means that a country
failing to follow the Hartwick rule will also have a strong interindustrial trade pattern in natural
resource intensive goods. If this relationship holds over time, international trade will reinforce
this pattern and can play against sustainability, as assessed by domestic conditions.
To explore this insight, we turn back to the logic of the scenarios and the notion that
countries may di er in nature depending on which kind of factor are primarily accumulated.
As in the CA scenario, we use the literature on the resource curse to explore the behaviour of
resource rich countries which have an incentive to accumulate natural resources (i.e. rely more
on the stock in total output) as in a Dutch Disease scenario. We could argue against this in a
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dynamic perspective using our model. Still it is rational at least in the short run to rely on the
comparative advantage from natural resources.
The literature on the resource curse stress that this may lead to institutional issues, so that
trade-induced specialisation and institutions may interplay into wasting some of the natural re-
sources rent. We argue that although the literature has so far focused on the role of institutions
and considered trade incentives as given if not optimal, the two are impossible to disentangle
in a dynamic perspective. One should therefore not discard the possible need to act on trade
flows so that unsustainable consumption of natural resources rent can be avoided.
We illustrate this point by investigating empirically how country 2 types countries in CA
(fostering its comparative advantages) seem to face empirically two paths towards a reduction
of asymmetry. Our archetypal country may either reduce asymmetry through depletion of
natural capital prior to accumulation of another form of capital. It then struggles to accumu-
late produced capital as a resource poor country. It could instead increase its endowment in
produced capital by sound reinvestment of the rent, as in the Hartwick rule. In this second
scenario, reduction is asymmetry is obtained by increasing the share of other instruments of
wealth, not by diminishing the amount of the abundant instrument, natural capital.
We present those two paths using the trade profile of resource abundant countries, demon-
strating how the one-way versus two-ways nature of trade in resource intensive goods may be
used as an indicator of the path followed by a resource rich country. We show that countries
engaged in possible excessive depletion tend to engage in one-way trade in natural resources
intensive goods. An indicator of sustainable use of natural resources is therefore two-ways
trade in natural resource intensive goods. This empirical test stress the role of trade flows as
an indicator of sustainability and the fact that trade flows shape as much as they are shaped
by domestic conditions, notably specialisation.
The feedback mechanism by which trade is shaping institutions and setting the pattern of
resources allocation still evades us. What is missing to estimate the respective impact of trade
and institutions on resource allocation is an estimate of the weight of institutions on allocation.
This is the famous theory of co-evolution between economic conditions and institutions (Arrow
et al. 2010). Establishing such a theory is beyond the scope of this chapter. Still, we propose a
natural experiment which might help with shaping such a theory. We present a sustainability
assessment for the Russian Federation and we propose a comparison between Russia and its
neighbours. We use this assessment to stress the importance of counterfactual studies (Hamilton
et al. 2006) as policy design instruments and indicators of sustainability.
We conclude that institutions are likely to have the strongest influence on the dynamic of
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development, as captured by ANS. Therefore, resource rich economies are better understood
by accounting for their regional characteristics (culture, politics and history) than by simply
focusing on the rent from natural resources. From this premise, it makes sense to account for
institutions in the dynamic part of the theory and to save trade impacts for a period by period
price setting mechanism 1.
In section I we present our analysis of the Ethier (1982) model and its implications for
sustainability. Section II reviews briefly the findings of the literature on the Dutch disease and
the resource curse to illustrate the role of intra-industry trade in sustainability approaches.
Finally, in section III we present an application of sustainability tools to the Russian case,
stressing the crucial role of institutions and the usefulness of counterfactual studies to assess
sustainable development.
I The Ethier model: IRS and international trade
In chapter 3 we presented a model based on the international division of labour. This
model, built on domestic Cobb-Douglass functions, exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS). We
conclude that focusing on domestic consumption and wealth only, countries (regardless of the
distribution of their factor endowments) should stay under autarky while undertaking structural
change. This conclusion is based on the cost of developing sectors producing intermediate goods
that will be traded to exploit comparative advantages.
This conclusion although strong and motivated is inconsistent with the reality of trade,
which saw an increase in trade in intermediate goods, after the second world war, culminating
in the formation of the global supply chain. As presented in Friedman (2005), the global supply
chain was boosted by lower coordination costs induced by the new communication technologies
and the internet. This latest wave of globalisation and economic integration started in the
1990’s and did not abate before the 2008 financial crisis. Although the association of lower
coordination and transaction costs, intra-industry trade and increasing trade flows are presented
together as motives for the development of the global supply chain, the rationale for developing
intra-industry trade is more confused.
Indeed inter-industry trade can make intuitive sense for the “consumption of services” from
capital theory. If a given good providing unique services is not available in the domestic econ-
omy, it makes sense to trade to obtain it. The rationale for developing some elements of national
1. This setting would in fact be a more complex version of the model in chapter 3 if a unique and stable
equilibrium can be found.
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production against others or even abandoning some productions that are still in demand, al-
ready makes less sense. It may explain the popularity of explanations based on comparative
advantages. As we discussed at length in previous chapters, the emerging sustainability field
relied mostly on those analytical tools aggregated in the neoclassical trade theory.
Authors in the field were not so much interested in how trade generated interdependence
in line with our analysis in chapter 3, but more in the way international trade a ected the
consequences of domestic shocks on the domestic economy. In chapter 2 we showed how this
leads to the elaboration of the Copeland and Taylor model for the composition, scale and
technique e ect, and to the assimilation of trade to productivity shocks over long intervals.
Intra-industry trade came as a puzzle for the first authors confronted to its rise as a share
of world trade. It came as a new reason for critique to authors already opposing the logic of the
comparative advantage (Daly 1992). Authors seeing any reduction of trade flows as a gain for
the environment welcome reductions in intra-industry trade, perceived as especially malignant
and harmful to both citizens and the environment. Authors less critical of trade looked for the
consequences of trade on the divide between inter and intra-industry trade. Cole and Elliott
(2003b), working on the pollution haven hypothesis, investigate the role of pollution regulation
in explaining the weight of intra-industry trade.
The pollution haven hypothesis is intimately related to intra-industry trade as both share
a common motive: increasing returns to scale (IRS). Further di erence should be introduced
between intra-industry trade in intermediate goods and intra-industry trade in consumption
goods. When considering trade in intermediates, IRS in the production of a dirty good help
in creating a pollution haven and keep the country specialised despite rising income. Even
in the literature on trade and the environment, where several trade models and settings have
been applied to the pollution haven hypothesis, the exploration of the potential impact of
intra-industry trade remains limited.
IRS are the basis for intra-industry trade. To understand why, one should explore, as
presented in Ethier (1979a), the reasons behind those returns. IRS emerge conventionally from
fixed costs in production linked to learning by doing. Any activity requires an initial investment
of time and resources, but as more units get produced, the benefit of the knowledge/resources
invested get repaid in full. This conventional view is the basis of the famous works by Krugman
(1980, 1981) which stress the role of variety gains from trade in intra-industry trade. This
explanation is complementary to the Lancaster (1980) view on product di erentiation and the
seminal work by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) on monopolistic competition.
This first segment in the literature provided an elegant rationale for intra-industry trade in
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consumption goods and still is the source of numerous articles. A second explanation for IRS
is explored by Ethier (1979a), born from the international division of labour. Going back to
Smith, Ethier shows that the logic of the division of labour behind the pin manufacture in a
cost-free world (both in assembly and transportation) should not be limited to the domestic
economy. Ever increasing division of labour segments the production process with increased
specialisation of the sub-components and helps productivity improvements, creating on the way
new products. One may consider an example of spare parts such as car seats which used to be
assembled with cars in the same factory and are now the main product of independent firms.
Ethier draws a clear di erence between those economies of scale that depend on the size of the
world market ( bigger countries have more opportunities to segment production processes) and
domestic, “plant-size” economies brought by agglomeration forces and product di erentiation.
IRS described by both explanations will generate gains from trade. As assumptions di er,
so will the nature of those gains. As we saw in the previous chapter, the nature of the gains
can make an important di erence from a sustainability perspective. Gains from trade arising
from variety and learning by doing are quite similar to the Ricardian gains from trade, in
the sense that they emerge from domestic characteristics, not directly from interdependence.
As such (and as presented in chapter 2), they are either already taken into account by current
sustainability theory and measures, or should be considered a bonus demanding no amendments.
Gains emerging from the international division of labour are di erent in nature. They
provide an explanation for the observed intra-industry trade in intermediate goods 2 and for
the resulting global supply chain. They impact domestic resource allocation too. Intuitively,
realising those gains from trade will require increased interdependence and further integration
of the world economy. As such, those gains may demand further amendments to sustainability
measures.
The Ethier model is presented through several articles (Ethier 1979a,b, 1982) and describes
the impact of IRS based on the division of labour on international trade theory. Puzzled, Ethier
notes in those articles that the IRS he studies seem to warrant little interest. He thought at
the time this could be explained by the conjunction of theoretical di culties in establishing the
framework, the existence of other more seducing explanations and the youth of the empirical
evidence.
Thirty years later, the model is now well-known, but still gets less credit than it deserves (in
our humble opinion). We strongly believe that the need for a sustainability theory should elicit
renewed interest in the model. To our knowledge, it is still the most relevant to the analysis we
2. Which is a broader aggregate including intra-firm trade, similar in rationale and impact in the theoretical
model we use.
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are about to conduct. In chapter 3 we presented extensively the dynamics of our Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In this chapter, we focus on comparative statics. This method is su cient enough
to study how IRS will impact the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, notably those
on the consequences for Adjusted Net Savings.
I.1 The final goods model and the allocation curve
The first part of the Ethier model is presented in the 1979a article. The problem with the
construction of a theoretical model incorporating IRS is that IRS tend to generate multiple
equilibria, which in turns introduce arbitrary picking within those equilibria for comparison
purposes. Ethier introduces a simple solution to solve this. By summarising the standard
technology on which factor allocation is based into one function, the model guarantees the
uniqueness of the equilibrium. Another concern emerges from the impossibility to use marginal
pricing. Ethier uses the assumption of free entry to justify the fact that firms will stick to
average pricing. The possibility of new competition if prices rise above this level is assumed to
be deterring enough.
Hence, even if the equilibria in the model are not Pareto-optimal, they are unique and
stable. Those sensitive issues out of the way, IRS help to bring the concerns regarding relative
size in the equation. The central theme of the model is the interdependence of world industrial
activity, although this first part mostly deals with the consequences for usual inter-industry
trade. The world economy is composed of 2 countries exchanging manufactures (M) and wheat
(W). Economies are dissimilar in factor endowments.
Manufactures are produced using produced capital K and wheat using natural capital N .
The domestic country is assumed to be produced capital intensive and the foreign country is
natural capital intensive. The production of manufactures is subject to IRS. Domestic scale of
manufacturing is represented by the parameter m. m is obtained via the concave production
possibility frontier presenting the relation between wheat and manufactures. This production
function is neoclassical, of the Heckscher-Ohlin type:
m= T (W ) (4.1)
mú = S(W ú) (4.2)
* indicates the foreign country. As manufacturing is characterised by IRS, the extent of
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economies of scale is given by the parameter k, defined as:
k © M
m
(4.3)
kú © M
ú
mú
(4.4)
As was made clear above, k and kú depend on world production and on the development of
manufacturing in both countries. Assuming a world increase of 1% in m+mú raises M +Mú
by –%, free-trade implies that:
kú = k = (m+mú)–≠1 (4.5)
With – > 1 3. To solve the problem of multiple equilibria, Ethier further assumes T Õ < SÕ for
a given point where average output between countries is equal. This is equivalent to assuming
relative intensity in produced capital in the home country under an HO structure 4. Finally,
Ethier assumes that the world always spends a constant proportion of income “ on manufactures
to set the demand function.
Ethier then interrogates the e ciency of output, understood as both countries output being
on the production frontier. He notes that this is equivalent to maximising m+mú constrained
by maximising feasible output of wheat W +W ú. As – is a constant, optimal allocation does
not depend on the magnitude of economies of scale. This leads to proposition 1:
P1: Internationally increasing returns to scale have no e ect upon the e cient patterns of
production
The shapes of T(W) and S(W*) will determine the e cient allocation. Ethier is keen to stress
that the proposition merely underlines what should happen for production e ciency, and this
is only a matter of allocation between manufactures and wheat. It is highly relevant to our
point to present the example he uses to show the consequences on output.
Consider the following home production possibility, where manufactures are expressed as a
function of wheat:
M = kT (W ) = [T (W )+mú]–≠1T (W ) (4.6)
3. As noted in Ethier (1979a) an important simplifying assumption to this result is that k and kú have
identical definitions. k and kú do not depend alone on m and mú respectively, that is the starting point from
CRS.
4. As stated by the author, this also means than under CRS domestic country has a comparative advantage
in manufactures, in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
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Figure 4.1: Production shares with IRS
Source: Ethier (1979a)
This function is reduced toM =T (W )– if foreign manufacturing does not contribute to domestic
production. Otherwise, it becomes meaningless to talk about a domestic production frontier
as domestic production depends on foreign production. Only the world level production set
can be considered. Let us consider figure 4.1 showing the world production frontier, the curve
ABCD. Under the assumption that domestic country is produced-capital intensive, the foreign
country specialises in wheat and the domestic country produces both goods along AB.
Between B and C both country produce both goods, and between D and C home specialises
in manufactures while foreign country produces both goods. The domestic production bloc
is FABE, and the world production frontier is above, between B and C because the foreign
country shifts the domestic production possibilities as it starts producing manufactures itself.
Hence, both the IRS e ect and the shift in production patterns are at play between B and C.
An interesting case echoing our concerns regarding FPE is the case where T is everywhere
steeper than S. In that case, complete specialisation happens as it makes sense to centralise
the production of manufactures in the home country (since again T is everywhere steeper).
This does not mean that the production of intermediates should be concentrated in the home
country. Still, in that setting B = C and when reaching B from A, the production frontier
jumps straight to a level equivalent to D. In this example, the patterns of production of the
goods we observed in chapter 3 are still observable.
A breakdown in FPE linked to high asymmetry in factor endowments creates complete
specialisation, and a jump from one equilibrium where one country specialises to the equilibrium
where the other country specialises. In line with proposition 1 we see that the pattern of
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production is determined solely by the shape (steepness) of the home and foreign production
function, but that the level of output integrates the contribution of IRS. This property of
international economies of scale is fundamental to our conclusion.
The second important contribution of Ethier (1979a) is the technique of the allocation curve.
To present it, we must briefly outline the challenges laid by finding the free-trade equilibrium
with IRS. In autarky, international IRS and national IRS are by definition the same. Let PHD be
the home relative demand price of wheat in terms of manufactures. This is the price that will
equate demand and supply for any level of W and corresponding M . With IRS, average cost
pricing is applied, disciplined by free entry. Based on the assumption regarding the demand
function:
PHD =
(1≠“)T (W )–
“W
(4.7)
Sensibly, the relative price is the ratio of the demand addressed to the manufacturing sector
(where production is in autarky without economies of scale) over the demand addressed to the
wheat sector. The home relative supply price pins down the production equilibrium in terms
of W and M :
PHS =≠kT Õ (4.8)
PHS =≠T (W )–≠1T Õ(W ) (4.9)
The intersection of the two curves gives the equilibrium price:
PH =≠T (W Õ)–≠1T Õ(W Õ) (4.10)
With the corresponding equilibrium value for W which solves ≠T Õ(W ) = (1≠“)T (W )“W . As the
demand prices curve is cut from below by the supply prices curve, the equilibrium price and
quantities are stable. Output increases for as long as the demand price is superior to the supply
price and vice-versa. In line with the literature on domestic returns to scale, it is clear from
4.10 that the equilibrium price depends positively on the scale variable T (W ). The larger the
country, the bigger the domestic economies of scale and the higher the autarky price.
We are now facing a problem. Proposition 1 states that the comparative advantage will
be determined under IRS as with CRS due to the fact that production patterns are the same.
Defining comparative advantage with respect to autarky prices leads us to believe it depends
on domestic economies of scale of the traditional fashion.
To solve this elegantly, Ethier (1979a) suggests the allocation curves technique. Consider
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Figure 4.2: International trade equilibria and allocation curves
Source: Ethier (1979a)
figure 4.2, where threeW/W ú diagrams are drawn. The scale of manufactures production can be
deduced from 4.1 and 4.2. The domestic curve AB links a given level W produced domestically
to the foreign level W* that will allow for equilibrium in the domestic economy. For a given
level of wheat output W +W ú and the related manufactures production [T (W )+S(W )ú]–, the
resulting world demand price sets the combination (W,W ú) on an allocation curve if world
markets are cleared with PD = PHS .
Hence, on the allocation curve PD = PHS it follows logically that PD < PHS is above the
allocation curve and PD > PHS is below respectively. Points E in each panel represents the
maximum reachable level of domestic wheat production, so that (W ú0 ,E,W0,0) rectangles are
production sets. The domestic allocation curve is given by the lowest segment inside the
rectangle, so that it is W ú0ADW0 in diagram (a), CB in diagram (b) and FB in diagram (c).
The international equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two allocation curves. As in
the example above, the nature of the intersection gives the specialisation patterns for countries.
In sub-figure (b) both countries diversify, as W ”= W ú ”= 0. As there is an interior solution,
PHS = PFS in equilibrium, and T Õ = SÕ. As in the example above, if T is everywhere steeper
because of high asymmetry in endowments, then there is no intersection. Remember that since
the domestic country is more produced capital intensive, T is steeper than S, which guarantees
uniqueness of equilibrium.
In the high-asymmetry case, T is everywhere steeper, which (as factor price equalisation
breaks down) leads to complete specialisation. In (a) the domestic country completely spe-
cialises in manufactures and in (c), the foreign country specialises into wheat. From this
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demonstration Ethier concludes that the patterns of production are in line with proposition 1,
vindicating it as the rule to identify comparative advantages against autarky prices. Regardless
of the size of the country and the domestic economies of scale, the equilibrium pattern under
international trade will reflect the CRS pattern.
The reader is referred to the remainder of the article for a more in depth formal demonstra-
tion and the exploration of the case where T Õ and SÕ are constant. We shall now turn to the
intermediate goods trade, happening in the background of the trade in final goods described
until this point. Trade in intermediate goods is important as it is the source of the IRS moti-
vating the article. To fully explore this aspect, we start with the proposition 6 from the 1982
article. We continue with the discussion on the trade of intermediate goods.
P6: Internationally decreasing costs imply a presumption that a greater similarity of T (W )
and S(W )ú results in a larger volume of trade in intermediate manufactured goods, both
absolutely and relatively to the volume of inter-industry trade.
Large di erences in T (W ) and S(W ) get the foreign country to specialise, leading to the
exchange of wheat against all the intermediate components of manufactures, that is pure inter-
industry trade. Conversely, if endowments are similar, then incentives for inter-industry trade
disappear while intra-industry trade rises boosted by growing production of manufactures in
both countries. In the limiting case where S = T international trade consists only of intra-
industry trade. The larger the international scale economies k, the bigger the e ect. There is
therefore substitution of intra-industry trade for inter-industry trade as asymmetry in endow-
ments decreases. This result, now quite standard in trade theory, will be discussed after the
presentation of the 1982 extension of the model.
I.2 The intermediate goods model
The second part of the Ethier model in the 1982 article is dedicated to the analysis of trade
in intermediates. It follows naturally from the conceptual framework presented above in the
1979a article. The main aim of the article is to investigate the consequences of IRS on the main
theorems of neoclassical trade theory. Following the first part of the model, Ethier concludes
that intra-industry trade, just like inter-industry trade is factor endowments based. Ethier
demonstrates this by adopting an explicit production structure for the intermediates.
Produced capital K and natural capital N are combined to produce two goods, wheat
W and manufactures M . W is subject to CRS via a smooth production function (satisfying
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the Inada conditions). Manufactures are subject to IRS, under a separable function M = km
where k is an index of scale economies and m an index of the scale of operations. Those are the
familiar domestic and international scaling parameters from the previous section. m is produced
with the same smooth production function. This production function can be summarized by a
transformation curve:
W = T (m) (4.11)
T(m) is the usual H-O model production set. The transformation curve represents any convex
production set, but Ethier assumes that the implicit structure is HO. Factors are combined
following the simple reference model from Findlay (1995). In this static model, the supply of
K and N are fixed:
X =X(Kx,Lx) (4.12)
Y = Y (Ky,Ly) (4.13)
Kx+Ky = K¯ (4.14)
Lx+Ly = L¯ (4.15)
Production functions, CRS, in per unit of labor form:
x= x(kx),xÕ(kx)> 0,xÕÕ(kx)< 0 (4.16)
y = y(ky),yÕ(ky)> 0,yÕÕ(ky)< 0 (4.17)
If Y is the numeraire and denoting the relative price of X as p
pxÕ(kx) = yÕ(ky) = r, (4.18)
p[x(kx)≠xÕ(kx)kx] = [y(ky)≠yÕ(ky)ky] = w (4.19)
Finished manufactures are costlessly assembled from intermediates (or components). All
intermediates are assumed to be producible using the two factors mentioned above. There
are n intermediates, which number is endogenously determined. All intermediates enter the
production of manufactures in the same way. The amount of a given component produced is
noted xi. Once a component is produced, it will be produced in the same amount as the other
produced components. Total production is therefore nx. The output of manufactures M is by
assumption given by the function:
M = n–≠1(nx) (4.20)
280 Chapter 4. Sustainability and Interdependence
For – > 1. This is in fact the special case for xi = x of the more general production function:
M = n–[
nÿ
i=1
(x
—
i
n
)]
1
— (4.21)
Higher — indicates a higher degree of substitution between components. Conversely, lower
values for — reflect di erentiation in intermediates. Taking a somewhat di erent interpretation
for the variable m, Ethier considers it as an index of the number of bundles of factors devoted
to manufacturing production. The values for the bundle are computed below:
m= n(ax+ b) (4.22)
With a,b > 0. We find with this definition the same domestic economies of scale, motivated by
a fixed cost b which generates plant size IRS. Those are assumed internalised by firms in this
model. The total output of one component is produced by one firm in one location nationally
to internalise those IRS and di erentiate it from the international variety. Those economies of
scale in turn come from n. Equation 4.20 displays CRS for a given value of n, but a rise in
n with constant x creates IRS, since M rises by more than nx thanks to the –≠1 power and
–> 1 assumption. Those economies are related to the size of the market: a bigger market gives
scope to the production of more components, as was the case in the previous section.
The autarky equilibrium can be obtained from those equations. Individual producers of
manufactures takes n as given. Consider q0 and q the price in terms of wheat of two components
with corresponding outputs x0 and x. Cost minimization subject to equation 4.21 yields:
x0 = x(
q
q0
)
1
1≠— (4.23)
With n large, each producer’s behaviour has no influence on the others so that equation 4.23
is the demand curve faced by any given producer of components, as a function of any other
producer’s price and quantity. Factors are purchased competitively, so that the cost function
for component producers is ≠T Õ(m)[ax0+ b] , a familiar form. Equating marginal cost with
marginal revenue under profit maximisation gives the price:
q0 =≠T Õ(m–
—
) (4.24)
This expression holds for every component produced because of the symmetry assumption.
Total profits for component producers are q0x0+T Õ(m)[ax0+ b], drawn to zero by firm entry,
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i.e. changes in n. Therefore, quantities produced when profits are null are:
x0 =
b—
a(1≠—) (4.25)
Substituting into 4.22, conditional to a given technology m and as in equilibrium x = x0, we
obtain the number of components producers:
n= (1≠—)m
b
(4.26)
and the value of k, representing the international economies of scale for the manufacturing
sector:
k = ([(1≠—)
b
]–≠1—
–
)m–≠1 (4.27)
From there, we can draw the supply and demand curves for manufactures. The relative sup-
ply price in terms of wheat PS is shown to be PS = ≠T
Õ(m)
k , which is the supply curve for
manufactures. The transformation curve term m is not related to x, so that a reallocation of
factors via the m term from the production of W to M will not increase output x, but will via
equation 4.22 increase the number of components producers. There are therefore IRS in the
manufacturing sector and the supply curve of manufactures is downward slopping.
As for the demand curve, Ethier uses again the assumption that a constant share “ is spent
on manufactures, which yields the following demand curve:
PD = [
“
(1≠“) ]
T (m)
km
(4.28)
With PD the relative demand price for manufactures in terms of wheat. The demand curve
intersects the supply curve from above, guaranteeing uniqueness and stability as in the 1979a
article.
The international equilibrium can be obtained from there, using the allocation curves tech-
nique. The di erence between countries comes from di erences in factor endowments, with m
and mú the scale of manufacturing operations. * indicates again foreign country variables. If
m and mú are both positive, the whole production of a given component is in one country
so that the two countries produce two di erent subsets of components. Under free-trade, the
world works as an the integrated economy so that from equations 4.25 and 4.26 we can write:
nH =
(1≠—)m
b
nF =
(1≠—)mú
b
n= (1≠—)(m+m
ú)
b
(4.29)
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With nH the number of components produced in the home country and nF the number produced
in the foreign country. From equation 4.20 in equilibrium it follows that total manufacturing
production is:
M +Mú = (—
–
)[(1≠—)
b
]–≠1(m+mú)– (4.30)
Similarly, the demand curve is transformed into:
PD =
“
1≠“
T (m)+S(mú)
M +Mú (4.31)
Which yields after substitution:
PD =
“
1≠“
a
—
( b1≠— )
–≠1T (m)+S(mú)
(m+mú)– (4.32)
Where S(mú) is the foreign transformation curve. The home supply price is then given by:
PHS =≠[
(1≠—)(m+mú)
b
]1≠–T
Õ(m)a
—
(4.33)
Equilibrium in the manufactures markets in the domestic country requires PD = PHS , which
yields:
“[T (m)+S(mú)]+ (1≠“)(m+mú)T Õ(m) = 0 (4.34)
The domestic allocation curve depends on the combinations of m and mú. Correspondingly,
the foreign allocation curve is given by:
“[T (m)+S(mú)]+ (1≠“)(m+mú)SÕ(m) = 0 (4.35)
The two allocation curves are represented in (m,mú) diagrams, in figure 4.3. The domestic
allocation curve is represented by the (H Õ,H) curve and the foreign one by the (F Õ,F ) curve.
The greatest extend possible for production is represented by the square (mú0,E,m0,0). The
domestic allocation curve should be completed by the segments [H Õ,mú0] and [H,m0] when
existent, and the foreign one by the segments [F,mú0] and [F Õ,m0].
Hence, the equilibria at the intersection of the two curves in each panel are F,H Õ,D,H,F Õ
for panels (a) to (e). Panels (a), (b), (d) and (e) depict the scenarios where complete special-
isation occurs. In panel (a) for instance, the equilibrium in F implies complete specialisation
in W for the domestic country while foreign does not specialise and panel (d) implies complete
specialisation in wheat for the foreign country while domestic country does not specialise.
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Figure 4.3: Allocation curves and world equilibria
Source: Ethier (1982)
The shape of the allocation curve is determined by the shape of the transformation curve,
since by the separability assumption one can writeM+Mú= k(m+mú) where depends only on
b,—,–,m and mú. The total production of components is distributed across countries following
the calculated values for nH and nF once x is calculated. Without explicit assumption on
assembly, the total production M +Mú can be split in any fashion. This means that M and
Mú do not necessarily reflect the quantities produced respectively in domestic and foreign
countries.
A final note on the equilibrium should be made. With this explicit production structure
for the intermediates/components generating the international economies of scale, the propo-
sition 1 of the 1979a article remains valid. Factor allocation is still solely determined by the
transformation curves T (m) and S(m). The model having more traded intermediate goods
than factors still yield indeterminacy in the actual production of manufactures, although the
production of components is fully determined by n and x. Hence, those values for n and x
depend on the equilibrium which in turns depends on the transformation curve and respective
factor endowments. The presentation of the adapted version of the canonical theorems will
help us understanding the impact of this trade in intermediates.
Starting with the assumption that countries are in the panel (c) situation, where both
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are diversified. This implies that at the intersection point T Õ(m) = SÕ(m). With identical
technology, this implies that components are priced evenly across countries. Therefore, in the
scenario where both country diversify, factor price equalisation holds. It breaks down when the
shape of allocation curves (via high-asymmetry in endowments) pushes the equilibrium to the
other cases in panel (a), (b), (d) and (e).
The Rybczynski theorems demands greater alterations. Equilibrium equations shows that
changes in endowments do not a ect the output x of components but the number n of compo-
nents producers will change in proportion to m. This gives proposition 2:
P2: Rybczynski. At constant relative component prices, an increase in the produced capital
stock will absolutely reduce the production of wheat, have no e ect on the outputs of all
components initially produced and increase the number of produced components in greater
proportion than the rise in the produced capital stock itself.
The change here is introduced at the intra-industry level, not the inter-industry level which is
unaltered. The change in m will be magnified by the scale e ect introduced by k (and through
it by the extend of internal economies of scale –). Total change is the proportional change in m
times the scale e ect in k. Therefore, economies of scale only accentuate the standard results.
The price of components being kept constant, there is still a relative increase in manufactures
output with respect to components (and to the produced capital stock) while the price of
manufactures fall.
We briefly note that the quantity version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem remains intact,
while the price version requires an alteration. This alteration demands the consideration of
the case where intra-industry-trade happens to allow for economies of scale but inter-industry
trade is forbidden (”quasi-autarky”). The “quasi-autarkic” amendment is mostly relevant to
trade between similar countries when intra-industry trade dominates although this scenario is
not relevant to our problem.
Modifying the Stolper-Samuelson prediction requires to come to grasp with a critical answer
to our problem: the impact of trade in components on factor prices. Understanding this impact
requires relationships between the price of components and the price of final goods. This is
obtained via the definition of the inter-sectoral price e ect and the scale e ect. The inter-
sectoral price e ect comes from the fact that if factors move from the wheat to the manufactures
sector, it will increase the price of components relative to wheat in line with the transformation
curve.
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This will also raise the price of manufactures compared to the price of wheat. The scale
e ect is the consequence of the variation in n implied by any allocation. More resources devoted
to manufacturing will reduce the relative price of manufactures via the international economies
of scale, going against the inter-sectoral price e ect. This gives proposition 5:
P5: If the scale e ect dominates the inter-sectoral e ect, changes in the intra-sectoral price
structure PMPC are magnifications of the changes in the intersectoral structure
PM
PW
. If the
inter-sectoral e ect dominates the scale e ect, the two relative prices always change in
opposite directions.
An increase in the price of manufactures raises the rent from produced capital and lowers the
rent from natural resources if and only if the inter-sectoral e ect dominates the scale e ect. If
the scale e ect dominates, then the opposite is true.
Finally, Ethier (1982) presents the most critical contribution to our topic, the factor-
endowments basis of intra-industry trade. The conclusion of the section was already apparent
in the first part of the model in the 1979a article. Ethier assumes from here that finished man-
ufactures are assembled costlessly in the consumption country, with each component entering
in the production function only once. He then presents the Grubel-Lloyd 1975 index defined
as:
ﬂ= 1≠ |XC ≠MC |
XC +MC
(4.36)
With ﬂ the Grubel-Lloyd index, and C indicating the domestic country. The Grubel-Lloyd (GL)
index is a measure of intra-industry trade: if ﬂ=1 trade in only intra-industry in manufacturing
and if ﬂ = 0 trade is only inter-industry. The application of the GL index to the definition of
imports and exports in the model yields the complementarity theorem:
P11: Complementarity Theorem. If both countries initially produce both goods, and if there are
no separating factor-intensity reversals, a small relative-endowment-equalizing will increase ﬂ.
So that the movement from high to low asymmetry will e ectively increase the volume of intra-
industry trade in total trade with international economies of scale. Inter and intra-industry
trade are in fact complementary in terms of asymmetry in endowments. The fundamental role
of factor endowments is further reinforced by proposition 12 which states that the technological
parameters a,b and — have no impact on the prevalence of intra-industry trade (that is the value
of ﬂ). A notable result is that higher product di erentiation, defined by —, reduces in similar
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amount inter and intra-industry trade. Higher product di erentiation increases the number of
components but reduces output by a larger extent because of fixed costs.
This concludes our presentation of the Ethier model, presented in the 1979a and 1982
article. The model provides a useful and robust background to assess the impact of international
economies of scale, as opposed to usual, domestic economies of scale generated by learning-by-
doing and/or fixed costs.
In the next section we confront the conclusions of the Ethier model to our conclusions form
chapter 3. We then discuss the implications for sustainability.
I.3 Discussion of the section: consequences for ANS
In this section we address the two questions raised by international economies of scale for
sustainability:
– Do international economies of scale have an impact on development paths and resulting
interindustrial trade flows?
– Does inter-industry trade emerging from international economies of scale warrants addi-
tional savings?
Those two questions can be answered on the basis of the propositions presented in the
Ethier model. We should first summarize briefly the pattern of trade derived from our model
in chapter 3. In this model, both countries trade goods that are intermediates used to produce
a final good which is non-traded. Those goods are e ectively produced with constant returns
to scale technologies, used in the production of the final good which is also produced with
constant returns to scale. This structure requires that when opening-up to trade, countries de
facto allocate endowments between the intermediate sectors.
Those intermediates goods are created in order to take advantage of each country’s com-
parative advantage, as those intermediates are relatively intensive in one factor. This is the
source of trade flows in a dynamic HO framework. Although the traded goods in the model are
intermediates with respect to the final good, they are in fact traded on an inter-industry basis.
They use di erent factors and can reasonably be assumed to be di erent in nature as they are
all required for the production of the final good.
Another important feature of the model is the parameter – which is the parameter allocating
resources in the final good Cobb-Douglas function. The parameter defines the repartition of
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resources between the intermediates intensive in one given factor, and the intermediates using all
factors in equal proportions. We showed at the end of the previous chapter that our conclusion
regarding free-trade and autarky did not depend on the value of this parameter. This means
that even in a setting where both countries only produce the four intermediates generating
a comparative advantage, consumption and wealth are lower under free-trade compared to
autarky.
The economic intuition behind this result is the added organisational complexity induced
by free-trade and setting production to be exported and imported. Still, we showed that the
reallocation of resources between autarky and free-trade lowered production but resulted in
lower prices. Crucial to sustainability, convergence from high to low asymmetry under free-
trade is performed with a lower increased in the price of factor which becomes scarcer in the
process (natural capital in type two countries) and a more pronounced decrease in the price
of factor becoming more abundant (such as produced capital and labour in country-two type
countries).
We concluded that this spread between autarky and free-trade prices multiplied by the
amount of factor endowments e ectively mobilised in the production process in the considered
period should be saved and reinvested. Indeed, those gains from trade are generated by a
deviation in the accumulation path of factors compared to autarky. Therefore, in a logic akin
to capital gains those resources should be levied to finance reinvestment and structural change
as they would have been invested under autarky, in line with domestic preferences.
This result rests critically on factor endowments, so that the first modification we should
eventually implement faced with IRS would be motivated by the impact of IRS on factor
endowments. The second element critical to this definition is the price system. If IRS impact
factor prices, then the savings rule must be modified accordingly. Third, the expected volume of
exchanges in free-trade when in autarky does not matter, in the sense that both the technology
and the – parameters have no impact on the conclusion.
A first important conclusion of the model is the stability of equilibria with international
economies of scale. Decreasing costs of production do not imply indeterminacy, as long as one
production space results in a steeper allocation curve, which is the case under HO technology.
As equilibrium selection is not arbitrary, the results of the Ethier model can be applied to other
context where equilibrium is also unique, that is derived from a given pattern of specialisation.
This being clearly stated, the answer to question one can be drawn from the final goods version
of the model.
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Proposition 1 in the 1979a article clearly states that even if intermediates are produced
with IRS, the allocation of factor endowments is determined by the transformation curve which
follows CRS HO technology. This result holds even in the scenarios where FPE breaks down
and one country specialises completely. This does not mean that the volume or the final output
would be the same, but the allocation of factors will be. This is a critical result as it gives
a way out of the somewhat puzzling conclusions that free-trade leaves country worse-o  than
autarky.
IRS provide countries with an incentive to open-up to trade, to benefit from increasing
returns to scale in sectors where production technology allows for increasing international di-
vision of labour. This incentive can be obtained with the same pattern of factor accumulation,
or degree of asymmetry, as gains from IRS are independent. Our model in chapter 3 should be
modified to exhibit this e ect in full, but the general sense of the results can be deducted from
the Ethier model.
Answering our two opening questions requires to turn to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
amended in proposition 6 of the 1982 and the inter-sectoral e ect versus the scale e ect. The
inter-sectoral e ect is the e ect at play in the regular HO version of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem. If it dominates, an increase in the relative price of manufactures produces a more
than proportional change in the relative price of components. If the scale e ect dominates, the
relative price of components will go in the opposite direction.
The introduction of IRS disturbs the response of factor prices in the sector a ected by IRS,
the intra-industry price structure between manufactures and components. This means that the
gains emerging in sectors not directly a ected by IRS, (in the Ethier model the wheat sector)
will be una ected. The proportional change induced by modifications in the price of wheat is
the same, while the combination of factors is also una ected. Disturbance will come from the
manufacturing sector, where an increase in the price of manufactures relative to wheat raises
return on produced capital and lowers return on natural capital relative to both final good
prices. This is the case in which the inter-sectoral e ect dominates the scale e ect (the change
is more than proportional). This means that international economies of scale will suppress
some of the rise in natural capital return and magnify the increase in produced capital return
if the inter-sectoral e ect dominates in the context of higher world demand for manufactures.
If the scale e ect dominates ,the conclusions are less clear and depend on the allocation of
resources between the sectors. Di erences between the Ethier model and our model in chapter
3 prevent us from drawing a clear conclusion. The best that can be said from intuition is
that a larger scale e ect is likely to lower the return on produced capital, the e ect on natural
capital return depending on technology and resource allocation and the size of the scale e ect
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relative to the inter-sectoral e ect. This somewhat imperfect conclusion leaves us with the
certainty that international economies of scale will a ect the evolution of the return of the
factor the sector concerned with those IRS is relatively well-endowed with. This is true even if
the underlying level of asymmetry in endowments is unchanged.
Doing so, IRS creates the need to amend the measure of the gains from trade presented in
chapter 3. If the inter-sectoral e ect dominates, IRS will have reduced return on natural capital,
making it cheaper to use relative to autarky for a given level of asymmetry. IRS will conversely
make produced capital more costly, although this goes with increased output and consumption.
IRS distort the goods price system and via the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, requiring in this
case more savings than under the CRS case.
This point is critical when moving from comparative statics to dynamics. IRS distort the
price system leaving factor allocation between the two sectors untouched, so that a priori, as
only relative prices are altered then only the measures of gains from trade using those prices
should be corrected. The “physical”, capital stock dimension in unchanged. Yet, in a dynamic
perspective, this distorted price system will change the investment incentives in the next period,
altering the physical reality this time.
We need to consider two price systems. The first one is the price system resulting from
production under CRS, the second one is under IRS. Then we need to consider the changes
brought by the dynamics into the savings rule. In comparative statics it looks as if the distortion
generated by the IRS price system simply requires saving under the IRS price system to take
place as if under the CRS price system. The resulting di erence in savings being e ectively
freed to be consumed 5. So that in comparative statics, savings ought to be lower than could
be deduced from the IRS price system.
In a dynamic perspective, those distorted prices get built in into the investment decisions,
and encourage in our example over depletion of “cheap” natural resources to invest in relatively
more expensive produced capital. Therefore, the di erence now has to be added in full to savings
and not consumed, since the beginning of the period prices come form the IRS price system
and not from the counterfactual “CRS” system. This brings us to a paradoxical situation.
International economies of scale do not distort allocation of resources between sectors, so that
the allocation resulting from inter-industry trade is valid, even when one of the goods traded
is produced from components under IRS.
5. This di erence is always positive under the result that if the inter-sectoral e ect dominates, the IRS price
system introduces larger than proportional changes.
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Changes in the goods prices structure impact the factor prices structure. Although they
will not change the allocation structure in the current period, they will do so in the forthcoming
period, demanding ex-post extra resources.This creates a dilemma. Countries have the choice
between on the one hand saving as in under CRS and in line with the observed allocation but
then following short in terms of savings in the next period. On the other hand they can save
according to the observed IRS hence “over-saving” from the perspective of the actual allocation
of factors that still obeys the CRS allocation.
This dilemma should not surprise us if we note the problem faced by Ethier (1979a) where
the comparative advantage could either be estimated using autarky prices or production e -
ciency. The paradox we face here have similar roots. Ethier warned that the price system in
his model, although producing stable equilibria, will not be Pareto-Optimal. However, when
Ethier could arbitrage against autarky prices, we cannot do so as the price system in a dynamic
setting is the marker of intergenerational equity.
This remark together with the precautionary principle should warrant the country, facing
this paradox, to save more (that is following the observed price system). The other, non-
normative way to solve the paradox is to acknowledge, as is often the case in the environment
literature, that IRS make market prices deviate from shadow prices. Therefore, investment
should be conducted ignoring those market prices and following the e cient (in our case CRS)
price system. Although more theoretically compelling, this solution raises several practical
issues, the least implying the di culty to estimate a parallel system of shadow prices. Again,
our demonstration describes the case where the inter-sectoral e ect dominates the scale e ect.
If the scale e ect dominates, other factor needs to be considers.
It would be idle to consider the case where the scale e ect dominates without a formal model,
as a way to measure the forces at play here. Let us mention though that in this scenario, the
volume of trade is likely to play a role. We know from proposition 12 in the 1982 article that
an increase in product di erentiation, will decrease both inter- and intra-industry trade. Even
if the number of components produced increases, the output of each component producers falls
more than proportionality.
Let us assume that as in our model in chapter 3 the volume of trade increases exogenously
(translating into an increase in the value of –). This increase is neutral in terms of endowment
structure under CRS. Under IRS if the inter-sectoral e ect dominates, this e ect is equivalent
to a price increase in manufacturing presented above. If the scale e ect dominates (strongly)
the return on natural capital should rise and the return on produced capital should fall, relative
to the CRS levels. An overall increase in the volume of trade then yields the expected impact
of IRS, making the factor the country is relatively intensive in cheaper and the other factors
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relatively more expensive.
This ends our discussion on IRS and savings. We found that IRS are likely to modify
inter-industry indirectly in a dynamics context, via the impact of prices on the patterns of
factor accumulation. We saw that in this context, additional savings from the gains resulting
from trade on intra-industry trade flows are also warranted. This result can be seen as a
consequence of the dissociation of market prices and shadow prices. Ethier (1979a) stressed
that IRS would bring some interesting economic policy questions, “particularly if the increasing
returns are due to economies external to the firm but internal to the international market”. We
believe again that the sustainability approach shed some light on those questions. We discussed
briefly the impact of exogenous variations in the volume of trade. One of the conclusions,
essentially HO, in chapter 3 was the extinction of international trade as endowments grow
similar. Proposition 1 in the 1979a article shows that intra-industry trade exists even in cases
of complete specialisation. Proposition 11, the complementarity theorem, shows that in the
course towards factor endowments equalisation, intra-industry trade increases as inter-industry
trade is decreasing.
This now well-known result shows that IRS will prevent the extinction of trade, whether or
not the course from high to low asymmetry yields FPE (preventing complete specialisation).
Overall, it is also clear that the more one country trades, the more it should save and reinvest.
Inter- and intra-industry trade call for di erent savings rule, but both warrant more savings.
IRS clearly reinforce the virtuous circle of reduced asymmetry: higher consumption and higher
income leading to more wealth and to more trade that implies reinvestment and endowments
asymmetry reduction.
Those conclusions help us discriminating between the likely decisions of countries. Intrain-
dustry trade creates new possibilities of gains, but also new ways to insert the country in the
global supply chain. Trade is not merely a way to converge from high to low asymmetry at a
lesser cost, but also a way to take part in the international division of labour, even by a small
extent. It makes it theoretically possible to be both specialised in the sense of the inter-industry
trade, and diversified in the sense that some components of several industries can be produced
in the country. This is very important for countries characterised by high asymmetry with a
long way under structural change. For those countries, opening up to inter-industry trade only
is (from chapter 3) not necessarily profitable and creates exposition to factor specific shocks.
IRS and the possibility to enter the global supply chain in a more diversified manner makes
it more likely for those countries to enter international trade. In the setting of chapter 3,
those would be country 2 type countries in the SC scenario. Country 1 type countries on
the other hand clearly have a stronger incentive to trade under IRS, under either low or high
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Table 4.1: Possibilities in Multilateral Trade
Source: Ethier (1982)
asymmetry. The case that is by far the most debatable is the case of country 2 types in CA
with low asymmetry. Those countries are very likely to be better-o  in autarky even with IRS
in one sector. Ethier (1982) tried to explore this question by assessing the resulting trade flows
depending on factor endowments. We reproduce his synthetic table in figure 4.1.
In the table hm and hW denote capital-labour ratios in manufacturing and wheat, and hÕ is
the cut-o  ratio. Above this value countries necessarily import wheat and below it countries
necessarily export it (assume also hm > hÕ > hW ). Country two type countries in CA and low
asymmetry are in CS, and therefore would be close to case V. The prospect of no intra-industry
trade and exports to countries that are either specialised in manufacturing or diversified is not
appealing as only CRS production can be expected. This is a corner case and again the
concordance of the Ethier model is not perfect, making any direct translation tentative, but
this shred of evidence does not point towards free-trade for those countries.
At the very least, those elements reinforce the idea that the case for free-trade depends on the
distribution of endowments and on the scenario or “case” that would logically follow. Country
two types countries in high asymmetry aiming for the integrated equilibrium in low asymmetry
are “stuck” in an exchange pattern that would see them relying heavily on their exports of
natural capital-intensive goods (inter-industry trade) and slowly undertaking structural change
by substituting endowments and substituting intra-industry trade for inter-industry trade. This
is the optimistic dynamic scenario, but it is conditional to a) a sound reinvestment strategy
and b) the evolution of trade relations.
One could imagine that if one country undertakes structural change more quickly than its
partners, its inter-industry would die down quickly creating a strong asymmetry. It does not
need the goods its partners are producing any more, while its partners need to enter intra-
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industry trade with this country. This unhappy scenario would see some countries “stuck” in
a specialisation and resulting pattern of trade, that it of little interest to anyone else.
Trade is usually assumed to be symmetric, creating interdependence. We see here the
possibility of asymmetric interdependence, likely to turn into plain dependence. Interestingly,
this possible dependence is based on the di erence in the nature of trade, not in the content
of trade. Insertion in the global supply chain is optimal because it is the way to get a share
of international economies of scale, while being part of the truly interdependent form of trade.
Critically these conclusions are independent from the concerns regarding national, plant-size
economies of scale and product di erentiation. Those questions are related to the size and
number of industrial sites and forces of agglomeration. Although they are obviously related,
they are beyond the scope of this chapter, as long as countries are still a relevant organisational
scale.
The questions we have raised are especially critical in the case of natural capital. Natural
capital enters a wide variety of industrial processes, but its exhaustible nature conjugated with
property rights issues makes it particularly prone to over-exploitation. There are nonetheless as
many possibilities to create a line in the global supply chain for natural capital intensive goods
as for any others. The extensive trade in semi-transformed agricultural, mineral and energy
products vouches for this. Still, countries with a comparative advantage in natural resources,
especially energy resources, seems to be facing relatively more obstacles to development. This
phenomenon is known in the literature as the “resource curse” or the “Dutch disease”.
We identified in this section two potential reasons for this phenomenon: a suboptimal
investment strategy resulting in delayed structural change, or inconsistent specialisation with
respect to trade partners. Note that the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Hence,
the next section is devoted to the discussion on the resource curse.
II Patterns of development and intra-industry trade
Are some countries structurally di erent, in the sense that mechanisms working in a given
fashion in the majority of countries work di erently in this considered set of countries? This is
the implicit assumption behind the resource curse, the counter-intuitive idea that some countries
may witness a decline in economic growth in the wake of natural resources abundance. The
aim of this section is not to present an exhaustive survey of the resource curse, subject wide
enough to be covered by a whole thesis. Instead, we will focus after a brief introduction on the
resource curse, on the trade related explanations for the curse and the Dutch disease. We will
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then proceed to an evaluation of the strategy regarding the reinvestment of rents in Russia.
The aim of this section is therefore to present the forces a ecting reinvestment strategies with
a focus on trade motives.
II.1 The Dutch disease and the resource curse: literature review
Discussion on the possibility of a resource curse emerged in the 1990’s, but the starting point
of the connection between natural resources and economic performance is the Dutch disease.
The term was coined after the discovery of extensive natural gas reserves in the north of the
Netherlands in the 1960’s. According to Corden (1984), the first mention of it can be found in
a newspaper article in the Economist, 1977. The basic mechanism can be explained using the
model in Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) based on the original model of Salter
(1959). For the sake of conciseness we will use the version of the Salter-Swan model presented
in the excellent survey by Van Der Ploeg (2011).
Consider a small two-sector economy with a resource windfall. In this static model we
assume balanced trade, so that:
HTQE = CT ≠HTF (LT ) (4.37)
With Q the world price for natural resources, E the volume of exports of natural resources, CT
the consumption of traded goods, LT employment in the traded sector and HT productivity
in the natural resource sector. This makes HTF (LT ) the output in the traded sector, with F
satisfying the Inada conditions. The non traded goods equilibrium is given by:
CN =HNG(LN ) (4.38)
With intuitive notations and G also following the Inada conditions. Van Der Ploeg (2011) sets
the labour supply exogenously to 1, so that labour market equilibrium is given by LT +LN = 1.
The utility function of consumers depends on both goods, U = (CN ,CT ) subject to the utility
constraint is terms of traded goods price Y = PCN +CT . National income is defined by Y ©
PHNG(LN )+HTF (LT +HTQE). Optimality requires the marginal utility of consumption of
both goods to be equalised. Assuming a CES function, this yields:
CN =
Y
(1+P ‘≠1)P (4.39)
With ‘ the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods. Let us define
H © HTHN the productivity of the traded sector relative to the non-traded one. Equilibrium in
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium in the economy
Source: Van Der Ploeg (2011)
the market of non traded goods is obtained for:
P ‘ = H[F (1≠LN )+QE]
G(LN )
(4.40)
This is the allocation representing the combinations of the real exchange rate P and the share
LN that clears the non traded goods market. This is noted by Van Der Ploeg (2011) as the
NTGME locus. For labour to move from one sector to the other, it must be paid equally on
both, which defines a cut-o  condition of equalised marginal product of labour:
PGÕ(LN ) =HF Õ(1≠LN ) (4.41)
Which is another allocation curve representing the combinations of P and LN clearing the
labour market. This LM curve is upward slopping, while the NGTME curve is downward slop-
ping. A diagrammatic presentation of the expansion of the natural resource sector is presented
in figure 4.4.
Assume an increase in the contribution of natural resources, an increase in QE. NTGME
shifts upwards to NTGME’ while LM is una ected. The first stage of the resource boom is
therefore an appreciation of the real exchange rate P while labour is reallocated from the
traded to the non-traded sector. This is what Corden and Neary (1982) presented as the
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resource movement e ect, a general equilibrium reallocation of resources in response to price
movements. This results in an increase in consumption and output of non traded goods, made
possible by extra imports of traded goods. This is the spending e ect. The overall impact
seems positive in the short run.
For more long term e ects, Van Der Ploeg (2011) considers an HO production structure
with capital and labour. If the non-traded sector is more labour intensive than the traded
sector, then the resource windfall will generate a higher wage-return on produced capital ratio.
This circle being repeated in a dynamic context results in reduced use of produced capital and
de-industrialisation, linked to the ever appreciating exchange rate. If, on the contrary, the non-
traded sector is capital intensive, the real exchange rate will depreciate (this is the movement
from A’ to A” or even B on the figure). A more complex model would be needed to frame all
these e ects into equations but the essence of the story is there.
Empirical evidence on the Dutch disease is somewhat mixed, but is getting more supportive
of the hypothesis as samples become more detailed and/or more exhaustive (Van Der Ploeg
2011). Ismail (2010) in particular conducts a detailed investigation on oil exporting countries
finding strongly supportive evidence for the Dutch disease. An increase in the revenues for the
oil sector is accompanied by a shrinking manufacturing sector. The Dutch disease was the first
manifestation of concern towards international trade and resource management. In the 1980’s
literature, the Dutch disease is one possibility for resource-rich countries, but those countries
do not seem to react in a similar fashion.
More exhaustive samples brought forward a di erent hypothesis, the resource curse. The
discussion on the resource curse started with the seminal article by Sachs and Warner (1995),
followed by several publications extending the analysis (Sachs and Warner 1997, 1999, 2001).
The concept originates in the negative relationship between the high ratio of natural resources
exports to GDP and subsequent low growth rate. While the Dutch disease focuses on a clearly
identified mechanism, the resource curse, by its very name, points towards a broad sets of
consequences stemming from natural resources. It is therefore one step further towards the
assumption that resource rich countries end up structurally di erent (at the very least).
It is by no means an accident that the idea of the resource curse is contemporary to the
early development of comprehensive wealth indicators. The debate on the sources of growth,
brought forward by endogenous growth models also plays a role. As in those fields, the role of
international trade, central in the Dutch disease, is slowly sidelined by domestic factors. This
is partly the consequence of the trend we already noted in chapter 2. 6 Also, as in Sachs and
6. That is the tendency to focus on capital gains and the productivity enhancing role of international trade.
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Warner (2001), data suggest that trade mechanisms alone cannot explain the curse. As the
Hartwick rule centred sustainability issues on domestic failures, the resource curse seems to
be rooted mainly in institutional problems. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) show that resource
abundance can have a positive impact on growth once corruption, actual starting point and the
terms of trade e ect are subtracted.
This would suggest that countries with structural problems happen to be resource rich and
that the direct correlation is less clear cut. These potential structural problems are carefully
reviewed in Van Der Ploeg (2011). We already presented in our discussion on the importance on
inclusiveness in chapter 2 the key role of institutions. ? speak eloquently of the lasting impact
of Spanish colonial institutions in Peru. An impressive number of articles documented the need
to reduce corruption, increase inclusiveness and limit the power of vested interest (Kolstad
and Wiig 2009). The literature is especially keen to avoid the concentration of political and
economic power in the hands of an elite, let alone a head of state (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
The history of countries such as Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo is eloquent
enough about the possibility of armed conflicts related to “blood diamonds” and other natural
resources.
We saw earlier that the core of the Dutch disease is the sudden boom in resources prices
and/or quantities. This assumption strikes as obvious the reader accustomed to the oil shocks
and the commodities boom of the 2000’s. It also makes sense in the context of the Hotelling rule
and the literature on optimal depletion paths. Still, the empirical reality may be di erent. The
famous Prebisch-Singer hypothesis predicted a secular fall in primary product prices. Although
ridiculed in the aftermath of the first oil shock, a recent contribution suggests that this could
be a question of time frame, as in the very long run the hypothesis seems verified (Harvey et al.
2010).
Following this logic, countries or groups controlling resources within countries, may be
tempted to deplete resources quickly as a way to extract the rent before it dies out. This
could even be the case in periods such as the counter oil shocks between peaks. This kind of
behaviour would lead to systematically lower and maybe negative adjusted net savings. The
question then is to decide whether the original problem is the price shock or the institutional
reaction. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) explore empirically the correlation between GDP
growth and resource abundance. They conclude that the investment policy by the rent owner
is fundamental to determine if a country falls prey to the resource curse. They point first and
foremost at macroeconomic and expenditure policy enforced in the face of resource abundance.
Another important contribution by Van der Ploeg (2010) investigates this matter further.
As we stressed earlier, the open economy matters also because it allows for investment outside of
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the domestic economy. Following this central lead, Van der Ploeg (2010) suggests amending the
Hartwick rule based on the expected capital gains on reserves of natural capital, the expected
increase in interest income on net foreign assets and the evolution of extraction technology.
These adjustments lead to postponing the depletion of natural resources. His very comprehen-
sive model tackles almost all of the issues presented above. He finds, in the political economy
part, the expected results. The innovation lies on the definition of a "Kuwait economy” where
natural resources do not enter in the production process. The challenge is therefore to deplete
oil optimally to maximize the rent, not production.
The Hotelling condition derived from the model states that the social planner should be
indi erent between extracting oil to invest the proceeds and get a return on capital to the world
interest rate, or keeping the oil on the ground to enjoy capital gains net of marginal extraction
costs. The o setting of depletion is therefore not obtained by investment in domestic assets,
but by investment in foreign assets. As noted in the article, the model of Okumura and Cai
(2007) reaches a somewhat similar conclusion where private consumption ends-up sustained
by the interest on accumulated foreign assets only. Both models exhibit a “rentier” behaviour.
This behaviour is obtained by preventing direct domestic investment of the rent, which could be
assumed to be impossible for political reasons or lack of opportunity. Depletion is still anchored
to expectation regarding the evolution of exogenous world prices though.
It seems to us that this discussion gravitates around the problem of the scope of the analysis.
What can be included in the normal functioning of economic mechanisms and therefore a) is
the object of study and b) is subject to the rest, the “exogenous variables”. In this perspective,
familiar from chapter 2, economic mechanisms are self-correcting when optimal, and subject
to external forces: property rights, wealth distributions, institutional arrangements, political
culture and organisation. As we made it clear before, we believe this methodologically useful
distinction should not be used in a sustainability context. It introduces a framing bias in the
problem by somewhat arbitrarily separating economics and variables that at the very least
can be a ected by economic outcomes. Studying international trade and sustainability requires
answering the question: to which extent do trade-induced specialisation patterns have an impact
on the institutional setting supporting sustainability? This feedback e ect of trade cannot be
ignored.
We saw that the set of countries characterised by natural resource abundance faces issues
that are either unique to those countries, or far more prevalent than in resource poor ones. We
followed the literature which clearly identifies factors sourced in domestic characteristics which
seem to be prominent in the resource curse debate. These factors have to do with inclusiveness,
corruption and macroeconomic and expenditure policy. We believe that the possibility that
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resources rich countries are structurally di erent also because of resource abundance-induced
trade patterns should be explored. Emphasising this, we merely say that trade patterns should
not be treated as a constraint on institutional arrangements. Trade patterns should be altered
to preserve institutional arrangements. Hence, trade patterns should be assessed and then
fostered or curbed, depending on sustainability constraints.
In that sense, we impose the normative sustainability approach on observed or predicted
trade flows and the analysis of international trade. The literature also recognised in the dis-
cussion on the Dutch disease the importance of trade-induced behaviour, that we would split
between direct and indirect consequences. The direct impact of trade is the impact on patterns
of specialisation in endowments. This e ect is the resource allocation e ect in Neary and Purvis
(1982) and the composition e ect in Copeland and Taylor (2003). The e ects are di erent as
the modelling is di erent but the logic is the same.
The importance of the direct impact is linked to a vision of “secular movements” in in-
ternational trade. The one critical to our topic is the evolution of world prices for primary
resources. If resource prices regularly increase in a context of increased scarcity, only contained
by backstop technologies, then countries specialised in resources should probably rely on this
specialisation and focus on optimal management. If a Prebisch-Singer situation is more likely,
then the main goal of those countries should be to undertake structural changes and find other
comparative advantages.
In the meantime, primary resources specialisation is more likely to be a curse, a dwindling
but critical and non perennial instrument of wealth. The possibility of a lock-in which soon
contaminates the institutions and market mechanisms via rent-seeking behaviours is real. We
see here that no matter what the actual “secular movement” might be, the same sort of be-
haviour can be expected from rent owners. It might be worth reconsidering the articulation of
specialisation and the old idea of imports substitution.
The indirect impact presents other challenges. The indirect impact is the induced decor-
relation in interest in international trade, with the possibility to invest and consume in other
countries. Although it may look optimal in a narrow economic perspective to invest some of
the natural resource abroad, it can be detrimental to the political equilibrium built around
resource extraction. The spatial decorrelation between factor usage and income is especially
problematic in the context of a potential internal struggle, as it may regulate the direct access
to wealth and income, critical to maintaining inclusiveness and the balance of power. In this
perspective, trade openness can be a useful way to prevent economic over-heating and domestic
wasteful investment, but can further distort the distribution of wealth and the political state of
a airs. International trade exacerbates the dependence of the national economy on a sector or
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even a single resource, creating imbalances inside the country, resulting in regulatory capture,
if not plain transfer of political power. This results in policy in favour of the sector, discour-
aging innovation and growth in the other sector, and in time the enforcement of extractive
institutions. In the end, these extractive institutions bring growth to a halt.
These elements reinforce our conclusion that trade movements and institutions are two sides
of the same sustainability coin, needing joint treatment. This is not without hurdles, as the
objection of Arrow et al. (2010) about the lack of a “co-evolution theory of institutions” reminds
us. But failing to appraise both simultaneously would lead us to have institutional evolutions
destroyed by positive or negative direct and indirect e ects of international trade. Conversely,
a potentially positive swing in resource prices would be thwarted by extractive institutions.
Consistency in sustainability requires, falling short of an integrated theory, a political economy
co-treatment of both issues. According to Van Der Ploeg (2011), the basis of the success stories
against the resource curse (as in Botswana, Thailand, Indonesia or Malaysia) are diversification,
high wages, complementaries between manufacturing and extraction. These are the signs of
sound structural change, and cannot be reached by political reforms or market mechanisms
alone.
Resource-rich countries trade and institutional profile are therefore impossible to disen-
tangle. Still, this would mean that resource rich economies would exhibit similar trade and
institutional patterns. Without being able to directly test this proposition on co-evolution
we can still use our previous conclusions to suggest amendments to empirical estimates of the
resource curse, in line with sustainability studies.
II.2 Resource abundance and the patterns of resources trade
Previous attempts to estimate the consequences of natural resources abundance have fo-
cused on the impact on the GDP growth rate. This is the core of the resource curse study.
Under the resource curse, international trade is only one factor, although an important one,
in explaining lagged performance in resource rich countries. Our ambition is to investigate
the role of international trade as the corollary of institutional arrangements, considered in the
literature (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003, Van Der Ploeg 2011) to be the key factor. We framed
our presentation of countries in terms of specialisation and investment strategies in chapter 3.
Similarly, Ethier (1982) proposed archetypal countries based on the nature of trade flows.
We will base our test on the importance of trade as an explanatory factor for specialisation
patterns. Usual tests of the resource curse include trade variables such as openness, variations
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in terms of trade and the share of manufacturing in total exports (Sachs and Warner 1997,
2001). As explained by Sachs and Warner (2001), these tests are centred on the notion that
natural resource abundance, as in the regular Dutch disease, crowds out other forms of economic
activity (Harding and Venables 2013). This should make our di erence in philosophy clear. We
do not consider this to be a crowding out e ect, we believe this to be an expectable consequence
of international trade incentives on industrial specialisation. To be clear, we do not dispute the
reality of the results. We merely believe that they need to be read in the context of international
interdependence and structural change. In this context, a pattern of trade can be the product
of distorted domestic management, but no more than distorted domestic management is the
product of patterns of trade shaped by the conditions of globalisation.
An oversized natural resource sector seems impossible to avoid when strongly encouraged
by trade incentives. For example, Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013) present a model inspired
by the Salter-Swan model stressing that causality in specialisation starts from the reallocation
of resources (labour) to the natural resource sector resulting in smaller size of manufacturing
and rising productivity, not the other way around. These trade induced e ects on the domestic
structure of production are somewhat overlooked in the discussion and we would like to address
this in this section.
On the course of structural change, countries are expected to balance their use of the instru-
ments of wealth. This implies going from high asymmetry in endowments to low asymmetry.
This result can be obtained via the shrinkage of natural resource use with respect to the emerg-
ing reliance on produced and human capital. Alternatively, it can be obtained with constant or
increasing natural resource use, but in the context of a more than proportional increase in the
use of other instruments. It is then not so much the absolute but relative use that is declining.
In the end, both ways generate reduced asymmetry in endowments. In chapter 3 we stressed
the link between the level of asymmetry and the pattern of trade. In table 4.2 we present an
illustration of the link between our measure of asymmetry from chapter 3 and the resource rent
as a percentage of GDP in a selection of countries for the year 2000.
Under our working hypothesis that domestic and trade factors are at work together in
creating this category of resource intensive countries we need to go beyond the traditional HO
conclusions. Considering inter-industry trade, tests of the HO prediction taking productivity
di erences into account yield robust results, available in Trefler (1993) and Trefler (1995).
We saw that for the needs of sustainability assessment, increasing returns to scale need to
be considered without exogenous improvements in productivity. Following this assumption
Antweiler and Trefler (2002) explore the predictive power of taking increasing returns to scale
7. As a percentage of GDP.
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Table 4.2: Synthetic asymmetry results
Country % Country 1 % Country 2 2005 rent 7
Uzbekistan 1.8397535 98.1602465 105.916563
Congo, Rep. 3.81127981 96.1887202 74.7260454
Brunei Darussalam 10.3769444 89.6230556 67.5211743
Angola 15.2689776 84.7310224 65.8734427
Azerbaijan 28.2707109 71.7292891 65.0217006
Brazil 67.4048681 32.5951319 6.00663863
India 60.4134331 39.5865669 5.54025533
The Netherlands 95.4956506 4.50434945 2.43423001
New Zealand 77.8761134 22.1238866 2.02620284
Albania 81.2012448 18.7987552 1.75427272
Armenia 79.581614 20.418386 0.92227285
Belgium 98.1376334 1.86236655 0.03442522
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI)
into account. They find the consideration of IRS to help considerably in predicting trade flows.
This concurs with the observation of Evenett and Keller (2002). Using a gravity framework,
they show that intra-industry and inter-industry trade are likely to be at work simultaneously
and that both need to be considered to explain trade flows accurately. More importantly,
Antweiler and Trefler (2002) find statistically significant increasing returns to scale in both
manufacturing and natural resources. All these elements concur to say that beyond the standard
HO prediction, there is no reason for resource rich economies not to trade under a diversified
pattern within their broadly defined comparative advantage.
Resource-rich countries can be categorised as country 2 types in low asymmetry and then
intra-industry trade should be dominant if any trade is to happen at all, across all production
goods considered. If there is high asymmetry in type 2 countries, then they should exhibit
a secular trend towards a more diversified export structure (controlled for variation in global
prices if they can be considered exogenous) as they enter the global supply chain and ben-
efit from the international division of labour. A good example of this is China, a country
doubtlessly undertaking a form of structural change. As figure 4.5 shows, the pattern of trade
in intermediate goods (index gl2) and capital goods (index gl4) diversified over the years.
Index gl2 and gl4 are computed using the Grubel and Lloyd (1975) index of intra-industry
trade. We have been discussing intra-industry trade somewhat loosely until now and precisions
are in order. Intra-industry trade is always defined relatively to a grid of industries and goods,
usually along the lines of international classification. A definition of intra-industry trade is
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Figure 4.5: Patterns of trade in China
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI, Comtrade, author’s calculations)
therefore always dependent on the level of aggregation associated with the classification in-
volved. Intra-industry trade is therefore linked to a degree of sameness. These elements in
mind, it would be abusive to talk of intra-industry trade per se in the rest of the section, as we
consider a high level of aggregation (4 categories). It is probably more accurate to talk about
one way (inter-industry) and two ways (intra-industry) trade, which we will use from now on.
We will use the Grubel-Lloyd indexes as indicators of the prevalence of two ways trade, as in
the example of China above.
True to our working hypothesis, we would like to investigate the correlation between resource
abundance and trade patterns using two regressions. The first test is centred on resource
abundance itself. We investigate whether countries identified as resource abundant can be
associated with a given pattern of trade in a statistically significant way. We control for
common variables in the context of the resource curse in order to determine whether patterns
of trade can be associated with resource abundance. The second test investigates whether
resource rich economies exhibit a distorted relationship with inter-industry (two ways) trade in
resource intensive goods compared to non-resource rich economies.
To do this we investigate whether the pattern of trade in natural resource intensive goods,
regrouped under a common bundle, is impacted by resource abundance controlling for the
pattern of trade on other bundles. These two tests should allow us to determine if resource
abundant countries enter international trade in line with the traditional HO prediction, or
in a di erent fashion. In statistical terms, we want to identify the correlation between the
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Figure 4.6: Global commodity prices
Base year 2005=100
Source: Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities
observed heterogeneity in resource abundance between countries, and a hypothetical correlated
heterogeneity in trade patterns. What makes this observation complex is the fact that it cannot
be done on an inter-industry basis only. If so, it would be a test of the HO prediction. This is
the rationale for our focus on one way and two ways trade, based on the results of the model
in chapter 3.
The evolution of commodity prices is an another important issue to be addressed. Although
energy and fuel saw the bulk of the increase, the rise in commodity prices is largely demand
driven. This trend can only reinforce the tendency of resource rich countries to enter inter-
national trade on an inter-industry (one way) trade basis. This should generate income gains
in the short run by the mechanical action on the terms of trade. But, the very logic of inter-
industry trade encourages resource rich countries to rely on this first comparative advantage
and precludes movement towards intra-industry trade by rising the opportunity cost of transi-
tion. Pittel and Bretschger (2010) investigated this in the context of the links between resource
intensity in production and biased technical change. We should take this context of increasing
prices into account for our tests.
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II.3 The data
The relationship, as stressed by the literature presented above, cannot be considered in
isolation of other general equilibrium e ects. We base our choices of variables to take these
e ects into account on the models presented before, Lederman and Maloney (2003) and Sachs
and Warner (2001). An exhaustive presentation of the data and sources is available in appendix
I.
The main variable of interest is resource abundance in the considered country. We depart
from Sachs and Warner (2001) who use natural resource exports as a share of GDP. This
variable, although better than other proxies can cause problems in the context of small countries
with a strong re-exporting base (Lederman and Maloney 2003). It would also overlap with our
other variables, since the volume and the patterns of exports in natural capital could be related.
Therefore, we use instead resources rent as a percentage of GDP. Data is extracted from the
Wealth Accounting database of the World Bank, for the years 1992 to 2010. The usual caveats
with rent data apply, most notably because rent is calculated using the di erence between the
average cost and the resource price, instead of the theoretically relevant marginal cost.
Our endogenous variable for the second test is the respective share of inter-industry (one
way) and intra-industry (two ways) trade in natural capital intensive resources. In line with
most of the literature since Grubel and Lloyd (1975), we compute this value using the Grubel-
Lloyd index. We use the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) portal to extract data from
the COMTRADE database. Our dataset is based on the HS 1988/92 classification. Trade
flows are regrouped under four bundles codenamed UNCTAD-SoP. The Bundle SoP1 regroups
raw materials, SoP2 is for intermediate goods, SoP3 for consumer goods and SoP4 for capital
goods. We extract imports and exports from a given country to the rest of the world between
1992 and 2011. The Grubel-Lloyd index Grubel and Lloyd (1971, 1975), is computed using the
formula:
GLi,t =
(Xi,t+Mi,t)≠ |Xi,t≠Mi,t|
Xi,t+Mi,t
= 1≠ |Xi,t≠Mi,t|
Xi,t+Mi,t
;0ØGLi,t Ø 1 (4.42)
If GLi,j = 1 trade between the two countries in the sector i in year t is only intra-industry. If
GLi,j = 0 it is only inter-industry. This gives us four Grubel-Lloyd indexes over 20 years per
country.
The interactions between these two variables are the core of our two tests. We obtain data
for a selection of 177 countries, based on availability. We then divide this sample between 3
groups. A first group (g5) is composed of countries earning rents equal to more than 5% of
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GDP on average over the period. It amounts to 50 countries. The second group (g2) is the first
group plus countries earning rents between 5% and 2% on average. It amounts to 87 countries.
The remaining 90 countries are left out as we consider countries earning less than 2% of GDP
in natural resource rent irrelevant to our study.
We plot the relationship between resource abundance and the Grubel-Lloyd index for raw
materials in 2005 for group g2. This is represented in figure 4.7. Graphically we see a moon-
shaped negative relationship between resource abundance and two ways trade in raw materials.
To test the validity of this first impression, we propose to run a regression on our two samples
g5 and g2. The relationship could be framed in terms of the scenarios from chapter 3. Consider
figure 4.8 where we split the relationship between four quadrants. In the top two quadrants,
countries are resource abundant, which makes them country 2 type countries. In the bottom
two quadrants countries are resources scarce, which makes them country 1 type countries.
In quadrant 1 countries are resource abundant and engaged in one way trade which casts
them into the CA scenario. They seem to be exploiting their comparative advantage in natural
capital and using it to buy goods in industries where they have a comparative disadvantage.
In quadrant 2 are countries which, while still resource abundant, are developing two ways
trade in raw materials. These should be countries in CA but more likely in a low asymmetry
setting. There are almost no countries in this quadrant, which makes sense since we predicted
that countries in CA and low asymmetry had little incentive to trade. The few doing it are
e ectively doing so on a two ways basis.
In quadrant 3 are resources scarce countries which are still relying on one way trade in
raw materials. This seems like the critical area where countries with an advantage in natural
resources switched to the SC scenario and started to significantly deplete natural assets, hope-
fully building produced capital with the proceedings. Finally, in quadrant 4 are resource scarce
countries engaged in two ways trade. These are countries in SC and low asymmetry since they
have enough natural resources to engage in two ways trade.
The disposition of points across the two samples in this year gives us precious insight
on countries strategies regarding structural change. It would e ectively bring countries from
quadrant 1 to 4. But this journey could be undertaken in two ways. The first path involves
following a CA strategy where sustainable management of resources brings country two type
countries from quadrant 1 to 2. Sound management of the resources allows reinvestment and
development of intra-industry trade. If this interpretation is correct, we should see a positive
relationship between two ways trade in raw materials and two ways trade in the other bundles,
notably intermediate goods. Then, as the total wealth in the country increases faster than the
value of natural resources, the share of resource rent in total output diminishes, bringing the
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Figure 4.7: Resource abundance and two-way trade in natural resources
Source: Author’s calculation from the Wealth Accounting and Comtrade Databases
considered country slowly from quadrant 2 to 3, where natural resources are still significant in
absolute terms, but not so much in relative terms.
The second path involves unsound management of the rent so that the share of resource
rent in total output declines before the industrial orientation actually changes. Country 2 type
countries go from quadrant 1 to quadrant 3. From there, they have to keep depleting the natural
capital they have left to obtain the resources to diversify their industry, as they start to need
more and more imports of natural capital which are no more compensated by their exports of
natural capital intensive material. They then move through this mechanism to quadrant 4.
Both paths involve factor intensity reversal when going from the top quadrants to the bot-
tom ones. The di erence is when it occurs and the consequences for wealth accumulation. The
first structural change path with proper maintenance of natural capital makes for a smoother
transition where sustainable instruments of wealth are built before exhaustible ones are de-
pleted. But the data suggest that countries wait for resource scarcity to bite in quadrant 3
to undertake in the worst possible conditions and with the least resource, a transition they
cannot control. The number of countries taking the “ideal path” through quadrant 2 is ob-
viously dependent on the definition of the limits on the quadrants. Observing the dynamic
plots of the data still suggest that most countries with the possible exception of Trinidad and
Tobago, take a path more akin to the second one. The dataset also suggests that countries
can go from the bottom quadrants to the top ones. The undesirability of this scenario is made
obvious by the fact that they systematically join quadrant 1 when doing so. To validate this
interpretation, we should therefore find a statistically significant negative relationship between
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Figure 4.8: Paths for structural change
Wealth Accounting Database, Comtrade, Author’s calculation
resource abundance and two ways trade in raw materials. To validate the intuition that two
ways trade in raw materials is a marker of industrial diversification and reduced asymmetry,
we should also at least observe a possible relationship between the index for raw materials and
the index for intermediate goods.
A test using such macro-level data requires variables to control for general equilibrium e ects
and potential biases. In the literature on the Dutch disease, resource abundance is associated
with a shrinking manufacturing sector. To test for the co-evolution of manufacturing, we
propose two variables. The first is manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP. it
seems suitable to control for the impact of resource abundance on manufacturing in the first
test. We obtain this data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). This variable should
capture the evolution of overall manufacturing in domestic production and therefore control for
reallocation of resources in response to domestic factors. The second variable is more suitable
to the second test on the response to variations in the pattern of trade. We use the Grubel-
Lloyd index on the second bundle SoP2 for intermediate goods. A value close to one would
indicate a diversified manufacturing base, even if its overall size is small (Kuralbayeva and
Stefanski 2013). This would indicate whether one way trade in raw materials is associated with
one way trade in intermediates or not. We also include for consistency the Grubel-Lloyd index
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on the fourth bundle SoP4 for capital goods. If our hypothesis on the occurrence of exports
diversification is true, this variable should follow the movements of the index from the SoP1
and SoP2 bundles. In the early stages of structural change when resource dependence is high,
countries should engage in one way trade in both intermediates and capital goods, following an
inter-industrial trade pattern.
Optimally, we should both control for the evolution of asymmetry as a driver of the patterns
of trade and a control for the importance of the resource sector. But data on natural capital are
only available for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005, which would narrow our period of study too
much. Another natural control variable is the growth rate of GDP. This would link our test to
the rest of the literature on the resource curse and help us capture the impact of the underlying
increase in wealth and income on the structure of exports. When the share of manufacturing
allows us to control for resource relocation between sectors, the growth rate of GDP will allow
us to control for the overall increase in wealth and income. We obtain this from the World
Development Indicators. We also stressed the role of commodity prices movements for exports
patterns. Therefore, we also control for commodity prices using the all commodities price index
from 1992 to 2011, from the Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities database. Similar
to the growth rate, we control for the increase in the volume of trade. The modification of
the structure of exports could be generated by an exogenous increase in productivity ceteris
paribus. Since resources abundant countries may experience unbalances in productivity gains
between sectors, this should be controlled for. To do this, we use the volume of total trade as
a share of GDP, from the World Development Indicators.
II.4 Model and Results
Our data covers 20 years and up to 87 countries. We plot the mean values for our samples
per year and per countries for our two variables of interest, resource abundance (rr) and pattern
of trade in raw materials (gl1). The results are available in figures 4.10 for the means per year
and 4.9 for the means per country for variable gl1. Correspondingly in figures 4.12 and 4.11 for
variable rr. We observe strong heterogeneity across countries and years for all samples for the
variable rr. The variable gl1 is characterised by increasing cross-country heterogeneity as the
size of the sample increase, while cross-years heterogeneity is much milder and does not seem
to depend on sample size.
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The correlation matrices and descriptives statistics for the di erent sample sizes are available
in appendix G. True to our strategy to control for the two-way causation, we test the two generic
regressions:
rri,t = –+—1gl1i,t+—2gl4i,t+—3vti,t+—4ggi,t+—5mani,t+—6cpt+ ‘i,t (4.43)
gl1i,t = –+—1rri,t+—2gl2i,t+—3gl4i,t+—4vti,t+ ‘i,t (4.44)
With cp the all commodities price index, gl1 the Grubel-Lloyd(GL) index for raw materials,
gl2 the GL index for intermediate goods, gl4 the GL index for capital goods,manmanufacturing
value added as a percentage of GDP, rr natural resource rent as a percentage of GDP and vt
the volume of trade as a percentage of GDP. We test both equations through the same strategy.
Starting with sample g5 composed of 57 countries, we test the pooled OLS model using the
Breusch-Pagan LM test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) and find the e ects to be significant for both
regressions. We then use the Hausman (1978) test to discriminate between fixed and random
panel e ects and conclude in favour of fixed e ects for both regressions.
We then test both models for cross-sectional dependence with the original Breusch and
Pagan (1980) statistic and the Pesaran (2004) statistic. We find significant cross-sectional de-
pendence for both regressions. We then test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component
of the errors. We use the Breusch (1978) test and perform it for order 1 and 2 autocorrela-
tion. We find significant autocorrelation of order 1 and 2 in both regressions. Considering the
importance of a proper treatment of autocorrelation in panel data, we use the Durbin-Watson
and Wooldridge tests for autocorrelation in fixed e ects panel data models (Wooldridge 2002)
and find the same statistically significant autocorrelation.
We test heteroskedasticity using the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test with studentized resid-
uals following Koenker (1981). We find evidence of heteroskedasticity in both regressions. We
found cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, resulting in biased es-
timators. To control for this, we apply the variance covariance matrix as in Arellano and Bond
(1991) with a clustering over time option to control for cross-sectional dependence. Those
corrections yield model 1 in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
The need to cluster observations over time to control for cross sectional dependence suggests
that time fixed e ects might be relevant. We compare the F-statistics from the pooling, two-
ways and time fixed e ects regressions and conclude that both time and individual fixed e ects
should be included in both regressions.The variable cp, is unsurprisingly strongly correlated with
time fixed e ects, the point of collinearity. As a consequence, we drop it from regression 4.43
and use time fixed e ects instead. We then run the same tests for cross-sectional dependence,
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heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and find evidence of all three. We then control for this
using the same robust variance covariance matrix which yields model 2.
Considering the persistence of autocorrelation with two-ways fixed e ects, we control for
unit roots in our variables using the Levin et al. (2002) test for panel data. We conclude
that some of our variables have a unit root. We then use the advanced Dickey-Fuller tests
(Fuller 1976, Said and Dickey 1984) to obtain the order of autocorrelation. We conclude that
the lags of our endogenous variables in both regressions need to be included. We then run
the Breusch (1978) test which allows to test for autocorrelation for orders higher than 1 and
find significant autocorrelation at 1% for all orders in both regressions. However, running the
Durbin Watson and Wooldridge tests we find no significant autocorrelation in regression 4.44
and autocorrelation in only one of the two tests for regression 4.43. We still find evidence
of heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence, so that we apply the robust variance
covariance matrix which gives us model 3.
The inclusion of lagged variables into a fixed e ects regression leads to a dynamic panel
bias (Nickell 1981). OLS estimators might not be asymptotically convergent when lagged
variables are included as robust variance covariance matrix controls for autocorrelation between
regressors and errors, but not between regressors in t and t≠1, let alone higher orders. This is
an especially great concern considering the order of autocorrelation suggested by our unit root
tests. We therefore need to estimate our regressors using an instrumental variable approach.
The standard in the literature on dynamic panel data is to use system GMMs. Originated by
Arellano and Bover (1995), Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Holz-
Eakin et al. (1988), the method is presented by Wooldridge (2002) and Roodman (2009b).
GMM system estimation is especially relevant amongst instrumental variable approaches in the
case of “large N, small T”, panels with a large number of individuals but a short time horizon.
Considering the length of our sample (20 years) it is likely as Roodman (2009b) suggests,
that the fixed e ects may be able to absorb autocorrelation, so that the standard two stage
least square (2SLS) instrumental approach would yield convergent estimators. We therefore
propose model 4, the 2SLS regressions as an indication of the prevalence of autocorrelation in
the models. We find this comparison especially important in the context of the arbitrariness
associated with the choice of instruments in system GMMs.
To pick our instruments we follow the recommendations in Roodman (2009a) regarding
the importance of the robustness of the di erence in Hansen test. The problem of correlation
between lagged di erences used as instruments and current errors in level is obviously central
here, considering the results of the autocorrelation tests in the previous models. We use the
di erence in Hansen test as a guide for the choice of our instruments, resulting in the following
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specifications. For sample g5 we use a two-step GMM system with robust errors for both
regressions. In regression 4.43 we have 60 instruments for 57 individuals and 741 observations.
We use the lagged values of rr and gl4 as GMM-type instruments. In regression 4.44 we have
62 instruments for 58 individuals and 768 observations. We use the lagged values of gl1 and
gl2 as GMM type instruments for both level and di erence equations. For sample g2 we use
one step system GMM with robust errors for regression 4.43 and two steps system GMM with
robust errors for regression 4.44. In regression 4.43 we have 80 instruments for 93 individuals
and 1240 observations. We use the lagged values of rr, gl1 and gl4 as GMM-type instruments
for the first di erences equation and the lagged values of rr in the level equation. In regression
4.44 we have 81 instruments for 94 individuals and 1257 observations. We use the lagged values
of gl1, gl2 and vt as GMM-type instruments for both equations. In all regressions we keep time
fixed e ect as a control for cross sectional dependence.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarise the 5 models for the g5 sample. Fixed-e ects (individual and
time fixed e ects for both samples and regressions) are presented in appendix H. Unsurprisingly,
countries with the greatest resource abundance also have the more important positive individual
fixed-e ects in regression 4.43. Highest values are recorded in model 3 for Kazakhstan, Libya,
Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan. Time fixed e ects are also varying strongly, with the highest
values concentrated in the second half of the sample. This is an indication that time fixed
e ects are capturing resource prices, as the one year in the 2000 decade where resource prices
fell dramatically is also the year with the smallest fixed e ect of all. In regression 4.44 the time
fixed-e ects are much more regular in model 3, suggesting that they may be dropped (as we
will do in model 5). Individual fixed-e ects are highest for countries that di er from the list in
regression 4.43 with Bhutan, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe.
We follow the same procedure for sample g2, whose characteristics are similar to sample
g5. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the 5 models for sample g2. The spread between the smallest and
the largest individual fixed e ect is wider for regression 4.43 and 4.44. This makes sense as
widening the sample on the bias of resource abundance should widen the gap between countries
from sample g5 and newcomers. Time fixed e ects are smaller than under sample g5 for
regression 4.43. As in the sample g5, variations in time fixed e ects are small for regression
4.44. Individual fixed e ects follow the expected pattern with new countries having lower values
than countries from sample g5.
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Table 4.3: Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.732806úúú 0.761348úúú 0.746758úúú
(0.074914) (0.116999) (0.097442)
gl1 ≠3.355378úú ≠4.110716úúú ≠1.822040ú ≠3.957981 ≠4.829866ú
(1.298318) (1.110792) (0.886025) (3.826604) (1.918752)
gl4 3.977309ú 1.552574 1.685772 4.389548 10.93009úú
(1.695577) (1.406175) (1.442188) (5.985293) (3.89853)
gg 0.282560úúú 0.124164ú 0.077986 0.098270 0.121313+
(0.083675) (0.061906) (0.057921) (0.150522) (0.073213)
man ≠0.480344úúú ≠0.495173úúú ≠0.229881úúú ≠1.152664 ≠0.368228úúú
(0.112033) (0.111854) (0.051093) (0.735587) (0.113420)
vt 0.058936+ 0.051656ú 0.005161 0.004402 0.010983
(0.031885) (0.026244) (0.015544) (0.024813) (0.018555)
cp 0.057101úúú
(0.015937)
(Intercept) 18.80759+ 7.632837úú
(11.00275) (2.514675)
R2 0.30157 0.079928 0.55607 0.7369
Adj. R2 0.27651 0.071387 0.49529
Num. obs. 758 758 741 665 741 (60 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.532816úúú 0.433037úú 0.719337úúú
(0.052501) (0.147512) (0.067168)
rr ≠0.002760úúú ≠0.003804úúú ≠0.002221úú ≠0.002127 ≠0.00263úú
(0.000613) (0.000917) (0.000736) (0.002308) (0.000885)
gl2 0.151365úúú 0.146660úúú 0.114022úú 0.213185ú ≠0.06998
(0.028615) (0.027039) (0.035822) (0.085649) (0.099765)
gl4 0.218079úúú 0.217751úú 0.065287 0.246841+ 0.056234
(0.058385) (0.066030) (0.056315) (0.146719) (0.039923)
vt 0.000104 0.000046 ≠0.000090 ≠0.000132 0.000145
(0.000220) (0.000213) (0.000143) (0.000719) (0.000191)
(Intercept) 0.0642978 0.148112ú
(0.112802) (0.072559)
R2 0.062421 0.065685 0.35147 0.5789
Adj. R2 0.057721 0.059271 0.3144
Num. obs. 850 850 768 696 768 (60 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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Table 4.5: Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.720756úúú 0.781939úúú 0.898921úúú
(0.093483) (0.076679) (0.040367)
gl1 ≠1.697171ú ≠1.581927ú ≠0.419481 ≠2.803414 ≠1.856415+
(0.738220) (0.676446) (0.549111) (2.19881) (1.077331)
gl4 2.940787ú 1.670589 1.121629 2.811513 0.773054
(1.340090) (1.111332) (0.859070) (3.241469) (0.496421)
gg 0.217883úúú 0.126296úú 0.049594 0.037065 0.019953
(0.061040) (0.041929) (0.034804) (0.080299) (0.037178)
man ≠0.382620úúú ≠0.384044úúú ≠0.162603úúú ≠0.618179úú ≠0.089806úú
(0.071831) (0.066883) (0.038208) (0.202388) (0.033959)
vt 0.057664ú 0.051513ú 0.003934 0.002273 0.005505
(0.026156) (0.022777) (0.014682) (0.020212) (0.010669)
cp 0.036247úúú
(0.009500)
(Intercept) 11.53158úú 3.313186úúú
(3.73364) (0.921842)
R2 0.23269 0.061941 0.53212 0.8565
Adj. R2 0.21452 0.056226 0.48191
Num. obs. 1268 1268 1240 1114 1240 (80 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
Table 4.6: Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.521562úúú 0.37969úú 0.680947úúú
(0.044445) (0.120070) (0.093004)
rr ≠0.002543úúú ≠0.002553úúú ≠0.001668úúú ≠0.00186 ≠0.002810úú
(0.000560) (0.000647) (0.000482) (0.001972) (0.001018)
gl2 0.181595úúú 0.181905úúú 0.110704úúú 0.203833ú 0.062188
(0.031173) (0.031210) (0.032099) (0.085248) (0.084273)
gl4 0.157758úúú 0.165791úú 0.055593 0.271278ú 0.095687ú
(0.045529) (0.050440) (0.043353) (0.121174) (0.044393)
vt ≠0.000134 ≠0.000120 ≠0.000162 ≠0.000203 ≠0.000502
(0.000205) (0.000238) (0.000167) (0.000753) (0.000799)
(Intercept) 0.102735 0.218135úú
(0.096604) (0.077940)
R2 0.057464 0.057253 0.32573 0.5225
Adj. R2 0.053324 0.052344 0.29541
Num. obs. 1388 1388 1257 1139 1257 (81 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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Table 4.7: Evolution of values between g5 and g2 for regression 1
Sample and model lag(rr) gl1 gl4 gg man vt cp
Model 1 g5 N/A ≠3.35úú 3.97ú 0.28úúú ≠0.48úúú 0.05+ 0.05úúú
Model 1 g2 N/A ≠1.69ú 2.94ú 0.21úúú ≠0.38úúú 0.05ú 0.03úúú
Model 2 g5 N/A ≠4.11úúú 1.55 0.12ú ≠0.49úúú 0.05ú N/A
Model 2 g2 N/A ≠1.58ú 1.67 0.12úú ≠0.38úúú 0.05ú N/A
Model 3 g5 0.73úúú ≠1.82ú 1.68 0.07 ≠0.22úúú 0.005 N/A
Model 3 g2 0.72úúú ≠0.41 1.12 0.04 ≠0.16úúú 0.003 N/A
Model 4 g5 0.76úúú ≠3.95 4.38 0.09 ≠1.15 0.004 N/A
Model 4 g2 0.78úúú ≠2.80 2.81 0.03 ≠0.61úú 0.002 N/A
Model 5 g5 0.74úúú ≠4.82ú 10.93úú 0.12+ ≠0.36úúú 0.01 N/A
Model 5 g2 0.89úúú ≠1.85+ 0.77 0.01 ≠0.08úú 0.005 N/A
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
Table 4.8: Evolution of values between g5 and g2 for regression 2
Sample and model lag(gl1) rr gl2 gl4 vt
Model 1 g5 N/A ≠0.002úúú 0.15úúú 0.21úúú 0.0001
Model 1 g2 N/A ≠0.002úúú 0.18úúú 0.15úúú ≠0.0001
Model 2 g5 N/A ≠0.003úúú 0.14úúú 0.21úú 0.00004
Model 2 g2 N/A ≠0.002úúú 0.18úúú 0.16úú ≠0.0001
Model 3 g5 0.53úúú ≠0.002úú 0.11úú 0.06 ≠0.00009
Model 3 g2 0.52úúú ≠0.001úúú 0.11úúú 0.05 ≠0.0001
Model 4 g5 0.43úú ≠0.002 0.21ú 0.24+ ≠0.0001
Model 4 g2 0.37úú ≠0.001 0.20ú 0.27ú ≠0.0002
Model 5 g5 0.71úúú ≠0.002úú ≠0.06 0.05 0.0001
Model 5 g2 0.68úúú ≠0.002úú ≠0.06 0.09ú ≠0.0005
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05, +p < 0.1
II.5 Discussion and possible extensions
We start the discussion with two summary tables with the coe cients for both regressions
in the two samples:
Our sample su ers from a missing observations bias, in the very category we would like
to investigate: resource rich economies. Missing observations on trade flows are concentrated
at the beginning of the period, so that missing observations are more likely to be on the first
quadrant of figure 4.8.
The first observation is that regressions one and two yield reasonably good fit considering
the very aggregate nature of the data. For both samples, regression 4.43 gets an adjusted R2
around 50%, a decent score considering the number of potentially missing variables. Regression
4.44 performs less well for sample g5 (31%) but similarly for sample g2. Autocorrelation tests
for model 5 performed following Arellano and Bond (1991) rejects autocorrelation in the model
at 5% for regression 4.43 and at 0.1% for regression 4.44. We can reject the hypothesis that
missing variables (especially institutional variables in regression 4.43) are driving the results.
Diving deeper on variable significance, both regressions show the critical importance of the
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lagged variable, which indicates the strong inertia associated with both the share of natural
resource rents in GDP and the structure of exports in natural resource intensive raw materials.
Resource dependence and export structure in raw materials are clearly better predicted by
the previous year value. Lagged variables in both regressions 4.43 and 4.44 become more
significant as autocorrelation is better controlled. The coe cient associated with the lagged
share of natural resource rent is surprisingly larger in sample g2 than in sample g5.
We interpret this as evidence that resources rich countries are more heterogeneous as a group
(within resources rich economies) with respect to the resources scarce economies (between the
two groups). This interpretation is backed by the importance of clustering and cross-sectional
dependence in both samples. The idea that there are several ways to be resource rich with
respect to more similar resource poor countries is also consistent with the scenarios we presented
in the section above. The relationship between the Grubel-Lloyd index for raw materials and
its lagged value is weaker in sample g2 than in sample g5. This suggests the inertia in the value
of the index is somewhat weaker in resource poor economies.
Moving to the Grubel-Lloyd for raw materials index in regression 4.43, the variable is
statistically significant in most models. It is however harder to see in the context of persistent
autocorrelation up to model 5. Variable gl1 is negatively correlated with resource abundance,
with higher magnitude in sample g5 than in sample g2. Resource abundant countries are
therefore more likely to experience one way trade in raw materials. The stark di erence between
the two samples suggests that this relationship is especially strong as resource abundance
increases. this result is confirmed by the strongly significant, although of small magnitude,
negative relationship between gl1 and resource abundance in regression 4.44. We consider that
our hypothesis, a correlation between one way trade in raw materials and resource abundance
is validated by these results.
The next significant insight pleading for the overall robustness of our results comes from the
share of manufacturing in regression 4.44. The variable is systematically significant (control
model 4 aside) and systematically negative. Resource abundance is clearly an impediment for
the development of the manufacturing sector. The e ect is again stronger in sample g5 than
in sample g2. Once this is controlled for, we find the growth rate of GDP to be positively
associated with resource abundance (when significant) as in Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004). We
therefore agree with the conclusion that it is not so much the GDP growth rate that is negatively
correlated with resource abundance but the development of a competitive manufacturing sector.
The observed possibility of growth subsidised by unsustainable use of natural resources is
confirmed by our results in regression 4.43.
This result helps in making sense of the possible positive relationship between the Grubel-
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Lloyd indexes for raw materials and intermediate goods. Two-way trade in raw materials
is associated with two-way trade in intermediate goods since both are the consequences of a
diversified production, more likely to be found in resource scarce economies. Although obviously
tentative, we can hint at a confirmation using the lower values in sample g2 for models 1, 2, 3
and 4. These results are nonetheless contingent to uncontrolled autocorrelation and should be
considered with extreme care. Indeed, The Grubel-Lloyd index for intermediate goods is not
significant in model 5 for both samples.
We controlled for inter-industry trade using the Grubel-Lloyd index for capital goods. The
variable is not statistically significant in model 5 for sample g5, but is positively correlated with
the dependent variable in regression 4.44. It is on the contrary not significant in sample g2 in
regression 4.43, and positively correlated with the dependent variable. The result in regression
4.44 mimics variable gl2 in line with our hypothesis. Countries engaging in one way trade in
raw materials tend to trade capital goods on an inter-industrial basis as well. The results from
regression 4.43 are more puzzling, as they suggest that resource abundance is correlated with
two ways trade in capital good, once the negative impact on overall manufacturing production
is controlled for.
We are inclined to take this result coming from model 5 sample g5 with great caution, as
the coe cient value is clearly at odds with the other models. The size of the coe cient could
be the result of unobserved autocorrelation. The positive sign seems to be observed across
all models nonetheless, and constitutes a contradictory result which requires an explanation.
This most likely comes from the composition of the bundle, which includes capital goods from
the first transformation of raw materials such as refined oil or steel. This first transformation
is often performed in the country of origin for ease of transportation. In that case, resource
abundance could lead to an increase in two ways trade in capital goods, as greater volumes of
steel are traded against machine tools for example.
Finally, the volume of trade is small in magnitude and of no statistical significance in
either model 3, 4 or 5 for both samples and both regressions. We can therefore conclude that
overall productivity gains did not influence the pattern of trade or that these e ects have been
captured by the time fixed e ects. As for the evolution of world prices in natural resources, it
was e ciently controlled for by the time fixed e ects in lieu of the price index variable cp.
The results we present here are to be considered with caution, considering the high level
of aggregation in the data and the unbalance in both samples. Numerous observations are
missing about trade flows in natural resource abundant countries. Missing observations on
trade flows are concentrated at the beginning of the period (as robustness tests below show), so
that missing observations are more likely to be on the first quadrant of figure 4.8. Nevertheless,
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our results appear robust enough to validate our hypothesis.
Resources abundant countries exhibit higher reliance on one-way trade in raw materials
and a lower share of manufacturing in total value added. One-way trade in resources appears
to be correlated with one-way trade in intermediate goods (and possibly capital goods). This
indicates that structural change is associated with an overall diversification in exports across
all the range of production goods. Therefore, countries characterised by low values for the
Grubel-Lloyd index in raw materials tend to persist in reliance on natural capital and natural
capital export as engines of growth, de facto postponing structural change (hence going through
quadrant 2).
We even find evidence of a positive relationship between resource abundance and growth
once this lack of structural change is controlled for. We can therefore further the claim that
the resource curse manifests itself much more through a lack of diversification in both exports
and production (with reliance on natural capital) than a slower GDP growth rate, which can
be obtained through unsustainable exhaustion of natural capital.
Should further tests confirm these preliminary results, we should consider the pattern of
trade and the exclusive institutional arrangement of resource abundant countries as two sides
of the same coin. International trade in the context of the resource curse is usually studied as
the trigger for an eviction e ect from manufacturing to the resource intensive sector as in the
Dutch disease, or as a vehicle for capital gains. Our results suggest that a significant impact
of the pattern of trade survives the control for world commodities prices and that the impact
of trade goes beyond the inter-sectoral shift of resources.
The indicator that should matter is the diversification of exports in all sectors, natural cap-
ital intensive goods especially. In this respect, institutional and trade patterns truly intertwine
in that a diversified range of exports is harder to be captured institutionally, while institutional
exclusiveness is harder to be preserved or created when imports and exports are more diver-
sified. Investigating further this question could provide interesting insights on the merits of
export-led growth in general, as opposed to the natural resource intensive exports led growth
we just discussed.
II.6 Robustness tests
We present the results of three static and one dynamic panel models. We use the first three
models as an indication of the potential biases in our results. Following Roodman (2009b) we
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also provide in the tables the results of the two stages least square instrumental regressions, as a
test for the dynamic panel bias and the likely convergence of our estimators. We controlled for
cross-sectional dependence, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in all models and treated it
using standard practices. The potential issues left are either related to the unbalanced structure
of the panel, data collection issues or dimensionality issues (between the time T and number
of individuals N).
Our dataset in unbalanced as observations are missing in some countries. These missing
observations are not uniformly distributed across individuals and periods. Missing data are
concentrated at the beginning of the period and in developing countries. Unfortunately, those
happen to be our individuals of interest as most resources rich countries are developing countries.
Most panel data analysis is conducted in a “small T big N” setting, with few periods but many
individuals. Our estimations do not fall in this category as our time frame is quite long. This
could be a problem as the notion of “fixed e ects” is potentially dubious here. The implicit
assumption behind our modelling strategy is that functional relations were stable in those
countries for 20 years, which is unlikely.
As a result, we insist in this section on the stability of the relationships we presented in
tables 4.3 to 4.6. To address those potential concerns over stability, we split both samples into
two sub-samples of ten years each. We then follow the exact same modelling strategy applied
on those four sub-samples. We notably keep the same instrumental strategy in the dynamic
panel regressions, even though changes may be warranted. Results are available in appendix J.
Over the period 1992 to 2002 the results for sample g2 are quite stable for both regressions.
The main relations, between resource abundance and the variables gl1 and man in regression 1
and gl1 and resource abundance in regression 2 are preserved. Results are more disappointing
for sample g5 where the relation between gl1 and resource abundance still holds in regression 2,
but regression 1 lost all statistical significance. As for the period 2002 to 2011, the relationship
between gl1 and resource abundance only holds for sample g2 regression 2. For this period, the
lagged variables in both regressions for the 2 samples seem to absorb almost all of the statistical
significance yielded by the model.
Those results for the second half of the sample are disappointing. Still, they can be explained
using a powerful underlying movement in our results. The period 2002-2011 is a period of
rapidly increasing then decreasing natural resource prices (see figure 4.6). We observe this
clearly in the yearly fixed e ect in sample g5. As all the variables loose statistical significance, all
the yearly fixed e ect become significant with important magnitudes. Unsurprisingly, natural
resources rich countries are greatly influenced by resource prices. Resource prices are confirmed
to be a structural variable in resource abundant countries, shaping the current account and the
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development of manufacturing.
Those results vindicate a posteriori our choice to present results over twenty years. The
fact that resource abundance still pulls countries toward inter-industry trade in regression 2 for
country 2 is proof that the relation exist even over the 2002-2011 decade. It is simply less potent
or volatile than resources prices, so that its impact fades with strong variations in resources
prices. The same can be said for manufacturing which regains briefly significance in regression
1 for sample g2. We can therefore conclude from those tests that resources rich countries
behave di erently when exposed to rapidly increasing resources prices. This is well-known
problem when studying resource abundance. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have been able
to neutralise that e ect. This was expectable considering the results of the Arellano-Bond tests
for regression 1 for the full samples.
A natural solution to this problem would be to use another instrument,that is less correlated
with resources prices. On the basis of those first results, we believe that a small theoretical
model could help us identify a better proxy. An alternative (or a complement) for this turn
back to theory, would be to change our testing strategy. A natural alternative would be to use
a simultaneous equation model (SEM) to test both equations simultaneously. SEM models are
normally saved for the estimation of structural model. Despite this, they are increasingly used
to estimate non-structural equations with common variables.
Our results underline again the inter-temporal trade-o  associated with the gains from
trade. When entering free-trade, countries have every incentive to increase specialisation of
both production and the content of trade. These incentives are empirically balanced with
forces of diversification from the versatility of instruments of wealth available in the domestic
economy. This leads many advanced economies to the somewhat antinomic “diversification of
exports specialisation”. The optimal transition from quadrant 1 to quadrant 4 in figure 4.8
should be skilfully timed to use the early gains from specialisation to favour innovation, the
development of other instruments of wealth which will bring diversification.
The next logical step would be to determine to which extent this rebalancing happens
endogenously through market forces and institutional incentives. Failure to follow the Hartwick
rule and the results from chapter 3 would suggest that careful management of market forces is
required as market mechanisms cannot distinguish between di erent sources for the gains from
trade. It should be noted that these observations are independent from the role of economies
of scale we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Taking those into account only adds to
the risks and resulting need for management as economies of scale are externalities from a price
formation perspective.
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This management is especially important when one considers that despite the important
increase in commodity prices (see figure 4.6) patterns of trade still exhibit a high degree of
inertia. This result needs to be confirmed with a more detailed analysis. But as things stand, a
sustainable outcome for structural change seems to depend much more on policy than market
forces alone. The question gets us to the di erence between extensive and intensive margin.
Increased reliance on the intensive margin could be a bad omen for future sustainability.
We hoped to convince the reader of the interdependence of trade incentives and institutional
arrangements in creating a resource curse. We have so far established the role of trade patterns
in a context of resource abundance. In the final part of this chapter we would like to delve
into the institutional side of the coin. Doing so, we would like to stress the merits of using
counterfactual scenarios in sustainability analysis. In the next section, we propose to examine
domestic reinvestment of natural resource rents in the former socialist economies of Eastern
Europe, with a focus on the Russian federation. To do this, we use the counterfactual method
proposed by Hamilton et al. (2006) to estimate the lack of reinvestment in produced capital as
advocated in the Hartwick rule. We then conclude on the respective importance of institutional
and trade factors in creating a resource curse. 8
III Empirical sustainability: The case of Russia
In chapter 3 we showed the importance of trade in establishing interdependence in devel-
opment paths.
In the beginning of this chapter, we stressed how via the global supply chain, some countries
would enter international trade in a fashion that could at least require additional savings in a
sustainability setting. We went on to discuss the empirical findings on the particular case of
natural resources abundant countries. We concluded on the impossibility to disentangle mostly
domestic institutional responsibility from international trade induced patterns of production
in explaining the peculiar behaviours of resource-rich countries. To back this claim we pre-
sented the roles of the direct and indirect impact of trade, discussing how they would play on
institutional arrangement and most likely encourage extractive economic institutions. We then
proposed quantitative evidence on the role played by resource abundance in dampening two
ways trade in raw materials, de facto putting resource abundant countries on a less sustainable
development path.
8. Which we would now define as taking an unsustainable path for structural change.
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As was repeatedly stressed in this chapter and in earlier chapters, the key to better resource
management and more sustainable development lies in the understanding of interactions be-
tween institutional evolutions and trade flows. This is the “open economy version” of the claim
made in Arrow et al. (2010). This comprehensive model is beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, we would like to propose as a first step to achieve this an empirical illustration based
on a natural experiment. Natural experiments are highly desirable as they ideally allow to
disentangle two or more potential e ects. They are nonetheless, as any empiricist would know,
reasonably rare and do not necessarily provide clear cut answers.
A natural experiment to test for the relative importance of institutional and trade factors for
resource rich economies would require regions to be under a common institutional setting. Then
those regions should break-up from the common institutional setting and form new entities
asymmetric in resource abundance. Then, tracking the development paths of those regions,
one could observe whether paths remain similar across regions (from the common institutional
background) or di er between groups of regions depending on resource abundance. In the
first case, institutional inertia is likely to determine natural resources management while in
the second case trade-induced wealth allocation creates divergence between resource abundant
regions and non resource abundant ones. The e ect could then be controlled for using a group of
natural resources abundant regions and a group of natural resources scarce regions reasonably
similar from an institutional perspective.
Such a natural experiment is obviously hard to find. However, we believe that the break-
up of the Soviet Union and the dismantlement of the communist block provides us with such
an experiment. The former Soviet Union was institutionally homogeneous (Kornai 1992) and
we can observe discrepancies in natural resources endowments between the newly constituted
independent states. We also have with the former European members of the COMECON 9 ,
a potential control group as those countries were reasonably close to the soviet political and
economic institutional setting before the break-up started in 1989. Those countries all have low
rents from natural resources. As any natural experiment, this one is far from perfect, especially
in terms of institutional similarities.
A whole literature is dedicated to the analysis of the transition of former communist
economies (see for example the journals Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Post-Communist
Economies) stressing the diversity of their experiences. Still, we believe this experiment is one
of the most appropriate available to us 10.
9. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
10. One can speculate that an homogeneous democratic transition in the middle east during the Arab spring
could have been a similar natural experiment. The actual dismal state of institutional change in the region
stresses that natural experiments like the one we are looking for are hard to come by. Also, the very fact that
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Inside the group of former soviet republics we focus on the Russian Federation. This is
a natural choice as Russia is both the largest of the former republics and resource abundant.
Russia is also interesting because it is less mentioned than other countries such as Nigerian,
Saudi Arabia or Venezuela in the literature on the resource curse. There are instead many arti-
cles focusing on the consequences of rent-seeking behaviours in Russia, while it seems uncertain
that Russia has fallen to the resource curse (Dülger et al. 2013).
One reason for this could be precisely that the Russian case is perceived as atypical from an
institutional perspective. As we will see, current economic and physical value indicators would
not naturally associate Russia with its neighbours. Since the fall of the USSR, the Russian
federation undergone a transition from soviet institutions towards free market economics and
liberal democracy 11. In that context, the swift growth of the Russian Federation between the
financial crisis of 1998 and the subprime crisis starting in summer 2008 has been particularly
impressive. GDP and GDP per capita increased twofold in constant USD, while numerous
development indicators like the HDI, the mortality or the natality rate improved.
During this decade, Russia moved from the uncertainty of the Eltsine government and the
“first transition” (1991-1998), which ended with the financial crisis of 1998. In this context,
a transition is defined as a structural change articulating an economic (from planning to free
market economics) and a political (from democratic centralism to pluralism and representative
democracy) dimension. The Eltsine years witnessed a recomposing of the political and economic
elite (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005). As Vladimir Putin 12 rose as head of state, a new
decade started (1998-2008) where Russia re-emerged as a major power.
We consider that this period is associated with a change in the challenges to the development
of Russia. As a consequence, we call this decade the “second transition”. On the political front,
the second transition is characterised by the power grabbing of the “United Russia” party
(Gel’man 2008), which slowly monopolised power without the authoritarianism of the soviet
period (Bader 2011). On the economic front, another kind of concentration is observed. The
Herfindhal-Hirschman index for exports went from 0.132 en 1998 à 0.363 en 2008 13 as the
economy grew more polarised. More importantly for the global projection of power, Russia
returned to growth after the 1998 crisis and the devaluation of the rouble. But as economic
growth returns, so do concerns regarding sustainability (Bobylev 2005).
the post-communist transition happened peacefully and in such a short period from East Germany to Tajikistan
is a manifestation of the relatively greater homogeneity of the communist bloc.
11. We define liberal democracy as a political organisation characterised by elections based on popular
sovereignty, aiming at providing and defending natural liberties. These natural liberties are understood as
in the universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
12. As head of government from 1999 and president of the Federation from 2000.
13. 0 indicates perfect dispersion and 1 perfect concentration.The index is provided by the UNCTAD.
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While economic growth brought Russia closer to the more advanced economies, it still is an
emerging country by many aspects: faster growth, widening inequalities, and a tense political
situation 14. Economic power is concentrated in the hands of the oligarchs, new patrons of the
state capitalism 15 now implemented in Russia. Russia is also plagued by a persistent imbalance
of the current account 16, once the impact of natural resources exports is subtracted. Considered
together, these problems cast a long shadow on the sustainability of Russian development.
Development being in essence a holistic process, it is usually analysed using a dashboard
of indicators. These indicators usually confuse the ends with the means of development (GDP
growth, medical insurance and coverage, investment, etc.). Multicriteria approaches are more
exhaustive, but it is harder to derive a clear message, let alone policy recommendation when
indicators send mixed signals. How should we weight economic progress against a deficient
political process or a shrinking population? We believe that beyond the assessment of the
current state of Russian development, the sustainability of this development is at stake.
We focus on the second transition in Russia as the sustainability challenge can be observed
then stripped of more traditional transition and development concerns as in the first transition.
This is also the best period for the setting of the natural experiment, as the institutional drift
from the soviet era is not yet too important, while enough time was left for market mechanism
to reshape resource allocation. Finally, now that Vladimir Putin is back as head of state, the
second transition gives us some indication about what to expect during his new term regarding
the sustainability of development.
We stressed in chapter 1 the di erent dimensions of a sustainable development and the need
to balance opportunity and equity in a framework organised under the subsidiarity principle.
We use in this section data on comprehensive wealth and Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) (Pearce
and Atkinson 1993) as the closest indicator to this perspective. Despite justified criticism
regarding the perfect substitutability assumption and under-performance as a predictive tool
in developed countries (Ferreira and Vincent 2005), ANS are best suited to assess the dynamics
of a development path.
We use ANS to characterise the development path of Russia and put into perspective the
institutional evolution of the country. We use the distinction between extractive and inclusive
institutions brought forward by ? to characterise the evolution of the institutional path in Rus-
sia. We then provide simple dynamic comparisons based on ANS and a composite index to show
14. As shown by the demonstrations following Vladimir Putin’s return at the presidency in 2011.
15. We consider capitalism in Russia as state capitalism as the general orientation of the economy, especially
in strategic sectors, is defined in accordance to or under the instructions of the central government and its
political allies.
16. 366.28 millions in deficit in 2008 according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
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how the Russian course of development takes from resource abundant country-characteristics,
but is still most closely associated with the performance of institutional siblings.
We then put forward the analytical framework we considered to be the best suited to
the study of transitional dynamics. We follow Hamilton et al. (2006) and the World Bank
(2006) to compute a counterfactual profile of investment in produced capital for Russia. The
counterfactual method is in our view particularly relevant as it allows the normative assessment,
based on rigorously defined assumptions, of a development path. We follow the version in
Hamilton et al. (2006) centred on the Hartwick rule and produced capital, but this is clearly only
the first step of more sophisticated counterfactuals and scenarios. An obvious first extension
in the context of this thesis would have been the consideration of overseas investment.
To do this, we still miss an open economy version of the model in Hamilton et al. (2006),
which still evades us and would yield an “augmented open economy Hartwick rule”. Once
such a rule is established, the extra savings from the model in chapter 3 could also be taken
into account as they are themselves counterfactual in nature. Still, the “closed economy”
method is a useful complement for ANS as two similar levels of ANS may come from di erent
fundamentals. By stressing the shortcomings of the reinvestment policy and the cumulative
e ect of these shortcomings, the counterfactual method provides a comprehensive assessment
of sustainable development.
We show that although Russia exhibits positive ANS for most of the second transition,
reinvestment policy lagged behind the requirements of the Hartwick rule. Russia consumed
some of the rent from natural resources, ending with a stock of produced capital per capita
26.7% below the counterfactual level from the Hartwick rule for 2008. We use a simple linear
model to forecast the results of this trend in 2018. We conclude that the 1998-2008 then leads
to a level of produced capital per capita almost 95% below the counterfactual. We then discuss
the results before concluding.
III.1 Sustainability and the Russian economy: from development
to sustainable development
The Russian Federation emerged from the communist area with a sclerotic economy, lag-
ging behind western Europe in both consumer goods and new technologies. The first transition
(1991-1998) was dedicated to the conversion from planning to free market economics and re-
sulted in massive poverty and social issues (low birth rate, mortality, alcoholism). Russia could
nonetheless use its educated workforce and resources to return to growth at the beginning of
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the 21st century, only to find itself facing the sustainability challenge.
III.1.1 Institutions from development to sustainable development
The soviet economy was structurally organised towards catching-up since the first and sec-
ond plans (1928-1938). The centralised structure of soviet planning turned the system sclerotic
(Kornai 1992) under Leonid Brejnev (1964-1982). The final attempt from Mikhaïl Gorbatchev
to reform the economy and the society of the soviet union critically disorganised the planning
system (Hobsbawm 1994) and led to the dislocation of the country. Just out of communism,
the Russian Federation critically lagged behind its western neighbours.
The evolution of poverty in Russia is well-documented, with on average 16 publications per
year between 1992 and 2006 (Lokshin 2009) 17. Poverty declined quickly but did not disappear
(Bertin and Clément 2008). Another indicator of social disaggregation is given by alcohol over
consumption by males. This increased the imbalance in the male/female ratio in Russia and
further reduced the natality rate which was already declining in the 1980’s.
Corruption already existed in the soviet era as an adaptation mechanism to the constraints
of planning. The Russian workforce was highly educated at the beginning of the first transition,
but ill-adapted to the realities of a free market economy (Fan et al. 1999). Both factors resulted
in a huge informal sector to cater for the subsistence of the poor and the elderly. The new wage
structure increased the number of people in financial distress, starting with women, pensioners
and older workers who where ill at ease with the new economic needs (Brainerd 1998). As
a consequence, inequalities have been continuously on the rise since 1991. This is a common
trend with the rest of the world, but it became more acute in Russia following the economic
power grab of the public estates by the new elite 18.
Still, current value development indicators show an improvement of the situation as the first
transition ends (see table 4.9).
17. See also the special edition of the Revue d’Études Comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol 37, Issue 2.
18. Some of its members coming from the old nomenklatura.
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Figure 4.13: Gross investment and GDP growth
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
These figures deserve some political perspective. As the first transition unfolds, networks of
influence are constituted to take control of the Russian manufacturing and energy production.
First aimed at subsistence, these networks rapidly become the tools of supervision for the new
ruling elite (Levin and Satarov 2000) 24. Vladimir Putin’s election is a form of continuity with
the soviet area as far as the role of the State for the society is concerned (Shlapentokh 2001).
Considering the structure of political power in Russia and the role of corruption as a political
tool to control and regulate the economy (Shlapentokh 2013), we would like to o er some
operational perspectives on Russian institutions.
We define as institution any accepted and partaken social structure designed to solve co-
ordination problems or regulate a potentially conflictual interaction between individuals inside
a given society (see chapter 1 section II.1). To understand how institutions interact with nat-
ural resources in Russia and analyse sustainable development during the second transition we
use the categories from ?. The authors o er to di erentiate between economic and political
institutions and within these two categories, extractive and inclusive institutions. Political in-
stitutions such as political parties, parliaments, local assemblies are to be considered inclusive
when they give to each and everyone the possibility to get involved in a social life, but also to
exploit individual and collective opportunities of development.
Conversely, extractive institutions only aim at extracting and or transferring power and op-
portunities from the social corpus to a small group of individuals. The same goes for economic
institutions. Exclusive economic institutions concentrate wealth and income in the hands of an
24. See also the investigation in Books magazine num. 27, (Postel-Vinay 2011).
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Table 4.10: World Governance Indicators for Russia
Indicator 1996 1998 2008
Voice and Accountability -0.29 -0.54 -0.84
Political Stability and Absence of Violence -1.22 -1.11 -0.76
Government E ectiveness -0.51 -0.76 -0.34
Regulatory Quality -0.28 -0.44 -0.39
Rule of Law -0.87 -0.96 -1.04
Control of Corruption -1.02 -0.93 -1.04
Source: The World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI)
elite while inclusive institutions o er equal access to economic opportunities and a fair income
to ensure sustenance. Kaufmann et al. (2010) o er 6 criteria to assess the quality of institu-
tions in a given country: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence,
Government E ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. Per-
formance for each dimension is represented by a score ranging from ≠2.5 to 2.5, 2.5 being the
best performance. Russian scores for years 1996, 1998 and 2008 are presented in table 4.10.
Russia polls quite badly on all 6 indicators, which stresses the extractive nature of institu-
tions in the country. Progress in terms of government e ectiveness and political stability has
not been matched by a reduction of corruption while participation to the civic debate declines.
Using these 6 indicators, we can get a clearer picture of the evolution of Russian institutions.
The first transition is associated with the relative failure of market mechanisms to reorganise
single handedly the Russian economy as the inclusive economic institutions needed for this are
still missing.
On the contrary, political institutions are quite inclusive. Faced with the progressive grab of
economic power by the first oligarchs, the government apparatus organises the political recon-
quest of the economy, which in turns progressively narrows the political space, with the notable
rise of the United Russia (Gel’man 2008). As political and economic power becomes more
concentrated, the central administration is used to reorganise the economy on both political
and economic grounds.
This organisation draws heavily on export revenues from the energy sector and pays for the
development of the welfare state to shore up the squeezed middle (Cerami 2009) and consolidate
the political power of the central government. It also promotes investment in state controlled
industries to maintain the illusion of renewed economic dynamism and inclusiveness as the
system in fact gets more and more extractive.
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In this context, the second transition is not about the very real development observed in
the first transition, it is about the sustainability of this development in a context of greater
extractiveness of institutions and reliance on natural resources depletion. The natural resources
rent is the privileged instrument for the Russian renewal both domestically and internationally.
The rent is for example used to o er benefits to boost the birth rate. But even the sound use of
this bonanza does not seem to be on the agenda. Martinot (1998) and Korppoo and Korobova
(2012) investigated energy e ciency in the residential sector. They show that reforms in the
organisation of the real estate market to promote energy e ciency never took place because of
subsidised prices which destroyed the incentives.
Locatelli (2007) and Locatelli and Rossiaud (2011) study the institutional organisation of the
oil industry and show that the central governance endeavours to retake direct or indirect control
over the whole sector. Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard (2008) extend this institutional analysis to
the broader topic of the management of the rent by the state with similar conclusions. Reynolds
and Kolodziej (2007) show using time series data that resource richness tends to encourage the
capture of rent by the central government. This argument is supported by Rutland (2008)
who shows how the energy rent and corruption form a self-reinforcing vicious circle favouring
the ruling oligarchy in Russia. These facts stress how a behaviour common to resource rich
economies intersects with the institutional reality of a country in transition like Russia to favour
extractiveness in both political and economic institutions.
Bobylev (2005) observes that energy intensity is positively associated with the weight of
natural resources dependent sectors. based on this observation, he advocates a reform of the
fiscal system to minimize the environmental impact of development, following the European
lead. Natural resources rent management intersects with many economic, political and social
issues. This is in line with the more general predictions in ? and confirms the extractive
character of Russian institutions. Still, this orientation is not set in stone. The Russian po-
tential in renewables is huge considering the diversity of landscapes and geography. Exploiting
it remains conditional to the rivalry in use for those spaces, which brings us back to the insti-
tutional setting. Tynkkynen (2007) shows how the use of the Russian immensity for natural
capital maintenance or plain extraction is too often mutually exclusive.
Russia is confronted to some usual catching-up countries issues, constantly on the verge
of falling into the "middle income trap" 25. The institutional framework currently enforced in
Russia was e ective in the very fashion presented by ?. An e ective re-centralisation of the
political power led to the possibility of e cient extraction of the rent.
25. The middle income trap is the situation in which a developing country stalls in its development path and
fails to catch-up with advanced economy. This phenomenon is usually explained by wage inflation, which then
lowers productivity gains as the country looses international competitiveness.
III. Empirical sustainability: The case of Russia 335
To some extent, this situation can be paralleled with the great plans industrialising the
country in the 1930’s, without being able to foster innovation and growth in the long run 26.
Russia cannot grow complacent extracting the rent from natural resources: it should also
plan for sustainable investment. This strategy starts with inclusive political and economic
institutions as guarantors for the optimal use of the resource 27.
The end of the first transition is characterised by the rise of extractive institutions. Control-
ling for the institutional setting in Russia matters to appreciate the tenants of natural resources
rent management. Rent is defined as the di erence between the marginal cost of extraction and
the market price. Estimating the marginal cost is hard as this first requires a production func-
tion fitted for the considered resource. To overcome this issue, rents are usually approximated
using the average cost of extraction, computed as total cost divided by quantities extracted 28.
What comes first when assessing the rent is actually institutions related issues. Who is in
charge of extraction? Private of public sector firms? How is the rent used? Is it consumed or
reinvested? To the benefit of the whole country, or mostly for a social or economic elite? In
the context of extractive institutions, rent management can lead to the resource curse. The
curse is associated with the grabbing of the rent by the elite controlling production (Van Der
Ploeg 2011, p. 23), which implies that a large rent may lead to extractive institutions and then
sustain them. A scenarios review is performed by Heal (2011). He shows persuasively the link
between rent management and sustainability.
Russian rent data are summarised in figure 4.14. The larger share of the rent comes from
the energy sector, mostly from natural gas and oil. We saw earlier on that the reorganisation
of institutions surrounding natural resources leads to a concentration of wealth and a politi-
cal use of the resource. This rent grabbing behaviour by an elite may lead to unsustainable
development. The Russian government tried to address this with structural reforms, trying
to rebalance economic development and diversify the instruments of wealth. The equilibrium
between reliance on oil, gas, coal and wood exports and the need to reduce reliance on natural
capital was searched but never found.
This is probably because those natural resources form the main revealed comparative ad-
vantage of the country (Chiappini 2011). Russia is still committed to an extensive development
based on natural resources consumption, as the articles we presented clearly show. From this
conclusion, our aim is to show that rent management cannot be considered in isolation of
other issues but as the cornerstone of a sustainable development. It is by first presenting the
26. The parallels drawn by ? with China and Argentina appear especially telling here.
27. See also Yi-fu Lin (2012) on development strategies and natural resources management.
28. A complete presentation of the computation methods for rents is available in World Bank (2011).
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Figure 4.14: Decomposition of natural resources rents in Russia
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
aims of sustainable development that the proper rent management tools can be defined and
implemented.
III.1.2 1998-2008: Natural resources, institutions and development
Any development strategy aims at improving the human experience, the perceived quality
of life. Sustainable development aims at improving the two major components of well-being:
civil rights, political and socio-economic situation and access to desired goods and services.
Allocation and continuous delivery of goods and services rest on resources available to society.
Those resources ought to be managed optimally. It is finally critical that current and future
generations each get a fair share of available resources to exert rights and fulfil responsibilities
while satisfying their needs. Sustainability studies are dedicated to this last objective, study-
ing the constraints on the means of a sustainable development. See chapter 1 for a detailed
presentation.
Sustainability studies in Russia have been conducted mostly using multidimensional ap-
proaches. Shmelev (2011) proposes a dynamic picture of sustainability based on revealed Rus-
sian preferences embodied in a given set of indicators. Set against weak sustainability, he refuses
to aggregate the multiple dimensions of sustainable development arguing of their incommensu-
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rability. His work is based on a series of indexes (HDI, Education index, life expectancy, etc...)
to embody the di erent goals and challenges to sustainability.
GDP per capita represents the economic pillar, CO2 emissions the environmental pillar and
life expectancy the social pillar. He then shows how Russian development is biased towards
economic development (towards GDP per capita that is) and also in geographical terms as
progress is concentrated in urban areas. Bobylev (2005) o ers to take environmental degrada-
tion into account when assessing Russian development, using energy intensity indicators. He
proposes to use taxation to amend people’s incentives against preservation.
In these studies, Russia is also perceived as improving after the first transition, but still
plagued by important spatial, economic, social and environmental imbalances. These findings
are obtained from current value indicators and are therefore not suited to capture the intertem-
poral dimension of sustainable development (see chapter 1). Although it is clear that Russia
is more developed in 2008 than in 1998, the price of development seems to be paid by natural
capital and the rest of the environment. Can Adjusted Net Savings provide extra information
on this conclusion? We use World Bank 29 data to obtain ANS series for the years 1998 to 2008,
with all the relevant time series for the subcomponents used to compute it from Gross Savings.
This gives us a profile over the decade for ANS and its subcomponents (figure 4.15).
The ANS average over the decade is 2.76%, while GDP increased 5.79% per year. This
result is a first downplay for the Russian economic performance over the period as measured by
regular economic indicators. ANS record the evolution of wealth and the ability of the country
to sustain present and future development. GDP merely accounts for the income derived from
production on a given year. As GDP growth rate outperforms ANS, the share of income
allocated to consumption is set to rise. From this deduction, one can distinguish between three
cases depending on respective GDP growth and ANS values:
– If ANS growth rate as a percentage of GNI is negative, the country’s development is
unsustainable.
– If ANS growth rate as a percentage of GNI is positive but inferior to the growth rate of
GDP, the country favours consumption over savings. It will therefore become unsustain-
able at some point.
– If ANS growth rate as a percentage of GNI is superior to the growth rate of GDP, the
country raises the share of savings in income. It is therefore sustainable under the weak
sustainability assumption.
These cases should be defined using the GNP instead of the GDP, but the di erence is
29. Data from the World bank Databank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
338 Chapter 4. Sustainability and Interdependence
Figure 4.15: ANS and components in Russia
(a) ANS and main subcomponents
(b) Others subcomponents
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
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minimal for relatively closed economies as a percentage of GDP. They are to be put in the
perspective o ered by Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) who link ANS to the produced capital
return rate 30 and the investment rate.
In this model consumption increases when ANS growth is superior to the average market rate
and falls when ANS growth is inferior to this same rate. As we lack any observable market rate,
our empirical rule can be considered consistent with the theoretical prediction. Consumption is
increasing in Russia, in a way that is detrimental to rent reinvestment following the Hartwick
rule. These elements are important to put the raw ANS rate into perspective as ANS are based
on an assumption of sustainable levels of consumption 31. The indicator may therefore send
a wrong signal of sustainability if consumption is already unsustainable or increasing rapidly.
This is due to the way Comprehensive Wealth is estimated by the World Bank, using 25 years
of consumption flows.
If GDP growth is superior to ANS growth Russia will deplete its natural capital even with
a high rate of gross savings. This observation brings us back to the resource curse (Sachs and
Warner 1995). Russia is not, stricto sensu falling into the resource curse during the second
transition. ANS show here their crucial forward looking dimension: although Russia seems to
be on a sustainable path now, future sustainability is in jeopardy based on current figures. This
diagnosis is comforted by our observations on institutional extractiveness. It makes sense for
rent grabbing to be associated with potential unsustainable management of resources. Intensive
natural resources depletion clearly shows in ANS (see figure 4.14). The Pearson correlation
between ANS and the natural resource depletion series is -0.33, suggesting a significant impact
of natural resources on the final message of ANS.
ANS synthesise information from all the dimensions of sustainable development to produce
a diagnosis of un-sustainability during the second transition in Russia. This is consistent with
the observations in Bobylev (2005) and Shmelev (2011) based on multiple indicators. It should
be noted that those studies used ANS, but only as a descriptive tool. We just illustrated the
additional information from a comparison to GDP growth. ANS are also important in enabling
international comparisons between countries as well as comparisons over time.
In the next section we would like to use this property and compare ANS between Russia
and neighbour countries. Finally, using the counterfactual method in Hamilton et al. (2006)
30. This theoretical rate is the cost of produced capital. It is traditionally estimated using the real interest
rate, the average rate used by banks adjusted for inflation. This rate is inferior to the growth rate of GDP for
our period of study in Russia. This rate is however computed without taking into account natural resources
depreciation, without even mentioning market ine ciencies in the Russian banking sector. The GDP growth
rate seems to us the best proxy available.
31. See the World Bank (2011, p. 93).
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we build a counterfactual investment profile for produced capital during the second transition.
The results of this study gives the full scale of the lack of reinvestment in Russia. This diagnosis
over time is a useful addition to the literature and makes the most of ANS.
III.2 Comparisons and counterfactual sustainability
We compare the ANS record in Russia with the record of countries with either institutional
similarities or a similar levels of natural resources rents (as a percentage of GDP). We rank
the countries in our sample using as a yardstick a composite index with geographical, demo-
graphical and institutional dimensions. Russia emerges from those comparisons as an outlier,
institutionally closer to its neighbours than from the other resource abundant economies. We
then present the counterfactual produced capital and show that Russia under performed during
the second transition compared to the Hartwick rule. This finding leads us to the conclusion
that to catch up on more advanced economies, whether former communist countries or west-
ern European, Russia has to change its resource management policy and engage in sustainable
development.
III.2.1 International comparisons based on ANS
We stressed the importance of institutions in the management of the rent from natural
resources. This relationship is characterised by two potential ways of causation. Either coun-
tries with extractive institutions systematically engage in suboptimal management of natural
resources, or resource abundant countries systematically drift towards extractive institutions.
The literature on the resource curse stresses (Van Der Ploeg 2011) similarities in resource rich
countries, from the Dutch disease to the institutional setting. A first comparison of interest
would allow us to investigate whether Russia is closer to resource rich economies or its neigh-
bours from an institutional perspective. This is especially important here since the break-up
of the former Soviet Union constitutes a natural experiment in this perspective.
Former Soviet Union republic used to share a common government and a relatively homo-
geneous institutional system, both politically and economically (Kornai 1992). We can then
observe an objective heterogeneity inside this group: natural resource endowments. Those
countries are therefore at the core of our comparisons. We then add countries similar to Russia
in terms of our dimension of interest, natural resources abundance. Following the literature
on the resource curse, those countries should register institutional similarities, but this is not
controlled for in the selection process. Finally to control for institutional similarities in former
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communist countries, we use as a control group the former members of the COMECON, all
of them being relatively poorly endowed in natural resources. 32 This gives us a total of 28
countries.
We then rank these countries using a composite index build from current value indicators.
The index aggregates institutional and physical dimensions. The method of aggregation for
the index is presented in appendix L. The index is based on the Borda ranking method as in
Dasgupta (2001). We use four series: the transmission and distribution losses on the electricity
network, population density, the share of natural resource rent in GDP and a composite index
based on the variables presented in table 4.10. The decision to average the 6 dimensions into
one was taken to keep the weight of the institutional dimension in par with the other variables.
Those four variables capture the physical dimension through resource abundance and elec-
tricity losses, the role of geography via population density and institutions. We use the index
to rank our 28 countries and from the ranking we derive 5 groups depending on the average
value for the index over the period. 33. The 28 countries, their group of origin and during the
comparative exercise are listed in appendix K Over a theoretical value between 1 and 28, the
actual values taken by the index range between 5.95 and 25.77 on average. The index o ers
significant discrimination between the countries in the sample.
We use the observed break in the values to constitute our groups. The target group is the
group including Russia, taking index values between 9.20 and 10.59. There are 6 countries in
the group 34: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, Syria and Uzbekistan. Control group
1 has an index value ranging from 5.95 to 8.40. It is composed of three natural resource rich
countries and Kyrgyzstan, former soviet republic also resource rich. Control group 2, with index
values ranging from 12.04 to 14.09 is composed of 4 former soviet republics. Control group 3
(index values between 16.13 and 17.81) is the most heterogeneous with countries belonging to
all three groups of origin. Group 4 (index values between 19.86 and 25.77) is composed of
Bahrain, Lithuania and 4 former members of the COMECON.
The composite index yields an expectable ranking 35. Control group 1 takes the lion share
of natural resources abundant countries. That makes it an interesting group to gauge the prox-
imity between Russian characteristics and an archetypal resource abundant country. Control
group 2 is composed of former soviet republics quite similar to Russia judging by their index
ranking. This control group will be useful to assess the impact of institutional factors as these
32. Despite the diversity of cultures and institutions in these countries, similarities with the former soviet
republic are important enough to use these countries as a control group (Lavigne 1985).
33. We can use the average value as the variance of the time series is relatively weak.
34. Average values and correlation coe cients for this group are subsequently computed excluding Russia.
35. The full ranking is available in appendix L.
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Figure 4.16: Adjusted Net Savings in Russia
(a) ANS in Russia compared to the groups (b) ANS in Russia and inside the target group
(c) ANS in Russia and in individually close countries
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
countries are relatively less resource abundant than Russia. Control group 3 is composed of
the former soviet republic that are quite far away from Russia in the ranking plus Bulgaria and
Romania, usually considered as the less advanced transition economies of the former COME-
CON.
Control group 4 is composed of the highest ranking scores and confirms that the former
COMECON drifted away from the former Soviet union quite rapidly after 1991. The group is
composed of Lithuania, Bahrain and the rest of the majority of the former COMECON. These
countries are densely populated with good institutional scores and relatively poor in terms of
natural resources (with the exception of Bahrain, which comes out as an outlier here). The
correlation between low institutional scores and resources abundance comes out quite strongly
in the ranking from the composite index. We can now compare these groups with Russia in
terms of ANS.
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Table 4.11: Russia and the control groups
% of GNI ANS Natural capital depreciation Net investment
Russia 2.76% 19.34% 11.56%
Target group -13.28% 29.93% 8.90%
Control group 1 4.56% 18.52% 14.64%
Control group 2 6.05% 1.92% 14.35%
Control group 3 5.83% 1.27% 15.07%
Control group 4 5.61% 3.77% 12.33%
Average values between 1998 and 2008
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
Figure 4.16 represents ANS in Russia compared to other countries in the sample. Russia
seems closer to the average performance of groups other than the target group (see figure 4.16a).
Figure 4.16b compares Russia with the other countries in its group. Russia outperforms its
potential peers in 2007 and 2008, in Syria and Azerbaijan aside. Individually, countries that
are actually correlated with Russia’s values are in groups 1,2 and 3, not in the target group.
The composite index and ANS produce a di erent message. ANS would place Russia closer to
countries with a higher index score than countries in group 1.
This suggests that dimensions such as the density of population or climatic conditions play
a weaker role in overall performance than institutional and economic factors. To put this first
finding into perspective, we compare the average Russian performance in terms of ANS, natural
capital depreciation and net investment with the control groups. By “de-constructing” ANS
this way, we can identify the respective contributions of those dimensions to the final result
(see table 4.11).
Comparisons in table 4.11 bring many insights. We have the confirmation that ANS in
Russia are on average between the target group and group 1, although closer from group 1.
The same is true for natural capital depreciation. The leading role of natural resources for
Russian development finds confirmation here. This weights on ANS, so that Russia ends up
behind all the control groups. When it comes to net investment, the result is the same, Russia
ranks between the target group and group 1. This has probably much more to do with natural
capital depreciation than gross investment as this last variable was actually quite dynamic over
the decade (see figure 4.13).
This lower average for net investment brings Russia closer to group 4, which suggests that
it is also linked to a more important stock of produced capital. Lower returns on a larger
stock may justify lower net investment. A final potential explanation lies in the imbalances of
the Russian financial account. Financial capital invested abroad is missing at home to raise
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Table 4.12: Spearman correlation coe cients across groups and indicators
Groups/Russia Net investment Natural capital
depreciation
ANS GDP growth
Target group 0.718 0.754 0.090 0.336
Control group 1 0.372 0.645 0.309 0.536
Control group 2 0.336 0.863 0.445 0.409
Control group 3 0.581 -0.172 0.309 0.318
Control group 4 0.336 0.563 0.218 0.281
Source: Author’s calculation from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
the overall stock of produced capital (see section III.2.2). Considering average performance
per group suggests that Russia, although investing in a way similar to its neighbour, manages
natural resources just like other natural resources rich countries. This duality between regional
institutional attachments and a common global attitude towards natural resources is the core
of our study.
To discriminate between the impact of both allegiances in terms of sustainable development,
we computed the Spearman correlation coe cients between Russia and the groups for ANS,
natural capital depreciation and net investment. On net investment, while the average perfor-
mance brought Russia closer to group 4, the correlation over time is stronger with the target
group. This would indicate a natural resources induced synchronicity between investment cy-
cles. Turning to natural capital depreciation, we observe high correlation between Russia and
all the groups, group 3 excepted. This finding is the result of the method used to compute the
rent, using the same world prices. This makes the negative correlation in group 3 an outlier,
which can only be explained by the very low weight of the rent in those countries, coupled with
a di erence in the nature of the natural capital involved.
Correlation in ANS between Russia and the groups put group 2 as the most correlated with
the Russian dynamic of development. This is for us the demonstration of the usefulness of ANS
as a sustainable development indicator. Considering the sole value of rent as a share of GDP,
Russia is better associated with other resource rich countries. But a comprehensive present
value indicator like ANS captures the atypical position of Russia amongst those countries. The
level of ANS in Russia is closer to the resource rich countries of group 1, but the evolution of
the indicator as captured by the correlation coe cient brings the country closer to countries
institutionally close such as those in group 2.
The composite index with which the target group is constructed gives an similar average
ranking for countries that have strong discrepancies in individual characteristics. The sound
theoretical basis of ANS correctly describes the common trends in development, as opposed
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to current value indicators which only point at common characteristics at one point in time.
Hence, members of the target group have a dissimilar ANS evolution compared to Russia 36
which can only come from under-weighted or unobserved factors which play a major role in
natural resource rent management. ANS seem to better take these elements into account, which
have to be institutional or institutions-related as their addition in ANS moves Russia closer to
group 2.
ANS are based on a rigorous theoretical framework which captures through all the instru-
ments of wealth the consequences of institutional inertia on development path. It cannot do so
perfectly as institutions are not yet included in the indicator, but clearly does a better job than
indexes based on current value indicators. These institutional impacts play a role on resource
management and allocation, which ANS do take into account when physical variables cannot.
We can test for the robustness of this observation comparing the correlation coe cients for
ANS and GDP growth. The correlation coe cients are similar between Russia and control
groups 2,3 and 4 for ANS and GDP growth. They diverge for the target group and control
group 1.
ANS bring a more accurate picture by incorporating the impact of natural resources man-
agement in overall resource allocation, which indirectly integrates the weight of institutions in
the equation. For countries having similar resource allocation institutions and little natural
resources, the message from ANS and GDP growth is logically quite similar. It should be noted
that a common base for development does not preclude cumulative divergence. Once the im-
pact of natural resource management is accounted for, Russia is closer in terms of development
path from countries that are geographically, culturally and institutionally close. ANS allow to
monitor the intertwined challenges of development and sustainable development.
We studied the ranking of Russia with respect to potentially similar countries, whether
in terms of institutional similarities conditioning development, or in terms of plain natural
resource abundance. Both factors seems to be taken into account and correctly weighted by
ANS. We show how institutional determinants, as described in the literature on the resource
curse (Van Der Ploeg 2011), have a relatively stronger influence on the Russian development
path. ANS rank Russia between the more advanced post-communist economies and resource
rich countries subject to the resource curse.
It does not seem possible, even using more advanced quantitative tools to establish whether
36. This result should be considered tentatively as some countries in the target group are not taken into
account in the comparisons (ANS data is missing). Results in table 4.11 suggest that those data would bring
the target group closer to the control group 1, as countries like Nigeria or Uzbekistan obtained lower index
scores than Russia.
346 Chapter 4. Sustainability and Interdependence
Russia su ers from the resource curse or the Dutch disease (Dülger et al. 2013). To get an
insight on this question, we propose to use the counterfactual method proposed by the World
Bank (World Bank 2006) and Hamilton et al. (2006) to investigate in more details the rent
reinvestment strategy. In the articles mentioned, Russia was not part of the sample considered.
III.2.2 The counterfactual study
Sustainability derives from the necessity of non declining consumption over time and can be
assessed by indicators. As we saw in chapter 1, Adjusted Net Savings when computed correctly,
indicate the rate of change in comprehensive wealth and therefore sustainability. This led to
the introduction of the Hartwick rule (Hartwick 1977) as a guide for reinvestment in line with
the maintenance and expansion of wealth. Negative genuine savings indicate un-sustainability,
but this leaves open the question of excessive reinvestment. Even more to the point, there is
the possibility for a country to invest without any attention for the depletion of its natural
resources, but still in such quantities that adjusted net savings are positive.
The risk is that investment might fall below the minimum level of reinvestment of the rent
in case of recession or structural shift towards more consumption. In this section we compute
the 2009 level of produced capital in Russia, had reinvestment of the rent according to the
Hartwick rule been implemented. The Hartwick rule is the standard reinvestment rule derived
from the Solow (1974) model. Its limits are investigated in Asheim et al. (2003) and in chapter 1.
Hamilton et al. (2006) present a modified Hartwick rule to account for unbounded consumption
in the reinvestment in produced capital.
We would like to stress that the counterfactual method is in our view not only the natural
complement of ANS, but also a necessary tool for policy design. Building reinvestment scenarios
based on sustainability rules provides the rationale for policy intervention to correct asset
misallocation. Based on our description on the workings of economic institutions, it seems
unlikely that market mechanisms may correct incentives and investment strategies in resource
rich economies. Building scenarios based on the Hartwick rule, the open economy Hartwick
rule and the augmented open economy Hartwick rule will guide governments in using policy
instruments to balance assets distribution and investment. The investments we propose here
are only a first step towards those comprehensive scenarios, but the results are already telling.
We assume rents are invested only in produced capital. Would rents be invested in other
forms of capital in Russia, we would naturally under-estimate the current level of investment in
the country. Education expenses or pro-natalist policies could be forms of investment in human
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Table 4.13: Comprehensive Investment in constant 2000 USD
Year Comprehensive investment(Ig)
1998 -123 572 708 254
1999 -26 850 135 565
2000 -46 073 222 093
2001 -26 602 710 011
2002 -10 737 037 465
2003 -20 503 953 121
2004 -21 545 480 170
2005 -35 221 865 405
2006 -46 152 332 284
2007 -33 341 979 050
2008 -10 891 977 104
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
capital, with a compounded e ect as human capital is typically characterised by increasing
returns. As a consequence the results we provide are to be considered as the lower bound of
actual reinvestment. Still, as ANS data show that Russian investment in human capital has
been stable as a percentage of GNI, it is unlikely that we are missing a fundamental e ect.
We build our study using data from the World Development Indicators, including ANS data.
Following World Bank (2006) we define comprehensive investment as:
Ig = I≠D≠R (4.45)
With Ig comprehensive investment, I investment in produced capital, D produced capital
consumption and R natural resources consumption, that is the variation of the available stock
S of natural capital. Comprehensive investment is actually negative for every year between
1998 and 2008. Russia consumed the equivalent of 270% of 2009 GNI in natural resources,
faced 139% of the same 2009 GNI in produced capital depreciation and invested only 238% of
2009 GNI in produced capital. Comprehensive investment over the period represents a total
loss in capital of 171% of 2009 GNI (in constant 2000 USD). Table 4.13 shows comprehensive
investment per year.
Armed with these comprehensive investment flows, we can elaborate several scenarios.
Scenario 1 is our reference scenario. It represents regular net investment in produced capital.
Scenario 2 represents the investment profile following the standard Hartwick rule. In this
scenario, investment in produced capital is divided into two subcomponents. First, there
is investment to compensate for the depreciation of produced capital (I = D using our
notation). Second, investment of the entirety of the rent from natural resources into
produced capital, so that total comprehensive investment is actually null: Ig =D≠D+
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Table 4.14: Produced capital endowments under the 4 scenarios
Scenario 1, Produced
capital per capita in
2008 (constant 2000
USD)
Scenario 2 com-
pared to baseline
scenario
Scenario 3 com-
pared to baseline
scenario
Scenario 4 com-
pared to baseline
scenario
Russia 18594 +15.2% +27.6% +24%
R≠R = 0. Under this scenario ANS are also null.
Scenario 3 starts from scenario 1 and adds the Hartwick rule, that is observed net investment
over the period plus the reinvestment of the entire rent into produced capital. This gives
us Ig = I≠D+R≠R = I≠D. This scenario is a combination of the first two.
Scenario 4 starts with the assumption that the highest level of gross investment observed
over the period (the 2008 level that is) could have been reached every year. We compute
comprehensive investment using this sole assumption, without explicit reinvestment of
the rent so that Russia invests every period Ig = I2008≠D≠R.
We use as a starting point the produced capital stock in 1998. We add to this stock the
investment profile from the baseline scenario and the three counterfactual ones. Results are
shown in table 4.14. The baseline scenario gives a 2008 produced capital stock of 18 594 2000
USD. Under scenario 4, the other scenario without explicit sustainability concerns, Russia gets
a counterfactual stock 24% higher and a comprehensive wealth 15% higher.
Consider now the 2 scenarios incorporating the Hartwick rule. Scenario 2 corresponds to the
standard Hartwick rule and yields a per capita produced capital stock 15.2% above the baseline.
Scenario 3 tops the results with 27.6% above the baseline produced capital and comprehensive
wealth 15.8% higher. Scenario 3 where observed behaviour is combined with the Hartwick rule
helps us appreciate the failure of the current reinvestment policy. Russia could have had a
produced capital per capita of 23 730 2000 USD in 2008, a level comparable to Poland under
this scenario (see also figure 4.17).
These scenarios stress the cumulative consequences of natural capital depletion. We stressed
that ANS are positive for most of the decade, but an early failure to follow the rule has lasting
consequences as the capital that hasn’t been build is missing to provide the income needed
to increase and maintain capital in the period and so on. As this decade which witnessed in
many aspects the come back of Russia on the international stage unfolded, the country failed
to accumulate between 15 and 25% of the produced capital it should have built. This single
figure gives a magnitude of the challenges associated with sustainability.
In a recent publication for the United Nations Atkinson et al. (2012) stress similar issues
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Figure 4.17: Rent reinvestment scenarios
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
in many emerging economies otherwise presented as role models during the last decade. China
is of course the emblematic example, but India and Brazil are also failing reinvestment. Our
scenarios do not model explicitly the price of commodities (Vincent et al. 1997) or the possibility
to invest the rent abroad, via portfolio or direct investments (Van der Ploeg 2010). Here the
fact that ANS are computed using GNI instead of GDP may play a role if the rent is invested
abroad in structures that are not legally owned by Russians.
It is theoretically possible that Russian assets invested for example in Cyprus are equal
or superior to the total amount of the rent. Still, we believe this possibility should not be
considered in a counterfactual study on sustainable development, as those resources are in any
case subtracted from domestic development to be dedicated to foreign development, in another
spatial and legal area. Should those assets be invested back at a later date, they have already
been missing for some previous capital accumulation periods and slowed down development.
Our counterfactual study also stresses the need to maintain an steady flow of investment, at
least equal to D+R. In the Russian case, the net impact would be negative in any case as FDI
in Russia are inferiors to Russian investments abroad.
The impact of reinvestment paths, is cumulative, and as such more important for longer
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horizons. The study in Hamilton et al. (2006) is conducted over 30 years, between 1970 and
2000. Available ANS data do not allow us to replicate the study over the same interval.
Nevertheless, considering the regularity of capital accumulation in the scenarios we presented,
we can without adding too many extra assumptions complete our presentation with a little
forecasting exercise. We apply a simple linear model on the capital accumulation series from
1997 to 2009, simply using the trend from the model. We then add produced capital to natural
capital to obtain an estimate of comprehensive wealth (neglecting the contribution of other
instruments of wealth). Results are presented in figure 4.18.
The twist in the series in 2008-2009 is simply the connection of the forecasted trend with
computed values between 1997 and 2008. In 2018, accumulated produced capital in scenario 3
amounts to 30 269 per capita constant 2000 USD when in scenario 1 the total of natural capital
and produced capital only amounts to 31 999 constant USD per capita 37. This amounts to
105% of produced capital only in scenario 3. Without any urgent and decisive action, Russia
will consume by 2020 the equivalent of what should have been reinvested under the Hartwick
rule from 1998.
If Russia reinvests the rent from natural resources into produced capital, under the assump-
tion of perfect substitutability between di erent instruments of wealth, it could theoretically
compensate its counterfactual wealth losses by 2008 and similarly by 2018. These striking fig-
ures should obviously be tempered by the exclusion of human capital from the comprehensive
wealth estimates. This potential objection should be put into the perspective of the shrinking
Russian population. Although a shrinking population requires less resources, it also accounts
for less human capital. Population in Russia shrank by 3.3% between 1998 and 2008. One of
the great legacies of the soviet period is the high level of education of the population, but it also
leaves the country with little margin for qualitative improvements. One can therefore safely
assume that Russia is also slowly eroding its human capital, which makes this instrument of
wealth unlikely to contribute more to comprehensive wealth.
III.2.3 Robustness and final remarks
Considering the numerous assumptions and the relatively simple theoretical framework on
which it is based, this counterfactual exercise it to be considered as an exercise in magnitude
more than an accurate depiction of sustainability in Russia. A first obvious improvement is to
account for human capital, and probably social, institutional and health capital as well to get
37. We do not adjust here for the fall of the Russian population as we obtain the per capita value using the
2008 population.
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Figure 4.18: Forecasts on capital accumulation
(a) 2018 projections for produced capital
(b) 2018 projections for comprehensive wealth
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Development Indicators(WDI), the World Bank
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the bigger picture. This is unfortunately not possible under the theoretical model in Hamilton
et al. (2006). The contribution by Arrow et al. (2010) used the bottom-up method to reach
comprehensive wealth. Based on this method it should be possible to design more accurate
counterfactuals.
As for our forecasting exercise, we base it on the assumption of a simple linear trend per
series of produced capital and comprehensive wealth. We believe this model is the best fit as
it yields a fairly high predictive power between 1998 and 2008. Produced capital depreciation
series (see below) usually exhibit low volatility along a linear trend. Over a 10 years horizon
these series have the most important impact on the trend, we therefore rely on them to guide
our exercise.
The major hurdle comes from the data itself. Russian statistics are not necessarily avail-
able or reliable, especially at the beginning of the period. We could add to natural capital
depreciation the impact of forestry management because of missing data. Data on the fixed
consumption of fixed capital can vary extensively, without any apparent rationale. Russia wit-
nessed an important increase in the consumption of fixed capital in 2006, which automatically
leads to lower ANS. The value is also high for 2007 before dropping sharply in 2008. This may
come from the end of the higher depreciation of soviet infrastructure, 20 years after the first
statistics.
This may also come from new methods of fixed capital consumption computation. We
contacted the World Bank about this point, we did not get an answer 38. The question of the
depreciation of fixed capital is related to the problem of the discount rate used to compare
flows over di erent periods of time. Changing the rate of depreciation is equivalent to changing
the weight on future flows, which will end up weighting heavily on estimates of comprehensive
wealth, and on the arbitrage between present and future consumption.
We present in this final section an application of sustainability concepts in the case of Russia
during the second transition. We show how, from the nature of the institutions to the evolution
of the role of di erent instruments of wealth, there is a di erence between the first transition,
mostly about usual development issues, and the second one where natural management and
extractive institutions become the main issues. This is not to say that poverty, over mortality,
employment or post communist structural change were all settled issues by 1998. We merely
stress that the focus in terms of sustainability shifted from those issues to the management of
natural capital.
We present the values for ANS in Russia during the second transition before comparing
38. The issue is significant as ANS and consumption of fixed capital are strongly correlated in Russia (-0.83).
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it using a composite index. We discuss how ANS perform relatively well as a predictor for
development paths in a comparative study. We then use a counterfactual analysis to show the
consequences of the violation of the Hartwick rule in the Russian case during the period of
study. Had Russia abided by the rule, produced capital per capita would be 27,6% higher in
2008 against the baseline. We also explore the long run consequences of this lack of reinvestment
via a small prospective exercise up to 2018.
Our results confirm the pessimism surrounding Vladimir Putin’s come back at the Kremlin
in 2012. Russia did not implement any sustainable development policy during his first two
mandates, it seems therefore unlikely that the course during the third will be significantly
altered. A policy that does not take natural resources into account explicitly considers the rent
as a free lunch. We stressed that the key to this are the institutional arrangements regulating
property and management in the energy sector and here again, lack of political change at the
top can only foster pessimism. The scenario for change may be triggered by the continuation
of the demographic crisis. As Russia keeps loosing population it may not want to squander
its other assets. Still, this is unlikely as natural resources are also the favoured leverage for
regional influence, as the geopolitical crisis in Belarus and Ukraine showed.
Within the limits of the exercise, more accurate data on the di erent instruments of wealth
are critical. The important work of the World Bank can only be commended, but the inter-
national institution rests on the e orts of individual countries. Data are missing where most
needed, as countries like Russia or Nigeria are first in line from a broader ecological perspec-
tive. The counterfactual exercise should be subject to more extensive robustness tests and a
longer time span. In the Russian case, 10 years already produce worrying results. Monitoring
potential drifts every 5 years seems in this respect the bare minimum.
Our results also suggest that institutions display more inertia than economic indicators. It
is therefore hard to associate a given institutional arrangement, either extractive or inclusive
with a given distribution of wealth or factor allocation. Still, the influence of institutions on the
dynamic, the rate and direction of change should be accounted for. Finally, the international
dimension should be completed following the principles presented in chapter 3. We cannot
stress enough that wealth invested abroad is necessarily missing at home, especially if those
foreign investments are controlled by an elite and returns not reinvested at home. The final
recovery of the Russian federation goes through a fair extraction and allocation of the rent.
This major challenge needs political, institutional and economic change to be implemented.
A final mention regarding ANS is in order. We applied the theoretical contribution in
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) and showed how Russian ANS although positive were too low
compared to the growth rate of GDP. Increasing ANS so as to keep pace with the increase in
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output is a first logical step. The consequences of going beyond are still somewhat uncharted
territory. This is a problem when trying to use ANS to assess the potential disequilibria in fast
growing emerging economies. This is where the role of counter-factaul studies is critical.
The lower bond of sustainable development is given by the Hartwick rule, but scenarios are
necessary to position the observed development path in the galaxy of potential paths. Counter-
factual studies appear in that respect not only operational, but also intellectually appealing
in situations where multiple equilibria and uncertainty rule. In terms of policy, it seems to us
it is better to be approximatively right than precisely wrong. The natural experiment of the
former Soviet Union gives us some insight on where to search for a reduction of this uncertainty:
a minimal characterisation of inclusiveness and extractiveness in institutions associated with
basic factor allocation rule, monitored by current values indicators.
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Conclusion
In this final chapter, we explore the consequences of the findings from chapter 3. We first
investigated the impact of increasing returns to scale (IRS) on the definition of the “counter-
factual gains from trade” from chapter 3. We show how, although IRS do not impact factor
allocation in time t, the system of relative prices in the economy is a ected. In a dynamic
perspective, the definition of the counterfactual gains from trade needs to be amended as those
prices are going to be used to take investment decisions. IRS creates a drift in capital accumu-
lation compared to the constant returns to scale case, another way to say that market prices
do not match constant returns to scale shadow prices under IRS. We conclude logically that
the gains from IRS in international trade should also be added to savings as those gains come
from a reallocation of factors between sectors.
We then go on to investigate the interplaying role of trade and institutions in shaping
the specialisation and resource allocation in a given country. We focus on natural resources
intensive countries as they are at the forefront of sustainability issues. We investigate whether
these countries develop a peculiar form of economic organisation, as defined in the literature
on the resource curse. We conclude that although the majority of the literature focus on the
distortions created by institutional deficiencies (mostly the extractive character of institutions)
as an explanation for the resource curse, the negative feedback of trade incentives should not
be neglected.
Insertion in global trade networks sends incentives that are aligned with the interests of
the elite controlling extractive institutions, as trade commands specialisation in natural re-
sources intensive goods. The relationship between trade incentives and institutions is then
better seen as a vicious circle than a neutral allocation mechanism and a setting needing fixing.
We illustrate this point by showing how natural resources abundant countries trade their com-
parative advantage goods on an inter-industrial (one way) basis, when reduction in asymmetry
and sustainable development would require an intra-industrial (two ways) trade pattern. Our
econometric results highlight the negative impact of resource abundance on two way trade in
natural resources even as the negative impact on manufacturing production is controlled for.
Interestingly, we concur with the literature regarding the actual impact of resource abun-
dance on growth. Once the negative impact of resource abundance on manufacturing is con-
trolled for, we find resource abundance to have a positive impact on GDP growth. This result
is consistent with the ability of extractive institutions to promote growth using the e ciency
of centralisation as in ?.
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We then turn in the last section to the possibilities to test for the respective impact of trade
and institutional factors in undermining sustainability in resource rich countries. Although
both factors are at play simultaneously in putting countries on a potentially unsustainable
path, being able to estimate the respective magnitude of both e ects would be precious. We
can only agree with Arrow et al. (2010) that a theoretically rigorous answer to this question
requires a theory for the “co-evolution of institutions and economic conditions” which still
evades us and is well beyond the reach of our work.
We suggest a natural experiment to at least test whether resources rich countries behave
(in terms of natural resources management) as a group apart, or more like culturally and
institutionally close countries. Our results (to be considered with care at this stage) show that
in the natural experiment of the former Soviet Union, the dynamics of ANS in the Russian
Federation have more to do with some resources poor but institutionally close countries than
with resources abundant countries. We consider this as further evidence that the resource curse
is not only a consequence of institutional issues generated by resources abundance. It is much
more a consequence of the failure to design proper structural change, which may not be harder
to conduct with a comparative advantage in natural capital. The early conclusions from this
natural experiment would clearly support regional policies playing on institutional and trade
ties, more than targeted institutional or structural reforms country by country.
These early findings clearly call for more investigation. We identified the potential role for
IRS in a sustainability context, but the impact on the links between sustainability and inter-
dependence between trading partners is not clear. An international division of the productive
processes clearly increases further interdependence, which we considered in chapter 3 not to bet
in the best interest of sustainability as it may prevent structural change. On the other hand
IRS magnify the gains from trade and put resources to better use. We have here an emerging
trade-o  between e ciency by insertion in the global supply chain and control, management of
the domestic development process. This trade-o  is not new, but clearly takes a new dimension
in the sustainability context. If one considers the critical role of uncertainty, the balance be-
tween gains from trade and sustainability by complete control over the domestic development
path may be upset in favour of the later. Therefore, as stressed by Ethier (1979a), IRS call for
some rethinking on national economic policy.
Our findings also suggest that interdependence in the development path might be more
relevantly studied at the regional level. Should this result find more robust confirmation, it
would clearly make the case for regional economic and political integration on the ground that
there is already a strong institutional co-evolution fostered by cultural, economic and political
ties. The best way to deal with the resource curse is probably not to take countries one by
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one but to “nest” resource abundant countries in the relevant web of regional interdependence.
This casts an interesting light on the debate in the trade literature between regionalism and
multilateralism. IRS call and regional institutional and economic co-evolution clearly makes
a strong case for a form of regional co-management of resources on sustainability grounds.
Note this is consistent with our early observations on the key role of subsidiarity for e cient
development paths in chapters 1 and 2. Based on these conclusions we can therefore predict a
bright future to regional blocks. Ironically, considering the current issues in the eurozone, their
future might be brighter the more institutionally homogeneous and economically heterogeneous
they are.

General Conclusion
In this thesis, we first proposed a definition of sustainability. We define sustainability asthe suitable management of the means for a sustainable development. Sustainability can be
characterised as the combination of a theory for the instruments, objects (the means themselves)
and a theory to assign value to those instruments. The means (the instruments) are defined
under capital theory. We traced back the origin of capital theory to the early work of Fisher
(1906). Capital theory is a conceptual tool designed to describe the relationship between
human-beings and their environment, material or immaterial. Capital theory gives a relative 39
value to instruments that can then be used to produce and to consume. As a consequence,
capital theory is the first building block of sustainability.
The second building block is the theory of value. The notion of value is evidently polysemic
but one of the raison d’être of economics is to set a value on objects and concepts. What
matters is that any conception of value is rooted in a philosophical theory of social priorities
and individual preferences. The most commonly used theory of that kind in economics is
utilitarianism. We present utilitarianism briefly in the general introduction. We then use it
in chapter 1 to introduce the neoclassical model, which is the basis for the weak sustainability
paradigm.
Di erent academic traditions have di erent perspectives on sustainability. The main bone
of contention is usually the degree of substitutability between di erent instruments of wealth.
The question of substitutability is nonetheless related to other dimensions of sustainability.
Using as a foundation the relation between human beings and their environment, we present
a conceptual framework for sustainability. This framework is based on a simple intuition: a
minimum set of rules should be respected just to maintain the possibility for present and future
generations to exert they right to free will. As a consequence, a minimal set of non contradictory
principles should be applied in any society, a “common ground” without which no sustainable
social organisation can thrive.
We summarise those principles in five points. Sustainability consists in maintaining compre-
hensive wealth over time, maintaining constant consumption over time, controlling for money-
value substitutability to be consistent with physical substitutability, guaranteeing intergener-
ational equity and fostering intragenerational equity. On this basis, sustainability should be
implemented following the subsidiarity principle. To keep decision making the closest possible
to the relevant scale would guarantee voice and institutional inclusiveness for all the agents. The
39. Relative to the human-beings using the instruments of wealth.
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subsidiarity principle creates consistency between the object (sustainability) and the structure
(inclusive institutions).
The implementation of sustainability naturally needs to be monitored and assessed. Sev-
eral indicators exist to this end. The most firmly established and theoretically consistent is
Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) proposed by Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and now computed by
the World Bank (2011). ANS are a current value indicator, so that it encompasses the forward
looking dimension of sustainability. ANS are therefore best suited to assess the sustainability of
the development path on which a social group is embarked. Monitoring sustainability requires
current value indicators to assess the general consistency of the path. But uncertainty makes
short run adjustments of the path necessary, especially in the face of potential “critical junc-
tures” or path dependence. Current value indicators should be supplemented by present value
indicators and counterfactual scenarios to o er the most comprehensive possible assessments
of sustainability.
International trade is a complicated object in this perspective. International trade emerges
in a “grey area” for sustainability, as it prospers in a partial institutional vacuum between
state level institutions and a handful of international organisations. International trade is a
challenge for the subsidiarity principle as it creates a mismatch between the relevant level where
some issues should be tackled and the level where it is institutional possible to tackle them.
Biodiversity protection in critical ecosystems comes to mind. This problem should ideally be
solved by scaling-up the adequate decision making process. In practice, such a move would
involve a transfer of power that is unlikely to happen.
If rising to the challenge is impossible, then sustainability issues should be scaled-down
to be manageable under the current institutional setting whenever it is possible. Even this a
priori simple solution could be very hard to implement. The world today is more and more
economically integrated as we go through the second globalisation. Globalisation di ers in
essence from simple trade expansion. When trade expansion is a plain increase in the volume of
goods and services exchanged ceteris paribus, globalisation describes increased interdependence.
In phases of globalisation, supply chains are scattered in di erent countries, instruments of
wealth are invested across borders, consumers gain access to both foreign goods and foreign
practices and habits.
An already important literature on trade and the environment explores the consequences of
trade-induced factor reallocation on pollution. Authors in this field implicitly assume that world
is converging towards an integrated equilibrium. The other extreme, in the literature on open
economy exhaustible resources management, investigates the impact of the exogenous, world
price system on domestic instruments of wealth. A final trend in the literature is to quantify the
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exhaustible resources embodied in trade flows to determine who the final consumer is and the
true responsibility for depletion. Responsibility for depletion highlights the di erence between
domestic sustainability and “virtual sustainability” where the importance of interdependence
is taken into account.
Globalisation generates increased interdependence. As a consequence, sustainability issues
tend to endogenously increase in scale in a globalised world as the number and the geographical
dispersion of agents involved in a given situation also increase. In this context, scaling-down
(which would be a second best) requires a characterisation of interdependence to discriminate
between forms of interdependence that are compatible with sustainability and those which
are not. On this basis, the decision to liberalise trade flows should be taken after a careful
review of the position of the domestic instruments of wealth relative to the rest of the world.
Conversely, if liberalised trade is proven to hinder sustainability some safeguard measures using
trade management instruments should be implemented. Those measures would allow to control
for “fungibility”, the substitution of a given instrument of wealth amongst di erent geographical
scales.
The notion of comparative advantage, central to international trade theory, bears a nity
with sustainability theory. A natural a liation can be made between the notion of compar-
ative advantage based on factor endowments and the distribution of instruments of wealth in
a given country. Trade theory encourages specialisation alongside the comparative advantage
when sustainability monitors investment/depletion behaviours of instruments of wealth. As-
sessing the impact of interdependence on sustainability requires a framework to understand
how trade incentives to specialise impact the sound management of instruments of wealth on
a development path. When this management implies to substitute a man made instrument for
an exhaustible one, it is termed structural change.
To complete this framework for open economy sustainability we use a dynamic Heckscher-
Ohlin model to test interdependence and asymmetry in endowments. Our model is based on four
di erent instruments of wealth to study substitutability. We also propose several scenarios to
study cases of structural change and pursued comparative advantage. We discuss the likelihood
of steady-state convergence by calculating a path of constrained steady-states. International
trade leads to polarisation in the trading partners. As the two countries engage in international
trade they are impacted by (positive or negative) idiosyncratic shocks in their partner. Using
trade management instruments could then be especially useful to protect instruments of wealth
that form the basis for reduced asymmetry and diversification of the domestic production.
This model is based on constant returns to scale, so that we observe lost productivity be-
tween autarky and free trade as the global supply chain grows more complex. In the final
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chapter, we explore the potential impact of increasing returns to scale (IRS) on sustainable
paths. The trend of increased interdependence via the segmentation of the production pro-
cess between countries has a dynamic impact on the decisions regarding wealth instruments
allocation. A specific case has been extensively studied in the literature, the “resource curse”
scenario. The resource curse is the tendency for resources rich countries to have lower GDP
growth than resources poor ones. This result is related to the “Dutch disease”, where trade
induced reallocation across sectors leads to the shrinkage of manufacturing in resources rich
economy. We show how an inter-industry pattern of trade in resources rich countries is a sign for
a lack of structural change. The resource curse is therefore another failure to set the considered
country on a sustainable open economy path.
We discuss the importance of institutions to guarantee sustainability. Still, we consider those
institutions to be determined outside of our framework. We mention only the instrumental value
of those institutions for sustainability. We finish our study of sustainability and international
trade with an application of ANS to the case of Russia. The Russian Federation and the former
Soviet Union constitute a natural experiment for the relative importance of interdependence
and institutional co-evolution against objective factors (such as resource abundance, climate) in
setting sustainability paths. We conclude that Russia is on an unsustainable path and that this
performance is most closely associated with countries that are institutionally and geographically
close. This preliminary finding stress how interdependence, lacking e ective global regulation,
gives a rationale for regional integration between countries that are institutionally similar but
asymmetrically endowed in instruments of wealth.
In the course of this work, we covered a lot of material, trying to o er a unified perspective
on sustainability. As this thesis draws to a close it seems useful to o er a synthesis of our
contributions.
We started with two contributions, methodological and conceptual in nature. We proposed
in chapter 2 a survey of the articles related to sustainability and international trade. Considering
the diversity of the e orts and the numerous modelling strategies used to address this question,
this survey is filling a gap in the literature. This work allowed us to point at the most important
gap in the literature to assess trade and sustainability: the need for a dynamic model of trade.
The most comprehensive model is the Copeland and Taylor (1994) model but it is essentially
static. What is needed is a model for the interactions between dynamics of accumulation and
trade incentives.
Our second preliminary contribution lies with the integrated framework for sustainability
assessment. We believe the separation between capital theory and the theory of value to be
fruitful. This separation stresses the necessity of a philosophical background for the theory
General Conclusion 363
of value. Capital theory only requires the recognition that human-beings consume and use
instruments of wealth. In our framework we put the weak versus strong sustainability debate
in a broader perspective. We insist that money-value substitutability is the real challenge, not
physical substitutability. In this “social” perspective, substitutability is as much a spatial as a
time problem. We propose to limit the use of substitutability to the time problem and use the
term “fungibility” to discuss substitution across spaces.
Discussing those issues lead us to an understanding of international trade as a blind spot
in sustainability. International trade brings interdependence and uncertainty. This translates
into the possibility of multiple equilibria, within and between free trade and autarky. Our first
key contribution is borne out of the analysis of international trade in chapter 3. We show
how coordination costs in international trade can a ect the sustainable paths for structural
change. We show how looking for comparative advantages may reduce overall e ciency. As
a consequence, countries should consider asymmetry in the distribution of their instruments
of wealth when discussing free trade. Free trade is more interesting when both countries are
characterised by high asymmetry in the distribution of endowments. Low asymmetry renders
trade liberalisation quite unappealing.
We then show in a second key contribution (in the same chapter 3) how interdependence im-
plies a shared responsibility for the investment/depletion behaviour of both countries. Interna-
tional trade alters optimal paths, creating at the same time multiple constrained steady-states.
Those are constrained steady states as they depend on the evolution of variables and param-
eters that are not determined by international trade. Interdependence is created under the
complete specialisation case where both countries have di erent factor prices and keep some
pricing autonomy. Interdependence is maximised in the integrated equilibrium where factor
prices are equalised.
Those two di erent trade settings show how international trade creates alignment (or sym-
metry) in investment/depletion policies in the two countries. This has an impact on how they
move together from high to low asymmetry. But it also has an impact on how countries react
to asymmetric shocks. If an idiosyncratic shock takes place in country 1, it is the most a ected
in complete specialisation. In the integrated equilibrium the most a ected is country 2. Shocks
are transmitted through traded goods and factor prices when they are equalised. This is what
we call the “burden sharing” property of international trade.
In the context of sustainability this interdependence is critical. First, because in terms of
precaution and uncertainty it creates the need for the co-management of the de facto shared
resources. Second, because domestic sustainability indicators must take those dynamics into
account if they want to stand a chance to a) reflect true sustainability and b) keep some
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amount of predictive power. Open economy sustainability assessments depend on the joint use
of current and present value indicators with counterfactual scenarios for free trade, imperfect
trade and autarky comparisons.
The next key contribution is a proposal to amend Adjusted Net Savings in line with our
findings. We presented, analysed and used ANS in the four chapters. We did so as ANS
are grounded in theory and perform decently as a predictor of future sustainability. Our
analysis stressed the importance of monitoring the overall savings rate but also to monitor
each instrument of wealth and its contribution to the overall rate (following the precautionary
principle). Based on our results in chapter 3 we propose to amend ANS for international trade.
We show how countries in autarky face higher costs on the transition path compared to free
trade. This “cost saving” property of international trade results is an evolution of domestic
specialisation and alters the investment/depletion path.
We recommend that the amount saved by undertaking structural change in free trade against
autarky should be saved and added to ANS. This amount should then be reinvested to under-
take structural change. Exhaustible resources in particular witness a slower price increase under
free trade than in autarky when those resources constitute the comparative advantage. As a
consequence, free trade does increase the pressure for resource depletion and proper reinvest-
ment must be conducted. If the domestic economy fails to do so, then the trade partner could
face a shortfall in the supply of resources, putting sustainability in both countries in jeopardy.
Still, cooperation under free trade is a second best compared to the balanced factor use in
autarky.
Our next key contribution is presented in chapter 4. We investigate the impact of increasing
returns to scale on accumulation patterns. As we demonstrated that international trade causes
higher coordination costs from the industrial restructuring, the observed gains from trade must
come from another source. The international division of the production process (IDPP) is
based on international economies of scale. Countries have an incentive to split the production
process to develop economies of scale by increasing international specialisation. We use the
Ethier (1982) model to show how increasing returns to scale do not a ect factor allocation in
a static setting. Economies of scale emerge from the reorganisation of tasks between countries,
but factor allocation in unchanged compared to the constant returns to scale case.
There is however a catch. Although the technical equilibrium is unchanged, international
returns to scale change factor prices. As a consequence, incentives to invest in the next period
are altered. Increasing returns to scale will therefore change the distribution of instruments of
wealth in both countries, towards greater interdependence again. Gains from trade emerging in
this process should be added to ANS and reinvested to preserve a minimal level of diversification
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in endowments. This finding is also first evidence that the rationale for the establishment of
the global supply chain does not matter for sustainability. What matters are the consequences
on sustainability paths.
This observation leads us to question the impact of the nature of trade on sustainability
paths. We focus on the resource curse as a prime example of the distortion set by asymmetry
in the distribution of endowments on a development path. We first review the literature and
show how institutional and trade motives interplay in the resource curse. International trade
encourages specialisation which reinforces economic extractiveness, which in turn reinforces spe-
cialisation and so on. We then show how resource abundance negatively a ects intra-industry
trade in primary goods. Resources rich countries trade more than the average resources inten-
sive goods against other goods. As a consequence, they can use the factor content of trade as
a substitute for domestic structural change.
Inter-industry trade in natural resources abundant goods is therefore an indicator of delayed
structural change. We suggest it is the sign that resources rich economies tend to deplete
exhaustible resources before considering structural change when an alternative engine for growth
is needed. The consequences for the analysis of the resource curse are clear. We confirm
that resources abundance is not so much correlated with lower growth but with a shrinking
manufacturing sector. The resource curse is in essence a problem of excessive specialisation
(and therefore sustainability) rather than a problem of aggregate growth.
Our final contribution is an empirical assessment of modern Russia using ANS. We show how
Russia and the former Soviet Union are an interesting natural experiment to test the importance
of institutional factors in shaping the development path. We show that the evolution of ANS for
Russia is a better match to countries that are institutionally similar, compared to countries that
have a similar distribution of endowments. Hence, the distribution of endowments is correlated
with the levels of ANS while ANS variations are correlated with institutional similarities. This
finding gives credit to the idea that integration could be conducted between countries that are
institutionally similar even if their distribution of instruments of wealth is di erent.
It also suggests that countries that have no desire to generate mutual dependence with other
countries should probably monitor the nature of their trade flows much more closely. It is one
thing to be exposed to the adverse consequences of an overall fall in the volume of trade. It is
quite di erent to suddenly loose a partner with a relative advantage in a instrument of wealth
that is scarce in the domestic market. In that situation, our scenarios in chapter 3 show that
the consequences are the most severe.
Based on those contributions, we discussed on several occasion the opportunity (notably for
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resources rich countries) to liberalise trade. We approached the problem using several angles.
We questioned the timing of trade liberalisation, its impact on domestic specialisation, the
potential relocation of parts of the production process abroad and the importance of interde-
pendence. The case for trade liberalisation is, to say the least, embattled in a sustainability
context. We should probably stress one last time that it is our normative approach that leads
to question the rationale for trade. From a more conventional perspective, as gains from trade
can be expected (and critically, productivity improvements) the literature generally sees trade
in a favourable light. We departed from that perspective to give a more nuanced picture of
trade liberalisation on sustainability grounds.
The starting point is our understanding of wealth and the composition of wealth as central
tenet of sustainability. As a consequence, sustainability demands diversification in the instru-
ments of wealth in the domestic economy. This is for protection against uncertainty and to
give the agents more flexibility over the evolution of the economy, which usually takes the form
of structural change (the substitution of some widely used instruments of wealth with new,
more productive ones). The logic of international trade is instead to increase the specialisation
of the economy to generate gains from an increased international division of labour (under
constant or increasing returns to scale). The decision to liberalise trade should therefore be
taken by considering the potential benefits of increased specialisation against the sustainability
imperative of diversification.
Trade liberalisation should always be undertaken with a clear purpose. In chapter 3 we
present a simple rationale: cost saving in the wake of structural change. A corner case of this
rationale is reached when some instruments of wealth enter as complements in the production
process. In that scenario, the domestic demand elasticity for those instruments is null, so that
trade liberalisation is not only desirable (to alleviate costs) but unavoidable (simply to keep the
domestic economy running). The two rationale left for trade liberalisation are the possibility
to access new goods (i.e. new technologies and savoir faire) or to access foreign varieties of
the domestic goods and to improve domestic total factor productivity via foreign technology
transfers.
In any case, the distinctive mark of trade liberalisation is increased interdependence, the
consequences of which should be considered carefully. The first consequence of increased inter-
dependence is increased specialisation. Specialisation can either take the form of a reduction
in the number of sectors covered by domestic production, or a change in the composition of
the parts of the global production processes that are produced domestically. We stressed in the
context of the resource curse the dangers associated with a concentration of the production in
a reduced number of sectors (in terms of political and economic inclusiveness). But there are
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also dangers in entering the global supply as a producer of a similar component in di erent sec-
toral production processes. This form of interdependence is potentially more balanced (every
country needs all the other countries) but increases specialisation much more markedly. The
responsibility for production falls on a much more limited number of instruments of wealth.
As a consequence, each and every country may desire structural change, but the global
trading system may not necessarily send any incentives to go in this direction. Countries
have to undertake structural change against the organisation of the international system of
interdependence. Reduction in interdependence is potentially destabilising, if one countries
reduces its dependence on the others while the others fail to reciprocate. The distribution of
global comparative advantages is therefore subject to asymmetric shocks. Those shock may
destabilise the trading system as the adjustment to those shocks is unevenly shared across
the system. It is nonetheless impossible to forbid countries to depart from their comparative
advantage as departure is in the interest of sustainability. The only viable option is to create
a global management of sustainability paths in countries that are already interdependent.
This is the final lesson of our work. It is certainly not new, but deserves repetition as the
lessons of the past seems to be forgotten in Europe and elsewhere. Sustained trade flows between
countries are necessarily the first steps towards a form of economic integration. Trade is too
much of a disruptive force for all countries to allow it to shape development paths uncontrolled
or unchecked. Sooner or later, either the volume or the structural impact of trade 40 will recede
under domestic pressure. And once a form of economic integration is reached, some steps for
political cooperation and integration will be undertaken as it will then be in the interest of
the stakeholders. It is impossible to maintain uncompromising free trade and sustainability
without political and economic integration. The necessary outcome of extended free trade
without political and economic integration is a state of subjection to the rule of specialisation.
Sustainability is then hindered, if not prevented.
International trade should never prevent diversification in either the domestic economy or
the trading partners. Asymmetric shocks from unilateral diversification should be managed, so
that the burden of adjustment is fairly shared between trading countries. In this perspective,
trade management instruments could legitimately be used to limit fungibility and money-value
substitutability. The alternative to autarky is not necessarily free trade. Managed trade could
make for the cohabitation of e ciency gains from trade with the necessary diversification,
especially at the regional level. Tari  revenues could be allocated to the funding of structural
40. Reduction in the volume of trade would be a plain reduction of the intensive margin of trade. The
structural impact of trade is the ability to shape specialisation because of world prices. The structural impact
of trade can be lowered using protectionist measures, productivity improvements or product di erentiation
strategies.
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change.
Trade management instruments are second best instruments. A final note may make them
worth considering in any case. In the course of this thesis, we represented firms as passive
maximising agents, within countries boundaries. It is obviously a simplifying assumption as
we focused on instruments of wealth. In a phase of globalisation, international firms operate
the global supply chain and have interests that do not necessarily coincide with the geography
of the polities. In this context, tari s are as legitimate as any tax to channel income from
one category of agents to another. Those tari s would in an ideal world be levied by an
international structural fund, in charge of managing global issues and alleviate the constraint
on structural change at the country level. Lacking this first best, the case can be made for
countries or regional blocks to do so. This is one way to partially reduce the “grey area” in
which international trade currently evolves.
We will now end this presentation with a brief discussion on potential leads for future
research. We present these chronologically, arguably the best mode for an agenda. For ease of
reading, we present those leads from the most immediate research avenues to a more ambitious
long run agenda.
To follow through with the model in chapter 3, the dynamic model should be amended.
The current setting, where three factor are exogenous, is useful to test scenarios of structural
change. It would also be interesting to give the representative agent more latitude to allocate
resources. Of prime interest is the question of the spontaneous emergence of structural change.
The representative agent should balance the extra income from immediate gains from trade
with the opportunity to have a more diverse productive base in the future. A second natural
step is to bring our results on increasing returns to scale in chapter 4 to the production structure
of the model. Increasing returns to scale can certainly tilt the balance in favour of international
trade. It would also be interesting to explore the consequence of increasing returns to scale in
intermediate goods compared to consumption goods.
We presented the impact of trade on sustainability using an Heckscher-Ohlin model, to be
able to model factors explicitly. Doing so, we focused on the impact of trade on the domestic
economy, more than we explored whether observed trade flows were or not compatible with
sustainability. Doing so would require to explore the impact of the taste for variety, or pro-
ductivity di erences on the distribution of factors. We should therefore build a joint model
for productivity and factor endowments motives for trade and see how productivity di erences
may change our results. Taste for variety is a di erent challenge. Following the current debate
on sustainable consumption, there is clearly an arbitrage to investigate between more varieties
from trade and sustainability. A balance between transaction costs, preferences and measures
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of entropy needs to be found for a “sustainable degree of variety” in consumption. Such a
balance can not exist independently of an ethical position on consumption.
Further down the road, two larger research avenues need to be explored. The concept of
“fungibility” should lead to a rethink of the allocation of resources between the regional and
country level. What is at stake here is a definition of a responsibility to promote optimal
regional diversification while benefiting from international specialisation. This is not an easy
task, so that careful regional economic and political planning should be organised. From a
theoretical perspective, the challenge is to propose criteria for new basic units in economic
analysis. Countries have always been the default geographical unit, the way the representative
firm and the representative agent are the basic blocks in microeconomics.
Our aim exploring fungibility will be to establish criteria (and indicators) to define regional
units that would be consistent with sustainability. Those units may be subdivisions in countries,
gathering of countries, or more problematically a gathering of administrative regions from
several countries. Based on those units, interregional trade flows could be designed in line
with sustainability requirements, to propose a counterfactual trade system. Deviation from
this trade system could then be used as a basis for the use of trade management instruments
to levy and reinvest gains from trade or correct trade flows for sustainability.
The second important avenue has to do with finance. Under our current economic or-
ganisation, financial flows are the counterpart of instruments of wealth. Fisher-type perfect
substitutability in instruments of wealth makes it possible to move in money-value form those
instruments all over the planet. We presented in chapters 3 and 4 the many contributions
studying the consequences of this possibility. We also stressed that in theory, the Fisher capi-
tal theory can accommodate imperfect substitution between instruments of wealth. There are
therefore many e orts to devote to the analysis of imposed limited money-value substitutability.
On a related topic, the expansion of wealth accounting and natural capital is going to “create”
many new assets in the current financial system. The impact of those assets on the financial
system (and vice versa) should also be investigated closely. There is a priori no reason for
those assets to be immune to the documented flaws of financial markets. Those assets have the
potential to increase financial instability.
All those potential research topics fit in a global e ort to understand better the normative
and objective rules presiding over the allocation of the limited resources at our disposal. In
this perspective we strongly believe that sustainability is nothing less than the raison d’être
of economics as a discipline in the XXIst century. When pioneers such as Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, Allen Kneese or David Pearce extended our knowledge of sustainability, they saw
this as the natural continuation of the works of François Quesnay, Richard Cantillion, Adam
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Smith or Alfred Marshall. The current e orts of Kenneth Arrow, Partha Dasgupta or Kirk
Hamilton clearly point in this direction. When considering the future of sustainability study it
seems therefore safe to assume that mainstream economics will gradually take more and more
of sustainability in the central corpus (at the very least on the macro side of the discipline).
The questions that we hope to tackle to complete the theory of sustainability have therefore as
much to do with sustainability than more mainstream economics.
The first missing link in that grand theory is an operational understanding of the famous
“co-evolution” of institutions and sustainability from Arrow et al. (2010). Beyond the general
principles of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, we still do not know much about the relationship
between institutions (the superstructure) and sustainability (the objects). Building such a the-
ory demands as a prerequisite an understanding of the impact of inequalities (intragenerational
equity) on wealth accumulation. Recent contributions seem to have made breakthroughs in
this direction. Should we be able to associate a distribution of wealth with an institutional
evolution, we would certainly be able to discriminate between institutions that e ectively foster
sustainability and those hindering it.
The second missing link is closer to our topic. We stressed early in this work the di erence
between means and ends of development. A sustainable development should be consistent, in
the sense that a sustainable development must take place within the means available. Once this
condition is realised, social groups should be free to choose the possible ends of development
as they fit. Those ends certainly include the choice of the perimeter of the social groups, a say
in the limits of the polis. There is, as often when exploring sustainability, both an intrinsic and
an instrumental value to economic and political integration. This is what makes (and will keep
making in the future) the definition of criteria for economic integration so complicated.
Nonetheless, we will have to revisit the usual convergence criteria of the Balassa (1961) scale
to propose a rationale for sustainable economic integration. The role of factor movements should
be considered, in the regional perspective we presented above. Convergence criteria based on
sustainability principles should also be designed, with an agenda for wealth management beyond
market mechanisms.
This is a very ambitious scientific objective. It is also a necessity for the consistency of
a theory of open economy sustainability. It is, in the end, a discussion on the possibility for
complex social groups to pool resources for a common future. In that sense, it is also the
original pledge of the Brundtland report. As a result, this could prove to be the ultimate
test for sustainability. Sustainability challenges are enormous and the latest news on climate,
biodiversity and ecosystem services are not bright.
General Conclusion 371
Solutions will not come from individual initiatives and stochastic technical progress. As
Jacques Ellul already knew, solutions will come from our ability to coordinate our e orts under
common ends and values. We hope that this thesis will prove to be a first small step in this
direction.
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In chapter 3 section II.1, the allocation of instruments of wealth between the five sectors is
obtained from the aggregate production function:
Y =  y–/41,i y
–/4
2,i y
1≠–
3,i y
–/4
4,i y
–/4
5,i
And the intermediate goods functions:
y1,i = ⁄Kl,i
y2,i = “Kp,i
y3,i = (Kl,iKp,iKe,iKr,i)
1
4
y4,i = ÊKe,i
y5,i = ÿKr,i
Substituting those intermediate goods production functions into the aggregate production func-
tion yields:
Y =  ⁄K–/4l,i “K
–/4
p,i (Kl,iKp,iKe,iKr,i)
1
4
1≠–
ÊK
–/4
e,i —K
–/4
r,i
We derive this expression with respect to ⁄,“,Ê and ÿ. Doing so gives us:
ˆY
ˆ⁄
= 0… ⁄= –
ˆY
ˆ“
= 0… “ = –
ˆY
ˆÊ
= 0… Ê = –
ˆY
ˆÿ
= 0… ÿ= –
The – parameter is equal to the allocation parameters, so that – e ectively allocates instru-
ments of wealth across sectors.
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In chapter 3 section II.1, the general equilibrium depends on the technical equilibrium
between the aggregate production function and the intermediate goods production function.
This is true in either autarky, the integrated or the complete specialisation equilibrium. First,
the unit cost of production (so that Y = 1 while Py is the numéraire) should be minimized:
Minimize:
Py = P1x1+P2x2+P3x3+P4x4+P5x5
Subject to:
1 =  y–/41 y
–/4
2 y
1≠–
3 y
–/4
4 y
–/4
5
The resulting Lagrangian L yields five first order conditions with respect to the goods quantities:
L= P1x1+P2x2+P3x3+P4x4+P5x5≠ ’( y–/41 y–/42 y1≠–3 y–/44 y–/45 ≠1)
ˆL
ˆx1
= 0… P1 =  –’x
–
4≠1
1 x
–
4
2 x
1≠–
3 x
–
4
4 x
–
4
5
4
ˆL
ˆx2
= 0… P2 =  –’x
–
4
1 x
–
4≠1
2 x
1≠–
3 x
–
4
4 x
–
4
5
4
ˆL
ˆx3
= 0… P3 =≠ ’(–≠1)x
–
4
1 x
–
4
2 x
–
4
4 x
–
4
5
x–3
ˆL
ˆx4
= 0… P4 =  –’x
–
4
1 x
–
4
2 x
1≠–
3 x
–
4≠1
4 x
–
4
5
4
ˆL
ˆx5
= 0… P5 =  –’x
–
4
1 x
–
4
2 x
1≠–
3 x
–
4
4 x
–
4≠1
5
4
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Substituting those values for the prices into the objective function gives a value for the La-
grangian ’ of 1. Rearranging the first order condition using ’ = 1 and the objective function
gives the following equilibrium conditions:
x1 =
–
4P1
x2 =
–
4P2
x3 =
1≠–
P1
x4 =
–
4P4
x5 =
–
4P5
Then, substituting into the unit cost production with X = [( (–4 )–(1≠–)1≠–)]≠1 gives:
1 =Xp1≠–3 (P1P2P4P5)
–
4
Which is our general equilibrium condition for the production of the final good. The market
share conditions are derived from the rearranged first order conditions. It naturally follows
from those that all the pjxj are equal to –4 so that pixi = pixi for all i but i = 3. The market
share for good 3 is obtained by taking the ratio of p1x1 = –4 over p3x3 = (1≠–).
For the intermediate goods, the price equal marginal cost conditions are derived from the
equilibrium of the firm in each sector:
 1 = P1y1≠wKl
 2 = P2y2≠pKp
 3 = P3y3≠wKl≠pKp≠ eKe≠ rKr
 4 = P4y4≠ eKe
 5 = P5y5≠ rKr
With   the profit. As inputs enter one to one in the production of intermediates, it is straight-
forward that equilibrium requires the price of the intermediate to be set at the price of the
corresponding factor. The exception is as usual good y3 where four factors enter production.
Maximising profit for good y3 requires to substitute for y3 in the profit function using the
production function y3 =K
1
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
e K
1
4
r . Deriving the profit function with respect to the four
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factors yields four first order conditions:
ˆ 
ˆKl
= 0… P3 = 4w
K
≠3
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
e K
1
4
r
ˆ 
ˆKp
= 0… P3 = 4p
K
1
4
l K
≠3
4
p K
1
4
e K
1
4
r
ˆ 
ˆKe
= 0… P3 = 4e
K
1
4
l K
1
4
p K
≠3
4
e K
1
4
r
ˆ 
ˆKr
= 0… P3 = 4r
K
1
4
l K
1
4
p K
1
4
e K
≠3
4
r
Equalising those first order conditions using P3 gives us two ratios wp =
Kp
Kl
and er =
Kr
Ke
. Sub-
stituting those ratios into the four first order conditions gives the same equilibrium condition:
P3 = 4(eprw)
1
4
This demonstration holds for the autarky and the integrated equilibrium. For the complete
specialisation (CS) equilibrium, di erences come in the consumption shares and price equal
marginal costs conditions. In CS, both countries specialise so that the entirety of goods y1 and
y2 is produced in country 1 while the entirety of goods y4 and y5 is produced in country 2. As
a consequence, price equal marginal cost conditions for the intermediate goods solely depend
on one out of two countries endowments and factor prices for the relevant goods.
The market share condition for good y3 is also amended as not only consumption but also
production is made in both countries. The global equilibrium is left unchanged, so that the
form of the equation is left unchanged. Still, production needs to be di erentiated between
countries 1 and 2 so that substitution in the resolution of the general equilibrium only takes
place with x3,1 and x3,2 together.
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The dynamic model in chapter 3 section II.2 is based on a representative consumer in both
countries, maximising utility:
Uj,t =
Œÿ
s=t
—s≠t lncj,t
Where utility in t Uj,t is the sum of discounted consumption flows cj,s over an infinite number
of periods, so that t goes to Œ from the present period s. Utility is maximised subject to the
budget constraint:
wj,tKl,j,t+pj,tKp,j,t+ ej,tKe,j,t+ rj,tKr,j,t
= cj,t+Kp,j,t+1≠Kp,j,t+ ”Kp,j,t+xKe,j,t≠ﬂKr,j,t
under the structural change (SC) scenario. The constraint is the same in both countries. To
solve this system we consider three endowments to be exogenous (Kl,Ke and Kr) so that our
representative agents in both countries only choose a value for cj,t and Kp,j,t. We rearrange the
budget constraint to isolate cj,t:
cj,t = wj,tKl,j,t+pj,tKp,j,t+ ej,tKe,j,t+ rj,tKr,j,t
≠Kp,j,t+1+Kp,j,t≠ ”Kp,j,t≠xKe,j,t+ﬂKr,j,t
We can then substitute the constraint into the utility function. We can then derive the utility
function with respect to produced capital in t+1:
ˆUj,t
ˆKp,j,t+1
= 0≈∆ ≠1
cj,t
+— 1
cj,t+1
(1≠ ”+pj,t) = 0
Which gives us the first equation of motion:
cj,t+1 = —cj,t(1≠ ”+pj,t)
This first equation of motion can then be used to obtain the steady-state value. In steady-state,
consumption is constant over time, so that cj,t+1 = cj,t. The first equation of motion becomes:
1
—
= 1+pj,t≠ ”
Under the comparative advantage (CA) scenario, the budget constraint changes for country
2 :
w2,tKl,2,t+p2,tKp,2,t+ e2,tKe,2,t+ r2,tKr,2,t
= c2,t+Kr,2,t+1≠Kr,2,t≠ﬂKr,2,t+ ”Kp,2,t+xKe,2,t
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So that the same procedure yields a slightly modified equation of motion:
c2,t+1 = —c2,t(1+ﬂ+ r2,t)

Appendix D
The distribution of wealth in countries
worldwide
The following three tables give the per capita values for labour/human capital Kl, produced
capital Kp, exhaustible resources Ke and renewable exhaustible resources Kr. We get those
values from the World Bank Wealth Accounting database, available here. 1 All values are in
2005 USD. We then sum the values for labour and produced capital and compute the share of
those instruments of wealth in comprehensive wealth. This gives the “country 1 percentage”,
the share of instruments corresponding to a country one type specialisation. We then compute
the same percentage with exhaustible resources (renewable and non-renewable) to obtain the
“country 2 percentage”.
We then use the factor price equalisation (FPE) condition defined in chapter 3 section II.1.3
to assess the likelihood of FPE in the considered year. We keep our benchmark value of 0.15 for
–, so that FPE occurrence is to be understood as a mere indication. Even under this very crude
assessment of FPE, the share of countries under FPE is decreasing over the years. In 1995,
27 countries out of 125 satisfied the FPE condition. The corresponding numbers are 31 out of
149 for 2000 and 28 out of 152 for 2005. This represents 24%, 21% and 18.4% of the sample
respectively. Therefore, when all the instruments of wealth are considered, FPE is rather the
exception than the norm in international trade. Under our benchmark parametrisation, FPE
breaks down when a given country owns more than 59.25% of its wealth in produced capital or
labour on the one hand or exhaustible resources on the other hand.
1. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=
wealth-accounting
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Distribution of wealth instruments and FPE in 1995
Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
Non-
Renewable
Resources
Country
1 %
Country
2 %
FPE
Algeria 26298.9041 11561.6128 6452.05284 2720.68874 5564.54968 68.4958796 31.5041204 No FPE
Argentina 38046.0398 11055.7396 21141.9798 5148.99859 699.321715 84.6283073 15.3716927 No FPE
Australia 232497.04 90926.6422 112029.433 21395.8913 8145.073 87.2940471 12.7059529 No FPE
Austria 248794.864 96185.4752 141643.909 10727.5773 237.902633 95.5925618 4.40743823 No FPE
Bahrain 141815.628 52266.1259 32479.4508 1372.55969 55697.4916 59.7575725 40.2424275 No FPE
Bangladesh 3113.61337 610.138777 1419.39521 1040.76947 43.3099162 65.1825947 34.8174053 No FPE
Belgium 223913.621 84756.073 135618.774 3538.07785 0.69624273 98.4195807 1.58041931 No FPE
Belize 37684.159 7830.32594 7697.90158 22155.9314 0 41.2062467 58.7937533 FPE
Benin 6883.73177 852.90773 1187.08514 4791.30844 52.430458 29.634985 70.365015 No FPE
Bhutan 17304.393 3386.27451 -
3918.47259
17802.7284 33.8627133 -
3.07550848
103.075508 No FPE
Bolivia 12583.4197 1921.42008 2470.49236 7484.11233 707.394885 34.902376 65.097624 No FPE
Botswana 25581.4873 9912.92962 9106.47733 6318.17107 243.909325 74.3483234 25.6516766 No FPE
Brazil 40661.3848 11831.1262 18209.4757 9879.008 741.774858 73.8799283 26.1200717 No FPE
Brunei
Darus-
salam
197130.71 63981.8692 -
308.311394
8996.925 124460.227 32.3001717 67.6998283 No FPE
Burkina
Faso
3973.582 766.839109 994.324965 2212.41793 0 44.3218254 55.6781746 FPE
Burundi 2054.36064 261.978132 301.676477 1490.06316 0.64287545 27.4369844 72.5630156 No FPE
Cameroon 10261.4935 2792.29125 2756.94118 3911.68032 800.580782 54.0782139 45.9217861 FPE
Canada 237284.661 76284.176 128505.391 27681.2656 4813.82826 86.3054385 13.6945615 No FPE
Central
African
Republic
7655.04702 638.216759 -
327.750305
7344.19873 0.38183729 4.05570929 95.9442907 No FPE
Chad 5917.25652 381.422508 834.655096 4701.17892 0 20.5513754 79.4486246 No FPE
Chile 45463.627 12227.8366 22041.4999 6187.36716 5006.92331 75.3774804 24.6225196 No FPE
China 7122.46162 2522.84664 1568.69162 2602.5184 428.404955 57.4455642 42.5544358 FPE
Colombia 27300.9706 6733.74174 12965.7479 6331.10403 1270.37687 72.1567375 27.8432625 No FPE
Comoros 7785.63329 2353.69351 3478.42448 1953.51529 0 74.9087169 25.0912831 No FPE
Congo,
Dem. Rep.
2708.01281 353.739255 163.099193 2091.82211 99.3522532 19.0855245 80.9144755 No FPE
Congo,
Rep.
17891.2125 5889.67277 -
2692.38681
6111.20646 8582.72006 17.8707059 82.1292941 No FPE
Costa Rica 36058.8743 8397.82619 16923.4803 10737.519 0.04880881 70.2221213 29.7778787 No FPE
Côte
d’Ivoire
8976.72512 2048.67602 4208.31275 2680.97104 38.765315 69.7023545 30.2976455 No FPE
Cyprus 154062.804 55476.0106 87438.4217 11144.7911 3.58043765 92.7637488 7.23625122 No FPE
Denmark 311752.062 107277.532 188108.414 13425.5533 2940.56245 94.7502783 5.24972174 No FPE
Dominica 39159.8033 12106.909 14840.1209 12212.7734 0 68.8129859 31.1870141 No FPE
Dominican
Republic
24545.0574 6129.33759 12828.8472 5453.7015 133.17104 77.2382991 22.7617009 No FPE
Ecuador 28041.93 6470.29289 7169.26744 10262.6389 4139.73081 48.6398773 51.3601227 FPE
Egypt,
Arab Rep.
10232.7994 2799.36003 4099.04877 2355.37598 979.014585 67.4146786 32.5853214 No FPE
El Salvador 22595.8105 4787.51127 13075.9312 4732.36804 0 79.056436 20.943564 No FPE
Ethiopia 2145.54346 248.431091 241.756819 1655.09539 0.260163 22.8467947 77.1532053 No FPE
Fiji 34064.3168 7725.17509 8882.46342 17016.3755 440.302804 48.7537695 51.2462305 FPE
Finland 224488.48 90934.2767 114378.816 19121.2614 54.1252615 91.4581868 8.54181323 No FPE
France 238449.357 84223.6173 145187.714 8955.59748 82.4283816 96.2096665 3.7903335 No FPE
Gabon 64524.6664 29620.416 3484.87976 10978.9342 20440.4365 51.306419 48.693581 FPE
Gambia,
The
2943.8258 714.72669 1465.2731 763.826014 0 74.0532876 25.9467124 No FPE
Germany 234126.644 90242.9479 138348.11 5324.48535 211.101501 97.6356442 2.36435578 No FPE
Ghana 4657.4909 627.608371 1602.63252 2421.4356 5.81440868 47.8850295 52.1149705 FPE
Greece 156229.304 63586.5551 82865.7254 9606.06314 170.960289 93.7418761 6.25812391 No FPE
Grenada 33311.503 14129.8677 16450.7417 2730.89367 0 91.80195 8.19805 No FPE
Guatemala 23010.9688 4441.36378 7737.28066 10742.8551 89.469232 52.9253878 47.0746122 FPE
Guinea 3725.18917 699.588548 1013.3891 1614.92831 397.283205 45.983642 54.016358 FPE
Guinea-
Bissau
4863.28285 970.988143 1161.38224 2730.91246 0 43.8463164 56.1536836 FPE
Guyana 22516.5356 4082.6645 -2481.7164 19990.0736 925.513853 7.11009954 92.8899005 No FPE
Haiti 6312.27765 1494.97373 2722.97537 2094.32856 0 66.8213492 33.1786508 No FPE
Honduras 13733.4809 3295.50567 3196.41284 7217.04632 24.5160446 47.2707435 52.7292565 FPE
Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
Non-
Renewable
Resources
Country
1 %
Country
2 %
FPE
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Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
Non-
Renewable
Resources
Country
1 %
Country
2 %
FPE
Hong
Kong,
China
139963.716 60820.7932 79138.3886 4.5339939 0 99.9967606 0.00323941 No FPE
Hungary 68420.3282 30510.1052 29514.9874 7397.49645 997.739178 87.7299103 12.2700897 No FPE
Iceland 325989.858 111596.317 196911.5 17482.041 0 94.6372439 5.36275611 No FPE
India 5630.05943 1160.93363 1056.06309 3228.43412 184.628591 39.3778564 60.6221436 No FPE
Indonesia 10367.0224 3327.86809 3635.35288 2782.02599 621.775433 67.1670294 32.8329706 No FPE
Iran, Is-
lamic Rep.
21505.5138 7403.53508 2772.58116 3917.5157 7411.88189 47.318638 52.681362 FPE
Ireland 197648.327 60230.0708 120043.316 16667.5205 707.41939 91.2091642 8.79083583 No FPE
Israel 139806.437 42876.1655 91745.8079 5177.05387 7.40942226 96.2916848 3.70831516 No FPE
Italy 213997.782 82228.8016 123529.916 7894.68208 344.382513 96.1499299 3.85007009 No FPE
Jamaica 39339.2574 10784.6196 17737.3737 8013.65478 2803.60927 72.5026226 27.4973774 No FPE
Japan 251630.802 127581.333 120448.073 3580.60315 20.7932171 98.5687776 1.43122239 No FPE
Jordan 19711.3578 6897.08805 10028.5039 2780.40069 5.36512613 85.8672049 14.1327951 No FPE
Kenya 6910.52646 1442.84707 1405.37138 4062.27544 0.0325616 41.2156508 58.7843492 FPE
Korea,
Rep.
83025.3586 37026.3123 43162.2536 2835.15555 1.63719626 96.5832213 3.41677868 No FPE
Kuwait 260049.01 66130.641 54481.6939 1351.67542 138084.999 46.3806169 53.6193831 FPE
Lesotho 9248.48472 3575.15519 4581.43531 1091.89423 0 88.1938041 11.8061959 No FPE
Luxembourg 350540.159 147654.564 191801.33 11084.2646 0 96.8379473 3.16205272 No FPE
Macao,
China
88031.7597 52346.3682 35685.3914 0 0 100 0 No FPE
Madagascar 4362.3794 444.413258 681.514329 3236.42473 0.02707818 25.8099419 74.1900581 No FPE
Malawi 3704.6445 597.994148 434.252489 2672.39787 0 27.8635814 72.1364186 No FPE
Malaysia 33069.255 13569.1432 11980.446 3705.6312 3814.03466 77.260855 22.739145 No FPE
Mali 4342.26767 805.082954 940.894984 2596.28973 0 40.2088971 59.7911029 No FPE
Malta 98602.9819 38992.9519 57450.0698 2159.96025 0 97.8094372 2.19056281 No FPE
Mauritania 6807.38859 1756.62688 2609.74144 1996.26212 444.758148 64.1416053 35.8583947 No FPE
Mauritius 34205.4344 10396.3486 12497.0291 11312.0568 0 66.9290656 33.0709344 No FPE
Mexico 60375.8351 18303.2244 30440.4158 7279.10364 4353.09126 80.7336911 19.2663089 No FPE
Mongolia 14649.4863 4897.92664 -
2732.99703
11318.7201 1165.83655 14.7781947 85.2218053 No FPE
Morocco 14256.9601 4593.55439 7530.76913 2093.39985 39.2367708 85.0414352 14.9585648 No FPE
Mozambique 2964.78638 415.204609 557.523086 1991.44634 0.61233634 32.8093688 67.1906312 No FPE
Namibia 26786.7082 6026.29244 14331.3102 6093.33178 335.773719 75.9988967 24.0011033 No FPE
Nepal 3557.29321 594.015432 596.863971 2366.4138 0 33.4771225 66.5228775 No FPE
Netherlands 241186.206 90329.4605 137276.53 9291.49983 4288.71484 94.3694066 5.63059344 No FPE
New
Zealand
207023.029 66905.2947 85648.5389 51737.2892 2731.90583 73.6893063 26.3106937 No FPE
Nicaragua 10693.0762 2373.92494 2298.5797 6013.63931 6.93220359 43.6965432 56.3034568 FPE
Niger 3273.21053 468.271853 765.172384 2038.974 0.7922956 37.6830096 62.3169904 No FPE
Nigeria 11756.2561 1482.54327 1081.69917 5854.95145 3337.06221 21.8117266 78.1882734 No FPE
Norway 418777.356 163303.354 193990.587 18425.092 43058.3225 85.3183527 14.6816473 No FPE
Oman 91289.8995 19381.5961 32055.1966 6037.91955 33815.1872 56.3444511 43.6555489 FPE
Pakistan 7209.31217 1268.65261 2003.93055 3760.10187 176.627142 45.3938335 54.6061665 FPE
Panama 32892.0678 9746.20104 13847.3058 9298.56101 0 71.7300807 28.2699193 No FPE
Papua New
Guinea
12178.9649 2476.95442 1325.38796 5995.88546 2380.73709 31.2205709 68.7794291 No FPE
Peru 21523.1641 7373.23701 10123.5159 3493.49674 532.91449 81.2926612 18.7073388 No FPE
Philippines 10001.828 2942.94009 4267.65226 2710.80902 80.4266266 72.092745 27.907255 No FPE
Portugal 126836.068 48599.9907 72334.9185 5863.19061 37.9686792 95.3474123 4.65258767 No FPE
Rwanda 3452.01416 607.289086 897.710396 1946.3149 0.69977937 43.5977205 56.4022795 FPE
Saudi Ara-
bia
133727.272 39266.3721 11249.264 14218.4955 68993.1402 37.775119 62.224881 No FPE
Senegal 6842.57999 1126.76615 3199.4541 2513.81002 2.54972503 63.2249861 36.7750139 No FPE
Seychelles 74635.7105 25859.924 46460.6905 2315.09606 0 96.8981389 3.10186109 No FPE
Sierra
Leone
2649.07355 415.209447 753.684488 1401.14386 79.0357559 44.1246312 55.8753688 FPE
Singapore 117916.203 69795.6483 48117.3923 3.16244795 0 99.9973181 0.00268195 No FPE
South
Africa
44819.0738 13030.9524 17984.4549 12258.9586 1544.70794 69.2013571 30.7986429 No FPE
Spain 162086.782 61033.5908 93603.887 7402.56396 46.7401739 95.4041261 4.59587392 No FPE
Sri Lanka 9260.5951 2343.83942 3488.36586 3428.33732 0.05249468 62.9787311 37.0212689 No FPE
St. Kitts
and Nevis
71965.8693 33200.8086 25971.8166 12793.2441 0 82.2231786 17.7768214 No FPE
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St. Lucia 37779.0537 12283.667 25487.7898 7.59693046 0 99.9798912 0.02010884 No FPE
St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines
25810.4005 8302.54978 13987.6258 3520.225 0 86.3612152 13.6387848 No FPE
Sudan 11115.9833 970.129029 -
209.692365
10354.8818 0.66480757 6.84093024 93.1590698 No FPE
Swaziland 28370.4126 5943.31809 6165.52058 16230.0939 31.4800584 42.6812216 57.3187784 FPE
Sweden 247007.826 85513.5311 145414.3 15920.4505 159.544304 93.4900869 6.5099131 No FPE
Switzerland 346174.892 168525.814 161954.516 15694.3596 0.20279341 95.466291 4.53370905 No FPE
Syrian
Arab Re-
public
15090.3837 3734.69694 3784.74426 4705.05624 2865.88622 49.8293574 50.1706426 FPE
Thailand 18786.439 7663.15377 6029.32493 4954.60221 139.358092 72.8849076 27.1150924 No FPE
Togo 4443.19467 982.646679 1332.79242 2127.75556 0 52.1120337 47.8879663 FPE
Tonga 52373.53 5248.72986 -
3494.85141
50619.6516 0 3.34878791 96.6512121 No FPE
Trinidad
and To-
bago
58537.5888 20684.0571 20065.1987 4418.93909 13369.3938 69.6121188 30.3878812 No FPE
Tunisia 18661.5284 6551.55011 9090.91549 2459.05421 560.008593 83.821996 16.178004 No FPE
Uganda 3546.22928 294.566279 473.214412 2778.44859 0 21.6506218 78.3493782 No FPE
United
Arab Emi-
rates
269937.934 97413.8501 34823.3599 3889.91764 133810.806 48.9880055 51.0119945 FPE
United
Kingdom
231032.112 71219.1888 153034.304 5040.39539 1738.22426 97.0659405 2.93405951 No FPE
United
States
271800.786 81085.003 177725.536 11388.9343 1601.31331 95.2206733 4.77932672 No FPE
Uruguay 39749.5516 9208.47457 25336.2925 5204.78455 0 86.9060547 13.0939453 No FPE
Venezuela,
RB
59405.0518 16445.2908 11665.3136 8518.90326 22775.5441 47.3202254 52.6797746 FPE
Zambia 6984.03089 1370.19095 2130.69936 3017.3312 465.809376 50.1270737 49.8729263 FPE
Zimbabwe 3999.73209 881.29591 1479.30438 1338.24566 300.886148 59.0189601 40.9810399 FPE
Source: The World Bank wealth accounting database, Author’s calculations
Distribution of wealth instruments and FPE in 2000
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Albania 21 018 5 696 7762.1594 7 544 16 64.0327815 35.9672185 No FPE
Algeria 26 585 10 518 4732.53979 3 289 8 045 57.3657538 42.6342462 FPE
Argentina 37 537 10 949 20837.9308 4 633 1 117 84.6817556 15.3182444 No FPE
Armenia 11 629 3 617 4309.4752 3 664 38 68.1619476 31.8380524 No FPE
Australia 268 070 98 670 127207.337 32 272 9 921 84.2604816 15.7395184 No FPE
Austria 273 818 106 138 155798.589 11 563 319 95.6606549 4.33934507 No FPE
Azerbaijan 9 399 2 534 1326.87585 2 537 3 002 41.072345 58.927655 FPE
Bahrain 134 719 40 782 36524.9192 932 56 480 57.3836962 42.6163038 FPE
Bangladesh 3 505 786 1526.87118 1 124 68 65.9847709 34.0152291 No FPE
Belarus 24 577 8 712 5850.20083 9 597 418 59.2510171 40.7489829 FPE
Belgium 243 369 90 875 144909.579 7 583 0 96.8838908 3.11610925 No FPE
Belize 42 221 8 613 11289.48 22 318 0 47.1394796 52.8605204 FPE
Benin 7 351 944 1455.99278 4 938 13 32.6548586 67.3451414 No FPE
Bhutan 14 498 4 208 -
533.857893
10 797 27 25.3417157 74.6582843 No FPE
Bolivia 12 449 2 082 3207.97188 6 378 781 42.4927757 57.5072243 FPE
Botswana 28 389 13 487 9930.46714 4 718 253 82.4890739 17.5109261 No FPE
Brazil 43 917 11 406 19193.6683 12 501 817 69.6750306 30.3249694 No FPE
Brunei
Darus-
salam
204 824 81 387 -
9996.85048
10 249 123 185 34.8542592 65.1457408 No FPE
Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
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Country
1 %
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Bulgaria 29 761 9 812 10180.5238 9 400 368 67.1770392 32.8229608 No FPE
Burkina
Faso
5 207 873 1204.0503 3 130 0 39.884983 60.115017 No FPE
Burundi 2 048 211 145.095313 1 690 1 17.4054655 82.5945345 No FPE
Cameroon 10 763 2 407 3119.74576 4 559 679 51.3426453 48.6573547 FPE
Canada 260 007 81 311 138930.932 32 578 7 187 84.706197 15.293803 No FPE
Central
African
Republic
8 440 597 -
539.073133
8 382 0 0.68394075 99.3160592 No FPE
Chad 6 407 610 820.908253 4 977 0 22.3312494 77.6687506 No FPE
Chile 55 362 16 289 25841.558 8 547 4 684 76.1004107 23.8995893 No FPE
China 9 974 3 796 2414.82794 3 416 347 62.2743913 37.7256087 No FPE
Colombia 29 532 6 953 12277.1264 9 337 965 65.1148561 34.8851439 No FPE
Comoros 7 730 1 799 3663.20588 2 268 0 70.6649667 29.3350333 No FPE
Congo,
Dem. Rep.
2 648 248 -
71.8398422
2 400 71 6.67041566 93.3295843 No FPE
Congo,
Rep.
15 855 5 367 -
3821.14342
4 661 9 648 9.74897933 90.2510207 No FPE
Costa Rica 37 620 8 597 18416.5211 10 606 0 71.8079008 28.1920992 No FPE
Côte
d’Ivoire
10 079 1 684 3465.21681 4 739 190 51.0900384 48.9099616 FPE
Croatia 66 887 16 706 40937.4981 8 021 1 223 86.1803626 13.8196374 No FPE
Cyprus 172 584 56 763 103660.227 12 096 66 92.9533276 7.04667237 No FPE
Czech Re-
public
85 000 38 824 38736.1671 7 385 55 91.2471897 8.75281029 No FPE
Denmark 340 467 118 137 199126.541 18 802 4 402 93.1847274 6.81527255 No FPE
Dominica 43 666 13 772 16797.78 13 096 0 70.0086664 29.9913336 No FPE
Dominican
Republic
28 212 6 910 16931.7719 4 173 197 84.5097008 15.4902992 No FPE
Ecuador 36 675 6 643 3004.93566 22 752 4 275 26.3055861 73.6944139 No FPE
Egypt,
Arab Rep.
10 901 2 869 5200.78642 2 070 761 74.0294936 25.9705064 No FPE
El Salvador 23 681 4 733 14640.396 4 308 0 81.8087831 18.1912169 No FPE
Ethiopia 1 934 259 459.255587 1 216 0 37.1362262 62.8637738 No FPE
Fiji 37 072 8 200 6720.73836 21 777 374 40.2485634 59.7514366 No FPE
Finland 272 809 91 747 145619.121 35 391 52 87.0080064 12.9919936 No FPE
France 258 601 87 325 157877.951 13 333 65 94.8192153 5.18078467 No FPE
Gabon 71 254 26 004 -
243.961255
11 218 34 275 36.1529162 63.8470838 No FPE
Gambia,
The
3 175 680 1337.23166 1 158 0 63.5369326 36.4630674 No FPE
Georgia 11 891 4 878 3703.2383 3 253 56 72.1666934 27.8333066 No FPE
Germany 257 022 97 146 151174.935 8 438 263 96.6146916 3.38530836 No FPE
Ghana 6 327 903 1328.69219 4 092 4 35.26856 64.73144 No FPE
Greece 175 924 66 139 97208.7866 12 522 54 92.85127 7.14872998 No FPE
Grenada 41 755 18 547 20666.2517 2 541 0 93.9133259 6.08667407 No FPE
Guatemala 25 245 4 619 8340.26309 12 040 246 51.3359105 48.6640895 FPE
Guinea 4 446 808 1074.45746 2 319 246 42.33101 57.66899 FPE
Guinea-
Bissau
4 630 821 582.253507 3 227 0 30.30215 69.69785 No FPE
Guyana 24 895 4 165 -2677.2765 22 672 735 5.97434587 94.0256541 No FPE
Haiti 5 931 1 671 2572.90388 1 688 0 71.5441367 28.4558633 No FPE
Honduras 14 090 3 796 4098.06008 6 167 29 56.0302593 43.9697407 FPE
Hong
Kong,
China
145 758 72 386 73364.6512 8 0 99.9945126 0.00548736 No FPE
Hungary 76 618 31 645 35968.1392 8 246 759 88.2463182 11.7536818 No FPE
Iceland 381 358 120 904 244718.407 15 735 0 95.8738864 4.12611359 No FPE
India 6 291 1 446 1594.07223 3 065 187 48.3168826 51.6831174 FPE
Indonesia 12 762 3 645 2729.17191 5 438 951 49.9444644 50.0555356 FPE
Iran, Is-
lamic Rep.
22 637 8 544 -
181.469558
6 130 8 145 36.9396631 63.0603369 No FPE
Ireland 249 400 82 072 149510.067 17 247 572 92.8553914 7.14460856 No FPE
Israel 147 285 46 968 95836.6124 4 478 3 96.9577494 3.04225065 No FPE
Italy 234 369 85 889 138556.096 9 485 439 95.765751 4.23424905 No FPE
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Jamaica 39 031 12 391 18901.4325 6 568 1 171 80.172721 19.827279 No FPE
Japan 269 629 134 953 130042.811 4 611 21 98.2819294 1.71807063 No FPE
Jordan 20 871 6 593 12234.6996 1 992 52 90.210016 9.78998401 No FPE
Kenya 7 064 1 325 1808.54768 3 930 0 44.3602495 55.6397505 FPE
Korea,
Rep.
102 696 47 402 52315.4976 2 976 3 97.0992815 2.90071851 No FPE
Kuwait 260 927 55 262 36515.4409 1 488 167 662 35.1736303 64.8263697 No FPE
Kyrgyz Re-
public
5 942 1 307 1049.64619 3 546 40 39.6611516 60.3388484 No FPE
Latvia 46 869 19 769 16926.1903 10 173 0 78.2939254 21.7060746 No FPE
Lesotho 10 364 4 349 4921.60165 1 093 0 89.4550694 10.5449306 No FPE
Liberia 3 620 132 895.753223 2 512 80 28.3912981 71.6087019 No FPE
Lithuania 51 991 18 896 24322.864 8 608 163 83.1284907 16.8715093 No FPE
Luxembourg 396 229 177 730 206943.344 11 555 0 97.0837162 2.91628382 No FPE
Macao,
China
88 935 47 271 41664.381 0 0 100 0 No FPE
Macedonia,
FYR
26 636 7 337 13805.2224 5 494 0 79.375157 20.624843 No FPE
Madagascar 3 631 448 977.288307 2 206 0 39.2478102 60.7521898 No FPE
Malawi 3 423 499 708.463376 2 215 0 35.2899893 64.7100107 No FPE
Malaysia 36 185 16 538 10235.6522 4 243 5 168 73.9903605 26.0096395 No FPE
Maldives 12 599 6 013 5615.15286 970 0 92.2986362 7.70136381 No FPE
Mali 5 052 859 999.095334 3 194 0 36.7729197 63.2270803 No FPE
Malta 120 390 45 666 70025.3145 4 699 0 96.0968836 3.90311645 No FPE
Mauritania 7 683 1 292 2838.71494 2 753 799 53.7658416 46.2341584 FPE
Mauritius 42 060 12 814 14365.4915 14 880 0 64.6210372 35.3789628 No FPE
Mexico 64 803 20 175 35875.8147 5 192 3 560 86.4942733 13.5057267 No FPE
Moldova 10 350 4 163 719.511868 5 467 0 47.179859 52.820141 FPE
Mongolia 12 709 3 947 702.306796 7 265 795 36.583678 63.416322 No FPE
Morocco 15 070 4 929 7185.34881 2 865 90 80.3895855 19.6104145 No FPE
Mozambique 3 209 542 851.19383 1 816 0 43.4148724 56.5851276 FPE
Namibia 26 112 6 648 15010.3216 4 343 111 82.9436951 17.0563049 No FPE
Nepal 4 042 723 587.851216 2 732 0 32.424109 67.575891 No FPE
Netherlands 276 874 101 694 160768.556 9 399 5 012 94.7949224 5.20507757 No FPE
New
Zealand
230 014 70 193 91132.7734 65 523 3 164 70.1375915 29.8624085 No FPE
Nicaragua 11 461 2 810 3686.66187 4 963 2 56.680758 43.319242 FPE
Niger 3 287 359 790.719348 2 137 0 34.9666104 65.0333896 No FPE
Nigeria 9 439 1 441 740.160046 4 184 3 074 23.1033571 76.8966429 No FPE
Norway 465 420 176 753 198516.199 26 612 63 539 80.6300556 19.3699444 No FPE
Oman 96 321 20 609 29921.0162 5 931 39 860 52.4599482 47.5400518 FPE
Pakistan 7 471 1 366 1994.33074 3 897 214 44.9757942 55.0242058 FPE
Panama 37 427 11 745 18032.5448 7 650 0 79.5611323 20.4388677 No FPE
Papua New
Guinea
13 144 2 459 -
18.3762882
8 460 2 244 18.568041 81.431959 No FPE
Peru 23 447 7 456 10941.9371 4 523 526 78.4655388 21.5344612 No FPE
Philippines 10 939 2 868 4300.33438 3 733 38 65.5248286 34.4751714 No FPE
Poland 59 906 17 846 31305.9349 10 429 326 82.0477257 17.9522743 No FPE
Portugal 148 560 55 859 86050.211 6 648 3 95.5234265 4.47657353 No FPE
Romania 37 833 13 279 13776.8074 8 396 2 382 71.5132745 28.4867255 No FPE
Russian
Federation
48 730 18 614 1602.12768 14 372 14 143 41.485027 58.514973 FPE
Rwanda 3 294 436 751.787441 2 106 0 36.069913 63.930087 No FPE
Saudi Ara-
bia
125 056 35 243 15357.8782 12 609 61 846 40.4626837 59.5373163 No FPE
Senegal 7 265 1 219 3240.58875 2 796 10 61.3841652 38.6158348 No FPE
Seychelles 90 807 32 539 56014.0819 2 254 0 97.517835 2.48216499 No FPE
Sierra
Leone
2 304 271 717.664909 1 315 1 42.8992632 57.1007368 FPE
Singapore 135 676 83 714 51959.2012 2 0 99.9982862 0.00171383 No FPE
Slovak Re-
public
64 528 28 991 27739.9543 7 721 76 87.9167056 12.0832944 No FPE
South
Africa
40 682 11 330 20265.2818 8 063 1 024 77.6649002 22.3350998 No FPE
Spain 188 171 69 091 108500.995 10 560 18 94.3781061 5.62189393 No FPE
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Sri Lanka 9 887 2 863 4416.20961 2 608 0 73.6225031 26.3774969 No FPE
St. Kitts
and Nevis
86 800 40 557 30953.624 15 289 0 82.3855628 17.6144372 No FPE
St. Lucia 41 527 14 839 26675.1923 14 0 99.96725 0.03274999 No FPE
St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines
29 714 10 206 16209.426 3 299 0 88.8979017 11.1020983 No FPE
Sudan 9 591 1 098 1096.45574 7 240 156 22.882483 77.117517 No FPE
Swaziland 31 328 5 752 4425.80724 21 131 18 32.4891593 67.5108407 No FPE
Sweden 276 992 87 945 168369.522 20 586 92 92.5350273 7.46497268 No FPE
Switzerland 355 785 169 000 173276.228 13 509 0 96.2031586 3.79684143 No FPE
Syrian
Arab Re-
public
13 667 3 690 4039.97651 2 906 3 031 56.5604575 43.4395425 FPE
Tajikistan 3 907 1 441 437.088344 2 014 16 48.0569472 51.9430528 FPE
Thailand 22 653 8 716 4503.75419 9 107 326 58.3563748 41.6436252 FPE
Togo 4 133 784 1694.36769 1 643 11 59.9641787 40.0358213 No FPE
Tonga 48 827 5 384 945.560868 42 497 0 12.963153 87.036847 No FPE
Trinidad
and To-
bago
70 406 22 126 27214.2762 1 046 20 020 70.0802909 29.9197091 No FPE
Tunisia 21 985 7 437 10782.6264 3 198 567 82.8742795 17.1257205 No FPE
Turkey 47 399 12 341 26672.3696 8 251 135 82.3075967 17.6924033 No FPE
Uganda 5 050 436 100.204399 4 515 0 10.6094441 89.3905559 No FPE
Ukraine 16 947 7 877 1834.8578 6 250 985 57.3079284 42.6920716 FPE
United
Arab Emi-
rates
244 400 84 972 47965.6071 4 642 106 821 54.3934688 45.6065312 FPE
United
Kingdom
262 161 76 336 178429.039 4 722 2 673 97.1791225 2.82087747 No FPE
United
States
309 980 91 254 204327.423 12 811 1 587 95.3549561 4.6450439 No FPE
Uruguay 41 826 9 639 26416.101 5 771 0 86.20239 13.79761 No FPE
Uzbekistan 5 275 1 491 553.848252 1 543 1 688 38.756071 61.243929 No FPE
Vanuatu 25 312 5 691 5562.82609 14 059 0 44.4594314 55.5405686 FPE
Venezuela,
RB
54 250 16 058 11639.3164 6 183 20 370 51.0555056 48.9444944 FPE
Zambia 7 173 1 188 2158.78904 3 676 149 46.6579481 53.3420519 FPE
Zimbabwe 4 284 950 1336.08324 1 799 199 53.3613115 46.6386885 FPE
Source: The World Bank wealth accounting database, Author’s calculations
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Albania 26 961 6 975 14917.8907 5 067 1 81.2012448 18.7987552 No FPE
Algeria 27 672 11 046 811.402547 2 522 13 293 42.8490953 57.1509047 FPE
Angola 15 705 2 897 -
499.213919
2 255 11 052 15.2689776 84.7310224 No FPE
Argentina 39 219 10 815 18137.1088 7 540 2 727 73.8216634 26.1783366 No FPE
Armenia 15 372 4 185 8047.99539 3 023 116 79.581614 20.418386 No FPE
Australia 290 746 111 671 139097.115 19 650 20 328 86.2496896 13.7503104 No FPE
Austria 286 320 112 799 164456.47 8 498 566 96.83411 3.16588999 No FPE
Azerbaijan 16 288 4 535 70.0678805 2 489 9 194 28.2707109 71.7292891 No FPE
Bahrain 148 360 43 365 21333.9864 739 82 923 43.6090327 56.3909673 FPE
Bangladesh 4 143 1 007 1741.76451 1 204 190 66.347817 33.652183 No FPE
Belarus 27 455 9 812 11671.0654 5 199 773 78.2488612 21.7511388 No FPE
Belgium 264 859 98 822 161105.241 4 932 0 98.1376334 1.86236655 No FPE
Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
Non-
Renewable
Resources
Country
1 %
Country
2 %
FPE
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Belize 45 914 9 258 12929.851 23 726 0 48.3253751 51.6746249 FPE
Benin 5 852 1 051 2175.20202 2 625 0 55.1397022 44.8602978 FPE
Bhutan 18 953 6 319 -
1370.72444
14 005 0 26.107501 73.892499 No FPE
Bolivia 12 328 2 000 2022.44253 6 114 2 191 32.6278585 67.3721415 No FPE
Botswana 36 469 20 988 10060.8247 4 439 982 85.1370784 14.8629216 No FPE
Brazil 45 953 11 330 19644.8129 12 657 2 321 67.4048681 32.5951319 No FPE
Brunei
Darus-
salam
204 208 73 831 -
52639.9229
10 059 172 958 10.3769444 89.6230556 No FPE
Bulgaria 33 641 10 079 18002.1974 5 004 556 83.4728443 16.5271557 No FPE
Burkina
Faso
4 578 879 2359.39205 1 339 0 70.7446679 29.2553321 No FPE
Burundi 2 673 166 -
189.697395
2 695 2 -
0.90101281
100.901013 No FPE
Cameroon 11 180 2 343 3639.57289 4 288 910 53.5090651 46.4909349 FPE
Canada 276 113 89 811 149377.69 24 280 12 644 86.6271915 13.3728085 No FPE
Cape Verde 19 752 5 797 13036.383 919 0 95.3493573 4.65064273 No FPE
Central
African
Republic
6 580 515 203.660814 5 861 0 10.9210372 89.0789628 No FPE
Chad 5 780 1 308 -164.46648 2 406 2 231 19.7777375 80.2222625 No FPE
Chile 61 815 19 268 23677.1046 9 307 9 563 69.4736052 30.5263948 No FPE
China 13 241 6 017 3211.42923 3 209 804 69.6921359 30.3078641 No FPE
Colombia 29 395 7 127 14654.317 6 126 1 488 74.0978279 25.9021721 No FPE
Comoros 7 284 1 301 4217.08212 1 765 0 75.7620985 24.2379015 No FPE
Congo,
Dem. Rep.
2 043 200 243.9898 1 522 77 21.7400719 78.2599281 No FPE
Congo,
Rep.
15 261 4 639 -
4056.90486
2 863 11 816 3.81127981 96.1887202 No FPE
Costa Rica 41 746 10 703 21605.847 9 437 0 77.3947746 22.6052254 No FPE
Côte
d’Ivoire
8 915 1 473 3455.42615 3 523 464 55.278993 44.721007 FPE
Croatia 81 605 25 231 50815.4215 3 637 1 923 93.1877979 6.81220209 No FPE
Czech Re-
public
97 561 44 254 48712.3098 4 264 332 95.2898143 4.71018573 No FPE
Denmark 363 283 130 827 212840.617 11 080 8 536 94.6003591 5.3996409 No FPE
Dominica 44 819 14 414 20011.7966 10 393 0 76.8113898 23.1886102 No FPE
Dominican
Republic
32 890 8 041 20099.1527 4 332 418 85.5584227 14.4415773 No FPE
Ecuador 35 607 7 601 5551.96046 16 012 6 442 36.9399326 63.0600674 No FPE
Egypt,
Arab Rep.
12 520 2 860 4989.63358 2 681 1 989 62.7000059 37.2999941 No FPE
El Salvador 25 328 5 201 16185.9962 3 941 0 84.4393212 15.5606788 No FPE
Ethiopia 2 199 324 752.04727 1 120 2 48.9393169 51.0606831 FPE
Fiji 29 079 8 693 8769.68814 11 232 384 60.0535388 39.9464612 No FPE
Finland 281 427 96 566 165640.057 19 088 132 93.170335 6.82966498 No FPE
France 275 625 93 619 173396.881 8 538 71 96.8764731 3.1235269 No FPE
Gabon 62 966 23 418 -
2516.75015
7 455 34 610 33.1943701 66.8056299 No FPE
Gambia,
The
3 571 758 1582.66505 1 230 0 65.5499756 34.4500244 No FPE
Georgia 15 329 5 128 6867.34512 3 247 87 78.2526078 21.7473922 No FPE
Germany 261 314 98 285 157313.177 5 181 535 97.8126273 2.18737265 No FPE
Ghana 5 996 1 237 2101.6984 2 653 5 55.6763257 44.3236743 FPE
Greece 199 793 74 237 117575.738 7 575 405 96.005998 3.99400204 No FPE
Grenada 46 593 23 375 21135.1932 2 083 0 95.5285723 4.4714277 No FPE
Guatemala 29 906 5 370 7844.99409 16 361 330 44.1874573 55.8125427 FPE
Guinea 4 125 777 1408.03936 1 713 226 52.9840556 47.0159444 FPE
Guinea-
Bissau
3 279 604 596.997153 2 078 0 36.6255717 63.3744283 No FPE
Guyana 24 271 4 106 -
1717.17699
21 233 649 9.84400086 90.1559991 No FPE
Haiti 5 776 1 761 2756.50486 1 258 0 78.2151659 21.7848341 No FPE
Honduras 19 689 4 140 3537.00194 11 964 48 38.9908477 61.0091523 No FPE
Country Total Produced
Capital
Human
Capital
Renewable
Resources
Non-
Renewable
Resources
Country
1 %
Country
2 %
FPE
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Hong
Kong,
China
156 880 77 653 79218.2568 10 0 99.9939274 0.00607263 No FPE
Hungary 92 003 35 162 50866.5697 5 172 803 93.5062861 6.49371385 No FPE
Iceland 437 517 137 470 287684.267 12 363 0 97.1743333 2.8256667 No FPE
India 6 831 1 980 2146.061 2 351 353 60.4134331 39.5865669 No FPE
Indonesia 12 997 3 968 4103.32717 3 452 1 473 62.1014156 37.8985844 No FPE
Iran, Is-
lamic Rep.
29 911 10 516 1461.37521 3 946 13 987 40.0445353 59.9554647 No FPE
Ireland 298 516 112 374 174952.931 10 899 290 96.2516685 3.74833153 No FPE
Israel 152 475 47 232 100400.964 4 589 253 96.8240334 3.17596663 No FPE
Italy 243 323 89 860 145961.223 6 977 525 96.916778 3.08322198 No FPE
Jamaica 42 424 14 450 22601.272 4 393 979 87.3375847 12.6624153 No FPE
Japan 281 554 135 866 143593.182 2 048 47 99.2561062 0.74389379 No FPE
Jordan 25 787 6 550 16546.7077 2 617 74 89.5679317 10.4320683 No FPE
Kenya 6 460 1 298 2422.58928 2 738 2 57.5951926 42.4048074 FPE
Korea,
Rep.
129 734 58 636 68455.6381 2 616 26 97.9637588 2.0362412 No FPE
Kuwait 268 568 58 115 -
2657.79243
1 099 212 013 20.6490367 79.3509633 No FPE
Kyrgyz Re-
public
6 612 1 210 2410.47161 2 923 69 54.7538854 45.2461146 FPE
Lao PDR 6 708 1 208 1055.20357 4 444 0 33.7444999 66.2555001 No FPE
Latvia 64 683 23 260 34077.0333 7 346 0 88.642543 11.357457 No FPE
Lesotho 11 039 4 705 6008.76008 325 0 97.0564549 2.94354509 No FPE
Liberia 4 015 217 597.415764 3 201 0 20.279078 79.720922 No FPE
Lithuania 66 435 21 265 39155.0728 5 667 347 90.9471385 9.05286147 No FPE
Luxembourg 435 000 213 425 215482.798 6 092 0 98.5995556 1.4004444 No FPE
Macao,
China
101 565 51 849 49715.5337 0 0 100 0 No FPE
Macedonia,
FYR
28 725 8 018 17065.3446 3 642 0 87.3204873 12.6795127 No FPE
Madagascar 2 895 551 426.458841 1 918 0 33.7540564 66.2459436 No FPE
Malawi 2 424 528 726.529979 1 170 0 51.7397288 48.2602712 FPE
Malaysia 42 513 16 824 12939.3971 2 648 10 102 70.0096121 29.9903879 No FPE
Maldives 15 198 7 402 6806.6572 990 0 93.4885683 6.51143166 No FPE
Mali 4 431 990 1534.05601 1 907 0 56.9718378 43.0281622 FPE
Malta 123 229 45 063 73882.647 4 283 0 96.5239476 3.4760524 No FPE
Mauritania 8 065 1 701 2349.06573 2 683 1 332 50.2159249 49.7840751 FPE
Mauritius 45 659 14 841 21439.7898 9 379 0 79.4596108 20.5403892 No FPE
Mexico 66 304 21 320 38342.8636 3 116 3 525 89.9833441 10.0166559 No FPE
Moldova 11 513 3 794 3570.68372 4 145 3 63.9712869 36.0287131 No FPE
Mongolia 10 871 3 675 1718.94994 4 291 1 186 49.6184579 50.3815421 FPE
Morocco 16 938 5 984 8505.35692 2 377 71 85.5464422 14.4535578 No FPE
Mozambique 3 334 708 1378.76393 1 130 118 62.5743135 37.4256865 No FPE
Namibia 29 757 8 280 16285.7833 4 960 231 82.555137 17.444863 No FPE
Nepal 4 128 828 837.028827 2 463 0 40.3354633 59.6645367 No FPE
Netherlands 292 905 109 658 170053.569 6 133 7 061 95.4956506 4.50434945 No FPE
New
Zealand
239 465 76 281 110204.598 49 304 3 675 77.8761134 22.1238866 No FPE
Nicaragua 12 355 3 127 4497.91184 4 709 21 61.7170079 38.2829921 No FPE
Niger 2 846 386 1029.16333 1 430 0 49.7322432 50.2677568 FPE
Nigeria 8 925 1 698 1185.13191 2 101 3 940 32.3052032 67.6947968 No FPE
Norway 484 804 183 078 191563.64 10 456 99 706 77.2770205 22.7229795 No FPE
Oman 116 337 22 987 16215.5829 5 503 71 631 33.6975609 66.3024391 No FPE
Pakistan 7 540 1 449 2735.92642 2 888 467 55.5069573 44.4930427 FPE
Panama 41 186 11 672 21569.9154 7 944 0 80.7124242 19.2875758 No FPE
Papua New
Guinea
10 545 2 547 -
570.212057
5 950 2 618 18.7425438 81.2574562 No FPE
Peru 24 919 7 160 11941.0026 4 770 1 047 76.6531638 23.3468362 No FPE
Philippines 11 281 2 745 5067.38466 3 329 139 69.2557285 30.7442715 No FPE
Poland 68 997 20 526 39576.4659 7 769 1 126 87.1089676 12.8910324 No FPE
Portugal 155 600 59 939 91457.0814 4 167 37 97.298184 2.70181603 No FPE
Romania 44 575 14 292 21225.1078 6 705 2 353 79.6797789 20.3202211 No FPE
Russian
Federation
57 800 17 712 8771.11778 7 079 24 238 45.8184628 54.1815372 FPE
Country Total Produced
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Rwanda 4 156 488 721.096338 2 947 0 29.0911631 70.9088369 No FPE
Saudi Ara-
bia
131 779 33 000 1766.96752 10 392 86 620 26.3827497 73.6172503 No FPE
Senegal 7 037 1 520 3896.82337 1 615 6 76.9708064 23.0291936 No FPE
Seychelles 86 363 33 767 50742.0241 1 854 0 97.8528348 2.14716523 No FPE
Sierra
Leone
2 592 251 978.046334 1 363 0 47.4256772 52.5743228 FPE
Singapore 140 752 81 405 59345.7804 2 0 99.9985896 0.00141039 No FPE
Slovak Re-
public
76 628 31 954 39694.6703 4 877 102 93.5020809 6.49791908 No FPE
South
Africa
42 067 11 087 25256.3735 3 129 2 595 86.3944928 13.6055072 No FPE
Spain 208 724 82 194 119058.516 7 413 58 96.4206089 3.57939108 No FPE
Sri Lanka 11 447 3 371 6001.32728 2 074 0 81.8764069 18.1235931 No FPE
St. Kitts
and Nevis
87 771 48 800 34576.2427 4 395 0 94.9931867 5.00681329 No FPE
St. Lucia 46 143 16 781 29337.3329 25 0 99.9464867 0.05351332 No FPE
St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines
33 303 12 183 18054.6276 3 065 0 90.7958238 9.20417624 No FPE
Sudan 10 074 1 495 1667.48293 5 357 1 554 31.3907146 68.6092854 No FPE
Swaziland 24 768 5 885 8302.75574 10 580 0 57.2824847 42.7175153 FPE
Sweden 298 285 92 488 190123.979 15 307 366 94.7456227 5.25437731 No FPE
Switzerland 357 352 165 561 182380.533 9 411 0 97.3664904 2.63350962 No FPE
Syrian
Arab Re-
public
14 544 3 709 2925.1947 3 252 4 657 45.6179477 54.3820523 FPE
Tajikistan 4 313 1 093 1458.75963 1 735 27 59.1573455 40.8426545 FPE
Thailand 25 134 9 711 7613.84944 7 172 638 68.9273169 31.0726831 No FPE
Togo 3 723 794 1818.13276 1 106 5 70.1769737 29.8230263 No FPE
Tonga 45 089 5 440 6733.52262 32 916 0 26.9990632 73.0009368 No FPE
Trinidad
and To-
bago
88 373 24 826 18268.5252 792 44 486 48.7641592 51.2358408 FPE
Tunisia 26 321 8 420 13488.1499 3 361 1 051 83.234976 16.765024 No FPE
Turkey 54 528 13 895 35277.4874 5 148 208 90.1784816 9.82151836 No FPE
Uganda 4 737 585 779.401249 3 372 0 28.8126491 71.1873509 No FPE
Ukraine 19 723 7 250 5574.42513 4 929 1 970 65.0217938 34.9782062 No FPE
United
Arab Emi-
rates
233 074 72 873 39211.9265 2 878 118 111 48.0898832 51.9101168 FPE
United
Kingdom
299 488 84 861 208364.746 3 178 3 085 97.908853 2.09114702 No FPE
United
States
339 705 100 075 225808.531 10 343 3 478 95.9313002 4.06869978 No FPE
Uruguay 43 059 9 743 25028.0116 8 288 0 80.7520372 19.2479628 No FPE
Uzbekistan 7 796 1 543 -
1399.28527
2 287 5 365 1.8397535 98.1602465 No FPE
Vanuatu 18 530 5 267 6312.73617 6 951 0 62.490136 37.509864 No FPE
Venezuela,
RB
54 399 15 863 7968.19032 6 477 24 090 43.8085244 56.1914756 FPE
Vietnam 6 992 1 851 1510.46962 2 747 884 48.0753444 51.9246556 FPE
Zambia 6 130 1 482 2505.79338 1 768 374 65.0611888 34.9388112 No FPE
Zimbabwe 3 705 827 913.375052 1 890 75 46.9636911 53.0363089 FPE
Source: The World Bank wealth accounting database, Author’s calculations
Appendix E
Diagrams of the simulations in chapter
3
418 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
1
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
In
te
gr
at
ed
Eq
ui
lib
ri
um
(I
E)
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n
419
Sc
en
ar
io
2
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
In
te
gr
at
ed
Eq
ui
lib
ri
um
(I
E)
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
420 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
3
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
In
te
gr
at
ed
Eq
ui
lib
ri
um
(I
E)
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
421
Sc
en
ar
io
4
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
In
te
gr
at
ed
Eq
ui
lib
ri
um
(I
E)
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
422 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
1
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
423
Sc
en
ar
io
2
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
424 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
3
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
425
Sc
en
ar
io
4
un
de
rS
C
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
St
ru
ct
ur
al
C
ha
ng
e
(S
C
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
426 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
1
un
de
rC
A
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
A
dv
an
ta
ge
(C
A
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
427
Sc
en
ar
io
2
un
de
rC
A
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
A
dv
an
ta
ge
(C
A
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
428 Appendix to chapter 3
Sc
en
ar
io
3
un
de
rC
A
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
A
dv
an
ta
ge
(C
A
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
429
Sc
en
ar
io
4
un
de
rC
A
(t
em
po
ra
ry
sh
oc
k)
(a
)F
ac
to
rE
nd
ow
m
en
ts
(b
)T
ot
al
W
ea
lth
(c
)C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Le
ve
ls
(d
)F
ac
to
rP
ric
es
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
un
de
r
th
e
C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e
A
dv
an
ta
ge
(C
A
)
hy
po
th
es
is
,
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
th
e
C
om
pl
et
e
Sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
r’
s
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns

A
pp
en
di
x
F
Tr
ad
e
se
tt
in
gs
an
d
sc
en
ar
io
s
in
ch
ap
te
r
3
Va
ria
tio
ns
un
de
ra
ut
ar
ky
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
CA
(b
as
e)
an
d
SC
ca
se
s(
in
%
)
siz
e
k=
1,
01
k=
1,
05
k=
1,
10
k=
1,
15
k=
1,
20
k=
1,
25
k=
1,
29
k=
1,
31
k=
1,
35
k=
1,
40
k=
1,
45
k=
1,
5
k=
1,
55
k=
1,
60
k=
1,
65
k=
1,
7
k=
1,
75
c
-2
2,
89
-2
1,
84
-2
0,
47
-1
9,
04
-1
7,
52
-1
5,
92
-1
4,
55
-1
3,
84
-1
2,
34
-1
0,
32
-8
,0
91
-5
,6
14
-2
,8
17
0,
39
8
4,
17
42
8,
74
13
14
,4
64
W
-3
1,
09
-3
0,
15
-2
8,
89
-2
7,
55
-2
6,
12
-2
4,
58
-2
3,
27
-2
2,
58
-2
1,
14
-1
9,
2
-1
7,
07
-1
4,
73
-1
2,
13
-9
,2
13
-5
,9
14
-2
,1
18
2,
30
9
Y
-1
5,
02
-1
3,
87
-1
2,
37
-1
0,
81
-9
,1
71
-7
,4
39
-5
,9
75
-5
,2
12
-3
,6
2
-1
,4
82
0,
85
13
3,
42
61
6,
30
45
9,
57
27
13
,3
57
17
,8
53
23
,3
6
kp
29
,2
51
32
,2
44
36
,1
04
40
,1
3
44
,3
37
48
,7
69
52
,5
05
54
,4
45
58
,4
9
63
,9
69
,7
82
76
,2
5
83
,4
52
91
,5
99
10
1
11
2,
11
12
5,
67
kl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ke
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
kr
-7
2
-7
1,
49
-7
0,
77
-6
9,
95
-6
9,
01
-6
7,
95
-6
6,
99
-6
6,
47
-6
5,
34
-6
3,
73
-6
1,
84
-5
9,
62
-5
6,
95
-5
3,
71
-4
9,
67
-4
4,
48
-3
7,
55
c1
5E
-0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
c2
-3
7,
18
-3
5,
49
-3
3,
29
-3
0,
98
-2
8,
54
-2
5,
94
-2
3,
73
-2
2,
58
-2
0,
15
-1
6,
87
-1
3,
25
-9
,2
14
-4
,6
33
0,
65
63
6,
90
76
14
,5
29
24
,1
84
W
1
-8
E-
06
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
W
2
-4
7,
36
-4
5,
92
-4
4,
02
-4
2,
01
-3
9,
85
-3
7,
56
-3
5,
59
-3
4,
57
-3
2,
41
-2
9,
5
-2
6,
3
-2
2,
77
-1
8,
82
-1
4,
38
-9
,2
84
-3
,3
52
3,
68
91
Y
1
-6
E-
05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Y
2
-2
6,
05
-2
4,
05
-2
1,
46
-1
8,
76
-1
5,
91
-1
2,
9
-1
0,
36
-9
,0
41
-6
,2
79
-2
,5
71
1,
47
66
5,
94
27
10
,9
36
16
,6
04
23
,1
69
30
,9
67
40
,5
21
kp
1
-2
E-
05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
w
1
0,
00
01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
p1
-2
E-
05
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
e1
4E
-0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
r1
4E
-0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
kr
2
-7
0,
69
-6
9,
9
-6
8,
87
-6
7,
8
-6
6,
66
-6
5,
48
-6
4,
47
-6
3,
95
-6
2,
85
-6
1,
38
-5
9,
78
-5
8,
01
-5
6,
03
-5
3,
78
-5
1,
18
-4
8,
08
-4
4,
3
w
2
-2
6,
05
-2
4,
05
-2
1,
46
-1
8,
76
-1
5,
91
-1
2,
91
-1
0,
36
-9
,0
42
-6
,2
79
-2
,5
71
1,
47
66
5,
94
27
10
,9
36
16
,6
05
23
,1
69
30
,9
63
40
,5
19
p2
-5
9,
41
-6
0,
48
-6
1,
78
-6
3,
06
-6
4,
3
-6
5,
54
-6
6,
51
-6
7
-6
7,
98
-6
9,
19
-7
0,
42
-7
1,
67
-7
2,
94
-7
4,
26
-7
5,
63
-7
7,
08
-7
8,
64
e2
-2
6,
05
-2
4,
05
-2
1,
46
-1
8,
76
-1
5,
91
-1
2,
91
-1
0,
36
-9
,0
42
-6
,2
79
-2
,5
71
1,
47
66
5,
94
27
10
,9
36
16
,6
05
23
,1
69
30
,9
63
40
,5
19
r2
35
0,
56
33
8,
69
32
4,
22
31
0,
1
29
6,
23
28
2,
56
27
1,
71
26
6,
3
25
5,
5
24
1,
97
22
8,
33
21
4,
49
20
0,
33
18
5,
73
17
0,
5
15
4,
41
13
7,
11
432 Appendix to chapter 3
Va
ria
tio
ns
un
de
rf
re
e
tr
ad
e
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
CA
(b
as
e)
an
d
SC
ca
se
s(
in
%
)
siz
e
k=
1,
01
k=
1,
05
k=
1,
10
k=
1,
15
k=
1,
20
k=
1,
25
k=
1,
29
k=
1,
31
k=
1,
35
k=
1,
40
k=
1,
45
k=
1,
5
k=
1,
55
k=
1,
60
k=
1,
65
k=
1,
7
k=
1,
75
c
-3
7,
12
-3
6
-3
4,
28
-3
2,
2
-3
0,
05
-2
7,
74
-2
5,
85
-2
4,
89
-2
2,
92
-2
0,
36
-1
7,
69
-1
4,
86
-1
1,
84
-8
,5
93
-5
,0
53
-1
,1
36
3,
28
66
W
-4
3,
2
-4
1,
66
-3
9,
6
-3
7,
37
-3
5,
24
-3
2,
87
-3
0,
92
-2
9,
92
-2
7,
88
-2
5,
24
-2
2,
5
-1
9,
64
-1
6,
66
-1
3,
53
-1
0,
26
-6
,8
-3
,1
42
Y
-2
6,
89
-2
5,
79
-2
4,
14
-2
2,
18
-2
0,
25
-1
8,
14
-1
6,
42
-1
5,
55
-1
3,
78
-1
1,
5
-9
,1
28
-6
,6
46
-4
,0
26
-1
,2
36
1,
76
98
5,
05
11
8,
69
55
kp
-1
2,
3
-9
,7
66
-6
,4
61
-3
,0
02
-0
,1
11
3,
17
18
5,
76
37
7,
05
13
9,
61
55
12
,8
12
16
,0
15
19
,2
47
22
,5
31
25
,8
97
29
,3
8
33
,0
29
36
,9
13
kl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ke
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
kr
-1
61
,2
-1
57
,6
-1
52
,7
-1
47
,3
-1
41
,4
-1
35
-1
29
,6
-1
26
,7
-1
20
,8
-1
12
,9
-1
04
,5
-9
5,
45
-8
5,
82
-7
5,
52
-6
4,
5
-5
2,
67
-3
9,
94
c1
-6
,7
25
-5
,9
03
-4
,6
35
-3
,1
-4
,4
85
-4
,4
19
-4
,3
62
-4
,3
33
-4
,2
7
-4
,1
86
-4
,0
92
-3
,9
86
-3
,8
66
-3
,7
26
-3
,5
6
-3
,3
58
-3
,1
01
c2
-6
7,
51
-6
6,
09
-6
3,
92
-6
1,
3
-5
4,
19
-4
9,
09
-4
5,
03
-4
3
-3
8,
92
-3
3,
78
-2
8,
55
-2
3,
22
-1
7,
73
-1
2,
04
-6
,0
6
0,
28
4
7,
12
56
W
1
-6
,6
78
-4
,7
86
-2
,3
82
0,
06
47
-1
,9
59
-1
,8
61
-1
,7
76
-1
,7
31
-1
,6
37
-1
,5
09
-1
,3
7
-1
,2
18
-1
,0
51
-0
,8
67
-0
,6
65
-0
,4
4
-0
,1
91
W
2
-7
9,
83
-7
9,
08
-7
7,
91
-7
6,
47
-6
7,
55
-6
1,
99
-5
7,
55
-5
5,
34
-5
0,
91
-4
5,
35
-3
9,
78
-3
4,
18
-2
8,
52
-2
2,
81
-1
7
-1
1,
1
-5
,0
52
Y
1
-8
,6
63
-7
,1
02
-4
,9
42
-2
,5
53
-4
,6
36
-4
,5
43
-4
,4
64
-4
,4
23
-4
,3
36
-4
,2
18
-4
,0
87
-3
,9
41
-3
,7
75
-3
,5
83
-3
,3
57
-3
,0
84
-2
,7
42
Y
2
-4
5,
16
-4
4,
73
-4
3,
86
-4
2,
63
-3
5,
36
-3
0,
86
-2
7,
31
-2
5,
54
-2
2,
02
-1
7,
62
-1
3,
2
-8
,7
43
-4
,2
12
0,
42
67
5,
21
74
10
,2
15
15
,4
92
kp
1
-2
5,
9
-1
7,
6
-8
,2
3
0,
21
08
-6
,7
04
-6
,3
73
-6
,0
94
-5
,9
5
-5
,6
5
-5
,2
49
-4
,8
15
-4
,3
39
-3
,8
13
-3
,2
21
-2
,5
44
-1
,7
52
-0
,8
w
1
-2
6,
58
-2
0,
65
-1
3,
6
-6
,8
96
-6
,7
04
-6
,3
73
-6
,0
94
-5
,9
5
-5
,6
5
-5
,2
49
-4
,8
15
-4
,3
39
-3
,8
13
-3
,2
21
-2
,5
44
-1
,7
52
-0
,8
p1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
e1
9,
31
17
6,
33
58
2,
45
96
-1
,6
19
-1
,8
27
-2
,0
46
-2
,2
3
-2
,3
26
-2
,5
24
-2
,7
87
-3
,0
71
-3
,3
81
-3
,7
21
-4
,1
01
-4
,5
32
-5
,0
28
-5
,6
15
r1
9,
31
17
6,
33
58
2,
45
96
-1
,6
19
-1
,8
27
-2
,0
46
-2
,2
3
-2
,3
26
-2
,5
24
-2
,7
87
-3
,0
71
-3
,3
81
-3
,7
21
-4
,1
01
-4
,5
32
-5
,0
28
-5
,6
15
kr
2
-3
20
,4
-3
45
,1
-3
80
,2
-4
21
,2
-3
60
,2
-3
45
,7
-3
34
,3
-3
28
,7
-3
17
,7
-3
04
-2
90
,5
-2
77
,1
-2
63
,8
-2
50
,6
-2
37
,5
-2
24
,4
-2
11
,6
w
2
-2
7,
17
-3
1,
24
-3
6,
53
-4
2,
08
-3
8,
33
-3
3,
42
-2
9,
54
-2
7,
61
-2
3,
76
-1
8,
96
-1
4,
13
-9
,2
43
-4
,2
59
0,
87
28
6,
21
94
11
,8
71
17
,9
6
p2
-3
0,
12
-3
4,
29
-3
9,
7
-4
5,
37
-5
1,
35
-5
7,
68
-6
3,
05
-6
5,
84
-7
1,
69
-7
9,
53
-8
8,
08
-9
7,
5
-1
08
-1
19
,8
-1
33
,4
-1
49
,3
-1
68
,4
e2
-6
2,
41
-5
5,
04
-4
6,
29
-3
7,
97
-3
3,
19
-2
9
-2
5,
68
-2
4,
04
-2
0,
75
-1
6,
64
-1
2,
53
-8
,3
82
-4
,1
79
0,
10
6
4,
50
2
9,
04
36
13
,7
69
r2
61
,2
63
61
,2
63
61
,2
63
61
,2
63
60
,3
23
59
,1
85
58
,2
32
57
,7
39
56
,7
17
55
,3
61
53
,9
52
,3
12
50
,5
64
48
,6
15
46
,4
05
43
,8
44
40
,7
94
Fo
rv
al
ue
sk
<
1.
20
th
e
co
m
pl
et
e
sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
tr
ad
e
m
od
el
re
ve
rt
st
o
in
te
gr
at
ed
eq
ui
lib
riu
m
(IE
).
433
Va
ria
tio
ns
in
CA
be
tw
ee
n
au
ta
rk
y
(b
as
e)
an
d
CS
ca
se
s(
in
%
)
siz
e
k=
1,
01
k=
1,
05
k=
1,
10
k=
1,
15
k=
1,
20
k=
1,
25
k=
1,
29
k=
1,
31
k=
1,
35
k=
1,
40
k=
1,
45
k=
1,
5
k=
1,
55
k=
1,
60
k=
1,
65
k=
1,
7
k=
1,
75
c
-4
0,
94
-4
0,
56
-4
0,
08
-3
9,
6
-3
9,
1
-3
8,
6
-3
8,
18
-3
7,
97
-3
7,
53
-3
6,
96
-3
6,
35
-3
5,
7
-3
4,
99
-3
4,
2
-3
3,
31
-3
2,
26
-3
0,
98
W
-1
7,
26
-1
6,
98
-1
6,
62
-1
6,
23
-1
5,
8
-1
5,
34
-1
4,
95
-1
4,
74
-1
4,
3
-1
3,
7
-1
3,
04
-1
2,
31
-1
1,
48
-1
0,
54
-9
,4
54
-8
,1
76
-6
,6
46
Y
-3
8,
63
-3
8,
27
-3
7,
81
-3
7,
35
-3
6,
87
-3
6,
38
-3
5,
97
-3
5,
76
-3
5,
32
-3
4,
75
-3
4,
14
-3
3,
48
-3
2,
76
-3
1,
96
-3
1,
04
-2
9,
97
-2
8,
67
kp
-1
7,
39
-1
7,
29
-1
7,
16
-1
7,
01
-1
6,
86
-1
6,
69
-1
6,
54
-1
6,
47
-1
6,
3
-1
6,
07
-1
5,
82
-1
5,
54
-1
5,
22
-1
4,
86
-1
4,
45
-1
3,
96
-1
3,
39
kl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ke
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
kr
-2
6,
87
-2
6,
55
-2
6,
13
-2
5,
68
-2
5,
19
-2
4,
67
-2
4,
22
-2
3,
98
-2
3,
47
-2
2,
77
-2
1,
98
-2
1,
07
-2
0,
01
-1
8,
75
-1
7,
21
-1
5,
23
-1
2,
61
c1
-4
0,
2
-3
9,
83
-3
9,
36
-3
8,
89
-3
8,
41
-3
7,
92
-3
7,
52
-3
7,
32
-3
6,
9
-3
6,
36
-3
5,
79
-3
5,
19
-3
4,
55
-3
3,
85
-3
3,
09
-3
2,
25
-3
1,
28
c2
-4
1,
41
-4
1,
02
-4
0,
53
-4
0,
04
-3
9,
53
-3
9,
02
-3
8,
6
-3
8,
38
-3
7,
93
-3
7,
34
-3
6,
71
-3
6,
02
-3
5,
27
-3
4,
42
-3
3,
45
-3
2,
27
-3
0,
79
W
1
-1
0,
11
-9
,9
57
-9
,7
48
-9
,5
19
-9
,2
77
-9
,0
15
-8
,7
91
-8
,6
73
-8
,4
27
-8
,0
97
-7
,7
4
-7
,3
53
-6
,9
31
-6
,4
69
-5
,9
62
-5
,4
01
-4
,7
77
W
2
-2
0,
99
-2
0,
66
-2
0,
22
-1
9,
75
-1
9,
23
-1
8,
69
-1
8,
21
-1
7,
96
-1
7,
43
-1
6,
71
-1
5,
91
-1
5,
01
-1
3,
99
-1
2,
82
-1
1,
44
-9
,7
92
-7
,7
63
Y
1
-3
7,
86
-3
7,
52
-3
7,
08
-3
6,
64
-3
6,
19
-3
5,
73
-3
5,
35
-3
5,
16
-3
4,
76
-3
4,
25
-3
3,
71
-3
3,
13
-3
2,
52
-3
1,
85
-3
1,
11
-3
0,
29
-2
9,
35
Y
2
-3
9,
19
-3
8,
82
-3
8,
35
-3
7,
87
-3
7,
37
-3
6,
85
-3
6,
42
-3
6,
2
-3
5,
74
-3
5,
12
-3
4,
46
-3
3,
74
-3
2,
94
-3
2,
04
-3
0,
99
-2
9,
73
-2
8,
17
kp
1
-2
6,
99
-2
6,
59
-2
6,
09
-2
5,
57
-2
5,
05
-2
4,
52
-2
4,
09
-2
3,
86
-2
3,
41
-2
2,
81
-2
2,
19
-2
1,
53
-2
0,
83
-2
0,
07
-1
9,
24
-1
8,
32
-1
7,
28
w
1
-2
6,
99
-2
6,
59
-2
6,
09
-2
5,
58
-2
5,
06
-2
4,
52
-2
4,
09
-2
3,
86
-2
3,
41
-2
2,
81
-2
2,
19
-2
1,
53
-2
0,
83
-2
0,
07
-1
9,
24
-1
8,
32
-1
7,
28
p1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
e1
-4
8,
73
-4
8,
44
-4
8,
08
-4
7,
71
-4
7,
33
-4
6,
94
-4
6,
62
-4
6,
46
-4
6,
12
-4
5,
69
-4
5,
22
-4
4,
73
-4
4,
2
-4
3,
62
-4
2,
98
-4
2,
26
-4
1,
43
r1
-4
8,
73
-4
8,
44
-4
8,
08
-4
7,
71
-4
7,
33
-4
6,
94
-4
6,
62
-4
6,
46
-4
6,
12
-4
5,
69
-4
5,
22
-4
4,
73
-4
4,
2
-4
3,
62
-4
2,
98
-4
2,
26
-4
1,
43
kr
2
-3
1,
19
-3
0,
71
-3
0,
09
-2
9,
44
-2
8,
75
-2
8,
05
-2
7,
44
-2
7,
12
-2
6,
45
-2
5,
55
-2
4,
56
-2
3,
44
-2
2,
16
-2
0,
66
-1
8,
87
-1
6,
61
-1
3,
68
w
2
-4
7,
19
-4
6,
93
-4
6,
61
-4
6,
29
-4
5,
98
-4
5,
66
-4
5,
4
-4
5,
27
-4
5,
02
-4
4,
7
-4
4,
37
-4
4,
05
-4
3,
73
-4
3,
41
-4
3,
12
-4
2,
85
-4
2,
66
p2
-4
7,
19
-4
6,
93
-4
6,
61
-4
6,
29
-4
5,
98
-4
5,
66
-4
5,
4
-4
5,
27
-4
5,
02
-4
4,
7
-4
4,
37
-4
4,
05
-4
3,
73
-4
3,
41
-4
3,
12
-4
2,
85
-4
2,
66
e2
-3
1,
19
-3
0,
71
-3
0,
09
-2
9,
44
-2
8,
76
-2
8,
05
-2
7,
44
-2
7,
12
-2
6,
45
-2
5,
55
-2
4,
56
-2
3,
44
-2
2,
16
-2
0,
67
-1
8,
87
-1
6,
62
-1
3,
68
r2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
434 Appendix to chapter 3
Va
ria
tio
ns
in
SC
be
tw
ee
n
au
ta
rk
y
(b
as
e)
an
d
CS
ca
se
s(
in
%
)
siz
e
k=
1,
01
k=
1,
05
k=
1,
10
k=
1,
15
k=
1,
20
k=
1,
25
k=
1,
29
k=
1,
31
k=
1,
35
k=
1,
40
k=
1,
45
k=
1,
5
k=
1,
55
k=
1,
60
k=
1,
65
k=
1,
7
k=
1,
75
c
-4
4,
14
-4
4,
08
-4
3,
89
-4
3,
56
-4
3,
22
-4
2,
83
-4
2,
52
-4
2,
35
-4
2,
02
-4
1,
6
-4
1,
15
-4
0,
68
-4
0,
18
-3
9,
65
-3
9,
06
-3
8,
4
-3
7,
66
W
-1
6,
14
-1
6,
11
-1
6
-1
5,
83
-1
5,
73
-1
5,
52
-1
5,
33
-1
5,
23
-1
5,
02
-1
4,
72
-1
4,
4
-1
4,
04
-1
3,
65
-1
3,
21
-1
2,
72
-1
2,
16
-1
1,
53
Y
-4
3,
08
-4
3,
02
-4
2,
83
-4
2,
51
-4
2,
2
-4
1,
82
-4
1,
51
-4
1,
35
-4
1,
02
-4
0,
6
-4
0,
16
-3
9,
7
-3
9,
2
-3
8,
66
-3
8,
07
-3
7,
42
-3
6,
67
kp
-4
3,
08
-4
3,
02
-4
2,
83
-4
2,
5
-4
2,
46
-4
2,
17
-4
1,
93
-4
1,
81
-4
1,
57
-4
1,
27
-4
0,
96
-4
0,
66
-4
0,
35
-4
0,
04
-3
9,
73
-3
9,
43
-3
9,
16
kl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ke
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
kr
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
c1
-4
3,
97
-4
3,
18
-4
2,
05
-4
0,
73
-4
1,
06
-4
0,
55
-4
0,
13
-3
9,
92
-3
9,
48
-3
8,
92
-3
8,
31
-3
7,
67
-3
6,
98
-3
6,
23
-3
5,
39
-3
4,
45
-3
3,
35
c2
-4
4,
32
-4
4,
96
-4
5,
62
-4
6,
14
-4
5,
13
-4
4,
78
-4
4,
49
-4
4,
34
-4
4,
04
-4
3,
65
-4
3,
24
-4
2,
81
-4
2,
35
-4
1,
85
-4
1,
3
-4
0,
69
-3
9,
99
W
1
-1
5,
74
-1
4,
07
-1
1,
85
-9
,4
6
-1
1,
02
-1
0,
68
-1
0,
38
-1
0,
23
-9
,9
02
-9
,4
63
-8
,9
87
-8
,4
67
-7
,8
98
-7
,2
73
-6
,5
83
-5
,8
16
-4
,9
59
W
2
-1
6,
54
-1
8,
08
-1
9,
89
-2
1,
58
-1
9,
85
-1
9,
61
-1
9,
4
-1
9,
29
-1
9,
05
-1
8,
73
-1
8,
37
-1
7,
99
-1
7,
56
-1
7,
09
-1
6,
57
-1
5,
98
-1
5,
32
Y
1
-4
2,
81
-4
1,
66
-4
0,
05
-3
8,
22
-3
9,
02
-3
8,
53
-3
8,
12
-3
7,
91
-3
7,
48
-3
6,
91
-3
6,
31
-3
5,
67
-3
4,
97
-3
4,
2
-3
3,
35
-3
2,
38
-3
1,
24
Y
2
-4
3,
35
-4
4,
34
-4
5,
43
-4
6,
38
-4
4,
97
-4
4,
6
-4
4,
28
-4
4,
13
-4
3,
8
-4
3,
39
-4
2,
95
-4
2,
49
-4
2
-4
1,
47
-4
0,
89
-4
0,
25
-3
9,
51
kp
1
-4
2,
01
-3
7,
58
-3
1,
71
-2
5,
41
-2
9,
76
-2
9,
04
-2
8,
45
-2
8,
14
-2
7,
5
-2
6,
66
-2
5,
76
-2
4,
8
-2
3,
74
-2
2,
57
-2
1,
25
-1
9,
73
-1
7,
94
w
1
-4
2,
32
-3
9,
16
-3
4,
94
-3
0,
38
-2
9,
76
-2
9,
05
-2
8,
45
-2
8,
14
-2
7,
5
-2
6,
66
-2
5,
76
-2
4,
8
-2
3,
74
-2
2,
56
-2
1,
25
-1
9,
73
-1
7,
94
p1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
e1
-4
3,
46
-4
4,
95
-4
6,
77
-4
8,
54
-4
8,
27
-4
8,
01
-4
7,
79
-4
7,
68
-4
7,
45
-4
7,
16
-4
6,
86
-4
6,
54
-4
6,
2
-4
5,
84
-4
5,
46
-4
5,
03
-4
4,
54
r1
-4
3,
46
-4
4,
95
-4
6,
77
-4
8,
54
-4
8,
27
-4
8,
01
-4
7,
79
-4
7,
68
-4
7,
45
-4
7,
16
-4
6,
86
-4
6,
54
-4
6,
2
-4
5,
84
-4
5,
46
-4
5,
03
-4
4,
54
kp
2
-4
4,
15
-4
8,
29
-5
3,
23
-5
7,
96
-5
3,
56
-5
3,
23
-5
2,
98
-5
2,
85
-5
2,
6
-5
2,
28
-5
1,
97
-5
1,
65
-5
1,
35
-5
1,
04
-5
0,
75
-5
0,
49
-5
0,
26
w
2
-4
3,
84
-4
6,
76
-5
0,
21
-5
3,
47
-5
3,
56
-5
3,
23
-5
2,
98
-5
2,
85
-5
2,
6
-5
2,
28
-5
1,
97
-5
1,
65
-5
1,
35
-5
1,
04
-5
0,
75
-5
0,
49
-5
0,
26
p2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
e2
-4
2,
7
-4
1,
15
-3
9,
15
-3
7,
05
-3
6,
39
-3
5,
96
-3
5,
59
-3
5,
4
-3
5,
01
-3
4,
49
-3
3,
93
-3
3,
32
-3
2,
65
-3
1,
89
-3
1,
02
-3
0
-2
8,
77
r2
-4
2,
7
-4
1,
15
-3
9,
15
-3
7,
05
-3
6,
39
-3
5,
96
-3
5,
59
-3
5,
4
-3
5,
01
-3
4,
49
-3
3,
93
-3
3,
32
-3
2,
65
-3
1,
89
-3
1,
02
-3
0
-2
8,
77
Fo
rv
al
ue
sk
<
1.
20
th
e
co
m
pl
et
e
sp
ec
ia
lis
at
io
n
(C
S)
tr
ad
e
m
od
el
re
ve
rt
st
o
in
te
gr
at
ed
eq
ui
lib
riu
m
(IE
).
A
pp
en
di
x
G
V
ar
ia
nc
e,
co
va
ri
an
ce
an
d
co
rr
el
at
io
n
ta
bl
es
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
ist
ics
fo
rs
am
pl
e
g5
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
1
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
0
M
in
.
:
0.
10
23
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
0
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
00
M
in
.
:
1.
85
7
M
in
.
:
47
.7
3
M
in
.
:
14
.7
7
M
in
.
:-1
7.
66
9
2
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.1
34
5
1s
t
Q
u.
:
6.
17
40
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.4
01
1
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.0
34
76
1s
t
Q
u.
:
7.
86
5
1s
t
Q
u.
:
58
.2
6
1s
t
Q
u.
:
47
.4
7
1s
t
Q
u.
:
2.
64
3
3
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.3
27
3
M
ed
ia
n
:1
0.
26
55
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.6
22
1
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.1
08
72
M
ed
ia
n
:1
2.
35
8
M
ed
ia
n
:
63
.2
4
M
ed
ia
n
:
63
.0
5
M
ed
ia
n
:
4.
68
2
4
M
ea
n
:0
.3
94
9
M
ea
n
:1
6.
92
71
M
ea
n
:0
.5
95
1
M
ea
n
:0
.2
40
16
M
ea
n
:1
3.
41
0
M
ea
n
:
87
.9
6
M
ea
n
:
71
.5
3
M
ea
n
:
4.
49
6
5
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.6
20
7
3r
d
Q
u.
:2
3.
05
78
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.8
24
7
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.3
45
09
3r
d
Q
u.
:1
7.
69
0
3r
d
Q
u.
:1
20
.7
7
3r
d
Q
u.
:
84
.2
2
3r
d
Q
u.
:
6.
88
1
6
M
ax
.
:0
.9
99
5
M
ax
.
:6
9.
85
95
M
ax
.
:0
.9
99
9
M
ax
.
:0
.9
97
54
M
ax
.
:3
3.
97
1
M
ax
.
:1
92
.2
0
M
ax
.
:5
62
.0
6
M
ax
.
:
34
.5
00
Va
ria
nc
e
ta
bl
e
fo
rs
am
pl
e
g5
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
0.
08
-1
.7
4
0.
01
0.
02
0.
69
0.
54
0.
81
0.
06
rr
-1
.7
4
23
3.
81
-0
.4
1
-0
.6
6
-3
9.
52
13
7.
19
18
3.
20
9.
31
gl
2
0.
01
-0
.4
1
0.
07
0.
02
0.
56
0.
68
0.
55
-0
.0
8
gl
4
0.
02
-0
.6
6
0.
02
0.
08
1.
24
0.
10
2.
25
-0
.0
5
m
an
0.
69
-3
9.
52
0.
56
1.
24
51
.2
9
-3
9.
20
-0
.2
1
-0
.1
9
cp
0.
54
13
7.
19
0.
68
0.
10
-3
9.
20
17
80
.9
4
21
3.
62
34
.9
8
vt
0.
81
18
3.
20
0.
55
2.
25
-0
.2
1
21
3.
62
16
62
.4
9
3.
98
gg
0.
06
9.
31
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
9
34
.9
8
3.
98
21
.5
2
436 Appendix to chapter 4
Co
rr
ela
tio
n
ta
bl
e
us
in
g
th
e
Pe
ar
so
n
co
e 
cie
nt
sf
or
sa
m
pl
e
g5
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
1.
00
-0
.4
0
0.
15
0.
27
0.
34
0.
04
0.
07
0.
05
rr
-0
.4
0
1.
00
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
6
0.
21
0.
29
0.
13
gl
2
0.
15
-0
.1
0
1.
00
0.
32
0.
29
0.
06
0.
05
-0
.0
6
gl
4
0.
27
-0
.1
5
0.
32
1.
00
0.
60
0.
01
0.
19
-0
.0
4
m
an
0.
34
-0
.3
6
0.
29
0.
60
1.
00
-0
.1
3
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
cp
0.
04
0.
21
0.
06
0.
01
-0
.1
3
1.
00
0.
12
0.
18
vt
0.
07
0.
29
0.
05
0.
19
-0
.0
0
0.
12
1.
00
0.
02
gg
0.
05
0.
13
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
1
0.
18
0.
02
1.
00
Co
rr
ela
tio
n
ta
bl
e
us
in
g
th
e
Sp
ea
rm
an
co
e 
cie
nt
sf
or
sa
m
pl
e
g5
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
1.
00
-0
.4
1
0.
12
0.
21
0.
35
0.
03
-0
.0
5
0.
10
rr
-0
.4
1
1.
00
-0
.1
1
-0
.0
8
-0
.3
2
0.
28
0.
46
0.
04
gl
2
0.
12
-0
.1
1
1.
00
0.
34
0.
25
0.
05
0.
00
-0
.0
4
gl
4
0.
21
-0
.0
8
0.
34
1.
00
0.
49
0.
03
0.
15
0.
02
m
an
0.
35
-0
.3
2
0.
25
0.
49
1.
00
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
5
0.
01
cp
0.
03
0.
28
0.
05
0.
03
-0
.1
3
1.
00
0.
21
0.
28
vt
-0
.0
5
0.
46
0.
00
0.
15
-0
.1
5
0.
21
1.
00
0.
07
gg
0.
10
0.
04
-0
.0
4
0.
02
0.
01
0.
28
0.
07
1.
00
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
ist
ics
fo
rs
am
pl
e
g2
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
1
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
0
M
in
.
:
0.
10
23
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
0
M
in
.
:0
.0
00
00
M
in
.
:
0.
00
0
M
in
.
:
47
.7
3
M
in
.
:
14
.7
7
M
in
.
:-1
7.
66
9
2
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.1
96
2
1s
t
Q
u.
:
2.
95
77
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.4
02
2
1s
t
Q
u.
:0
.0
46
02
1s
t
Q
u.
:
8.
97
5
1s
t
Q
u.
:
58
.3
0
1s
t
Q
u.
:
46
.2
9
1s
t
Q
u.
:
2.
45
6
3
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.4
26
1
M
ed
ia
n
:
5.
91
89
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.6
53
6
M
ed
ia
n
:0
.1
38
87
M
ed
ia
n
:1
4.
18
2
M
ed
ia
n
:
63
.2
4
M
ed
ia
n
:
66
.8
2
M
ed
ia
n
:
4.
54
8
4
M
ea
n
:0
.4
51
1
M
ea
n
:1
1.
47
37
M
ea
n
:0
.6
08
2
M
ea
n
:0
.2
71
21
M
ea
n
:1
4.
42
5
M
ea
n
:
89
.7
7
M
ea
n
:
74
.5
4
M
ea
n
:
4.
36
5
5
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.6
88
8
3r
d
Q
u.
:1
2.
71
14
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.8
53
9
3r
d
Q
u.
:0
.4
33
96
3r
d
Q
u.
:1
8.
07
2
3r
d
Q
u.
:1
20
.8
0
3r
d
Q
u.
:
94
.1
1
3r
d
Q
u.
:
6.
56
2
6
M
ax
.
:0
.9
99
9
M
ax
.
:6
9.
85
95
M
ax
.
:0
.9
99
9
M
ax
.
:0
.9
99
18
M
ax
.
:4
1.
72
4
M
ax
.
:1
92
.2
0
M
ax
.
:5
62
.0
6
M
ax
.
:
34
.5
00
Va
ria
nc
e
ta
bl
e
fo
rs
am
pl
e
g2
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
0.
08
-1
.5
0
0.
01
0.
02
0.
68
0.
17
1.
62
-0
.0
1
rr
-1
.5
0
18
5.
89
-0
.3
2
-0
.6
1
-3
2.
47
78
.0
1
81
.9
4
6.
80
gl
2
0.
01
-0
.3
2
0.
08
0.
03
0.
58
0.
56
1.
31
-0
.1
5
gl
4
0.
02
-0
.6
1
0.
03
0.
09
1.
24
-0
.0
2
2.
50
-0
.0
7
m
an
0.
68
-3
2.
47
0.
58
1.
24
51
.8
8
-3
2.
38
62
.0
7
-0
.4
3
cp
0.
17
78
.0
1
0.
56
-0
.0
2
-3
2.
38
18
45
.3
7
25
1.
58
23
.3
0
vt
1.
62
81
.9
4
1.
31
2.
50
62
.0
7
25
1.
58
16
47
.3
0
-1
.5
1
gg
-0
.0
1
6.
80
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
7
-0
.4
3
23
.3
0
-1
.5
1
18
.4
7
437
Co
rr
ela
tio
n
ta
bl
e
us
in
g
th
e
Pe
ar
so
n
co
e 
cie
nt
sf
or
sa
m
pl
e
g2
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
1.
00
-0
.3
9
0.
14
0.
30
0.
34
0.
01
0.
14
-0
.0
0
rr
-0
.3
9
1.
00
-0
.0
8
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
3
0.
13
0.
15
0.
12
gl
2
0.
14
-0
.0
8
1.
00
0.
40
0.
28
0.
05
0.
11
-0
.1
3
gl
4
0.
30
-0
.1
5
0.
40
1.
00
0.
59
-0
.0
0
0.
21
-0
.0
5
m
an
0.
34
-0
.3
3
0.
28
0.
59
1.
00
-0
.1
0
0.
21
-0
.0
1
cp
0.
01
0.
13
0.
05
-0
.0
0
-0
.1
0
1.
00
0.
14
0.
13
vt
0.
14
0.
15
0.
11
0.
21
0.
21
0.
14
1.
00
-0
.0
1
gg
-0
.0
0
0.
12
-0
.1
3
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
1
0.
13
-0
.0
1
1.
00
Co
rr
ela
tio
n
ta
bl
e
us
in
g
th
e
Sp
ea
rm
an
co
e 
cie
nt
sf
or
sa
m
pl
e
g2
gl
1
rr
gl
2
gl
4
m
an
cp
vt
gg
gl
1
1.
00
-0
.3
7
0.
11
0.
27
0.
37
0.
01
0.
11
0.
03
rr
-0
.3
7
1.
00
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
9
0.
16
0.
08
0.
07
gl
2
0.
11
-0
.0
7
1.
00
0.
40
0.
26
0.
04
0.
11
-0
.1
1
gl
4
0.
27
-0
.1
2
0.
40
1.
00
0.
52
0.
02
0.
16
-0
.0
1
m
an
0.
37
-0
.2
9
0.
26
0.
52
1.
00
-0
.1
2
0.
11
0.
01
cp
0.
01
0.
16
0.
04
0.
02
-0
.1
2
1.
00
0.
20
0.
20
vt
0.
11
0.
08
0.
11
0.
16
0.
11
0.
20
1.
00
0.
00
gg
0.
03
0.
07
-0
.1
1
-0
.0
1
0.
01
0.
20
0.
00
1.
00

Appendix H
Fixed e ects across specifications
Regressions for the g5 sample
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 1
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 16.591327 3.957123 4.1928 2.756e-05 *** MOZ 3.763620 2.873596 1.3097 0.1902890
ARG 7.813879 3.062701 2.5513 0.0107321 * MRT 18.846816 2.392023 7.8790 3.331e-15 ***
AZE 36.830396 2.158767 17.0609 < 2.2e-16 *** MWI 1.635525 2.320413 0.7048 0.4809084
BDI 9.759799 2.103997 4.6387 3.506e-06 *** MYS 6.446597 4.509115 1.4297 0.1528086
BOL 14.047561 2.539638 5.5313 3.178e-08 *** NGA 25.061593 1.894434 13.2291 < 2.2e-16 ***
BRN 38.692370 2.757553 14.0314 < 2.2e-16 *** NOR 7.837446 2.495624 3.1405 0.0016867 **
BTN 7.115129 2.742246 2.5946 0.0094691 ** OMN 27.770357 2.123229 13.0793 < 2.2e-16 ***
CAF 0.587337 1.853623 0.3169 0.7513505 PER 6.677352 2.699203 2.4738 0.0133676 *
CHL 10.420056 2.661507 3.9151 9.037e-05 *** PNG 27.741320 2.912920 9.5235 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHN 9.853844 4.471819 2.2035 0.0275565 * ROM 9.450174 3.777967 2.5014 0.0123706 *
CMR 11.799245 3.014130 3.9146 9.054e-05 *** RUS 24.096105 3.079573 7.8245 5.107e-15 ***
COG 46.324244 2.810846 16.4805 < 2.2e-16 *** SAU 38.302939 2.077393 18.4380 < 2.2e-16 ***
COL 6.447271 2.477324 2.6025 0.0092543 ** SDN 8.932874 2.026237 4.4086 1.040e-05 ***
DZA 17.855627 2.491602 7.1663 7.703e-13 *** SLB 4.720378 4.421195 1.0677 0.2856693
ECU 16.735601 2.585970 6.4717 9.691e-11 *** SLE -2.990737 4.317923 -0.6926 0.4885397
EGY 12.833817 2.792407 4.5960 4.307e-06 *** SUR 6.847980 2.672077 2.5628 0.0103834 *
ETH 3.110153 1.978299 1.5721 0.1159193 SYR 18.789766 4.355388 4.3141 1.602e-05 ***
GAB 36.499917 1.997522 18.2726 < 2.2e-16 *** TKM 54.955513 6.480062 8.4807 < 2.2e-16 ***
GHA 0.476066 2.420192 0.1967 0.8440577 TTO 25.954482 2.396766 10.8290 < 2.2e-16 ***
GIN 5.123291 1.921210 2.6667 0.0076600 ** TZA -0.040024 2.066584 -0.0194 0.9845483
GUY -3.623246 3.167212 -1.1440 0.2526295 UGA 1.377320 1.941678 0.7093 0.4781102
IDN 13.383331 3.747744 3.5710 0.0003556 *** UKR 5.258285 3.746806 1.4034 0.1604962
IRN 32.445945 2.488567 13.0380 < 2.2e-16 *** VEN 28.816312 2.641776 10.9079 < 2.2e-16 ***
KAZ 35.556449 2.727403 13.0367 < 2.2e-16 *** VNM 6.385709 3.324396 1.9209 0.0547490 .
KWT 36.994590 3.125522 11.8363 < 2.2e-16 *** YEM 23.439474 2.705728 8.6629 < 2.2e-16 ***
LBY 46.457218 4.405885 10.5444 < 2.2e-16 *** ZAF 5.708961 3.034969 1.8811 0.0599637 .
MEX 4.499458 3.268010 1.3768 0.1685682 ZMB 8.710569 2.476555 3.5172 0.0004361 ***
MLI -3.217217 1.977284 -1.6271 0.1037181 ZWE 5.750663 3.002803 1.9151 0.0554799 .
MNG 6.290972 2.330832 2.6990 0.0069543 **
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 1
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 0.193544 0.097390 1.9873 0.0468870 * MNG 0.038215 0.058323 0.6552 0.5123179
ARG 0.032531 0.047962 0.6783 0.4976006 MOZ 0.541713 0.052826 10.2547 < 2.2e-16 ***
AZE 0.268563 0.056690 4.7374 2.165e-06 *** MRT 0.236719 0.054584 4.3368 1.446e-05 ***
BDI 0.249289 0.041216 6.0484 1.463e-09 *** MWI 0.247597 0.042181 5.8698 4.363e-09 ***
BHR 0.127383 0.068682 1.8547 0.0636407 . MYS 0.498145 0.079982 6.2282 4.717e-10 ***
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BOL 0.156085 0.048091 3.2456 0.0011720 ** NGA 0.133751 0.050777 2.6341 0.0084365 **
BRN 0.176693 0.062545 2.8251 0.0047272 ** NOR -0.108134 0.058940 -1.8346 0.0665577 .
BTN 0.809633 0.056764 14.2631 < 2.2e-16 *** OMN 0.089073 0.051465 1.7307 0.0834971 .
CAF 0.166889 0.041777 3.9948 6.476e-05 *** PER 0.608853 0.042112 14.4581 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHL 0.474925 0.041907 11.3328 < 2.2e-16 *** PNG 0.076288 0.075307 1.0130 0.3110494
CHN 0.282163 0.057374 4.9180 8.744e-07 *** QAT 0.083975 0.060147 1.3962 0.1626650
CMR 0.349766 0.045500 7.6872 1.510e-14 *** ROM 0.197652 0.055700 3.5485 0.0003874 ***
COG 0.049485 0.079072 0.6258 0.5314302 RUS 0.172665 0.053709 3.2148 0.0013054 **
COL 0.153916 0.041902 3.6732 0.0002395 *** SAU 0.076976 0.054278 1.4182 0.1561369
DZA 0.349069 0.041660 8.3791 < 2.2e-16 *** SDN 0.530096 0.040230 13.1765 < 2.2e-16 ***
ECU 0.086926 0.040122 2.1665 0.0302718 * SLB 0.421203 0.082226 5.1225 3.015e-07 ***
EGY 0.523487 0.041680 12.5598 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 0.196156 0.109927 1.7844 0.0743545 .
ETH 0.537429 0.041449 12.9661 < 2.2e-16 *** SUR 0.611887 0.052172 11.7284 < 2.2e-16 ***
GAB 0.062083 0.057101 1.0873 0.2769227 SYR 0.271084 0.055380 4.8950 9.830e-07 ***
GHA 0.593643 0.050922 11.6579 < 2.2e-16 *** TKM 0.255116 0.163935 1.5562 0.1196598
GIN -0.014804 0.051168 -0.2893 0.7723318 TTO 0.709586 0.054936 12.9167 < 2.2e-16 ***
GNB 0.104130 0.089987 1.1572 0.2472072 TZA 0.250258 0.045520 5.4978 3.846e-08 ***
GUY 0.149163 0.078090 1.9101 0.0561166 . UGA 0.259411 0.040416 6.4185 1.376e-10 ***
IDN 0.357215 0.055025 6.4919 8.479e-11 *** UKR 0.582833 0.061903 9.4152 < 2.2e-16 ***
IRN 0.144835 0.056382 2.5688 0.0102050 * VEN 0.034317 0.048400 0.7090 0.4782994
KAZ 0.099956 0.060707 1.6465 0.0996534 . VNM 0.203154 0.061008 3.3300 0.0008685 ***
KWT 0.116456 0.068112 1.7098 0.0873070 . YEM 0.381662 0.064836 5.8866 3.943e-09 ***
LBY 0.053693 0.121411 0.4422 0.6583131 ZAF 0.554932 0.049123 11.2968 < 2.2e-16 ***
MEX 0.261930 0.059963 4.3682 1.253e-05 *** ZMB 0.659419 0.045017 14.6481 < 2.2e-16 ***
MLI 0.134178 0.048376 2.7737 0.0055430 ** ZWE 0.298029 0.055565 5.3636 8.158e-08 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 2
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 26.2651 3.5494 7.3999 1.363e-13 *** MOZ 12.8898 2.5116 5.1322 2.864e-07 ***
ARG 13.8308 2.7214 5.0822 3.730e-07 *** MRT 26.8608 2.0948 12.8226 < 2.2e-16 ***
AZE 45.5867 1.9591 23.2696 < 2.2e-16 *** MWI 8.4365 2.0010 4.2161 2.485e-05 ***
BDI 15.7842 1.7755 8.8898 < 2.2e-16 *** MYS 17.0295 4.1238 4.1296 3.634e-05 ***
BOL 21.0181 2.1990 9.5579 < 2.2e-16 *** NGA 32.4267 1.6943 19.1390 < 2.2e-16 ***
BRN 44.1663 2.4768 17.8319 < 2.2e-16 *** NOR 15.4763 2.2523 6.8713 6.363e-12 ***
BTN 16.0562 2.4498 6.5541 5.598e-11 *** OMN 33.4526 1.9597 17.0704 < 2.2e-16 ***
CAF 7.4027 1.5948 4.6417 3.456e-06 *** PER 13.8218 2.3475 5.8879 3.911e-09 ***
CHL 17.7105 2.3252 7.6167 2.598e-14 *** PNG 32.9206 2.6625 12.3645 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHN 19.3883 4.0291 4.8120 1.494e-06 *** ROM 15.6834 3.4093 4.6002 4.221e-06 ***
CMR 17.7701 2.6674 6.6620 2.701e-11 *** RUS 33.6163 2.6557 12.6581 < 2.2e-16 ***
COG 54.7867 2.5701 21.3173 < 2.2e-16 *** SAU 44.9720 1.7976 25.0171 < 2.2e-16 ***
COL 13.1103 2.1251 6.1693 6.861e-10 *** SDN 16.0030 1.7463 9.1642 < 2.2e-16 ***
DZA 22.2814 2.2357 9.9662 < 2.2e-16 *** SLB 14.6319 3.9921 3.6652 0.0002471 ***
ECU 23.2178 2.2282 10.4199 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 3.7307 3.9731 0.9390 0.3477449
EGY 19.9945 2.4267 8.2392 2.220e-16 *** SUR 12.3404 2.3939 5.1550 2.536e-07 ***
ETH 10.5021 1.7337 6.0578 1.380e-09 *** SYR 23.7807 3.9759 5.9812 2.215e-09 ***
GAB 42.0330 1.8143 23.1678 < 2.2e-16 *** TKM 62.0204 5.9494 10.4246 < 2.2e-16 ***
GHA 8.3746 2.1454 3.9035 9.483e-05 *** TTO 33.3669 2.1922 15.2205 < 2.2e-16 ***
GIN 11.0741 1.6988 6.5188 7.088e-11 *** TZA 7.1630 1.7829 4.0177 5.877e-05 ***
GUY 2.3533 2.9237 0.8049 0.4208616 UGA 8.5841 1.6760 5.1219 3.025e-07 ***
IDN 21.9423 3.3316 6.5861 4.516e-11 *** UKR 14.7439 3.3592 4.3892 1.138e-05 ***
IRN 37.9710 2.2019 17.2449 < 2.2e-16 *** VEN 35.1090 2.2837 15.3735 < 2.2e-16 ***
KAZ 44.4281 2.3781 18.6822 < 2.2e-16 *** VNM 16.2220 2.9549 5.4898 4.024e-08 ***
KWT 42.2970 2.8729 14.7228 < 2.2e-16 *** YEM 32.2412 2.3597 13.6633 < 2.2e-16 ***
LBY 56.7981 3.9687 14.3116 < 2.2e-16 *** ZAF 13.6295 2.6767 5.0919 3.545e-07 ***
MEX 13.2032 2.9313 4.5043 6.660e-06 *** ZMB 15.8824 2.1840 7.2722 3.535e-13 ***
MLI 2.9175 1.7934 1.6268 0.1037867 ZWE 12.7886 2.6036 4.9118 9.023e-07 ***
MNG 12.6032 2.1143 5.9610 2.507e-09 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 2
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1992 20.4044 2.5499 8.0019 1.332e-15 *** 2002 17.8768 1.8234 9.8043 < 2.2e-16 ***
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1993 21.6581 2.2127 9.7880 < 2.2e-16 *** 2003 20.8878 1.9468 10.7294 < 2.2e-16 ***
1994 19.7998 2.1045 9.4083 < 2.2e-16 *** 2004 22.4365 1.9819 11.3204 < 2.2e-16 ***
1995 16.4061 2.0423 8.0331 8.882e-16 *** 2005 24.3686 1.9184 12.7027 < 2.2e-16 ***
1996 18.0516 1.9671 9.1765 < 2.2e-16 *** 2006 26.7837 1.9135 13.9971 < 2.2e-16 ***
1997 16.6673 1.9659 8.4781 < 2.2e-16 *** 2007 25.6239 1.8438 13.8971 < 2.2e-16 ***
1998 14.2370 1.9219 7.4078 1.286e-13 *** 2008 27.9495 1.8477 15.1265 < 2.2e-16 ***
1999 15.8403 1.9030 8.3237 < 2.2e-16 *** 2009 19.2371 1.8855 10.2027 < 2.2e-16 ***
2000 20.6451 1.8063 11.4293 < 2.2e-16 *** 2010 21.2185 1.8690 11.3526 < 2.2e-16 ***
2001 19.0227 1.8493 10.2865 < 2.2e-16 *** 2011 20.6185 1.9195 10.7418 < 2.2e-16 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 2
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 0.2321837 0.1002891 2.3151 0.0206051 * MNG 0.0638677 0.0604663 1.0563 0.2908527
ARG 0.0444220 0.0494352 0.8986 0.3688703 MOZ 0.5574000 0.0541025 10.3027 < 2.2e-16 ***
AZE 0.3256736 0.0657408 4.9539 7.274e-07 *** MRT 0.2725558 0.0583833 4.6684 3.036e-06 ***
BDI 0.2657202 0.0424197 6.2641 3.750e-10 *** MWI 0.2584486 0.0429479 6.0177 1.769e-09 ***
BHR 0.1719775 0.0736202 2.3360 0.0194908 * MYS 0.5261879 0.0847790 6.2066 5.415e-10 ***
BOL 0.1803195 0.0504344 3.5753 0.0003498 *** NGA 0.1748032 0.0562907 3.1054 0.0019004 **
BRN 0.2281078 0.0695514 3.2797 0.0010392 ** NOR -0.0841212 0.0623755 -1.3486 0.1774575
BTN 0.8327996 0.0585044 14.2348 < 2.2e-16 *** OMN 0.1390398 0.0593992 2.3408 0.0192442 *
CAF 0.1777709 0.0426985 4.1634 3.135e-05 *** PER 0.6202088 0.0428317 14.4801 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHL 0.4930838 0.0435469 11.3230 < 2.2e-16 *** PNG 0.1225886 0.0804525 1.5237 0.1275738
CHN 0.2953905 0.0598865 4.9325 8.118e-07 *** QAT 0.1361340 0.0669307 2.0340 0.0419561 *
CMR 0.3661743 0.0467405 7.8342 4.663e-15 *** ROM 0.2105895 0.0579382 3.6347 0.0002783 ***
COG 0.1203616 0.0899039 1.3388 0.1806417 RUS 0.2072333 0.0587735 3.5260 0.0004219 ***
COL 0.1662888 0.0428374 3.8819 0.0001037 *** SAU 0.1310098 0.0622917 2.1032 0.0354512 *
DZA 0.3806799 0.0454544 8.3750 < 2.2e-16 *** SDN 0.5466201 0.0414382 13.1912 < 2.2e-16 ***
ECU 0.1101877 0.0424744 2.5942 0.0094807 ** SLB 0.4451393 0.0836829 5.3194 1.041e-07 ***
EGY 0.5415073 0.0430887 12.5673 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 0.2051225 0.1105685 1.8552 0.0635731 .
ETH 0.5503873 0.0422591 13.0241 < 2.2e-16 *** SUR 0.6242770 0.0529535 11.7892 < 2.2e-16 ***
GAB 0.1179961 0.0655683 1.7996 0.0719250 . SYR 0.3024300 0.0585883 5.1620 2.444e-07 ***
GHA 0.6084217 0.0519705 11.7071 < 2.2e-16 *** TKM 0.3302091 0.1699971 1.9424 0.0520838 .
GIN 0.0044222 0.0525347 0.0842 0.9329163 TTO 0.7550823 0.0611254 12.3530 < 2.2e-16 ***
GNB 0.1122985 0.0905938 1.2396 0.2151300 TZA 0.2616157 0.0462400 5.6578 1.533e-08 ***
GUY 0.1722309 0.0802168 2.1471 0.0317879 * UGA 0.2706644 0.0411548 6.5767 4.809e-11 ***
IDN 0.3766159 0.0577918 6.5168 7.184e-11 *** UKR 0.5988935 0.0648929 9.2289 < 2.2e-16 ***
IRN 0.1850853 0.0610441 3.0320 0.0024295 ** VEN 0.0716348 0.0530394 1.3506 0.1768244
KAZ 0.1533420 0.0680552 2.2532 0.0242465 * VNM 0.2271036 0.0639263 3.5526 0.0003815 ***
KWT 0.1780485 0.0764907 2.3277 0.0199273 * YEM 0.4197424 0.0685375 6.1243 9.110e-10 ***
LBY 0.1260871 0.1283618 0.9823 0.3259623 ZAF 0.5670305 0.0508197 11.1577 < 2.2e-16 ***
MEX 0.2745122 0.0628641 4.3668 1.261e-05 *** ZMB 0.6789982 0.0467154 14.5348 < 2.2e-16 ***
MLI 0.1475700 0.0493436 2.9907 0.0027837 ** ZWE 0.3140450 0.0569026 5.5190 3.410e-08 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 2
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1992 0.302644 0.049390 6.1276 8.919e-10 *** 2002 0.270504 0.038222 7.0772 1.471e-12 ***
1993 0.276534 0.045958 6.0171 1.775e-09 *** 2003 0.318038 0.040100 7.9311 2.220e-15 ***
1994 0.325339 0.041506 7.8383 4.663e-15 *** 2004 0.312365 0.041330 7.5579 4.086e-14 ***
1995 0.292648 0.039939 7.3274 2.347e-13 *** 2005 0.347222 0.042551 8.1601 4.441e-16 ***
1996 0.295106 0.039043 7.5584 4.086e-14 *** 2006 0.314501 0.044579 7.0549 1.727e-12 ***
1997 0.301121 0.038347 7.8526 3.997e-15 *** 2007 0.310288 0.043682 7.1034 1.217e-12 ***
1998 0.311715 0.037562 8.2986 < 2.2e-16 *** 2008 0.331374 0.045552 7.2747 3.473e-13 ***
1999 0.283928 0.038795 7.3186 2.505e-13 *** 2009 0.324983 0.041457 7.8391 4.441e-15 ***
2000 0.285368 0.040123 7.1123 1.141e-12 *** 2010 0.349644 0.041336 8.4586 < 2.2e-16 ***
2001 0.277597 0.039602 7.0096 2.389e-12 *** 2011 0.316483 0.042396 7.4649 8.327e-14 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 3
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Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 10.7805 2.5631 4.2061 2.599e-05 *** MOZ 5.6335 1.8058 3.1197 0.0018103 **
ARG 5.9435 1.9791 3.0031 0.0026723 ** MRT 11.8300 1.5886 7.4469 9.548e-14 ***
AZE 13.3702 1.8495 7.2292 4.858e-13 *** MWI 4.0584 1.4325 2.8331 0.0046095 **
BDI 5.7506 1.3169 4.3667 1.261e-05 *** MYS 8.0104 3.0230 2.6498 0.0080543 **
BOL 8.0998 1.6590 4.8823 1.049e-06 *** NGA 8.6542 1.4939 5.7932 6.905e-09 ***
BRN 13.0783 2.1816 5.9947 2.038e-09 *** NOR 5.0986 1.6670 3.0585 0.0022246 **
BTN 5.8549 1.7724 3.3033 0.0009554 *** OMN 10.6092 1.6767 6.3275 2.492e-10 ***
CAF 2.8385 1.1418 2.4860 0.0129180 * PER 6.2233 1.6994 3.6621 0.0002502 ***
CHL 7.2867 1.7057 4.2720 1.937e-05 *** PNG 11.9045 2.0422 5.8292 5.570e-09 ***
CHN 7.6380 2.9556 2.5842 0.0097597 ** ROM 6.4619 2.4716 2.6145 0.0089362 **
CMR 7.2811 1.9448 3.7439 0.0001812 *** RUS 9.6482 2.1099 4.5729 4.811e-06 ***
COG 15.6530 2.3447 6.6759 2.456e-11 *** SAU 14.4743 1.7459 8.2907 2.220e-16 ***
COL 5.3885 1.5465 3.4843 0.0004934 *** SDN 6.0325 1.2872 4.6867 2.777e-06 ***
DZA 9.2959 1.7086 5.4406 5.309e-08 *** SLB 3.9655 2.8199 1.4063 0.1596376
ECU 8.4192 1.6813 5.0077 5.508e-07 *** SLE 1.0560 2.7791 0.3800 0.7039575
EGY 7.6628 1.7924 4.2751 1.911e-05 *** SUR 4.3718 1.7191 2.5430 0.0109895 *
ETH 3.5804 1.2471 2.8711 0.0040903 ** SYR 5.8485 2.8643 2.0419 0.0411647 *
GAB 13.4492 1.6773 8.0185 1.110e-15 *** TKM 35.0834 4.3005 8.1579 4.441e-16 ***
GHA 4.4989 1.5237 2.9526 0.0031510 ** TTO 11.6830 1.7914 6.5217 6.950e-11 ***
GIN 4.3285 1.2218 3.5428 0.0003959 *** TZA 3.2565 1.2688 2.5667 0.0102678 *
GUY 3.1234 2.0586 1.5172 0.1292158 UGA 2.9691 1.2026 2.4690 0.0135507 *
IDN 8.3909 2.4951 3.3629 0.0007712 *** UKR 6.5681 2.4402 2.6917 0.0071095 **
IRN 13.5323 1.8154 7.4540 9.059e-14 *** VEN 10.9953 1.8773 5.8569 4.716e-09 ***
KAZ 14.3851 2.0447 7.0355 1.986e-12 *** VNM 7.0380 2.1493 3.2745 0.0010586 **
KWT 13.6334 2.2840 5.9691 2.385e-09 *** YEM 9.2492 1.8741 4.9353 8.001e-07 ***
LBY 14.0581 3.2108 4.3784 1.196e-05 *** ZAF 5.9148 1.9524 3.0295 0.0024497 **
MEX 5.0135 2.1489 2.3330 0.0196464 * ZMB 6.9371 1.5852 4.3762 1.207e-05 ***
MLI 1.8678 1.2605 1.4818 0.1384044 ZWE 6.3079 1.8736 3.3667 0.0007608 ***
MNG 5.8754 1.5177 3.8712 0.0001083 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 3
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1993 7.90650 1.67243 4.7276 2.272e-06 *** 2003 9.10303 1.47057 6.1901 6.011e-10 ***
1994 6.55252 1.59253 4.1145 3.880e-05 *** 2004 9.70565 1.50598 6.4447 1.158e-10 ***
1995 6.12417 1.51726 4.0363 5.429e-05 *** 2005 11.45381 1.46311 7.8284 4.885e-15 ***
1996 7.32671 1.47140 4.9794 6.378e-07 *** 2006 9.17215 1.53038 5.9934 2.055e-09 ***
1997 5.29723 1.47777 3.5846 0.0003376 *** 2007 7.07221 1.50060 4.7129 2.442e-06 ***
1998 3.17199 1.44480 2.1955 0.0281307 * 2008 11.14032 1.47287 7.5637 3.908e-14 ***
1999 7.43566 1.40574 5.2895 1.226e-07 *** 2009 0.88103 1.52399 0.5781 0.5631915
2000 11.84488 1.34160 8.8289 < 2.2e-16 *** 2010 8.61754 1.42388 6.0522 1.429e-09 ***
2001 4.86934 1.43631 3.3902 0.0006985 *** 2011 8.23720 1.45218 5.6723 1.409e-08 ***
2002 5.31265 1.39714 3.8025 0.0001432 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 3
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
ARE 0.137722 0.132406 1.0402 0.2982680 MLI 0.020621 0.043185 0.4775 0.6329972
ARG 0.005682 0.042137 0.1348 0.8927325 MNG 0.024799 0.051510 0.4815 0.6301943
AZE 0.133058 0.056800 2.3426 0.0191520 * MOZ 0.253672 0.049313 5.1441 2.687e-07 ***
BDI 0.128688 0.036584 3.5176 0.0004355 *** MRT 0.161758 0.050725 3.1890 0.0014279 **
BHR 0.010127 0.062694 0.1615 0.8716708 MWI 0.113288 0.036619 3.0937 0.0019771 **
BOL 0.057338 0.043680 1.3127 0.1892945 MYS 0.285280 0.074126 3.8486 0.0001188 ***
BRN 0.146932 0.065732 2.2353 0.0253963 * NGA 0.102899 0.048758 2.1104 0.0348240 *
BTN 0.344627 0.059989 5.7449 9.200e-09 *** NOR -0.045580 0.053238 -0.8561 0.3919150
CAF 0.074029 0.036351 2.0365 0.0417009 * OMN 0.078097 0.050852 1.5358 0.1245948
CHL 0.224766 0.039837 5.6421 1.680e-08 *** PER 0.258094 0.042190 6.1174 9.511e-10 ***
CHN 0.108826 0.052559 2.0705 0.0384010 * PNG 0.095374 0.076310 1.2498 0.2113626
CMR 0.184386 0.041136 4.4824 7.382e-06 *** QAT 0.054203 0.056665 0.9565 0.3387946
COG 0.100168 0.081969 1.2220 0.2217009 ROM 0.117805 0.049330 2.3881 0.0169355 *
COL 0.056607 0.036772 1.5394 0.1237044 RUS 0.095234 0.050529 1.8847 0.0594663 .
DZA 0.186146 0.040249 4.6249 3.748e-06 *** SAU 0.052548 0.054655 0.9614 0.3363275
443
ECU 0.054990 0.035867 1.5331 0.1252411 SDN 0.251341 0.039225 6.4078 1.477e-10 ***
EGY 0.235598 0.040141 5.8692 4.379e-09 *** SLB 0.149163 0.078670 1.8961 0.0579527 .
ETH 0.273660 0.040356 6.7811 1.193e-11 *** SUR 0.239593 0.051998 4.6078 4.070e-06 ***
GAB 0.061321 0.057225 1.0716 0.2839173 SYR 0.173818 0.051051 3.4048 0.0006622 ***
GHA 0.264240 0.049439 5.3448 9.051e-08 *** TTO 0.358338 0.057444 6.2380 4.432e-10 ***
GIN -0.019378 0.045839 -0.4227 0.6724811 TZA 0.119381 0.040579 2.9420 0.0032613 **
GNB 0.125329 0.089352 1.4027 0.1607201 UGA 0.132163 0.035798 3.6920 0.0002225 ***
GUY 0.076490 0.068306 1.1198 0.2627950 UKR 0.299779 0.057822 5.1845 2.166e-07 ***
IDN 0.171572 0.051322 3.3431 0.0008286 *** VEN 0.022651 0.044967 0.5037 0.6144593
IRN 0.076437 0.053122 1.4389 0.1501789 VNM 0.150752 0.054903 2.7458 0.0060368 **
KAZ 0.072800 0.058043 1.2542 0.2097540 YEM 0.227582 0.060683 3.7504 0.0001766 ***
KWT 0.078374 0.067139 1.1673 0.2430700 ZAF 0.271904 0.046875 5.8007 6.605e-09 ***
LBY 0.058522 0.138902 0.4213 0.6735194 ZMB 0.329288 0.044931 7.3287 2.323e-13 ***
MEX 0.136337 0.054407 2.5058 0.0122159 * ZWE 0.179348 0.053610 3.3454 0.0008216 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 3
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1993 0.155434 0.043095 3.6067 0.0003101 *** 2003 0.169851 0.035388 4.7996 1.590e-06 ***
1994 0.141168 0.038997 3.6200 0.0002946 *** 2004 0.144462 0.036913 3.9136 9.094e-05 ***
1995 0.147694 0.037742 3.9133 9.106e-05 *** 2005 0.147589 0.037959 3.8881 0.0001010 ***
1996 0.132681 0.035406 3.7474 0.0001787 *** 2006 0.136387 0.039171 3.4819 0.0004979 ***
1997 0.145026 0.034234 4.2363 2.272e-05 *** 2007 0.148636 0.037822 3.9299 8.498e-05 ***
1998 0.148761 0.033117 4.4920 7.055e-06 *** 2008 0.160344 0.040051 4.0035 6.241e-05 ***
1999 0.104277 0.034205 3.0486 0.0022989 ** 2009 0.153697 0.036357 4.2274 2.364e-05 ***
2000 0.136523 0.035942 3.7984 0.0001456 *** 2010 0.154959 0.036717 4.2204 2.439e-05 ***
2001 0.133005 0.034792 3.8229 0.0001319 *** 2011 0.126611 0.037430 3.3826 0.0007179 ***
2002 0.125153 0.033743 3.7091 0.0002080 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Regressions for the g2 sample
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 1
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG -2.1395174 2.8027601 -0.7634 0.4452482 LBY 49.6057574 3.5681095 13.9025 < 2.2e-16 ***
ALB -0.5982008 1.8179035 -0.3291 0.7421097 LSO -4.8367429 2.7109409 -1.7842 0.0743982 .
ARE 18.6630387 3.1048886 6.0109 1.845e-09 *** MDG 1.0363447 1.6519430 0.6273 0.5304305
ARG 7.5157863 2.0637387 3.6418 0.0002707 *** MEX 4.8005878 2.1385208 2.2448 0.0247799 *
AUS 2.9239357 1.5372354 1.9021 0.0571615 . MKD 0.6677869 2.0688722 0.3228 0.7468632
AZE 38.7802680 1.5879505 24.4216 < 2.2e-16 *** MLI -1.7242100 1.5535695 -1.1098 0.2670689
BDI 10.1722282 1.4815849 6.8658 6.613e-12 *** MNG 7.4568384 1.7611028 4.2342 2.294e-05 ***
BEN -1.2299521 1.6706639 -0.7362 0.4616056 MOZ 4.2905311 1.9972557 2.1482 0.0316968 *
BFA 2.9794136 1.6290977 1.8289 0.0674186 . MRT 20.3716852 1.7679661 11.5227 < 2.2e-16 ***
BGD 4.5011809 1.8182263 2.4756 0.0133017 * MWI 2.1795639 1.6144698 1.3500 0.1770101
BGR -2.8667201 2.1522701 -1.3320 0.1828760 MYS 5.8038897 2.9184392 1.9887 0.0467347 *
BLR -0.0992610 3.0222551 -0.0328 0.9737995 NAM -4.2882812 1.9438055 -2.2061 0.0273751 *
BOL 14.3506739 1.7073775 8.4051 < 2.2e-16 *** NER -1.7001772 1.3747898 -1.2367 0.2162053
BRA 4.5099497 2.0692088 2.1796 0.0292906 * NGA 27.1677909 1.4705179 18.4750 < 2.2e-16 ***
BRN 38.9474317 2.0028964 19.4456 < 2.2e-16 *** NOR 9.2123002 1.7263486 5.3363 9.487e-08 ***
BTN 7.6895654 1.9840832 3.8756 0.0001064 *** NPL 0.4928385 1.9138394 0.2575 0.7967828
BWA -4.3296228 1.6922566 -2.5585 0.0105128 * NZL 1.8509781 1.8784258 0.9854 0.3244336
CAF 1.7919960 1.3573141 1.3203 0.1867511 OMN 29.0036101 1.6207668 17.8950 < 2.2e-16 ***
CAN 2.4984367 2.0927619 1.1938 0.2325380 PAK 4.4620825 2.0867852 2.1383 0.0324959 *
CHL 10.2996730 1.7801926 5.7857 7.221e-09 *** PER 6.2503181 1.8112653 3.4508 0.0005589 ***
CHN 8.9623013 2.8388645 3.1570 0.0015940 ** PNG 28.4719377 2.2748966 12.5157 < 2.2e-16 ***
CIV 3.7170456 2.1521787 1.7271 0.0841482 . PRY -1.2777826 1.7045606 -0.7496 0.4534801
CMR 11.1558398 2.0500409 5.4418 5.276e-08 *** ROM 8.2683726 2.4905292 3.3199 0.0009004 ***
COG 48.6335761 2.1684508 22.4278 < 2.2e-16 *** RUS 25.4019269 2.1375417 11.8837 < 2.2e-16 ***
COL 6.7304905 1.6726899 4.0238 5.728e-05 *** RWA -0.5071799 1.5342966 -0.3306 0.7409755
CUB 2.6171164 2.0548993 1.2736 0.2028058 SAU 39.4637720 1.4825265 26.6193 < 2.2e-16 ***
444 Appendix to chapter 4
DZA 17.5485853 1.8781041 9.3438 < 2.2e-16 *** SDN 9.6904541 1.4752403 6.5687 5.075e-11 ***
ECU 17.0877704 1.7346562 9.8508 < 2.2e-16 *** SLB 6.9811935 3.5783963 1.9509 0.0510656 .
EGY 12.5078762 1.8681996 6.6951 2.154e-11 *** SLE -1.2281826 3.5287717 -0.3480 0.7278040
EST -2.7559853 2.4223137 -1.1377 0.2552253 SUR 6.2796132 1.9426877 3.2324 0.0012274 **
ETH 4.1759302 1.4720131 2.8369 0.0045556 ** SWZ 3.5773861 3.6008685 0.9935 0.3204767
FJI -3.1334940 2.1534936 -1.4551 0.1456486 SYR 19.4881996 3.5385844 5.5073 3.643e-08 ***
GAB 37.7955809 1.5443566 24.4734 < 2.2e-16 *** TGO -0.7218359 1.6046842 -0.4498 0.6528326
GHA 0.9838759 1.7313820 0.5683 0.5698581 THA 3.3195863 2.9493360 1.1255 0.2603616
GIN 6.5724759 1.4924725 4.4038 1.064e-05 *** TKM 55.2144330 5.1712706 10.6772 < 2.2e-16 ***
GTM 1.8899686 2.2397565 0.8438 0.3987657 TTO 26.3099704 1.7285924 15.2205 < 2.2e-16 ***
GUY -3.1478295 2.3758014 -1.3250 0.1851861 TUN 2.6598613 2.1009958 1.2660 0.2055130
HND 0.3822536 2.0804997 0.1837 0.8542240 TZA 0.9527662 1.4926717 0.6383 0.5232811
IDN 12.6918216 2.3968405 5.2952 1.189e-07 *** UGA 2.5692712 1.4162910 1.8141 0.0696648 .
IND 3.5565386 1.7687049 2.0108 0.0443450 * UKR 4.7965641 2.4430283 1.9634 0.0496034 *
IRN 32.9431926 1.8385934 17.9176 < 2.2e-16 *** VEN 29.1385204 1.7915543 16.2644 < 2.2e-16 ***
JAM -2.0845452 2.1546043 -0.9675 0.3333021 VNM 7.3773401 2.2637418 3.2589 0.0011184 **
KAZ 37.0520327 1.9230804 19.2670 < 2.2e-16 *** YEM 25.1928955 2.0739841 12.1471 < 2.2e-16 ***
KEN -0.0034435 1.7691159 -0.0019 0.9984469 ZAF 5.2321668 1.9915720 2.6272 0.0086102 **
KGZ 0.6898310 2.0386411 0.3384 0.7350784 ZMB 8.6747312 1.7346275 5.0009 5.706e-07 ***
KHM -2.9719399 2.2709755 -1.3087 0.1906488 ZWE 5.6690853 2.0828408 2.7218 0.0064927 **
KWT 38.3510669 2.5447538 15.0706 < 2.2e-16 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 1
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG 0.2157768 0.0758307 2.8455 0.0044341 ** KWT 0.1072038 0.0643625 1.6656 0.0957879 .
ALB 0.5409753 0.0418251 12.9342 < 2.2e-16 *** LBY 0.0365299 0.1160517 0.3148 0.7529342
ARE 0.2138897 0.0927325 2.3065 0.0210814 * LSO 0.2519506 0.0727891 3.4614 0.0005374 ***
ARG 0.0430761 0.0427543 1.0075 0.3136813 MDG 0.5667801 0.0377466 15.0154 < 2.2e-16 ***
AUS 0.1040304 0.0425654 2.4440 0.0145250 * MEX 0.3080076 0.0507524 6.0688 1.288e-09 ***
AZE 0.2754202 0.0531692 5.1801 2.218e-07 *** MKD 0.4643257 0.0481111 9.6511 < 2.2e-16 ***
BDI 0.2402501 0.0385405 6.2337 4.555e-10 *** MLI 0.1344192 0.0447991 3.0005 0.0026955 **
BEN 0.5990013 0.0435875 13.7425 < 2.2e-16 *** MNG 0.0432656 0.0537147 0.8055 0.4205487
BFA 0.2185885 0.0391508 5.5832 2.361e-08 *** MOZ 0.5508310 0.0491278 11.2122 < 2.2e-16 ***
BGD 0.4939088 0.0397259 12.4329 < 2.2e-16 *** MRT 0.2462879 0.0513773 4.7937 1.637e-06 ***
BGR 0.4094304 0.0563964 7.2599 3.875e-13 *** MWI 0.2559012 0.0395783 6.4657 1.008e-10 ***
BHR 0.1380360 0.0626250 2.2042 0.0275127 * MYS 0.5692181 0.0678664 8.3873 < 2.2e-16 ***
BLR -0.0016794 0.0644148 -0.0261 0.9791997 NAM 0.0851023 0.0530297 1.6048 0.1085366
BOL 0.1499878 0.0434853 3.4492 0.0005623 *** NER 0.1215929 0.0389985 3.1179 0.0018215 **
BRA 0.4187053 0.0486454 8.6073 < 2.2e-16 *** NGA 0.1458714 0.0482538 3.0230 0.0025028 **
BRN 0.1985702 0.0590947 3.3602 0.0007788 *** NOR -0.0829480 0.0508930 -1.6299 0.1031327
BTN 0.8092509 0.0528381 15.3157 < 2.2e-16 *** NPL 0.1980023 0.0544454 3.6367 0.0002761 ***
BWA 0.0608671 0.0525583 1.1581 0.2468282 NZL 0.2782324 0.0426671 6.5210 6.983e-11 ***
CAF 0.1707404 0.0386785 4.4143 1.013e-05 *** OMN 0.1006940 0.0478666 2.1036 0.0354098 *
CAN 0.4828483 0.0497114 9.7130 < 2.2e-16 *** PAK 0.1386993 0.0541837 2.5598 0.0104734 *
CHL 0.4808447 0.0389068 12.3589 < 2.2e-16 ** PER 0.6002830 0.0390869 15.3577 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHN 0.3151759 0.0490253 6.4288 1.286e-10 *** PNG 0.0944901 0.0707931 1.3347 0.1819624
CIV 0.4281517 0.0526979 8.1247 4.441e-16 *** PRY 0.1184064 0.0465418 2.5441 0.0109563 *
CMR 0.3448431 0.0420928 8.1924 2.220e-16 *** QAT 0.0755123 0.0563801 1.3393 0.1804589
COG 0.0757967 0.0742077 1.0214 0.3070587 ROM 0.2282745 0.0481190 4.7440 2.096e-06 ***
COL 0.1494729 0.0386208 3.8703 0.0001087 *** RUS 0.1951497 0.0485683 4.0180 5.868e-05 ***
CUB 0.2365841 0.0573679 4.1240 3.724e-05 *** RWA 0.4140179 0.0394311 10.4998 < 2.2e-16 ***
DZA 0.3531307 0.0395736 8.9234 < 2.2e-16 *** SAU 0.0651964 0.0505421 1.2899 0.1970708
ECU 0.0897626 0.0378550 2.3712 0.0177293 * SDN 0.5262276 0.0383877 13.7082 < 2.2e-16 ***
EGY 0.5210859 0.0392082 13.2902 < 2.2e-16 *** SLB 0.4235925 0.0784401 5.4002 6.656e-08 ***
EST 0.6050074 0.0624252 9.6917 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 0.2078959 0.1059829 1.9616 0.0498091 *
ETH 0.5358355 0.0394574 13.5801 < 2.2e-16 *** SUR 0.6206734 0.0497119 12.4854 < 2.2e-16 ***
FJI 0.5825541 0.0569720 10.2253 < 2.2e-16 *** SWZ 0.5227450 0.0705510 7.4095 1.268e-13 ***
GAB 0.0632307 0.0532849 1.1867 0.2353644 SYR 0.2812837 0.0525201 5.3557 8.521e-08 ***
GHA 0.5940302 0.0468955 12.6671 < 2.2e-16 *** TGO 0.4604392 0.0453069 10.1627 < 2.2e-16 ***
GIN -0.0238925 0.0475899 -0.5021 0.6156317 THA 0.5025381 0.0569579 8.8230 < 2.2e-16 ***
GNB 0.1204304 0.0866880 1.3892 0.1647600 TKM 0.2622068 0.1573401 1.6665 0.0956144 .
GTM 0.4156329 0.0395506 10.5089 < 2.2e-16 *** TTO 0.7205375 0.0502245 14.3463 < 2.2e-16 ***
GUY 0.1863379 0.0705443 2.6414 0.0082557 ** TUN 0.7414845 0.0453035 16.3671 < 2.2e-16 ***
HND 0.3674034 0.0465311 7.8959 2.887e-15 *** TZA 0.2426000 0.0421156 5.7603 8.395e-09 ***
IDN 0.3795890 0.0476860 7.9602 1.776e-15 *** UGA 0.2583195 0.0381023 6.7796 1.205e-11 ***
IND 0.1684772 0.0442744 3.8053 0.0001416 *** UKR 0.6363864 0.0537973 11.8293 < 2.2e-16 ***
445
IRN 0.1412427 0.0539055 2.6202 0.0087881 ** VEN 0.0251356 0.0449954 0.5586 0.5764170
JAM 0.4384110 0.0510543 8.5872 < 2.2e-16 *** VNM 0.2479243 0.0554885 4.4680 7.894e-06 ***
KAZ 0.0981810 0.0568029 1.7285 0.0839074 . YEM 0.3885246 0.0620007 6.2665 3.694e-10 ***
KEN 0.7249720 0.0421854 17.1854 < 2.2e-16 *** ZAF 0.5743098 0.0434247 13.2254 < 2.2e-16 ***
KGZ 0.5951369 0.0515830 11.5375 < 2.2e-16 *** ZMB 0.6653065 0.0419499 15.8595 < 2.2e-16 ***
KHM 0.7694282 0.0529691 14.5260 < 2.2e-16 *** ZWE 0.3082010 0.0512347 6.0155 1.794e-09 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 2
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG 4.921513 2.596891 1.8952 0.0580718 . LBY 56.217135 3.403653 16.5167 < 2.2e-16 ***
ALB 3.877688 1.692208 2.2915 0.0219348 * LSO 0.008967 2.593889 0.0035 0.9972417
ARE 24.791300 2.962181 8.3693 < 2.2e-16 *** MDG 4.549802 1.542525 2.9496 0.0031821 **
ARG 10.935987 1.932728 5.6583 1.529e-08 *** MEX 9.661037 2.016088 4.7920 1.652e-06 ***
AUS 7.070254 1.416966 4.9897 6.047e-07 *** MKD 5.178711 1.937807 2.6725 0.0075297 **
AZE 44.106973 1.530719 28.8145 < 2.2e-16 *** MLI 2.059855 1.491988 1.3806 0.1673985
BDI 13.748476 1.347613 10.2021 < 2.2e-16 *** MNG 11.435407 1.695931 6.7428 1.553e-11 ***
BEN 2.929582 1.561906 1.8756 0.0607040 . MOZ 9.576282 1.860241 5.1479 2.635e-07 ***
BFA 7.223706 1.496892 4.8258 1.394e-06 *** MRT 25.376287 1.667259 15.2204 < 2.2e-16 ***
BGD 7.852049 1.696903 4.6273 3.705e-06 *** MWI 6.279244 1.493225 4.2052 2.609e-05 ***
BGR 2.342302 2.048131 1.1436 0.2527776 MYS 11.800224 2.809224 4.2005 2.663e-05 ***
BLR 6.182139 2.862191 2.1599 0.0307779 * NAM 1.054059 1.819180 0.5794 0.5623096
BOL 18.474695 1.575349 11.7274 < 2.2e-16 *** NER 2.542743 1.281818 1.9837 0.0472892 *
BRA 9.051099 1.928844 4.6925 2.699e-06 *** NGA 31.776269 1.406402 22.5940 < 2.2e-16 ***
BRN 42.345763 1.907132 22.2039 < 2.2e-16 *** NOR 13.786589 1.651198 8.3494 < 2.2e-16 ***
BTN 12.841014 1.881119 6.8263 8.715e-12 *** NPL 4.685515 1.798274 2.6056 0.0091724 **
BWA 0.833261 1.611484 0.5171 0.6051025 NZL 5.356999 1.769275 3.0278 0.0024635 **
CAF 5.865298 1.257854 4.6629 3.117e-06 *** OMN 32.490571 1.575362 20.6242 < 2.2e-16 ***
CAN 6.920075 1.994291 3.4699 0.0005206 *** PAK 9.796280 1.896311 5.1660 2.392e-07 ***
CHL 14.480411 1.650730 8.7721 < 2.2e-16 *** PER 10.231260 1.668993 6.1302 8.777e-10 ***
CHN 14.180875 2.677604 5.2961 1.183e-07 *** PNG 31.737292 2.193476 14.4689 < 2.2e-16 ***
CIV 7.982508 2.029627 3.9330 8.390e-05 *** PRY 2.815741 1.594748 1.7656 0.0774573 .
CMR 14.571108 1.916980 7.6011 2.931e-14 *** ROM 11.696871 2.358105 4.9603 7.039e-07 ***
COG 53.983801 2.104346 25.6535 < 2.2e-16 *** RUS 31.085532 1.971598 15.7667 < 2.2e-16 ***
COL 10.651868 1.529555 6.9640 3.307e-12 *** RWA 4.101853 1.422108 2.8843 0.0039223 **
CUB 6.150550 1.932252 3.1831 0.0014571 ** SAU 43.621611 1.381892 31.5666 < 2.2e-16 ***
DZA 20.082245 1.781003 11.2758 < 2.2e-16 *** SDN 13.784345 1.361015 10.1280 < 2.2e-16 ***
ECU 21.022778 1.593300 13.1945 < 2.2e-16 *** SLB 13.090082 3.415969 3.8320 0.0001271 ***
EGY 16.592926 1.722524 9.6329 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 2.809040 3.393617 0.8277 0.4078165
EST 2.802259 2.343888 1.1956 0.2318683 SUR 9.334073 1.838420 5.0772 3.830e-07 ***
ETH 8.485518 1.375721 6.1681 6.914e-10 *** SWZ 8.256163 3.419084 2.4147 0.0157469 *
FJI 1.854952 2.021279 0.9177 0.3587697 SYR 22.563558 3.389937 6.6560 2.813e-11 ***
GAB 41.315412 1.491729 27.6963 < 2.2e-16 *** TGO 3.528484 1.518698 2.3234 0.0201597 *
GHA 5.570078 1.634402 3.4080 0.0006544 *** THA 8.681608 2.791847 3.1096 0.0018732 **
GIN 10.297796 1.412385 7.2911 3.075e-13 *** TKM 59.483443 4.967785 11.9738 < 2.2e-16 ***
GTM 6.877967 2.060782 3.3376 0.0008452 *** TTO 30.598904 1.673861 18.2804 < 2.2e-16 ***
GUY 0.706497 2.314414 0.3053 0.7601683 TUN 7.314383 1.979172 3.6957 0.0002193 ***
HND 4.643514 1.953435 2.3771 0.0174493 * TZA 5.250991 1.382719 3.7976 0.0001461 ***
IDN 17.434912 2.239811 7.7841 7.105e-15 *** UGA 6.865054 1.311599 5.2341 1.658e-07 ***
IND 8.179345 1.642090 4.9811 6.324e-07 *** UKR 10.071582 2.309143 4.3616 1.291e-05 ***
IRN 36.287784 1.728482 20.9940 < 2.2e-16 *** VEN 32.957820 1.650725 19.9657 < 2.2e-16 ***
JAM 2.801162 2.014793 1.3903 0.1644385 VNM 13.310089 2.143890 6.2084 5.353e-10 ***
KAZ 42.524419 1.797212 23.6613 < 2.2e-16 *** YEM 30.602564 1.944606 15.7372 < 2.2e-16 ***
KEN 3.914625 1.649780 2.3728 0.0176531 * ZAF 9.580126 1.853785 5.1679 2.368e-07 ***
KGZ 5.752084 1.920966 2.9944 0.0027501 ** ZMB 12.740703 1.626064 7.8353 4.663e-15 ***
KHM 2.664022 2.142812 1.2432 0.2137807 ZWE 9.848895 1.933538 5.0937 3.511e-07 ***
KWT 41.691487 2.451912 17.0037 < 2.2e-16 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 2
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1992 13.2966 1.6276 8.1693 2.220e-16 *** 2002 11.0865 1.2998 8.5296 < 2.2e-16 ***
1993 14.9058 1.5123 9.8566 < 2.2e-16 *** 2003 12.3225 1.3409 9.1897 < 2.2e-16 ***
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1994 13.4472 1.4319 9.3913 < 2.2e-16 *** 2004 13.4894 1.3715 9.8353 < 2.2e-16 ***
1995 10.9704 1.3754 7.9761 1.554e-15 *** 2005 14.9223 1.3420 11.1193 < 2.2e-16 ***
1996 11.7259 1.3486 8.6951 < 2.2e-16 *** 2006 16.5455 1.3419 12.3300 < 2.2e-16 ***
1997 10.9556 1.3417 8.1657 2.220e-16 *** 2007 15.7610 1.3232 11.9116 < 2.2e-16 ***
1998 9.3141 1.3185 7.0643 1.614e-12 *** 2008 17.0096 1.3088 12.9959 < 2.2e-16 ***
1999 10.4639 1.3038 8.0259 1.110e-15 *** 2009 11.4400 1.2892 8.8738 < 2.2e-16 ***
2000 12.9767 1.2967 10.0077 < 2.2e-16 *** 2010 12.6729 1.2886 9.8350 < 2.2e-16 ***
2001 11.9302 1.3134 9.0833 < 2.2e-16 *** 2011 12.1335 1.3263 9.1483 < 2.2e-16 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 2
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG 0.214759 0.076390 2.8113 0.0049335 ** KWT 0.106124 0.069655 1.5236 0.1276135
ALB 0.539128 0.042500 12.6855 < 2.2e-16 *** LBY 0.035467 0.120446 0.2945 0.7684037
ARE 0.211906 0.095133 2.2275 0.0259162 * LSO 0.248073 0.074493 3.3302 0.0008679 ***
ARG 0.038832 0.043810 0.8864 0.3754121 MDG 0.565178 0.038398 14.7190 < 2.2e-16 ***
AUS 0.100524 0.043524 2.3096 0.0209083 * MEX 0.299845 0.052732 5.6862 1.299e-08 ***
AZE 0.272956 0.059011 4.6255 3.737e-06 *** MKD 0.460094 0.049554 9.2848 < 2.2e-16 ***
BDI 0.239223 0.039431 6.0669 1.304e-09 *** MLI 0.132454 0.045719 2.8971 0.0037659 **
BEN 0.597426 0.044093 13.5491 < 2.2e-16 *** MNG 0.041090 0.055677 0.7380 0.4605104
BFA 0.217166 0.039683 5.4725 4.437e-08 *** MOZ 0.548137 0.050292 10.8991 < 2.2e-16 ***
BGD 0.492689 0.040146 12.2726 < 2.2e-16 *** MRT 0.245017 0.054242 4.5171 6.269e-06 ***
BGR 0.402395 0.058465 6.8826 5.876e-12 *** MWI 0.254441 0.040364 6.3036 2.908e-10 ***
BHR 0.134825 0.066719 2.0208 0.0433010 * MYS 0.558840 0.072240 7.7358 1.021e-14 ***
BLR -0.011193 0.067103 -0.1668 0.8675249 NAM 0.081140 0.054177 1.4977 0.1342175
BOL 0.147488 0.045244 3.2598 0.0011149 ** NER 0.119563 0.039607 3.0187 0.0025386 **
BRA 0.411960 0.049975 8.2433 2.220e-16 *** NGA 0.144099 0.051834 2.7800 0.0054363 **
BRN 0.196223 0.063875 3.0720 0.0021262 ** NOR -0.089563 0.053452 -1.6756 0.0938213 .
BTN 0.807725 0.054390 14.8507 < 2.2e-16 *** NPL 0.196691 0.054998 3.5763 0.0003485 ***
BWA 0.057562 0.053709 1.0717 0.2838417 NZL 0.274161 0.043731 6.2693 3.628e-10 ***
CAF 0.168378 0.039444 4.2688 1.966e-05 *** OMN 0.097746 0.053135 1.8396 0.0658299 .
CAN 0.475473 0.051657 9.2044 < 2.2e-16 *** PAK 0.137083 0.054819 2.5006 0.0123970 *
CHL 0.478736 0.040257 11.8920 < 2.2e-16 *** PER 0.599083 0.039718 15.0833 < 2.2e-16 ***
CHN 0.308052 0.050803 6.0637 1.331e-09 *** PNG 0.090950 0.074546 1.2201 0.2224426
CIV 0.422312 0.054349 7.7704 7.772e-15 *** PRY 0.116541 0.047608 2.4479 0.0143682 *
CMR 0.343090 0.043108 7.9589 1.776e-15 *** QAT 0.074361 0.060865 1.2217 0.2218093
COG 0.071295 0.081305 0.8769 0.3805448 ROM 0.221761 0.049868 4.4470 8.709e-06 ***
COL 0.147584 0.039375 3.7482 0.0001781 *** RUS 0.190069 0.051874 3.6641 0.0002482 ***
CUB 0.235263 0.057888 4.0641 4.822e-05 *** RWA 0.413140 0.039818 10.3758 < 2.2e-16 ***
DZA 0.352303 0.042122 8.3638 < 2.2e-16 *** SAU 0.063830 0.055616 1.1477 0.2510921
ECU 0.088323 0.039529 2.2344 0.0254553 * SDN 0.525619 0.039250 13.3916 < 2.2e-16 ***
EGY 0.519950 0.040307 12.8998 < 2.2e-16 *** SLB 0.422259 0.079717 5.2969 1.178e-07 ***
EST 0.596076 0.065384 9.1165 < 2.2e-16 *** SLE 0.206937 0.106670 1.9400 0.0523824 .
ETH 0.535120 0.040135 13.3330 < 2.2e-16 *** SUR 0.619352 0.050462 12.2737 < 2.2e-16 ***
FJI 0.580212 0.058115 9.9838 < 2.2e-16 *** SWZ 0.518001 0.072402 7.1545 8.396e-13 ***
GAB 0.060996 0.058846 1.0365 0.2999467 SYR 0.279167 0.054794 5.0949 3.490e-07 ***
GHA 0.592236 0.047964 12.3476 < 2.2e-16 *** TGO 0.458032 0.046380 9.8756 < 2.2e-16 ***
GIN -0.025283 0.048702 -0.5191 0.6036599 THA 0.493519 0.059562 8.2858 2.220e-16 ***
GNB 0.118838 0.087304 1.3612 0.1734509 TKM 0.260073 0.161535 1.6100 0.1073941
GTM 0.413758 0.040205 10.2912 < 2.2e-16 *** TTO 0.717556 0.054881 13.0748 < 2.2e-16 ***
GUY 0.182501 0.072982 2.5007 0.0123965 * TUN 0.736289 0.046976 15.6738 < 2.2e-16 ***
HND 0.364929 0.047696 7.6512 1.998e-14 *** TZA 0.241283 0.042804 5.6369 1.731e-08 ***
IDN 0.373528 0.049719 7.5128 5.795e-14 *** UGA 0.257092 0.038747 6.6351 3.242e-11 ***
IND 0.163787 0.045376 3.6096 0.0003067 *** UKR 0.628551 0.056213 11.1817 < 2.2e-16 ***
IRN 0.140289 0.056737 2.4726 0.0134131 * VEN 0.023438 0.047937 0.4889 0.6248898
JAM 0.436734 0.052023 8.3951 < 2.2e-16 *** VNM 0.242587 0.058095 4.1757 2.971e-05 ***
KAZ 0.096056 0.061637 1.5584 0.1191326 YEM 0.387694 0.064530 6.0079 1.879e-09 ***
KEN 0.723311 0.042762 16.9149 < 2.2e-16 *** ZAF 0.569393 0.044743 12.7258 < 2.2e-16 ***
KGZ 0.590944 0.053149 11.1186 < 2.2e-16 *** ZMB 0.663341 0.043376 15.2928 < 2.2e-16 ***
KHM 0.766211 0.054174 14.1435 < 2.2e-16 *** ZWE 0.305233 0.052523 5.8114 6.194e-09 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time Fixed-E ects for regression 1 model 2
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
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1992 0.359615 0.038014 9.4600 < 2.2e-16 *** 2002 0.312230 0.031457 9.9257 < 2.2e-16 ***
1993 0.330350 0.036406 9.0740 < 2.2e-16 *** 2003 0.326530 0.031927 10.2273 < 2.2e-16 ***
1994 0.327051 0.033185 9.8555 < 2.2e-16 *** 2004 0.314899 0.032896 9.5724 < 2.2e-16 ***
1995 0.325420 0.032166 10.1168 < 2.2e-16 *** 2005 0.338458 0.033498 10.1039 < 2.2e-16 ***
1996 0.349577 0.031141 11.2257 < 2.2e-16 *** 2006 0.331016 0.034379 9.6284 < 2.2e-16 ***
1997 0.341769 0.031015 11.0196 < 2.2e-16 *** 2007 0.326401 0.034203 9.5432 < 2.2e-16 ***
1998 0.341378 0.030697 11.1208 < 2.2e-16 *** 2008 0.323610 0.035329 9.1598 < 2.2e-16 ***
1999 0.312046 0.031475 9.9142 < 2.2e-16 *** 2009 0.341272 0.032873 10.3817 < 2.2e-16 ***
2000 0.306784 0.031979 9.5933 < 2.2e-16 *** 2010 0.342457 0.032903 10.4081 < 2.2e-16 ***
2001 0.309099 0.032024 9.6521 < 2.2e-16 *** 2011 0.320982 0.034096 9.4141 < 2.2e-16 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 3
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG 2.03909 1.85348 1.1001 0.2712713 LBY 14.72433 2.71603 5.4213 5.918e-08 ***
ALB 2.45796 1.21346 2.0256 0.0428077 * LSO 2.74694 1.86815 1.4704 0.1414502
ARE 10.50765 2.15342 4.8795 1.063e-06 *** MDG 2.33317 1.12692 2.0704 0.0384154 *
ARG 4.67508 1.41149 3.3121 0.0009258 *** MEX 3.73756 1.48749 2.5127 0.0119822 *
AUS 3.09240 1.04060 2.9718 0.0029610 ** MKD 3.50134 1.40266 2.4962 0.0125526 *
AZE 13.64369 1.42502 9.5744 < 2.2e-16 *** MLI 1.73605 1.06260 1.6338 0.1023077
BDI 4.78758 1.00264 4.7750 1.797e-06 *** MNG 5.67420 1.22626 4.6272 3.706e-06 ***
BEN 1.56691 1.11490 1.4054 0.1598928 MOZ 4.22318 1.34463 3.1408 0.0016850 **
BFA 3.19194 1.08017 2.9550 0.0031265 ** MRT 11.49040 1.26352 9.0939 < 2.2e-16 ***
BGD 3.52491 1.25054 2.8187 0.0048219 ** MWI 3.06121 1.07708 2.8421 0.0044811 **
BGR 2.45861 1.48221 1.6587 0.0971683 . MYS 6.04010 2.07407 2.9122 0.0035889 **
BLR 4.07999 2.09037 1.9518 0.0509619 . NAM 1.84296 1.30872 1.4082 0.1590680
BOL 7.10118 1.19940 5.9206 3.207e-09 *** NER 1.27096 0.91563 1.3881 0.1651144
BRA 3.27083 1.40335 2.3307 0.0197680 * NGA 9.02980 1.21124 7.4550 8.993e-14 ***
BRN 12.80398 1.68286 7.6085 2.776e-14 *** NOR 4.85459 1.22457 3.9643 7.360e-05 ***
BTN 4.53747 1.36685 3.3197 0.0009013 *** NPL 1.93395 1.28363 1.5066 0.1319073
BWA 1.58676 1.15171 1.3777 0.1682831 NZL 2.67904 1.29838 2.0634 0.0390774 *
CAF 2.29671 0.90568 2.5359 0.0112158 * OMN 10.89384 1.33433 8.1643 2.220e-16 ***
CAN 3.28584 1.46628 2.2409 0.0250302 * PAK 3.77757 1.37004 2.7573 0.0058287 **
CHL 5.85707 1.22280 4.7899 1.669e-06 *** PER 4.46798 1.22111 3.6590 0.0002532 ***
CHN 5.51587 1.97820 2.7883 0.0052981 ** PNG 11.88685 1.67611 7.0919 1.322e-12 ***
CIV 4.03936 1.47331 2.7417 0.0061123 ** PRY 2.42884 1.16086 2.0923 0.0364144 *
CMR 5.72823 1.40627 4.0734 4.634e-05 *** ROM 4.69055 1.72998 2.7113 0.0067014 **
COG 16.35055 1.87912 8.7012 < 2.2e-16 *** RUS 8.99514 1.56794 5.7369 9.642e-09 ***
COL 4.26988 1.12486 3.7959 0.0001471 *** RWA 1.72505 1.01666 1.6968 0.0897370 .
CUB 3.04763 1.38299 2.2037 0.0275482 * SAU 14.43091 1.33986 10.7705 < 2.2e-16 ***
DZA 8.35944 1.37519 6.0788 1.211e-09 *** SDN 5.11846 1.00456 5.0952 3.484e-07 ***
ECU 7.55169 1.21860 6.1970 5.754e-10 *** SLB 3.49978 2.44279 1.4327 0.1519450
EGY 6.05213 1.27981 4.7289 2.257e-06 *** SLE 1.16161 2.41002 0.4820 0.6298106
EST 2.69694 1.69570 1.5905 0.1117318 SUR 2.93996 1.32830 2.2133 0.0268746 *
ETH 2.79676 0.99465 2.8118 0.0049263 ** SWZ 6.13200 2.48270 2.4699 0.0135153 *
FJI 2.52677 1.44971 1.7429 0.0813424 . SYR 5.70013 2.46056 2.3166 0.0205253 *
GAB 13.79113 1.34667 10.2409 < 2.2e-16 *** TGO 2.19495 1.08770 2.0180 0.0435945 *
GHA 3.26357 1.17107 2.7868 0.0053226 ** THA 4.96450 2.06467 2.4045 0.0161948 *
GIN 4.21026 1.02271 4.1168 3.842e-05 *** TKM 34.74128 3.61227 9.6176 < 2.2e-16 ***
GTM 3.60865 1.48672 2.4273 0.0152132 * TTO 10.91411 1.36560 7.9922 1.332e-15 ***
GUY 2.57079 1.66323 1.5457 0.1221876 TUN 3.74558 1.44898 2.5850 0.0097387 **
HND 3.34808 1.41203 2.3711 0.0177342 * TZA 2.46733 0.99190 2.4875 0.0128649 *
IDN 6.46884 1.68846 3.8312 0.0001275 *** UGA 2.35693 0.94637 2.4905 0.0127564 *
IND 3.12569 1.20908 2.5852 0.0097329 ** UKR 4.61687 1.68525 2.7396 0.0061520 **
IRN 13.14445 1.41717 9.2751 < 2.2e-16 *** VEN 10.27683 1.37244 7.4880 6.994e-14 ***
JAM 2.01329 1.43962 1.3985 0.1619671 VNM 6.09859 1.56589 3.8947 9.834e-05 ***
KAZ 14.18468 1.54584 9.1760 < 2.2e-16 *** YEM 8.91238 1.52930 5.8277 5.618e-09 ***
KEN 2.12595 1.20770 1.7603 0.0783512 . ZAF 4.08735 1.36286 2.9991 0.0027077 **
KGZ 3.83990 1.38370 2.7751 0.0055184 ** ZMB 5.52799 1.18512 4.6645 3.093e-06 ***
KHM 2.54245 1.54144 1.6494 0.0990665 . ZWE 4.80273 1.40023 3.4299 0.0006037 ***
KWT 14.10558 1.92715 7.3194 2.491e-13 ** *
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Time fixed-e ects for regression 2 model 3
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Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1993 5.49547 1.13271 4.8516 1.225e-06 *** 2003 5.84217 0.99482 5.8726 4.290e-09 ***
1994 4.57820 1.07285 4.2673 1.978e-05 *** 2004 6.38745 1.02040 6.2598 3.855e-10 ***
1995 4.19973 1.01873 4.1225 3.747e-05 *** 2005 7.57799 1.00026 7.5760 3.553e-14 ***
1996 4.97936 1.00023 4.9782 6.418e-07 *** 2006 6.37586 1.02212 6.2379 4.436e-10 ***
1997 3.73695 0.99856 3.7423 0.0001823 *** 2007 5.02893 1.01409 4.9591 7.083e-07 ***
1998 2.35031 0.98111 2.3956 0.0165948 * 2008 7.50680 0.99291 7.5604 4.019e-14 ***
1999 5.14685 0.96134 5.3538 8.611e-08 *** 2009 0.91390 0.98880 0.9243 0.3553542
2000 7.79443 0.95620 8.1514 4.441e-16 *** 2010 5.76298 0.95799 6.0157 1.791e-09 ***
2001 3.50162 0.98901 3.5405 0.0003993 *** 2011 5.41324 0.98281 5.5079 3.631e-08 ***
2002 3.72796 0.97166 3.8367 0.0001247 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
Fixed-e ects for regression 1 model 3
Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Country Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AFG 0.162377 0.071511 2.2707 0.0231672 * KHM 0.363692 0.049779 7.3061 2.749e-13 ***
ALB 0.279924 0.038161 7.3353 2.212e-13 *** KWT 0.060706 0.061555 0.9862 0.3240285
ARE 0.134774 0.127439 1.0576 0.2902558 LBY 0.034093 0.132169 0.2580 0.7964426
ARG 0.014110 0.037436 0.3769 0.7062422 LSO 0.139902 0.068933 2.0295 0.0424045 *
AUS 0.045021 0.037287 1.2074 0.2272687 MDG 0.263823 0.035256 7.4831 7.261e-14 ***
AZE 0.119733 0.050731 2.3602 0.0182673 * MEX 0.153737 0.046076 3.3366 0.0008482 ***
BDI 0.130988 0.033707 3.8860 0.0001019 *** MKD 0.215523 0.043573 4.9463 7.565e-07 ***
BEN 0.323934 0.039950 8.1085 4.441e-16 *** MLI 0.028115 0.040117 0.7008 0.4834141
BFA 0.096072 0.035002 2.7447 0.0060558 ** MNG 0.029263 0.047688 0.6136 0.5394554
BGD 0.229763 0.037022 6.2062 5.430e-10 *** MOZ 0.265901 0.045104 5.8953 3.740e-09 ***
BGR 0.214628 0.050835 4.2221 2.421e-05 *** MRT 0.156220 0.047074 3.3186 0.0009047 ***
BHR 0.011183 0.057063 0.1960 0.8446233 MWI 0.120363 0.034340 3.5051 0.0004565 ***
BLR 0.010023 0.057534 0.1742 0.8616953 MYS 0.313689 0.063616 4.9310 8.182e-07 ***
BOL 0.061086 0.038980 1.5671 0.1170881 NAM 0.046206 0.046526 0.9931 0.3206499
BRA 0.177123 0.044281 4.0000 6.334e-05 *** NER 0.068945 0.033538 2.0557 0.0398100 *
BRN 0.134713 0.061332 2.1965 0.0280592 * NGA 0.092146 0.045081 2.0440 0.0409528 *
BTN 0.356810 0.054366 6.5631 5.271e-11 *** NOR -0.037009 0.045834 -0.8075 0.4193965
BWA 0.044988 0.045844 0.9813 0.3264301 NPL 0.030057 0.062452 0.4813 0.6303194
CAF 0.080988 0.033535 2.4150 0.0157348 * NZL 0.141748 0.037825 3.7475 0.0001786 ***
CAN 0.236632 0.045904 5.1550 2.536e-07 *** OMN 0.067038 0.045494 1.4736 0.1406005
CHL 0.232240 0.035998 6.4515 1.107e-10 *** PAK 0.062939 0.047351 1.3292 0.1837797
CHN 0.126078 0.044805 2.8140 0.0048936 ** PER 0.268449 0.037655 7.1291 1.010e-12 ***
CIV 0.222126 0.048210 4.6075 4.076e-06 *** PNG 0.089539 0.071577 1.2509 0.2109530
CMR 0.191136 0.037468 5.1014 3.372e-07 *** PRY 0.040010 0.040388 0.9906 0.3218687
COG 0.083574 0.074828 1.1169 0.2640480 QAT 0.041302 0.051652 0.7996 0.4239246
COL 0.062364 0.033653 1.8532 0.0638606 . ROM 0.134172 0.042747 3.1387 0.0016969 **
CUB 0.058361 0.050733 1.1504 0.2499914 RUS 0.094673 0.044676 2.1191 0.0340846 *
DZA 0.180201 0.036740 4.9048 9.351e-07 *** RWA 0.162903 0.036101 4.5124 6.410e-06 ***
ECU 0.052561 0.033399 1.5737 0.1155542 SAU 0.037077 0.048731 0.7608 0.4467497
EGY 0.240873 0.036378 6.6213 3.560e-11 *** SDN 0.254056 0.035785 7.0996 1.251e-12 ***
EST 0.302533 0.058010 5.2152 1.837e-07 *** SLB 0.155354 0.074887 2.0745 0.0380312 *
ETH 0.279728 0.037240 7.5115 5.840e-14 *** SUR 0.249724 0.048486 5.1504 2.599e-07 ***
FJI 0.288243 0.054150 5.3230 1.021e-07 *** SWZ 0.234454 0.063707 3.6802 0.0002330 ***
GAB 0.047229 0.051424 0.9184 0.3584031 SYR 0.171479 0.047633 3.6000 0.0003182 ***
GHA 0.277911 0.044564 6.2362 4.484e-10 *** TGO 0.233185 0.041701 5.5918 2.248e-08 ***
GIN -0.018026 0.042797 -0.4212 0.6736051 THA 0.236168 0.052995 4.4564 8.334e-06 ***
GNB 0.126295 0.086692 1.4568 0.1451631 TTO 0.360777 0.050292 7.1737 7.303e-13 ***
GTM 0.188188 0.035608 5.2849 1.257e-07 *** TUN 0.362582 0.043992 8.2420 2.220e-16 ***
GUY 0.093055 0.062873 1.4800 0.1388632 TZA 0.127489 0.037194 3.4276 0.0006089 ***
HND 0.182073 0.042295 4.3048 1.671e-05 *** UGA 0.137568 0.033402 4.1186 3.812e-05 ***
IDN 0.185750 0.044084 4.2136 2.513e-05 *** UKR 0.321717 0.050318 6.3937 1.619e-10 ***
IND 0.070480 0.039170 1.7993 0.0719647 . VEN 0.014548 0.040657 0.3578 0.7204814
IRN 0.063641 0.049285 1.2913 0.1966054 VNM 0.161183 0.050170 3.2127 0.0013148 **
JAM 0.163150 0.046357 3.5194 0.0004324 *** YEM 0.219626 0.056999 3.8532 0.0001166 ***
KAZ 0.060690 0.052613 1.1535 0.2486980 ZAF 0.288754 0.040854 7.0679 1.573e-12 ***
KEN 0.338312 0.041489 8.1542 4.441e-16 *** ZMB 0.338657 0.040239 8.4161 < 2.2e-16 ***
KGZ 0.310603 0.048934 6.3473 2.191e-10 *** ZWE 0.191635 0.049499 3.8715 0.0001082 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1
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Time Fixed-E ects for regression 1 model 3
Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) Year Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
1993 0.192586 0.033932 5.6757 1.381e-08 *** 2003 0.171771 0.028707 5.9837 2.181e-09 ***
1994 0.143885 0.031672 4.5429 5.548e-06 *** 2004 0.153102 0.029395 5.2084 1.905e-07 ***
1995 0.185652 0.030335 6.1200 9.357e-10 *** 2005 0.161499 0.029790 5.4212 5.921e-08 ***
1996 0.176188 0.028649 6.1498 7.759e-10 *** 2006 0.165124 0.030485 5.4166 6.074e-08 ***
1997 0.162242 0.028167 5.7600 8.414e-09 *** 2007 0.164994 0.030305 5.4444 5.197e-08 ***
1998 0.180375 0.027663 6.5204 7.014e-11 *** 2008 0.163414 0.031379 5.2078 1.910e-07 ***
1999 0.132417 0.028209 4.6942 2.677e-06 *** 2009 0.179203 0.029262 6.1241 9.121e-10 ***
2000 0.155780 0.029105 5.3524 8.680e-08 *** 2010 0.159359 0.029393 5.4217 5.903e-08 ***
2001 0.156408 0.028670 5.4555 4.884e-08 *** 2011 0.151786 0.030153 5.0339 4.806e-07 ***
2002 0.154714 0.028000 5.5255 3.285e-08 ***
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,.p < 0.1

Appendix I
Metadata for the econometric
regressions
We use three databases for our dataset. International trade data used to build the gl1,
gl2 and gl4 variables are extracted from the COMTRADE 1 database. We use the WITS 2
extractor from the World Bank to select the product range. We use the HS 1988/92 database
and extract the available UNCTAD SoP1 to SoP4 bundles for years 1992 to 2011. Those
bundles are aggregated data on imports and exports. Bundle SoP1 is for raw materials, SoP2
for intermediate goods and SoP4 for capital goods. We extract exports and imports value for
those three bundles for the 94 countries composing sample g2 (see the list below). Sample g2
is composed of countries earning more than 2% of GDP in natural resources rent on average
between 1992 and 2011. Sample g5 follows the same rule with a threshold at 5%, which gives
a total of 60 countries (see the list below). We then compute the values for the Grubel-Lloyd
index using the formula presented in chapter 4:
GLi,t =
(Xi,t+Mi,t)≠ |Xi,t≠Mi,t|
Xi,t+Mi,t
= 1≠ |Xi,t≠Mi,t|
Xi,t+Mi,t
;0ØGLi,t Ø 1 (I.1)
With Xi,t the exports of country i in t, and Mi,t the imports.
Data on the volume of trade as a percentage of GDP vt, the growth rate of GDP gg
and the value-added in manufacturing as a share of GDP man are obtained from the World
Development Indicators (WDI) available in the World Bank databank 3. We extract data for
those three series for the years 1992 to 2011. Data on commodities prices comes from the Global
Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities. We extract monthly data starting in January 1992
for the “All commodities price index”, with a reference year 2005=100. The index aggregates,
Fuel, Non-Fuel, Food, Beverages, Industrial and Agricultural Inputs, Metals and Energy. We
then compute a simple average per year for the index and to obtain a series of 20 points. Those
values are then matched with all the countries in both samples. Finally, resources rents are
obtained from the Wealth Accounting database from the World Bank databank. We extract
total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP for all the countries in both samples, for
years 1992 to 2011.
1. http://comtrade.un.org/
2. https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx
3. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
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Countries in sample g5
United Arab Emirates Guinea Qatar
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Romania
Azerbaijan Guyana Russia
Burundi India Saudi Arabia
Bahrain Iran (Islamic Republic of) Sudan
Bolivia Kazakhstan Solomon Islands
Brunei Darussalam Kuwait Sierra Leone
Bhutan Lybian Arab Jamahiriya Suriname
Central African Republic Mexico Syria
Chile Mali Turkmenistan
China Mongolia Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Mozambique Tanzania, United Republic of
Congo Mauritania Uganda
Colombia Malawi Ukraine
Algeria Malaysia Venezuela
Ecuador Nigeria Vietnam
Egypt Norway Yemen
Ethiopia Oman South Africa
Gabon Peru Zambia
Ghana Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe
Note that those lists contain more countries than were used in the regressions. This is
because depending on missing data, some countries were dropped altogether during our econo-
metric tests. The final list of countries contains a maximum of 50 countries for sample g5 and
87 for sample g2 at a time.
Countries in sample g2
Afghanistan Colombia Lesotho Rwanda
Albania Cuba Madagascar Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates Algeria Mexico Sudan
Argentina Ecuador Macedonia Solomon Islands
Australia Egypt Mali Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Estonia Mongolia Suriname
Burundi Ethiopia Mozambique Swaziland
Benin Fiji Mauritania Syria
Burkina Faso Gabon Malawi Togo
Bangladesh Ghana Malaysia Thailand
Bulgaria Guinea Namibia Turkmenistan
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Belarus Guatemala Nigeria Tunisia
Bolivia Guyana Norway Tanzania (United Republic of)
Brazil Honduras Nepal Uganda
Brunei Darussalam India New Zealand Ukraine
Botswana Iran (Islamic Republic of) Oman Venezuela
Central African Republic Jamaica Pakistan Vietnam
Canada Kazakhstan Peru Yemen
Chile Kenya Papua New Guinea South Africa
China Kyrgyzstan Paraguay Zambia
Cote d’Ivoire Cambodia Qatar Zimbabwe
Cameroon Kuwait Romania
Congo Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Russia
Appendix J
Robustness tests with sub-samples
We split our samples g5 and g2 in the year 2002, constituting four sub-samples covering
the periods 1992-2002 and 2002-2012. Sample g5 is split into two parts of 600 theoretical
observations each. Sample g2 is split into two parts of 960 observations each. The actual
number of observations used in each model is mentioned at the bottom of the tables. As
more observations are missing (mostly in developing countries) at the beginning of the period,
sub-samples for years 2002-2012 are larger.
Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g5 1992-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.257196ú 0.767039úúú ≠0.218116
(0.104591) (0.069825) (0.223455)
gl1 ≠3.378113ú ≠2.636941+ ≠2.800096+ ≠6.832167 ≠8.321342
(1.470511) (1.505893) (1.580480) (4.366742) (6.658232)
gl4 1.051416 1.700555+ 0.776028 4.094516 ≠0.821696
(1.238534) (0.891276) (0.894190) (5.475021) (12.55616)
gg 0.003539 0.016557 ≠0.018004 ≠0.011387 0.107184
(0.053303) (0.060959) (0.078956) (0.174947) (0.134740)
man ≠0.054241 ≠0.018952 ≠0.031576 ≠0.201991 ≠0.344761
(0.087312) (0.106600) (0.080420) (0.356597) (0.301670)
vt 0.061210úú 0.059068úú 0.057227+ 0.108457ú 0.098449
(0.021834) (0.018077) (0.031220) (0.054894) (0.073651)
cp 0.367960úúú
(0.056233)
(Intercept) ≠1.99737 15.95702ú
(7.832099) (7.790101)
R2 .30451 0.037989 0.10749 0.7986
Adj. R2 0.25391 0.030805 0.086122
Num. obs. 349 349 332 271 332 (30 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
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Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g5 1992-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.395079úúú 0.772382 0.434620
(0.096424) (0.081647) (0.283652)
rr ≠0.004781úúú ≠0.004859úúú ≠0.003956úúú 0.0033232 ≠0.004156ú
(0.001014) (0.001101) (0.000520) (0.0023946) (0.0020396)
gl2 0.137644úúú 0.132860úúú 0.054292 0.290216 0.087159
(0.039286) (0.038073) (0.043133) (0.1725071) (0.152542)
gl4 0.044928 0.035426 ≠0.007097 0.0573795 0.155976
(0.055606) (0.052286) (0.074294) (0.133066) (0.105741)
vt 0.002093ú 0.001932ú 0.001231 0.000253 0.000291
(0.000822) (0.000927) (0.000753) (.001204) (0.000621)
(Intercept) ≠0.049836 0.148517
(0.120969) (0.114239)
R2 0.065436 0.054475 0.18631 0.7392
Adj. R2 0.054712 0.044186 0.14512
Num. obs. 360 360 294 237 294 (24 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g2 1992-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.249630+ 0.759037úúú 0.558484úúú
(0.149477) (0.062919) (0.059144)
gl1 ≠2.593402úú ≠2.034687ú ≠2.044342ú ≠6.322186ú ≠5.607611úú
(0.891837) (0.859241) (0.895652) (3.226901) (1.880661)
gl4 1.797912+ 2.140386ú 1.443402 5.39859 1.594326
(1.026493) (0.834136) (1.059947) (3.650851) (1.505335)
gg ≠0.000135 0.002854 ≠0.026970 ≠0.080622 ≠0.036411
(0.025887) (0.030056) (0.046040) (0.108306) (0.052346)
man ≠0.109774 ≠0.116203 ≠0.125963+ ≠0.470958úú ≠0.246007úú
(0.074361) (0.084960) (0.075562) (0.173499) (0.090552)
vt 0.043498úúú 0.045138úúú 0.036371+ 0.057225ú 0.036411úú
(0.013050) (0.012837) (0.019760) (0.057254) (0.0132963)
cp 0.230779úúú
(0.035862)
(Intercept) 5.201472 6.6554úúú
(4.065938) (1.891659)
R2 0.18718 0.031598 0.093618 0.8169
Adj. R2 0.1562 0.025915 0.075887
Num. obs. 556 556 528 428 528 (40 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
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Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g2 1992-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.324733úúú 0.704405 0.606245úúú
(0.093609) (0.142116) (0.188466)
rr ≠0.004365úúú ≠0.004422úúú ≠0.003685úúú ≠0.004796ú ≠0.0042834úú
(0.000965) (0.000878) (0.000475) (0.002436) (0.001844)
gl2 0.130977úúú 0.129331úúú 0.089184ú 0.328922ú ≠0.053997
(0.037977) (0.037983) (0.037157) (0.167532) (0.121270)
gl4 0.047065 0.043687 ≠0.008714 0.151462 0.137901
(0.052558) (0.046423) (0.055585) (0.142116) (0.091789)
vt 0.001256ú 0.001137 0.000634 ≠0.0003321 0.0001545
(0.000607) (0.000719) (0.000504) (0.001346) (0.0007787)
(Intercept) ≠0.030913 0.185024+
(0.114211) (0.110125)
R2 0.044857 0.039306 0.12488 0.6665
Adj. R2 0.037627 0.032357 0.098893
Num. obs. 577 577 471 378 471 (41 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g5 2002-2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.626421úúú 1.626745 0.924466úúú
(0.102039) (2.130158) (0.116852)
gl1 ≠0.762479 ≠2.656644 ≠1.105699 ≠13.69712 ≠2.835927
(1.587943) (1.714872) (0.937732) (53.46419) (3.816486)
gl4 8.634755úúú 6.842307úú 6.005152ú 47.38885 23.48135
(2.278436) (2.261418) (2.650014) (139.1027) (15.141401)
gg 0.458047úúú 0.274438úúú 0.243397úúú 0.248741 0.278110ú
(0.091852) (0.081951) (0.071221) (0.836015) (0.141401)
man ≠1.128516úúú ≠1.421493úúú ≠0.677803úú 4.756719 ≠0.724548+
(0.124840) (0.096638) (0.212587) (15.91052) (0.373814)
vt 0.027560 0.023940 ≠0.004773 0.0113161 ≠0.008754
(0.027164) (0.023465) (0.009714) (0.073502) (0.024355)
cp 0.038129ú
(0.017803)
(Intercept) ≠72.00606 5.913669
(236.4328) (3.960782)
R2 0.28194 0.15495 0.48787 .
Adj. R2 0.23989 0.12881 0.39732
Num. obs. 409 409 361 304 361 (30 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
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Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g5 2002-2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.332381úúú 0.657773úúú 0.921503úúú
(0.092767) (0.100133) (0.108726)
rr ≠0.001650ú ≠0.001714 ≠0.000741 ≠0.004003 ≠0.000781
(0.000719) (0.001434) (0.000769) (0.003190) (0.000875)
gl2 0.146422úúú 0.140647úúú 0.088369úúú 0.020692 0.0054219
(0.040304) (0.040996) (0.025637) (0.099231) (0.067870)
gl4 0.235390úúú 0.242735úúú 0.135548 0.425714 ≠0.003080
(0.033007) (0.033268) (0.076110) (0.291674) (0.031939)
vt ≠0.000183 ≠0.000156 ≠0.000119 ≠0.000032 0.000042
(0.000101) (0.000136) (0.000140) (0.000718) (0.0001885)
(Intercept) 0.072864 0.031131
(0.177283) (0.054706)
R2 0.059806 0.058339 0.16411 0.5975 1.000000
Adj. R2 0.052117 0.049766 0.13656
Num. obs. 490 490 423 361 423 (24 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
Model 1 to 5 for regression 1 sample g2 2002-2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(rr) 0.606277úúú 0.917283úúú 0.949489úúú
(0.118302) (0.068018) (0.031308)
gl1 ≠0.490777 ≠0.618962 0.624791 0.059771 ≠0.892778
(1.181813) (1.143717) (0.670208) (3.020711) (0.977407)
gl4 5.234963úúú 4.687605úúú 4.030676úú 0.441138 0.540586
(1.247531) (0.975195) (1.427341) (5.477811) (0.512113)
gg 0.306779úúú 0.185930úúú 0.151849úú 0.106602 0.073225
(0.060629) (0.051578) (0.046886) (0.107208) (0.0491274)
man ≠0.513266úúú ≠0.595614úúú ≠0.206139ú ≠0.519696 ≠0.068946ú
(0.145822) (0.160177) (0.099902) (0.367724) (0.029882)
vt 0.027037 0.023380 ≠0.008898 ≠0.011822 ≠0.000830
(0.028277) (0.025852) (0.011167) (0.022509) (0.014431)
cp 0.032234úú
(0.010462)
(Intercept) 8.936551 2.360863
(6.740742) (0.838273)
R2 0.20419 0.071839 0.42185 0.8978
Adj. R2 0.17637 0.061245 0.3531
Num. obs. 712 712 632 533 632 (40 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1
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Model 1 to 5 for regression 2 sample g2 2002-2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lag(gl1) 0.321868úúú 0.610818úúú 0.770008úúú
(0.079908) (0.100782) (0.112790)
rr ≠0.001340 ≠0.001076 ≠0.000796 ≠0.003642 ≠0.002304ú
(0.000720) (0.001025) (0.000686) (0.003098) (0.003098)
gl2 0.134044úú 0.132334úú 0.072933 0.065574 ≠0.066459
(0.048356) (0.049186) (0.040394) (0.114364) (0.111674)
gl4 0.204955úúú 0.204997úúú 0.150938ú 0.643801ú 0.027825
(0.035514) (0.035356) (0.069660) (0.275557) (0.050334)
vt ≠0.000216 ≠0.000201 ≠0.000149 ≠0.000193 0.0009783
(0.000154) (0.000180) (0.000153) (0.001005) (0.001251)
(Intercept) 0.002908 0.076897
(0.125096) (0.096590)
R2 0.0466 0.044999 0.14683 0.3227
Adj. R2 0.040912 0.039006 0.12448
Num. obs. 811 811 703 601 703 (41 instr.)
úúúp < 0.001, úúp < 0.01, úp < 0.05,+p < 0.1

Appendix K
Lists of countries and comparison
groups
460 Appendix to chapter 4
Former Soviet Republics:
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Tajikistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Eastern Europe (Former COMECON):
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovak Republic
Natural Resources abundant countries:
Algeria
Bahrain
Iran
Nigeria
Syria
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E)
Venezuela
Yemen
Control Group 1:
Algeria
Iran
Kyrgyzstan
Venezuela
Yemen
Target Group:
Azerbaijan
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Nigeria
Syria
Uzbekistan
461
Control Group 2:
Belarus
Latvia
Tajikistan
Ukraine
Control Group 3:
Armenia
Bulgaria
Estonia
Georgia
Latvia
Moldova
Romania
Tajikistan
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E)
Ukraine
Control Group 4:
Bahrain
Czech Republic
Hungary
Lithuania
Poland
Slovak Republic
Following our criteria (institutional ties and an average share of natural resources rent in
GDP between 20 and 40% between 1998 and 2008, Russia being at 30%) this list should have
been completed by Chad, Papua New Guinea and Turkmenistan. Those countries were excluded
because of missing data. This gives us a total of 28 countries.

Appendix L
Cross-country comparisons and the
counterfactual study in chapter 4
The 6 governance indicators used in table 4.9 are from the World Governance Indicators
(WGI). 1 Those indicators are build as described in Kaufmann et al. (2010). For the needs of our
synthetic indicator, we replace missing 1999 and 2001 values by the average values from years
1998, 2000 and 2002, two by two. The values for the composite index are displayed below. We
have no other missing observations in the data required to build the composite index. Rankings
are obtained by giving a value of 1 to the worst performer in the considered dimension and 28
to the best performer. We use electric power transmission and distribution losses to capture
the impact of climate distance and maintenance policy in the country. Population density plays
a similar role, but produces a di erent ranking, suggesting that both indicators are required.
The final ranking is just the average of the index values per year, without any weighting.
ANS and rents data are extracted from the “Changing Wealth of Nations” (data website)
database. Details on the computation of rents are available at this address. Other data can
be found in the World Development Indicators (WDI) (data website). ANS are missing for the
U.A.E, Uzbekistan, Nigeria and Yemen. Some years are missing for Algeria, Iran, Tajikistan,
and the Slovak Republic. We compute net investment from the Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF) and Gross National Income (GNI) data in constant 2005 USD, while the produced
capital depreciation is obtained from ANS data. Depreciation of produced capital is then
multiplied by the GNI in constant USD, then subtracted to the GFCF and divided by GNI to
obtain net investment as a percentage of GNI.
1. available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators
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Résumé :
Nous étudions les liens entre commerce international et soutenabilité. D’un point de vue théorique, la soute-
nabilité est l’application de la théorie utilitariste à la théorie du capital. La soutenabilité se définit par une
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venant du commerce international ont un impact joint sur la gestion des dotations dans les pays riches en
ressources naturelles. Un commerce inter-industries dans les secteurs des biens intensifs en ressources naturelles
est un signe probable d’un sentier de développement insoutenable. Nous proposons d’étudier les pays issus de
l’Union Soviétique pour mieux comprendre les interactions entre institutions et soutenabilité. l’Epargne Nette
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luer les trajectoires de développement dans un contexte d’uncertitude sur les niveaux réels de richesse globale.
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Abstract: We endeavour to explore the many ways by which international trade has an impact on sustainabil-
ity. From a theoretical perspective, sustainability is the application of the utilitarian theory of value on capital
theory, used to define the interactions between human-being and their environment. We show how sustainability
can be understood as sound and equitable management of the means of development, preserving consumption
and wealth over time while fostering intragenerational and intergenerational equity and controlling for money-
value substitutability. We use Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) to assess how opening economies to trade alters
development paths. We then show how international trade should lead to additional savings, as gains from
trade resulting from resources reallocation should be reinvested and not consumed. We explore how the nature
of trade impacts development paths, showing how increasing returns to scale in the international division of the
production processes changes factor prices. This should lead to more gains from trade saved and reinvested.
We investigate how institutions and trade incentives interact in hindering sustainable management of natural
capital in resource abundant countries. We show how inter-industry trade in natural resources intensive goods
might be a sign for unsustainable development paths. To better understand interactions between institutions
and sustainability, we suggest the dislocation of the Soviet Union as a natural experiment. We show how the
evolution of ANS in the Russian Federation is closely correlated with the neighbouring countries, regardless of
resources abundance. Counterfactual studies should be used to monitor sustainable development in the wake
of uncertainty and scarce data on comprehensive wealth depreciation. Those elements lead us to conclude on
the necessity to reconsider the rationale for economic integration on sustainability lines.
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